THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
IN THE BATtLES OF THE HUNDRED DAYS
AUGUST 8^»T0 NOVEMBER U™ 1918
MAJOR GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD MONTGOMERY K.C.M.G..C.B.
GENERAL STAFF, FOURTH ARMY
THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
Frontispiece.
GENERAL SIR HENRY RAWLINSON.
{Commander of the Fourth Army.)
THE STORY OF THE
FOURTH ARMY
IN THE BATTLES OF THE HUNDRED
DAYS, August 8th to November llth, 1918
BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR
ARCHIBALD MONTGOMERY
K.G.M.G., G.B.,
GENERAL STAFF, FOURTH ARMY
With a Foreword by
General Lord Rawlinson
G.G.B., G.G.V.O., K.G.M.G., A.D.G.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LIMITED LONDON
J
DEDICATED
TO
THE SOLDIERS FROM GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND, AND THE DOMINIONS WHO BY THEIR
SELF-SACRIFICE AND DOGGED DETERMINATION IN DEFENCE, AND THEIR INITIATIVE,
RESOURCE, AND UNEQUALLED GALLANTRY IN ATTACK, TURNED DAYS OF
DISASTER AND ALARMS INTO WEEKS OF SUCCESS AND VICTORY.
" If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew
To serve your turn long after they are gone,
And so hold on when there is nothing in you
Except the will which says to them, ' Hold on ' :
*****
If you can meet with triumph and disaster
And treat these two impostors just the same :
*****
Yours is the earth and everything that's in it,
And — which is more — you'll be a man, my son ! "
— RuDYARD Kipling.
FOREWORD
By
General Lord Rawlinson, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., A.D.C.
There is no period in the history of the Great War which is of such
transcendent interest to the soldier as that covered by this book. It is
not too much to say that the events which took place in France during
August, September, and October, 1918, constitute the greatest mihtary
triumph the world has ever seen.
This book, which is written by a soldier for soldiers, gives the first
detailed account of any of the battles of the hundred days, and, for this
reason, will be most valuable to all students of military history. The
moment the armistice was signed steps were taken to lay the foundation
of this work whilst events were still fresh in the memories of all who
were directly concerned in the operations. As is well known, no written
record of a fight can produce the mechanical accuracy of a cinematograph,
but every possible endeavour has been made to avoid error and ascertain
the truth. The numerous maps, photographs, and sketches have been
the subject of especial labour and attention. They will not only enable
readers who are unacquainted with the actual terrain to form some
idea of the tactical features of the ground and to reahse the truly formidable
natiu-e of the obstacles which confronted the troops, but will also serve as
a permanent record of the general aspect of the country as it appeared
in 1918. That such a record is needed will have been apparent to all
who have visited the battlefields since the armistice. The gro^vth of
vegetation has already obliterated to a great extent the scars of war,
and before long the reconstruction of villages and resumption of
cultivation will have so far transformed the landscape as to completely
change the war aspect of the terrain.
At the end of July, 1918, the opposing forces on the western front,
after four years of unprecedented battling, still confronted one another
without any decisive advantage having accrued to either side. The
great German offensive of 1918 had no doubt failed, but the effect on the
moral of the German Army, consequent on its failure, and combined with
the result of the " wearing dovm " battles of 1916 and 1917, was still
concealed from the world. We learn from the Ludendorff Memoirs that
he himself dreaded, and had indeed suspected, a weakening in the German
moral before this date, but to the world at large, as well as to the leaders
of the Allied Armies, no reliable indication had so far been forthcoming.
viii FOREWORD
Preparations were even being made in Allied Countries for the produc-
tion of military material to enable the war to be continued not only
throughout 1919 but into 1920. The Fourth Army victory in front
of Amiens on August 8th, with its tale of some 16,000 prisoners and 400
guns, was the first indication of the true state of affairs in the enemy's
camp. It restored permanently to the Allies the priceless weapon of
the initiative, and aroused in the hearts of all the Allied Armies the
confident hope that victory might be won in 1918. From evidence now
available it is clear that our success on August 8th induced consternation
at German General Headquarters. It caused Ludendorff to tender his
resignation to Hindenburg, and produced from the Kaiser on August 14th
a direct order to Secretary of State von Hintze to open peace negotiations.'^
Though at the time these facts were not revealed to us. Marshal
Foch quickly realised that as a result of the battle of Amiens the moment
for a general offensive had arrived. It was his continued pressiu-e on all
fronts throughout August and September, that above all other factors
brought triumph to the AUied Armies on the western front. The success
of the Australians at Mont St. Quentin and Peronne, one of the most
brilliant attacks carried out during the whole war, was further proof in
early September that the resisting power of the enemy had declined
considerably. It was not, however, until the third week in September
when our Fourth, Third, and First Armies were confronted by the
formidable defences of the Hindenburg Line, and the Canal de I'Escaut,
that the momentous decision had to be taken as to whether it was worth
while to accept the risk of one more supreme effort.
There were those who doubted if the capture of these positions,
defended as they were by the flower of the German Army, was possible,
and I confess that, when in the early part of September I was asked my
views on this point, I hesitated to give an answer, until we had fought
our way to within striking distance of this great defensive system.
However, when by the 21st September this had been accomplished, I
gave it as my considered opinion that the capture of the Hindenburg
Line was possible and that an attack on it offered good chances of success.
No doubt there was a risk of failure. There always is, and at this
particular moment failure might have had serious consequences, but,
on the other hand, success would mean a speedy and victorious termination
of the war and the saving of thousands of hves, to say nothing of millions
of money.
It is the essence of good strategy to force your enemy to fight in such
a position that, whereas failure may cost you dear, success will bring
disaster upon him. The positions of the Allied Armies on the western
front at the end of September, 1918, fulfilled these conditions. ^\Tiat
wonder then that military leaders with the genius and foresight of Foch
and Douglas Haig declared emphatically for the immediate continuance
of the offensive. That they were right in their judgment is abundantly
clear from the fact that the first peace note was actually dispatched to
the President of the United States on October 5th," though Ludendorff
states that " the events of the 29th September and succeeding days did
» " My War Memories," by Ludendorff, Vol. II., pp. 684 and 687 » Ibid., p. 730.
FOREWORD ix
not compel the Germans to sudden and momentous decisions."^ WTiat-
ever he may say, the sequence of events and dates, and the evidence of
the great victories won between St. Quentin and Cambrai during the last
week of September, 1918, are overwhelming.
It is probable, as he clearly points out, that the increasing danger
of the situation on the western front had been withheld by the German
Government from the German people. \Mien, therefore, the nation was
suddenly confronted at the beginning of October with disaster, irre-
trievable and immediate, it is not surprising that the people turned against
their Kaiser's Government and brought down the whole edifice of Empire
with a crash. The unexpected rapidity with which the armistice was
forced upon the enemy is thus to some extent explained, for it was the
direct consequence of overwhelming defeat on the field of battle, suddenly
revealed to a nation utterly unprepared for such a reversal of fortune,
and at the same time shaken physically and morally by the efficacy of
our blockade and the far-reaching effects of our propaganda.
It has been contended by some that the armistice was premature —
that in another few weeks the German Army would have been forced to
lay down their arms and surrender unconditionally. I do not hold this
view. It is true that, in so far as the fighting troops of the Allies were
concerned, a pronounced moral ascendency had been established in all
the Allied Armies throughout the whole western front, and was daily
increasing. Owing, however, to the thorough and systematic manner
in which the Germans had destroyed all railways, roads, and bridges
during their retreat, it was a physical impossibility for at least the British
Armies, and I think for any of the Armies, to continue their advance
rapidly and in strength, and to immediately follow up their successes.
Had they done so, they would have starved.
Turning to the composition of the Fourth Army during the period
covered by this book, it is interesting to note that it consisted of men
arawn from almost every part of the British Empire. AustraUans,
Canadians, South Africans, as well as British and Americans. Several
of the British divisions engaged had been decimated during the retreat
in March, only four months previously, yet they commenced the offensive
on August 8th and fought right through till November 11th, a fine example
of that great British characteristic of " never knowing you are beaten."
The dogged determination of the British divisions, backed by a fighting
spirit which was beyond all praise, will be ever memorable as one of the
main factors of the Fourth Army success. The Dominion troops won a
reputation second to none ; the Australians by their skill and cunning
as well as by their surpassing gallantry, the Canadians by their bold
tactics and invincible will to conquer. The South Africans more than
maintained the fighting reputation they had gained while with the
9th Division. All units, no matter from what corners of the earth they
came, struggled gallantly and in unison to beat the hated enemy. Of
particular interest is the. fact that forming part of the Fourth Army
during some of the most bitterly contested battles of this period, and in
no way behind their comrades in gallantry and dash, were the men of the
' " My War Memories," by Ludendorff, Vol. II., p. 719.
b
X FOREWORD
II American Corps from Illinois, New York, Carolina, and Tennessee,
names that conjure up memories of the fierce battles nearly sixty years
ago during the civil war between the North and South, in which men of
the English-speaking race were likewise fighting to the bitter end for a
cause which they were convinced was just. The gallantry and dash of
these American troops will never be forgotten by their comrades of the
Fourth Army.
It would be impossible to select for special praise any particular
branch of the service, when all carried out their share and co-operated
so effectively to the common end, but no factor did more to bring about
success than the close and skilful co-operation with the infantry, of the
various arms— cavalry, artillery, machine-gunners, engineers, the Air
Force, and last but not least the tanks. There is always a tendency on
the part of a new service like tanks, aeroplanes, or even machine-guns,
when first employed in a general action, to think that they can win the
battle " on their own," and it is a matter of time and careful training to
get each arm to exert its maximum effort, not independently but in
combination. To ensure this is no easy matter, but I attribute the success
of the battles of the hundred days chiefly to three paramount factors :
First, the unity of purpose and whole-hearted co-operation of all concerned ;
secondly, the combined tactics of all the fighting services based on the
lessons of four years of war ; and thirdly, the invincible will to conquer
of every officer, non-commissioned officer, and man.
I should like in conclusion to acknowledge the devoted work that
has been done by the Fourth Army Staff, and particularly by Maj.-Gen.
Sir A. A. Montgomery, not only in the compilation of this book, no small
labour in itself, but by the invaluable assistance he and they rendered
to me during these " Battles of the Hundred Days." No Commander has
ever been better served by his Staff, and I know that, in the opinion of
the Corps and Divisional Commanders who served in the Fourth Army
during this momentous period, the Army Staff won both the respect and
affection of the lower formations by their helpfulness and consideration
in times of sunshine and of cloud. It is not too much to say that our
general success during the hundred days, and the smoothness and
efficiency with which the Army machine worked as a whole, was largely
due to the knowledge, efficiency, and tact of the Staff Officers at Army
Headquarters.
Rawlinson,
General.
Government House,
Aldershot,
December, 1919.
PREFACE
This story has been compiled from the excellent accoimts of the
operations which have been written by the staffs of the corps and divisions
which served in the Fourth Army during the hundred days, supplemented
by verbal information given by individual officers, and from the records
of the Fourth Army during that period. Though in narrating the events
of a period so crowded with incident there must of necessity be many
omissions, this book will, it is hoped, be of interest to all who shared in
the victories of the Fourth Army, victories which, in three months of
hard and continuous fighting, carried it from within sight of Amiens
over the frontiers of France near Avesnes. It is thought, moreover,
that the impressions left at the time on the minds of those who took part
in operations of such importance will be of interest to the military student
and of value to the future historian when a complete history of the World
War comes to be written.
It is much regretted that it has not been possible to give the narrative
of the doings of the II American Corps in so much detail as in the case
of the other corps. This is due to the fact that the II American Corps
left the Fourth Army soon after the Armistice to join the American Army,
and that the reports received from it and from the 27th and 30th American
Divisions did not furnish so many details as those sent in by the British,
Australian, and Canadian Corps.
The following officers of the Operations and Intelligence branches
of the General Staff of the Foui-th Ai-my have taken a very large share
in the compilation of this story and in the production of the battle maps
which accompany it : —
Lt.-Col. R. M. Luckock, Royal Lancaster Regiment,
Lt.-Col. V. Vivian, Grenadier Guards,
Captain R. C. Berkeley, Rifle Brigade,
Captain C. Q. Taplin, Australian Imperial Forces,
Captain D. W. Fiu-long, Royal Berkshire Regiment,
and to them my sincere thanks are due.
They are also due to Lieut. E. C. Gardiner, Devonshire Regiment,
attached to the General Staff, Fourth Ai-my, who drew and prepared
a large number of the maps for reproduction.
To Major A. M. Gillies, Head of the Foiulh Army Printing and
Stationery Services, for his help as regards the provision of photographs
to illustrate the story, and to the Australian Imperial Force Publication
xii PREFACE
Department and the Canadian War Records for their kind permission
to reproduce the photographs, taken by their special artists, to illustrate
the part that the Australian and Canadian Corps took in the operations
of the Fourth Army. To Captain F. E. Hodge, Royal Artillery, Fourth
Army Artillery and Trench Mortar School, for the excellent sketches,
which at much trouble to himself he has drawn especially for this book.
To Sir Charles Close and Lt.-Col. W. J. Johnston, R.E., of the Ordnance
Sxu-vey, Southampton, for the interest and trouble they have taken in
the reproduction of the maps. To Major J. Ewing, 6th King's Own
Scottish Borderers, and Lt.-Col. Cuthbert Headlam, for their assistance
in checking and editing the narrative, and for many valuable suggestions.
Nor must the clerks and draughtsmen of the Fourth Army Staff be for-
gotten, some of whom delayed their demobilisation in order to help.
This is a soldier's story of the achievements of officers and men,
many of whom gave their lives or sacrificed their health in the cause
of their coimtry, and it is proposed to devote any profits that may be
derived from its sale to augmenting the funds which have been raised
for assisting those gallant officers who have been disabled during the
Great War, to whom the British Empire owes a debt that it can never
repay, and by whom the British Army has been set an example that it
can never forget.
A. A. Montgomery,
Major-General.
Wargkave,
Camberley,
October, 1919.
Note. — The titles of infantry battalions are given in full in the Orders of Battle in
Appendix F, but in order to save space in the narrative the words " battalion " and
" regiment " have been omitted, e.g., the 7th Battalion The Queen's Royal West Surrey
Regiment, 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and l/5th Battalion Royal Warwickshire
Regiment are referred to as the 7th The Queen's, 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and l/5th
Royal Warwickshire.
It will be noticed that in some cases the names of places, especially of woods and
farms, are shown in English and French on the same map. This is due to our maps being
in course of revision at the end of the war, but the work had not been completed. In
order to avoid confusion the names of all places referred to in the text in their English
form have been similarly shown on the maps which form the second volume of this book.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
Maps 1 and 2
The value of moral — Human nature — The situation in front of Amiens at the end of March,
1918 — The loss of Villers Bretonneux, April 24th — A comparison with the Waterloo
campaign — The recapture of Villers Bretonneux — Events on other parts of the Western
front in April, May, June, and July^The first signs of the weakening of the moral of the
German Army — The situation on the Fourth Army front after April 24th — The Aus-
tralians— The capture of Hamel on July 4th, and its lessons — Plans for a counter-
offensive — The surprise attack on August 8th — The Third and Tenth French Armies and
the Third British Army join in the offensive — The complete loss of the initiative by the
Germans — The British moral — The First British Army extends the front of attack
to the north — The crisis of the counter-offensive, September 26th-29th — The capture of
the Hindenburg Line — The crossing of the Selle and Sambre rivers — German demoralis-
ation— The Armistice — General Ludendorfl and German moral
CHAPTER II
PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE
Maps 1, 2, and 3
The situation in the middle of July on the Fourth Army front — The concentration of troops
— The reorganisation of the front prior to the attack — The nature of the country —
The hostile defences — The strength and moral of the enemy — The strategic objectives of
the attack — Secrecy, the basis of the plan of attack — The conditions affecting the plan —
The frontage of the attack — The objectives — The synchronisation of the attack — The
allotment of tanks — The role of the cavalry — The role of the Royal Air Force — The role
of the Artillery,Engineers, and Machine Gun Corps — The issue of maps and photographs —
The danger of hostile gas shelling during the assembly of troops — IVDnor hostile attacks
on August 3rd and August 6th — The assembly of the troops — The forming up of the
infantry — The hour of " zero " — The confidence of the troops 11
CHAPTER III
THE BATTLE OF AiUENS ; THE ATTACK OF AUGUST 8TH
Maps 2 and 3 ; and Panoramic Photograph 1
summary of events on August 8th — The plan of attack of the Canadian Corps — The
attack of the 3rd Canadian Division — The Franco-British liaison force — The
advance of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions to the first objective — Their further
advance to the second objective^The advance of the 4th Canadian Division to the
third objective — The capture of the third objective by the 1st and 2nd Canadian
Divisions — The result of the day's fighting by the Canadian Corps — The Australian
Corps plan of attack — The advance of the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions to the
first objective — The capture of the second objective by the 4th and 5th Australian
Divisions — ^The armoured cars — ^The advance of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions
xiv CONTENTS
PAOI
to the third objective — The result of the day's fighting by the Australian
Corps — The action of the Cavalry Corps — The III Corps plan of attack —
The disposition of the troops at " zero " — The attack on the first objective — The
advance against the second objective — The result of the day's fighting by the III
Corps — The work of the Royal Air Force — The attack by the First French Army — The
situation on the Fourth Army front on the evening of August 8th — The orders for
August 9th 81
CHAPTER IV
THE BATTLE OF AMIENS {continued) AUGUST 9TH-11TH,
AND THE EVENTS OF AUGUST 12TH-21ST
Maps 1, 2, 3, and 4
August 9th — The Canadian Corps — The capture of Le Quesncl — The action of the
2nd and 1st Cavalry Divisions — The advance of the 3rd, 1st, and 2nd Canadian
Divisions — The Australian Corps — The III Corps operations — The attack on the
Chipilly Spur — The situation on the night of August 9th — The reallotment of
front between the Australian and III Corps — The orders for August 10th — August
10th ; the Canadian Corps ; the Chilly and Le Quesnoy operations — The Australian
Corps ; the advance on Lihons — The attacks astride the Somme by the 3rd and 4th
Australian Divisions and the 131st American Regiment — The complete occupation
of the Amiens outer defences by the III Corps — The orders for August 11th —
August 11th ; the Canadian Corps — Heavy hostile counter-attacks — The Australian
Corps ; the capture of Lihons — The general situation on August 11th ; the Army
Commander's conference — A lull in the battle — Events from August 12th-16th —
August 17th ; instructions from General Headquarters — The progress of the First
French Army, August llth-20th — The reorganisation of the front of the Fourth
Army — The German dUemma — The results of the Battle of Amiens .... 52
CHAPTER V
THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE, AUGUST 21ST-30TH
Maps 2, 4, and 5
August 21st ; the opening of the second phase ; the general policy — The III Corps plan of
attack for August 22nd — August 22nd ; the artillery support — The attack by the 47th
and 12th Divisions — The capture of Albert by the 18th Division — The advance of the
3rd Australian Division — The German counter-attack in the Happy Valley — August
23rd ; the operations of the Australian Corps south of the Somme — The general plan
of attack — The first phase of the Australian Corps attack — The second phase — The
third phase ; the capture of Chuignes — The action of the 32nd Division — The capture of
Tara and Usna Hills — August 24th ; the capture of Bray-sur-Somme and Becordel Becourt
by the Australian and III Corps — The situation on the Fourth Army front on the night
of August 24th — The readjustment of the Australian Corps friynt south of the Somme —
August 23th; the capture of Ceylon AVood and Fricourt — Our artillery policy — 1 he enemy's
retirement in front of the Third Army — The events of August 26th — The action of the
hostile artillery — August 27th ; the renewal of the pressure south of the Somme —
The co-operation of the First French Army with the Australian Corps — The events
north of the Somme- — The capture of Trones AVood by the 18th Division — The events
of August 28th— The events of August 29th ; our troops reach the banks of the Somme
south of Peronne — The advance north of the Somme on August 30th .... 71
CHAPTER VI
THE BATTUE OF MONT ST. QUENTIN, AUGUST SOTH-SEPTEMBEE 2ND , AND
THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 3ED AND 4TH
Maps 4, 6, and 7
The situation on August 30th — The forcing of the river crossing ; the
Australian Corps plan — First phase ; August 30th ; the seizure of a bridgehead
south-east of Clery-sur-Somme— Second phase ; August 31st ; the attack on !Mont
CONTENTS XV
PAQB
St. Quentin by the 5th Australian Brigade — The advance of the 6th Australian
Brigade — The action of the 3rd Australian Division and the III Corps — September
1st ; the attack continued — The 1-ith Australian Brigade enters Peronne — The capture
of the village of Mont St. Quentin by the 6th Australian Brigade — The advance of
the 3rd Australian Division — The operations of the III Corps ; the attatks
of the 58th and 47th Divisions — The 18th Division attack — The situation
on the evening of September 1st — September 2nd ; the exploitation of success
— The attack of the 5th Australian Division — The attack of the 2nd Australian
Division— The operations of the III Corps — The events of September 3rd and
4th— The results of the Battle of Mont St. Quentin — The general situation on
September 4th 96
CIL\PTER VII
THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG UXE, SEPTEMBER 5TH-28TH
Maps 1, 2, 4, 8, and 9 ; and Panoramic Photographs 4 and 5
The readjustment of the front — September 5th ; the enemy in full retreat — September 6th
and 7th ; the pursuit — The co-operation of the Royal Air Force — The events of Sep-
tember 8th — The situation on September 9th — September 10th ; the fighting on the
flanks at Holnon Wood and Epehy — September 11th ; the arrival of the IX Corps ;
the readjustment of the front — The general situation on September 11th — Sir Henry
Rawlinson's proposals — The proposals approved — September 12th to 17th ; minor
operations — The preliminary arrangements for the attack on September 18th — The
objectives — The frontages of attack — The artillery arrangements — The allotment of
tanks — A summary of the Fourth Army attack on September 18th — The assembly of
the IX Corps — The first phase of the IX Corps attack — The second phase — The result
of the day's fighting by the IX Corps — The assembly of the Australian Corps — The
first phase of the Australian Corps attack — The second phase — The third phase — The
result of the day's fighting by the Australian Corps — The assembly of the III Corps — The
first phase of the III Corps attack — The 74th Division attack — The 18th Division attack
— The attacks of the 12th and 58th Divisions — The second phase of the III Corps
attack — The result of the day's fighting by the III Corps — The situation on September
19th — The events on the IX Corps front on September 19th and 20th — The events
on the III Corps front on September 19th and 20th — The decision to attack the Hinden-
burg Line ; the Fourth Army reinforced — The readjustment of the front — The III
Corps attacks on September 21st-22nd — The IX Corps operations on September 24th —
The pressure maintained by the IX Corps on September 25th and 26th — The bombard-
ment of the Hindenburg Line begun on September 26th — Minor operations by the 27th
and 30th American Divisions on September 26th and 27th — The attacks of the Allied
Armies on other parts of the front — The situation on the Fourth Army front on Sep-
tember 28th 114
CHAPTER VIII
THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE, SEPTEMBER 29tH
Maps 2, 8, and 10 ; and Panoramic Photographs 6 and 7
The German defences — The preparations for the attack — The communications — Secrecy —
The temporary amalgamation of the Australian and II American Corps — The frontages
of attack— The objectives — The co-ordination with flank armies — The artfllerj- — The
preliminary bombardment — The ammunition supply — The allotment of tanks — The
special mission of the 5th Cavalry Brigade and the armoured cars — The role of the Cavalry
Corps — The assembly of the troops — The assault — The IX Corps ; the action of the
1st Division — The capture of the first objective by the 46th Division — The advance of the
82nd Division to the second objective — The result of the day's fighting by the IX Corps —
The Australian-American Corps ; the attack of the American divisions — The 30th
American Division — The 27th American Division — The action of the 5th Australian
Division — The action of the 3rd Australian Division — The armoured cars — The III
Corps operations — The situation of the III Corps at dusk — The result of the battle —
The orders for September 30th 147
xvi CONTENTS
CHAPTER IX
THE COMPLETION OF THE CAPTURE OF THE HINDENBURG DEFENCES, SEPTEMBER SOTH-
OCTOBER '2nd, and THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR LINE, OCTOBER 3RD-5TH
Maps 2, 10, 11, and 12
PAQI
September 30th ; the advance of the IX Corps — The plan of operations of the Australian
Corps — The attack of the 5th Australian Division — The attack of the 3rd Australian Divi-
sion— The action of the III Corps — October 1st ; the IX Corps operations ; the 32nd
Division attack — The attack of the Australian Corps continued — The III Corps relieved
by the XIII Corps — October 2nd ; the action of the IX Corps — The relief of the 3rd
and 5th Australian Divisions — The situation on the evening of October 2nd — The orders
for the attack on October 3rd — The objectives and frontages of the attack — October 3rd ;
the IX Corps attack; the action of the 1st Division — The attacks of the 32nd and
46th Divisions — The action of the XV French Corps — The Australian Corps ; the
attack of the 2nd Australian Division — The XIII Corps ; the attack of the 50th Division
— The result of the day's fighting — The orders for the continuance of the attack on
October 4th — October 4th ; the action of the IX Corps — The action of the 2nd
Australian Division — The XIII Corps attack — The progress of the First French Army —
The plan of attack for the capture of Montbrehain and Beaurevoir — October 5th ;
the IX Corps at Mannequin HiU — The capture of Montbrehain by the 2nd Australian
Division — The XIII Corps ; the capture of Beaurevoir by the 25th Division — The
advance of the 50th Division north of Gouy, and of the 38th Division of the V Corps —
The result of the day's fighting — The relief of the Australian Corps by the II American
Corps on October 6th — The work of the Royal Air Force — A review of the situation on
October 6th — Sir Douglas Haig's orders for the continuance of the offensive . . . 170
CHAPTER X
THE ADVANCE TO LE CATEAU, OCTOBER 6TH-16TH
Maps 2, 12, 13, and 14
The nature of the country east of the Beaurevoir line — The objectives for the attack on
October 8th — The role of the Cavalrj' — The allotment of tanks — Artillery action — The
disposition of troops on the Fourth Army front on October 6th — The events of October
6th and 7th — October 8th ; the attack of the IX Corps — The attack of the II American
Corps — The attack of the XIII Corps— The result of the day's fighting — The orders and
objectives for the continuance of the advance on October 9th — October 9th ; the
attack — The action of the cavalry — The capture of Honnechy — Further objectives
ordered — The action of the armoured cars — The result of the fighting — October 10th ;
the advance resumed ; cavalry action — The infantry advance — The attacks of the
25th and 66th Divisions on St. Benin and Le Cateau — -The events of October 11th —
The orders from General Headquarters for the continuance of the offensive — The
preparations for the attack — The nature of the country ; the Selle — Le Cateau — The
readjustment of the front — The dispositions of the troops — The objectives — Informa-
tion regarding the enemy — The detailed arrangements for the attack 192
CHAPTER XI
THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE, OCTOBER 17TH-19TH ; AND THE EVENTS TO OCTOBER 31 ST
Maps 2, 13, 14, and 15
The plan of attack of the IX Corps — The dispositions of the 46th Division — The attack of
the 46th Division — The attack of the 6th Division — The dispositions of the 1st Division
— The attack of the 1st Division — The result of the day's fighting by the IX Corps —
The dispositions of the II American Corps — The attack of the II American Corps — The
dispositions of the XIII Corps — The attack of the 50th Division — Tank action — The
plan of attack of the 66th Division — The South African Brigade attack — The result
of the fighting on October 17th — The army orders for the attack on October 18th —
Further orders from General Headquarters — October 18th ; the attack of the IX Corps
—The attack of the II American Corps — The preparations for the attack of the XIII
CONTENTS xvii
PAOB
Corps — The attack of the 50th and 66th Divisions — The events of October 19th — The
result of the Battle of the Selle — The army orders for the advance to be continued
on October 23rd^ Artillery and tanks — The readjustment of the front — The nature of the
country — The detailed orders for the attack on October 23rd — The IX Corps plan —
The XIII Corps plan — October 23rd ; the attack of the IX Corps — The attack of the
XIII Corps — The 25th Division attack — The 18th Division attack — The action of the
tanks — The result of the day's fighting ; army orders issued for the attack to be
continued on October 24th — October 24th ; the IX Corps attack — The XIII Corps
attack — The result of the fighting on the 23rd and 24th — Minor operations from October
25th to 31st — The progress north and south of the Fourth Army — A summary of the
situation on October 31st 209
CHAPTER XII
THE CROSSING OF THE SAMBEE AND OISE CANAL, AND THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE
ARMISTICE, NOVEMBER IST-llTH
Maps I, 2, 16, and 17
The situation prior to the resumption of the Allied offensive — The orders from General Head-
quarters for a general advance — The preliminary operations by the IX Corps — The
general plan for the attack on November 4th — The nature of the country ; the Sambre
and Oise Canal — The Mormal Forest — The country east of the Sambre and Oise Canal —
The objectives of the attack — The IX Corps plan of attack — The XIII Corps plan of
attack — The action of the artillery — The preparations for bridging the canal — The
allotment of tanks — The assembly — November 4th ; the IX Corps ; the attack of the 1st
Division ; the crossing of the canal by the 2nd Brigade — The 1st Brigade crossing —
The capture of Catillon by the 3rd Brigade — The further advance of the 1st Division —
The result of the fighting by the 1st Division — The attack of the 32nd Division ; the
14th Brigade force a crossing — The temporary check to the 96th Brigade — The capture
of the Happegarbes spur — The further advance of the 32nd Division — The XIII Corps
operations ; the capture of Landreeies by the 25th Division — The 50th Division attack
through Mormal Forest — The attack by the 18th Division — The armoured cars — The
result of the fighting on November 4th — The pursuit ; November 5th and 6th ;
the events on the IX Corps front — The events on the XIII Corps front — The pursuit
continued on November 7th, 8th, and 9th — The IX Corps — The XIII Corps — The
question of supply — Bethell's Force — The frontier of France reached on November
10th — The Armistice, 11 a.m., November 11th 239
CHAPTER XIII
CONCLUSION
Some tactical questions — The co-operation of all arms — Surprise — Flank attacks — Simul-
taneous attacks — Attack formations and the number of men required — Counter-attacks
— " Zero " — The rate of advance of the barrage — The creeping barrage — Pre-war text-
books— Col. Henderson and the " human " side of war — Initiative and discipline . . 263
APPENDICES
PAQE
(A). — Comparative Table, for the months of March to November, 1918, showing
captures, casualties, and reinforcements of the Fourth Army 275
(B). — Table giving the battle casualties suffered, and the prisoners captured, by the
Fourth Army in the operations between August 8th and November 11th, 1918,
shown by Corps 276
(C). — Table showing the losses in prisoners suffered by German divisions, and the
number of times these divisions were engaged by the Fourth Army, between
August 8th and November 11th, 1918 277
(D). — Table showing the rate of absorption of German divisions between August 8th
and November 11th, 1918 278
(E).— V.C. Stories 280
(F). — The Fourth Army Orders of Battle for August 8th, September 29th, and
November 4th, 1918 301
(G). — Table showing the daily ammunition expenditure by the Fourth Army from
August 8th to November 11th, 1918 328
(H). — Extracts from captured German orders issued during the first half of
September, 1918 332
(J). — Notes on machine-gun organisation and tactics 334
(K). — The adventures of a Whippet tank on August 8th 336
zTiii
ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
SKETCHES
By Captain F. E. Hodge
To fact vagt
1. Panorama looking north-west from Villers Bretonneux 1
2. The Red Chateau at Villers Bretonneux from the Corbie road .... 4
3. Peronne and Mont St. Quentin from La Maisonette 93
4. Mont St. Quentin from the Bapaume-Peronne road 97
5. Old Gateway in Peronne. " La Porte de Bretagne " 113
6. Bellenglise and the St. Quentin Canal 151
7. Bellicourt and the wire in front of the Hindenburg Line 152
8. Beaurevoir and Beaurevoir Mill 177
9. Le Cateau from the Honnechy road 192
10. The lock and bridge at Landrecies 258
DIAGRAMS
Diagram I, showing the assembly areas of the Australian Corps prior to August 8th . 27
Diagram II, showing the forming up of a brigade for a trcneh-to-trench attack . 29
Sketch Map of the attack of the 9th Canadian Brigade on August 8th .... 84
Tartan Diagram III, showing the employment of divisions in the Fourth Army from
August to November, 1918 262
MAPS
{In map case)
1. The western theatre of war (showing Army boundaries on August 8th)
1/1,000,000
2. The successive phases of the Fourth Army advance. 1 /250,000
3. The attack of August 8th. Battle of Amiens. 1/40,000
4. The advance to Peronne. 1/40,000
XX ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
5. The attack of the 32nd Division and 1st Australian Division on August 23rd.
1/20,000
6. The capture of Mont St. Quentin, August 31st to September 1st. 1/20,000
7. The attack of the 18th Division at Fregicourt, September 1st. 1/20,000
8. The attack on the outer defences of the Hindenbiu-g Line, September 18th.
1/40,000
9. The operations of the III Corps, September 19th to 22nd. 1/20,000
10. The storming of the Hindenburg Line, September 29th to October 2nd. 1/20,000
11. The capture of the Beaiurevoir Line, October 3rd to 5th. 1/20,000
12. The advance to Le Cateau. 1/40,000
18. The IX and II American Corps at the Battle of the Selle, October 17th to 19th.
1/40,000
14. The XIII Corps at the Battle of the Selle, October 17th and 18th. 1/20,000
15. The IX and XIII Corps attack on October 23rd and 24th. 1/40,000
16. The advance to Avesnes. 1/40,000
17. The crossing of the Sambre and Oise Canal, November 4th. 1/20,000
18. Barrage Map (46th Division, IX Corps on September 29th). 1/20,000
19. Machine-gun tasks for the attack of the 4th Austrahan Division on September
18th. 1/20,000
PANORAMIC PHOTOGRAPHS
To /ace pai7«
1. The country looking east from Villers Bretonneux {in map case)
2. The Chipilly Spur from the Cerisy-Morcourt road 48
3. Mont St. Quentin from the south-west 99
4. Holnon Wood from the west {in map case)
5. Epehy and Peizieres from the west „
6. View of the country west of the Hindenburg Line as seen from a German balloon
{in map case)
7. The Spoil-bank of the Bellicourt Tunnel as seen from Bony ... „
8. Bony from the west 172
9. Beaurevoir and Bellevue Farm from the west 187
PHOTOGRAPHS
1. General Sir Henry RawUnson, Commander of the Fourth Army . . Frontispiece
To face page
2. Villers Bretonneux, as seen from the German Lines 2
3. An Australian platoon receiving instructions from its commander prior to an
attack 6
4. Australians, and Americans of the 38rd Illinois Division, resting near Corbie
on their way up to the line on July 3rd 6
ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS xxi
To face page
5. Group taken at the headquarters of the Fourth Army at FHxecourt on August
13th, 1918, on the occasion of the visit of his Majesty the King ... 10
6. Malard Wood from the north-west 14
7. The Somme valley and the Chipilly Spur. 14
8. The valley of the Luce at Hangard 15
9. The high ground between the Luce and the Avre from west of Domart . . 15
10. Domart and the Hourges bridgehead 26
11. Rifle Wood 38
12. Canadian Engineers filling in the crater blown by the Germans in the
bridge at Hangard 35
13. Canadians capturing a German gun near Mezieres 85
14. A 4'2-inch howitzer battery captured by the Canadians on August 8th . . 37
15. Prisoners captured by the Australians passing burning dumps in the Cerisy-
Warfusee valley 40
16. Armoured car temporarily held up by fallen trees on the Villers Bretonneux-Brie
road 42
17. Chipilly and Cerisy-Gailly 42
18. The cavalry dismounted near Framerville 45
19. Sailly Laurette 46
20. The 11-inch Naval gim on railway mounting captured by the Royal Air
Force and Australians on August 8th 50
21. French and Canadian troops on the Roye road 50
22. Some of the guns taken on August 8th 51
28. Some of the prisoners captured on August 8th 51
24. A Canadian armoxired lorry going into action along the Roye road on August 9th 58
25. A tank dealing with a German machine-gun post on the railway near Lihons . 54
26. Crepey Wood 55
27. Gressaire Wood 56
28. A large dump of engineer material captured at Rosi^res 57
29. Mark V tanks advancing across the open near Le Quesnoy 58
80. Canadian cavalry resting on August 10th 58
31. Crepey and Auger Woods 59
32. A trench near Lihons captured by the Australians on August 10th ... 59
83. Etinehem and the Somme marshes 60
34. The Somme Canal near Mericourt, with a pontoon bridge blown up by the
Germans in the foreground 61
35. Lihons 62
36. Canadians on a Mark V tank behind our lines 66
37. Prisoners arriving at the Army cage on the Amiens-Doullens road on
August 8th 68
xxii ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
To face page
38. Albert and the ground to the south-east 73
39. British infantry in Albert on August 22nd 76
40. Australian pioneers digging in on the high ground overlooking Bray, while the
enemy still held the village 77
41. The 15-inch gun captured by the Australians in the Arcy Woods ... 81
42. The steep and difficult country near Chuignolles, with Froissy Beacon in the
background 81
43. Sir Douglas Haig congratulating Canadian troops a few days after the battle of
August 8th 85
44. Carnoy and Billon Wood 85
45. Australians clearing a dug-out near Cappy on August 26th 87
46. Montauban 87
47. Peronne and its suburbs 94
48. Anvil Wood and Fiorina Trench 100
49. Gaps in the wire through which the Australians had to pass when attacking
Anvil Wood 100
50. Australian infantry moving up a trench previous to attacking Mont St. Quentin 100
51 Australians charging the brick wall on Mont St. Quentin on September 1st . 105
52. The Canal du Nord, AUaines and Haut-Allaines 106
53 Peronne, St. Denis and Anvil Wood 109
54. A smoke-screen thrown across the hills east of Peronne to cover the advance
of AustraUan patrols on September 5th 116
55. The causeway over the Somme at Brie, taken from the east bank . . . 116
66. Fresnoy-le-Petit and Gricourt 127
57. Australians advancing close up to the barrage on September 18th . . . 128
58. Australian reserves watching the barrage creeping up the slopes towards the
outer defences of the Hindenburg Line on September 18th .... 128
69. A typical German trench near Cologne Farm 130
60. Germans surrendering to the AustraUans on September 18th .... 130
61. Templeux le Guerard and the Quarries 132
62. Gillemont Farm, showing the result of the shelling to which it had been
subjected both in 1917 and in March and September, 1918 .... 137
63. Fourth Army Headquarters established in a camouflaged camp at Eterpigny,
near Peronne, in September, 1918 146
64. The thick belts of wire defending the Bellicourt Tunnel . . ... 149
65. Bellenglise, showing the underground tunnel in course of construction. . . 149
66. The area over which the right of the IX Corps attacked on September 29th . 158
67. The St. Quentin Canal ; one of the places where the 46th Division crossed. . 158
68. Another part of the St. Quentin Canal, where a crossing was effected by the
46ih Div-ision 158
ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS xxiii
To face page
69. Bellenglise showing the exits from the tunnel . 159
70. The wire protecting Bellicourt 162
71. The southern entrance of the St. Quentin Canal tunnel at Bellicourt . . , 162
72. Nauroy and the surrounding country 164
73. Australians moving along a trench near Gillemont Farm . . . .166
74. Le Tronquoy 170
75. Bony and the ground to the north-east 172
76. Sequehart 173
77. The wire in front of the Beaurevoir Line 180
78. Gouy, Le Catelet, and Macquincourt Farm 183
79. Fourth Army Advanced Headquarters established in a railway train at
Montigny Farm, near Roisel, during the first two weeks of October, 1918 . 191
80. Montbrehain and Brancourt le Grand I95
81. Riquerval Wood 201
82. French inhabitants coming back to their homes in Maretz 202
83. The Selle south of Le Cateau 204
84. The Selle at the southern outskirts of St. Souplet 205
85. St. Martin Rivere 216
86. St. Crepin and Bandival Farm 217
87. View looking east from the high ground above Le Cateau 218
88. The Selle just north of Le Cateau, where the South African Brigade crossed . 223
89. The high ground overlooking the Sambre and Oise Canal 229
90. The enclosed country between the Selle and Sambre 231
91. The southern outskirts of Englefontaine and Mormal Forest .... 237
92. The Sambre and Oise Canal, showing the reservoirs on each side . . . 241
93. Mormal Forest, showing some of the clearings 242
94. The Sambre and Oise Canal between Catillon and Oisy, showing the Lock-house
at Lock No. 1, where the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, crossed , . . 244
95. The Lock-house at Lock No. 1 and the reservoirs on the Sambre and Oise Canal 247
96. The Lock-house from the west 248
97. Another part of the Sambre and Oise Canal south of Catillon, showing the
bri('ges by which the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, crossed . . . ? . 248
98. Catillon from the west 249
99. Preux aux Bois and Mormal Forest 254
100. The Fourth Army Commander and the Army Headquarters, July, 1918 . . 272
m
l'6pl«i> <!n Anii»iii — Albert mad
*-„fc.\o. 1, .»/-<. I«r1
.<^-'-?//./,.
\'illtr. II... ' ■Tl
Panf.rama looking north-vvc^t from VILLERS BRETONXEL X
THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
Maps 1 and 2
The value of moral — Human nature — The situation in front of Amiens at the end of March, 1918
— The loss of Villers Bretonneux, April 24th — A comparison with the Waterloo campaign —
The recapture of Villers Bretonneux — Events on other parts of the Western front in April,
May, Jime, and July — The first signs of the weakening of the moral of the German Army —
The situation on the Fourth Army front after April 24th — The Australians — The capture
of Hamel on July 4th, and its lessons — Plans for a counter-offensive — The surprise attack on
August 8th — The Third and Tenth French Armies and the Third British Army join in the
offensive — The complete loss of the initiative by the Germans — The British moral — The First
British Army extends the front of attack [to the north — The crisis of the counter-offensive,
September 26th-29th — The capture of the Hindenburg Line — The crossing of the Selle and
Sambre rivers — German demoralisation — The Armistice — General Ludendorff and German
moral.
Although the story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the
Hundred Days, strictly speaking, begins with the attaek on August 8th,
the events of the previous four months had sueh an important bearing on
the subsequent operations that something more than a passing reference
to them is essential.
While it is now realised that the moral effect of the successful attack
of the Fourth Army on August 8th directly influenced the fighting spirit
of the whole of the British Army in France, it is not
'morai^ SO generally known that this victory could not have
been won without the steady and continuous offensive
of the Australian Corps throughout the months of April, May, June, and
July. To its remarkable achievements during these months may be
attributed to a very large extent the increase in moral, which was
necessary in order to make the battle of August 8th a complete success,
or even a possibility.
The incalculable value of moral stands out as the greatest of the
many lessons that are impressed on us by the period from ]\Iarch 21st
to the Battle of Amiens and the months that followed. We most of us
remember Napoleon's dictum that " in war moral force is to the physical
as 3 to 1," but it has been the good fortune of few soldiers to witness
so remarkable an example of the truth of this maxim.
As Col. Henderson tells us ^ — " Human nature, the paramount
> " The Science of War." " Notes on Wellington," p. 101.
B
2 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
consideration of either tactics or strategy, remains unaltered. The art
of generalship, the art of command, whether the force be large or small,
is the art of dealing with human nature." And again,'^
Human nature " the first thing is to realise that in war we have to
do not so much with numbers, arms, and manceuvres
as with human nature. What did Napoleon find in the history of the
campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar ? Not merely a
record of marches and manceuvres, of the use of entrenchments, or of
the general principles of attack and defence. No, he found in those
campaigns a complete study of human nature under the conditions that
exist in war, human nature affected by discipline, by fear, by the need of
food, by want of confidence, by over confidence, by the weight of
responsibility, by political interests, by patriotism, by distrust, and by
many other things."
Those who followed the anxious days of March and April, 1918, the
dawn of brighter days in May and June, and the final fulfilment of their
hopes in August, September, and October, have seen these things for them-
selves. These months will live in military history for all time. They are
yet one more proof of the great Corsican's knowledge of men and wai:
and a lasting testimony to the value of Col. Henderson's writings.
It will be remembered that the Fifth Army, attacked by overwhelming
odds on March 21st, had, in spite of a determined resistance, been driven
The situation in front ^ack to the neighbourhood of Amiens. It had suffered
of Amiens at the end hea\y losses, the men were physically exhausted after
of March, 1918 ^^en days of continuous marching and fighting, and for
the time being their moral had been seriously affected. But they were
not a beaten army. They required rest and sleep, and, when they
obtained these, it was astonishing to see how quickly they recovered, and
thus demonstrated once again the indomitable spirit of the British soldier.
On INIarch 28th, when the Fifth Army Headquarters were relieved
by the Fourth Army Headquarters, ^ the situation about Amiens was
found to be extremely critical. Not only had all reserves been absorbed
into the firing line some days previously, but a considerable part
of the actual firing line itself consisted of a force,^ rapidly impro-
vised from elements of different units and in many cases under strange
officers, hastily thrown together in the emergency to oppose the enemy's
further advance. The Germans continued to press forward, but, fortunately,
the greater part of the Cavalry Corps and the 9th Australian Brigade
arrived to reinforce the Fourth Army, and brought the enemy's advance
to a halt until April 4th and 5th, when a strong German attack drove
back our line once again to a point on the eastern outskirts of Villers
Bretonneux. Here, thanks principally to the timely arrival of three
more Australian brigades, the line remained stationary until April 24th,
on which date the enemy made his final attempt to capture Amiens.
Attacking after a heavy bombardment and assisted by tanks, the
• " The Science of War." " Lessons from the Past for the Present," p. 174.
2 The Fourth Army Headquarters were re-formed for this purpose under General Sir Henry
Rawlinson, who, for the previous six weeks, had been the British Representative of the Supreme
War Council at Versailles.
' Known as " Carey's Force "
CO
z
03
X
M
Z
z
o
INTRODUCTORY 3
Germans in the early hours of the morning succeeded in capturing Villers
Bretonneux, The possession of this village and of the neighbouring high
ground enabled the Germans to obtain direct obser-
The loss °^^^""^jjj vation down the valley of the Somme almost as far as
re onneux, pn Amicns, and of part of the Hallue valley. It was a tactical
locality of vital importance to the defence of Amiens, and, in German
hands, constituted a direct menace to the junction between the French
and British Armies.
Just as in the Waterloo Campaign of 1815 the separation of Wel-
lington's and Bliicher's Armies, and their defeat in detail, was the paramount
object of Napoleon's strategv, so in March and April,
A comparison with the jgjg ^j^ ^^^^ means, by which the Germans could hope
Waterloo Campaign '. j • • • i. i • ^ • i.u r> -t- u j
to gam a decisive victory, lay m lorcing the British and
French Armies asunder at the outset of the campaign.^
As soon as the news of the loss of Villers Bretonneux reached Army
Headquarters, Sir Henry Rawlinson decided to retake the village at all
costs, and every available reserve at his disposal was employed for this
purpose. These were little enough, and consisted of the 13th and 15th
Australian Brigades, the 54th Brigade of the 18th Division reinforced
by a battalion of the 58th Division, and two battalions of the 8th Division.
All the battalions of the 8th, 18th, and 58th Divisions employed had
already suffered severely during the retreat, especially in experienced
officers, and had had little or no time to absorb the drafts of yovmg soldiers
they had received. Moreover, heavy concentrations of Yellow Cross gas ^
on Villers Bretonneux and L'Abbe Wood had caused severe casualties to
the 8th and 58th Divisions on April 22nd.
The counter-attack, which was organised by the III Corps at very
short notice and under great difficulties, was launched at 10 p.m. on the
same day as the attack, and was executed in a most
Sfew BrSneL brilliant manner in spite of the darkness. It was greatly
assisted by the determined manner in which the 5th
Australian Division had maintained its position all day on the high
ground immediately north of Villers Bretonneux. This division had
learnt one valuable lesson of the March fighting, that, if part of a defen-
sive line is forced back, it is essential for the rest of the line, and espe-
cially that part on the flanks of the breach, to hold firm. " Conform-
ing," or " withdrawing," so as to straighten the line was not part
' As regards this, there are several questions which are of intense interest, but which it is at
present impossible to decide with the information as yet available.
First, what degree of importance did General Ludendorfi actually place on the separation
of the French and British Armies ?
Secondly, how near did the Germans come to the attainment of this object ?
Lastly, instead of putting in large reserves to follow up the German success on the Lys on
April 9th,"would it have been possible for General Ludendorff to have directed his reserves against
Aruiens early in that month, and, if so, would he have achieved his purpose ?
Future "historians will doubtless find an ample field for discussion on these points when further
evidence from the German records is available. It would appear, however, that in clianging his
strategic objective in April, General Ludendorff committed an error which eventually brought
about his undoing, and at the same time saved the Allies from a situation which might well have
cost them the war.
Since this storj' was written, General Ludendorff's Memoirs have been published, but they
do not appear to give a satisfactory answer to these questions.
' Commonly known as " Mustard Gas."
4 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
of its programme. It realised that, if the flanks of the breach hold
firm, the enemy who has penetrated has both his flanks exposed and
is at the mercy of a well-organised counter-attack ; also, that the force
that has broken through cannot receive efficient artillery support, owing
to the ignorance of its gunners as to the exact position of the infantry
they are supporting.
As the result of this brilliant counter-attack, carried out by the
Australians and well supported by the divisions of the III Corps, the
village of Villers Bretonneux was recaptured together with 900 prisoners,
and Amiens was saved. This is an excellent example of the value of a
counter-attack delivered with all available forces before the enemy has had
time to establish himself and organise the defence. Hesitation and delay
would have permitted the Germans to establish themselves firmly in their
newly-won positions, their artillery would have been ready to rake all
approaches to the village, and dayhght on the 25th would have found
the position practically impregnable against the limited forces which were
at the disposal of the Fourth Army Commander.
Unfortunately, the First French Army, which had lost the village of
Hangard at the same time as we had lost Villers Bretonneux, was unable
to lavmch its counter-attack in conjunction with that of the III Corps.
For various reasons it was postponed until next morning. In spite of
the greatest gallantry and self-sacrifice on the part of the troops engaged,
it failed, and Hangard village remained in German hands until August Sth.^
The attack on April 24th was the last attempt made by the Germans
to break through the defences of Amiens, and, although this front was
prepared and maintained as an offensive one for some time, false strategy
and more attractive objectives on other parts of the front relieved the
Amiens area from any further hostile pressure.
Meanwhile, the German attack on the Lys, which had begun on
April 9th, continued and drew in the enemy's available reserves. As
Events on other parts ^^ch frcsh division made its appearance in the northern
o! the Western front theatre, SO did it become more and more evident that the
in April, May, June, enemy did not intend to press his menace at Amiens,
*° ^^^ and the spirits of the troops in this area continued to
rise in proportion to the opportunities for rest and training thus
afforded.
On May 27th, the great German offensive in Champagne was
launched, followed on Jume 9th by an attack towards Compiegne from
the Montdidier direction. Both were brought to a standstill after the
first successful rush.
Then ensued an anxious period of waiting until it was possible to
discover on which portion of the Allied front the next great German
onslaught would be delivered. As time went on, it became evident that
it would be directed against the French on either side of Rheims. During
this period our information was excellent, and it soon became clear,
from the preparations that were being made, that every man and gun
that could be made available would take part in this decisive attack, on
1 This counter-attack was carried out by the famous Moroccan Division, consisting of four
regiments, and of which the Foreign Legion formed a part.
sketch No. 2, to face page 4.
L'Abbc Wood
'Mu^j^.x
/.
Shiib ,Ve, 2. (0 /*« pjt, I.
The- RED CHATEAU ^t \ILLERS BRETONNEUX from the CORBIE road
INTRODUCTORY 5
which the Germans were about to risk their all, and that other fronts
would be correspondingly weakened. General Foch ^ made his dispositions
accordingly.
On July 15th the blow fell. How General Gotiraud foiled the
offensive east of Rheims, how the Germans, at first successful west of
Rheims, succeeded in crossing the Marne, and how on July 18th General
Mangin's counter-attack from the direction of Villers Cotterets Forest
drove the enemy back in confusion over the Marne, is now well-known
history.
It was clear to those who had watched the course of events and had
studied the losses and the state of moral of the German Army that the
The first signs oi the crisis was ovcr and that the time for the Allied counter-
weakening of the moral offensive was approaching, if indeed it had not already
of the German Army arrived. Moreover, the Germans, in addition to serious
errors in strategy, had made the fatal mistake of underrating their
opponents, and especially the power of recuperation of the British Army.
Although acting perfectly correctly in weakening their forces on other
fronts so as to mass all available reserves for their main attack, they
had made no serious effort to improve their defences on the weakened
portions of the line. In front of Amiens their defences were especially
weak, and nothing had been done to improve them, although it might
well have been realised that this omission gave the Allies an opening for
a counter-stroke of which it was more than probable that full advantage
would betaken.
Meanwhile, on the Fourth Army front, the situation after April 24th
had rapidly improved, and, thanks to the indefatigable labours of officers
The situation on the ^^^ men, the defences of Amiens had daily grown in
Fourth Army front strength. Long lincs of trenches and innumerable belts
after AprU 24th qJ ^jj.g ^j^^j machine-gun dug-outs covered all the country
between Albert and Amiens. Battalions had improved in strength and
training. The whole of the Australian Corps, with the exception of the
1st Australian Division, which was still up in the north, had by now
joined the Fourth Army and held the sector from south of Villers Breton-
neux to the Ancre, whilst the III Corps, consisting of the 18th, 47th, and
58th Divisions, held the remainder of the army front to just north of
Albert. The weather was fine ; the men when out of the line could enjoy
good fishing and bathing in the Somme, and they were afforded excellent
opportunities for rest, training, and recreation.
The Australians, always inquisitive, seldom idle, and with the
greatest contempt for " Fritz," very soon began a series of inroads into
the German lines which had a very important effect on
The Australians subsequent operations. These minor operations and
raids, some fourteen in number in May and June, met
with encouraging success. Not only did they gradually improve the
position of our line and give us many prisoners, but they established a
moral superiority over the Germans that was to be of the greatest value
in the future. No sooner had the Germans dug and wired a new front
' He was created Marshal of France on Augiist 10th.
6 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
and support trench than, under a surprise barrage, the Austrahans
captured them and repulsed any attempt at their recovery. The Germans
had perforce to begin all their work over again and construct a new front
line, which, in its turn, before long passed into the possession of the
Australians.
Towards the end of June, the situation had so much improved that
Sir Henry Rawlinson decided that the Australians should undertake an
operation on a somewhat larger scale. This had for its objective the
capture of the village of Hamel and Vaire Wood, together with an im-
portant ridge east of these two localities. The capture of this ridge, he
considered, would materially improve our line by giving it more depth,
would furnish us with better observation, and would deny to the enemy
observation of much of the Somme valley. Moreover, he considered that
the attack would test not only the strength of the enemy's defences,
but also the state of the German moral, which was already
under considerable suspicion. It would fiirther form a good trial run for
an offensive on a still larger scale, should it be desirable to carry out such
an operation finally to disengage Amiens. A most important factor,
however, at that time was the question of man power. In this respect
the situation was serious, and it was not advisable, nor even possible, for
us to incur heavy casualties. Fortunately, the terrain about Hamel
was almost ideal for the employment of tanks, and, by using these in
the closest possible touch with the infantry, it was hoped that casualties
would be reduced to a minimum. Sir Henry Rawlinson decided, there-
fore, to attack on a very wide front, compared with those adopted in the
offensives of 1916 and 1917, and to employ as few infantry as possible
in the firing line. Six battalions attacked on a front of 6,000 yards ^
supported by sixty tanks, whose task it was to deal with whatever opposi-
tion might escape the barrage. The success of the operation, and the
number of casualties incurred, would, it was felt, very largely depend on
the degree of surprise attained. As the German defences were known to
be weak, and there was little wire, no preliminary bombardment was
considered necessary, and, in consequence, it was possible, with due pre-
cautions, to carry out all the preparations up to the moment of assault
without attracting attention.
The attack, which came as a complete surprise, was delivered at
dawn on July 4th and was entirely successful. Four companies of the
I H 1 ^^^d American Division were attached to the attacking
on^ Juiy'^4th, and its Australian battalions and added further glory to the
lessons American flag on Independence Day. All objectives
were gained with astonishingly small loss, and all counter-attacks were
easily driven off. The Australians had outfought the Germans at every
point.
This operation conclusively proved several important points, which,
up to that time, had been in doubt. It became clear that the German
infantry, even though it had not been subjected on July 4th to the terrors
of a preliminary bombardment, was no longer the formidable foe in defence
' 1,200 to 2,000 yards was looked upon as a suitable frontage to allot to a division in the
offensives of 1916 and 1917.
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AUSTRALIANS, AND AMliRlCANS OF THE jJKD (iLLINOlS) DIVISION, RESTING
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ly kittj permission of llv Ausiralian CKcriimciii.
INTRODUCTORY 7
that it had been in 1916 and 1917, and that the German defences, judged
by previous standards, did not count for much. It was also obvious
that, under the conditions obtaining on the Fourth Army front, a well
organised attack, carried out by determined men and supported by tanks
well trained with the infantry beforehand, had every chance of breaking
right through the enemy's defences. Lastly, it proved that, given the
element of surprise, an attack of this nature could be successful without
incurring the heavy losses to which we had become accustomed in previous
years.^ It was a good omen for the future.
By July 16th there were good grounds for thinking that the last
great German effort would definitely fail, and that the opportunity for
a successful counter-offensive by the Allies would
cou^ntw^oseiuive shortly arise. Everything indeed appeared to favour
an early offensive, and it was certain that the
Germans, after the failure of their great attack in Champagne on July 15th,
would be in a state of despondency.
For an offensive, the object of which was to gain a decisive success,
there was probably no sector on the whole Allied front which presented
such favourable conditions at that particular time as that held by the
Fourth Army. The situation, both as regards the forces opposed to us
and the terrain, was ideal for an attack on a large scale. Moreover, if
successful, the attack was bound to have very far-reaching results and
was, therefore, well worth considerable risks, for it would render Amiens
safe once and for all, and thus secure the junction of the British and French
Armies. Further, it would directly threaten the communications of the
German Armies facing the First and Third French Armies. In the
light of after events the correctness of these forecasts has been clearly
proved.
The plan for an attack on the Fourth Army front was submitted to
General Headquarters on July 17th, was approved by Sir Douglas Haig,
and received General Foch's approval a week later with some minor
modifications which will be referred to later.
So far as one can judge, no surprise has ever been more complete
than was that of the Germans on August 8th. It is astonishing that this
should have been so, for, between July 30th and
on^ August 8th'' August 8th, the Cavalry Corps of three divisions,
fourteen divisions of infantry, over 2,000 guns, and
some 450 tanks were concentrated east of Amiens on a front of about ten
miles, within striking distance of the unsuspecting von der Marwitz,^
who commanded the opposing German Army.
The actual attack, carried out on the same lines as the attack of
July 4th, though on a much larger scale, went mthout a hitch. The
cavalry, after its many disappointments in previous offensives, at last
found its opportunity. The Germans were swept off their feet
• The actual casualties incurred on July -Ith were 1,030, while the prisoners taken amounted
to 1,472.
'' General von der Marwitz commanded the Second Army ; Gleneral von Hutier commanded
the Eighteenth Army immediately to the south of the Second Army. They were the two com-
m:»nders who had been most successful in March, and Gleneral von Hutier was also the victor of
Riga.
8 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
and never really recovered from the overwhelming nature of the
disaster.^
The attack of the Fourth Army assisted the First French Army to
capture the important high ground north of Moreuil. This, together with
the further success of the First French Army, as it
French ArmUs, and*the advanced on the right of the Fourth Army, enabled the
Third British Army join Third French Army, and then the Tenth French Army,
in the offensive ^^ pj.ggg forward in turn. On August 21st, when the
advance of the Fourth Army reached the level of Albert, the Third British
Army widened the front of attack to the north, and from then onwards
continuous pressure was kept up along almost the whole of the British,
and the greater part of the French and American fronts.
The additional impetus given to the offensive by the participation of the
Third British Army not only resulted in the captiire of Bapaume and the
The complete loss ot turning of the Somme defences from the north, but also
the initiative by the greatly discouraged the already dispirited troops of the
Germans enemy, and added enormously to the difficulties and
embarrassments of the German Great General Staff. The enemy had now
lost the initiative beyond all hope of recovery, and was forced by our
successes to carry out an extensive withdrawal of his forces from the
Lys salient. Reserves were flung into the line piecemeal, as our attacks
developed, without time or consideration for their most usefiil employment.
• It is interesting to note the great importance General Ludendorff attaches in his Memoirs
to this attack of August 8th. " August 8th," he says, " was the black day of the German Army
in the history of the War. . . . Early on August 8th in a dense fog, that had been rendered still
thicker by artificial means, the British, mainly with Australian and Canadian divisions, and French
attacked between Albert and Moreuil with strong squadrons of tanks, but for the rest, in no great
superiority. They broke between the Somme and the Luce stream deep into our front. The
divisions in line at that point allowed themselves to be completely overwhelmed. Divisional
staffs were surprised in their headquarters by enemy tanks. . . . The exhausted divisions that
had been relieved a few days earlier, and that were lying in the region south-west of Peronne were
immediately alarmed and set in motion by the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army. At
the same time he brought forward towards the breach by any means all available troops. The
Rupprecht Army Group dispatched reserves thither by train. The Eighteenth Army threw its
own reserves directly into the battle from the south-east and pushed other forces forward in the
region north-west of Roye. On an order from me the Ninth Army too, although itself in danger,
had to contribute. . . . By the early hours of the forenoon of August 8th I had already gained a
complete impression of the situation. It was a very gloomy one. I immediately dispatched a
General Staff officer to the battlefield in order to obtain a view of the condition of the troops. . . .
Six or seven divisions, that were quite fairly to be described as effective, had been completely
battered. Three or four others, together with the remnants of the battered divisions, were
available for closing the broad gap between Bray and Roye. . . . The wastage in the Second Army
had been very great. Heavy toll had also been taken of its reserves, when these were thrown
in. In the case of some divisions the infantry had had to go into the line straight out of their
motor lorries, while their artillery was lined up elsewhere. Units were badly mixed up. It was
to be foreseen that a further number of divisions had become necessary to reinforce the Second
Army, even if the enemy should not attack again, a prospect upon which we could not count
with any assurance. Owing, in addition, to the deficit created by the number of prisoners taken
from us, our losses had reached such proportions that the supreme command was once more faced
with the necessity of having to disband a further series of divisions in order to furnish drafts.
Our reserves were diminishing. As against all this there had been an only uncommonly slight
expenditure of strength on the part of the enemy. The relative man-power had shifted appreciably
further to our disadvantage. . . . All we could do was to put off the inevitable. We had abso-
lutely to be prepared for a continuation of the enemy's attacks. He had been allowed to score
too cheaply. . . . August 8th marked the decline of our fighting power, and, the man-power
situation being what it was, it robbed me of the hope of discovering some strategic expedient that
might once more stabilise the position in our favour. . . . The war would have to be ended."
See " My War Memories, 1914-1918," by General Ludendorff. Vol. ii, p. 679 et seq.
INTRODUCTORY 9
Upon our own troops in other parts of the line the record of these
rapid and brilHant successes had a most inspiriting effect. Until
August 8th the general feeling among officers and men
^moraj"^ was that the complete repulse of the enemy and the
preparation for a triumphant campaign in 1919, by
which time the weight of the rapidly increasing American Army would
have turned the scale definitely in our favour, was the most that could
be hoped for. Officers and men now saw with amazement that the enemy
was being driven back almost as rapidly as he had advanced, and hopes
ran high that the enemy's defeat would be complete before the end of the
year. Local enterprises were accordingly undertaken against the enemy
with eagerness and vigour, and it became clear that the demoralisation
and depression of the enemy had spread far beyond the zone covered by
the operations of the Fourth and Third Armies.
The results of the Battles of Amiens and Bapaume gave the oppor-
tunity for the First Army to join in the onslaught. Accordingly, on
The First British Army August 26th, the battle was extended north to the
extends the front ol Sensee and Scarpe, and on September 2nd the difficult
attack to the north and formidable Drocourt-Queant line was brilliantly
stormed, and the enemy thrown into precipitate retreat.
Under the combined and continuous pressure of the three armies the
enemy, fighting tenaciously but unsuccessfully, was driven back to the
strongly fortified zone of defences known as the Hindenburg Line, which
was his main line of resistance, and upon the maintenance of which
his hold on France and Belgium depended.
The crisis of our counter-offensive had now been reached. The
inability of the Germans to check the advance, and the accumulating
The crisis ol the counter- evidence of their growing demoralisation and disor-
oflensive, September ganisation, proved conclusively that the time had come
26th-29th for the Allies to deliver the decisive blow without delay.
Marshal Foch and Sir Douglas Haig lost no time in taking advantage
of their opportunity. Four convergent and simultaneous attacks were
delivered between September 26th and 29th.
In the Argonne and to the east, the French and American forces
attacked the enemy and pressed them steadily back in the direction of
Mezieres. In Flanders, the Passchendaele Ridge, the scene of so much
laborious and bitter fighting in 1917, was crossed in one day by the
Belgian forces and the Second British Army under the command of King
Albert.
The main and most critical attack was that delivered by the First,
Third, and Fourth Armies against the Hindenbiug Line. The attack
was a magnificent success and opened the way for the
mnTenburg°Line^ rapid and complete defeat of the enemy.
"With the breach in the Hindenburg Line the
enemy lost his last and most strongly prepared position, and he had no
alternative but to withdraw his forces along the entire front. From now
onwards, he endeavoured to make use of semi-prepared and natural
positions to resist ovu advance for a period sufficiently long to enable
him to carry out his wathdrawal in good order.
10 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARINIY
Our troops, however, flushed with constant success and eager to
transform the defeat into a rout, pursued the retreating enemy with the
The crossing of the utmost vigour and determination. Against the dash
Seiie and Sambre and resolution of our men no obstacles were of any
rivers avail. The battles on the Selle and Sambre rivers
brought only new victories to our arms, and the Lys failed to check our
progress in Flanders.
The embarrassment and bewilderment of the German Great General
Staff increased daily. All reserves were used up. Many of the German
battalions could not be relied upon to fight, and even
demorSsation ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ machine-gunners, hitherto the back-
bone of the defence, the will to resist had vanished.
After November 4th the withdrawal became a rout. In the words of
Sir Douglas Haig's Victory Despatch, " The enemy was falling back
without coherent plan in widespread disorder and confusion."
The destruction of the German Army was only averted by the signing
of the armistice on November 11th. When a stroke of the pen put an end
to hostilities, the town of Mons, whence had begun the
The Armistice epic retreat of the •' Old Contemptibles " in the autumn
of 1914, was, by a fitting coincidence, once more in
British hands. The forces of the enemy were still on foreign soil, but the
utter demoralisation of his army is clearly evidenced by the terms which
Germany was forced to sign before the armistice was granted. The
armistice was, in fact, a capitulation, and is the best testimony to the
value of the series of successes which began with the victory of August 8th.
NOTE TO CHAPTER I.— GENERAL LUDENDORFF AND GERMAN MORAL
As has been pointed out in this chapter, there was a feeling in the Fourth Army during July
that the German Army had reached its limit of endurance, and that the bubble of its invincibility
only required pricking. August 8th and the days that followed strengthened the impression and
caused it to spread throughout the British Army. General Ludendorff's Memoirs confirm it.
Seldom has the commander of large forces admitted defeat, and given the reasons for such defeat,
in clearer language. The German High Command had lost all hope of victory, all hope even of
staving off inevitable disaster. WTien those in supreme command are overcome with such feelings
of despair as are expressed by General Ludendorff, then the forces which they control are indeed lost.
History teaches us that it is the spirit of the commander almost more than anj'ihing else which
affects the moral of an Army. It was the unconquerable spirit of Frederick the Great in the face
of disaster that saved Prussia from destruction in the Silesian Wars, and again in the Seven Years'
War. It was the magnetism of Napoleon that kept the half-starved, ragged conscripts of 181-1
in the field so long against five or six times their number. Again, it was their wonderful faith in
Lee's genius that maintained the moral of the Confederate soldiers, even when the enemy was
within a few miles of Richmond. Wlien one reads these Memoirs of General Ludendorff and
thinks of the great commanders of the past, can one be surprised that the moral of the German
Army was crumbling, that the officers had lost faith in their men, and the men in their officers ?
To students of Col. Henderson's " Stonewall Jackson " and " The Science of War," the story
of August 8th and the subsequent three months' fighting will appeal with especial force. It
bears out those imperishable maxims of war that Col. Henderson devoted his unique literary
powers to impressing on the minds of British officers. " Wellington knew well," he says,' " that
the issue of battles lies in the hearts of men — in the heart of the Commander even more than in
the heart of the soldiers — and that human nature, even when disciplined, is peculiarly susceptible
to a strong, sudden, and sustained attack." And again a few pages later,^ " What could be more
valuable than to have learned so thorouglily, that its application has become instinctive, the
following principle. Always endeavour to mystify and mislead your enemy whether you are
attacking or defending ; if you can surprise your enemy's General, his army is already defeated."
I " The Science of War," " Notes on Wellington," p. 97.
» Ibid., p. 102.
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■ •^ ^ IV,
CHAPTER II
PKEPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE
Maps 1, 2, and 3
The situation in the middle of July on the Fourth Army front — The concentration of troops—
The reorganisation of the front prior to the attack — The nature of the countrj' — The hostile
defences — The strength and moral of the enemy — The strategic objectives of the attack —
Secrecy, the basis of the plan of attack — The conditions affecting the plan — The frontage of
the attack — The objectives — The synchronisation of the attack — The allotment of tanks —
The role of the cavalry — The role of the Royal Air Force — The role of the artillery, engineers,
and Machine Gun Corps — The issue of maps and photographs — The danger of hostile gas
shelling during the assembly of troops — Minor hostile attacks on August 3rd and August 6th
— The assembly of the troops — The forming up of the infantry — The hour of " zero " — The
confidence of the troops.
The belief that the conditions on the Fourth Army front were
extremely favourable for the carrying out of a successful offensive on a
The situation in the ^^rge scale had been growing rapidly since July 4th.
middle of July on the In addition to the moral superiority which had been
Fourth Aimy front attained by the Australians over the enemy, the
German divisions on this front were known to be weak in numbers.
Scarcely one had more than 3,000 effectives in its ranks, with the corres-
pondingly lowering result on their fighting spirit that almost always
accompanies reduced strengths ; nor was there any considerable body of
reserves behind this front. There were no well-organised systems of defence,
and, judging by those captured by the Australian Corps on July 4th, the
German trenches were badly constructed, and were protected with little
wire. Lastly, the terrain was extremely favourable for an offensive
with a distant objective limited only by the physical powers of endm-ance
of horse and man. The country was open and undulating ; the hard
soil, with chalk very near to the surface, rendered it particularly
favourable for tanks and cavalry. The chances of the successful employ-
ment of these arms were further increased by the absence of shell craters
and by the dry weather of the preceding months. The observation available
from our positions was excellent and favoured our artillery action ; good
artillery positions were numerous, and the general lie of the country
afforded covered lines of approach, which favoured a surprise attack.
On July 17th, Sir Henry Rawlinson submitted to the Commander-
in-Chief his proposals for the attack, and on Jvily 23rd, after some
discussion, the plan^ was approved, with some minor modifications, by
' The original proposal put forward by Sir Henry Rawlinson was that the Fourth Army
should take over from the French as far south as Moreuil, and should carry out an attack on the
whole of this front from Moreuil to Morlancourt. He considered that, for reasons of secrecy,
11
12 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [July-Auo.
Sir Douglas Haig and General Foch. It was decided that the First
French Army on the right should participate in the attack with the
Fourth Army, and, to ensure close co-operation. General Foch placed the
First French Army directly under the orders of Sir Douglas Haig. On
July 26th Sir Henry Rawlinson received instructions from the Commander-
in-Chief to press on the preparations for the attack, the date of which
was fixed for August 10th, but subsequently advanced to August 8th.
At the end of July, the Fovuth Army was composed as follows :
The III Corps, comprising the 12th, 18th,^ 47th, and 58th Divisions,
together with the 33rd American Division, which was
^''' °°°roopf '°° °' attached for training but had not yet been in the
line.
The Australian Corps,^ comprising the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th
Australian Divisions.
The 3rd Cavalry Division.
The 5th Brigade, Royal Air Force, comprising eleven squadrons.
The 5th Brigade, Tank Corps, comprising three battalions, two of
which had taken part in the operations at Ham el on July 4th.
The artillery in the army, which totalled about 1,000 guns,
consisted of 23 field artillery brigades, 13 garrison artillery brigades, and
10 long-range siege batteries.
By August 8th, the Fourth Army had been reinforced by five infantry
divisions (1st Australian, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Canadian), two cavalry
divisions (1st and 2nd), six squadrons of the Royal Air Force, nine batta-
lions of tanks, together with another 1,000 guns, the final strength and
distribution being : —
The III Corps : Commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Richard Butler.
12th, 18th, 47th, and 58th Divisions, with the 33rd American
Division attached.
The Australian Corps : Commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Monash.
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Australian Divisions.
The Canadian Corps : Commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthiir Currie.
1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Divisions.
The Cavalry Corps : Commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Charles Kavanagh.
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Cavalry Divisions.
simplification in the co-ordination of the hour of attack, barrages, etc., it would be preferable
to have the -whole arrangements in the hands of troops of one nationality. Past experience had
shown that, with the best will in the world on both sides, a combined attack by French and British
troops was always more difficult to co-ordinate and keep secret than one which was entirely in
the iiands of a French or British Commander, controlling only his own troops. Sir Henry Raw-
linson suggested that General Debeney, commanding the First French Army, should employ
his available troops towards his right, and that, when the British attack had been successful and
had thrown the German defence into confusion, General Debeney should attack northwards from
the direction of Montdidier. He considered that this plan would, if successful, lead to greater
strategical results. General Foch decided against this proposal, as he considered that better
results would be obtained by a joint attack by both armies from the same direction.
1 The 12th and 18th Divisions, though in the IH Corps area, were earmarked for general
reserve in case of emergency. They were released from general reserve at the end of July.
2 The 1st Australian Division was still in the north, where it had been sent early in the spring
to reinforce the Second Army during the Lys battle and had greatly distinguished itself in the
fighting round Hazebrouck.
July— Aug] PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE 13
The 5th Brigade, Royal Air Force:
15th (Corps) Wing, six corps squadrons.
22nd (Army) Wing, eight scout squadrons ; three bombing
squadrons.
The 3rd, Uh, and 5th Brigades, Tank Corps :
12 Tank Battahons, of which eight were equipped with Mark V,
two with Mark V star, and two with whippet tanks.
The large majority of the additional units and formations, which were
concentrated during the eight days prior to the attack, were moved into
the area by train ; the cavalry, whippet tanks, and a portion of the artillery
moving by road. Altogether about 230 special trains for personnel and
guns, as well as upwards of 60 special trains for ammunition, were run
into the Fourth Army area, in addition to the ordinary supply trains for
food and engineer material. If it is remembered that only two railway
lines were available, one along the coast via Etaples and Abbeville and
the other via St. Pol and Doullens, that all movements from detraining
stations had to take place during the hours of darkness, and that the
utmost secrecy had to be maintained by all concerned in the moves, the
amount of work thrown on the administrative services will be fully
realised. The fact that the concentration was carried out and that the
formations moved into their places of assembly without a hitch and
entirely unsuspected by the enemy, was not the least remarkable
feature in the story of the battles of the hundred days.
In addition to the troops already mentioned, the 17th, 32nd, and
63rd Divisions were assembled close behind the battle front, in general
reserve in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, in order to maintain
the fight and to take full advantage of any success gained. Other divisions
were also held in positions of readiness in rear of the remainder of the
British front, with a view to their being moved to the battle front as
circumstances required. By August 8th, the 17th Division was con-
centrated behind the Australian Corps, the 63rd Division behind the
III Corps, and the 32nd Division in rear of the Canadian Corps. Of
these three divisions, the 32nd Division was subsequently released from
general reserve and placed at the disposal of the Canadian Corps, the
17th Division was employed to hold a portion of the line on the front of
the Australian Corps for a few days during a lull in the fighting, whilst
the 63rd Division was not used on the front of the Fourth Army.
On August 1st, the front held by the Fourth Army extended from
Monument Wood, just south of Villers Bretonneux, where junction was
The reorganisation niadc with the First French Army, to the high ground
of the front prior north of Albert, where the Fourth Armv joined the
to the attack rpj-,ij.(j Army ; the total front being about 21,000
yards. The front was held by two corps ; on the south the Australian
Corps held from the southern boundary to the river Ancre, and the III
Corps thence to the junction with the" Third Army. Before the attack
it was necessary to take over about 7,000 yards of front from the First
French Army, and to readjust the corps boundaries of the Australian
and III Corps. On the night of July 31st, therefore, the III Corps
14 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [July-Aug.
extended its front southwards and took over as far as the Somme. This
addition to the III Corps front included the high tongue of land about
Morlancourt, on which so many of the successful enterprises of the
Australian Corps had been carried out during the preceding months.
In fact, as lately as July 29th, the Australian Corps had advanced its
line on a front of 2,500 yards, captvu-ing the important ground over-
looking Morlancourt and adding considerably to the depth of the defence
of the plateau. During the nights of July 31st and August 1st the 4th
Australian Division took over from the First French Army as far south
as the Amiens-Roye road inclusive. This extension of the front by the
two corps already in the line must undoubtedly have assisted in giving
the enemy a false sense of security, as the natural inferences to be deduced
therefrom were the relief of French troops for employment on the
Champagne battle front and a change to a passive attitude on the part
of the Australian Corps, which had thus had its front very considerably
extended.
At the beginning of August a withdrawal by the enemy in the neigh-
bourhood of Albert to the east bank of the Ancre gave indications that
rumours of an attack on our front might have reached him. These
fears, however, were shortly allayed, when it was ascertained from
prisoners that the withdrawal was only local, and that it had been carried
out in order to avoid the difficulties of supplying troops on the far side of
the marshy ground astride the Ancre.
The main features of the ground over which the attack of August 8th
was made are the valleys of the Luce and the Somme, the dominating
heights between the Avre and the Luce, the wide
the "country plateau between the Luce and the Somme, and the
flat-topped high ground north of the Somme. North
of the Somme the ground presents many difficulties. The high ground,
for the first 3,000 yards east of the line we then held, is slightly undulating
and offers few natural obstacles until Tallies Wood and Gressaire
Wood are reached. The northern slopes fall comparatively gently
down to the marshy valley of the Ancre, but the southern slopes
of the plateau, leading down to the Somme, are steep and broken
by a series of well-defined gullies or re-entrants. The ground
is very rough, and, with the steep slopes, constitutes a serious
obstacle for tanks. The village of Sailly Laurette lies hidden in
one of these re-entrants on the northern bank of the Somme, whilst
further east there is a steep gully, the slopes of which are in summer
covered by the thick foliage of Malard Wood. Still further east is the
village of Chipilly, built on the steep Avestern slopes of the Chipilly spur,
which is a dominating feature of the Somme valley, commanding it as
far west as Corbie. Beyond the Chipilly spur the Somme winds its way
to Peronne in a series of bends, the high ground in the vicinity of each
bend forming an outstanding tactical feature and hiding in turn the villages
of Etinehem, Bray-sur-Somme, and Suzanne, each of which played a
conspicuous part in the early stages of the battle.
The Somme itself is well known in the history of the Great
War. For purposes of commerce it has been canalised, the old river
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JuLY-AuG J PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE 16
flowing by the side of the canal through marshy swamps, the whole thus
forming an obstacle which can only be crossed by causeways and bridges.
Between the Somme and the Luce, the country is generally flat and
open, with numerous villages and woods, scattered about at wide intervals.
In this part of France a distinctive feature of the country is the absence
of outlying farms and houses. The villages for the most part consist of
groups of farms interspersed with the shops necessary for supplying them
with commodities. Buildings are distinctly poor, the greater part of
the granaries and cattle stalls being constructed of " wattle and daub."
The villages are, in nearly every case, surrounded by orchards and trees ;
consequently at a distance they often present the appearance of small
woods, from which, however, the church steeple standing out above the
trees generally distinguishes them.
The Luce forms a difficult obstacle. The stream itself is not wide,
but on either side there are broad marshes, which restrict the movement
of troops to the normal crossings shown on the map. The only bridge
in our lines was that at Domart ; while, of the two which lay within the
enemy's lines, the one at Hangard was broken, the other at Demuin
was intact.
In the angle formed by the Luce and Avre the high ground between
Moreuil and Demuin overlooks the valleys of both rivers and gives good
observation on to a large part of the Gentelles-Cachy plateau, on which
a very large number of our batteries were posted. It also includes Rifle
Wood, a position of great natural strength.
It has already been mentioned that the enemy's defences were not
formidable. The front system consisted of very roughly dug trenches,
with few communication trenches and no dug-outs of
defences^ any strength. Beyond the enemy's front system the
only defences in existence were the old Amiens defences
dug in 1915 and 1916. These defences were divided into two systems,
the inner and the outer defences, of which the outer defences had been
made the more complete. The inner defences ran northwards in a series
of disconnected posts from Mezieres along the eastern face of a deep
re-entrant ; crossing the Luce near Demuin, they continued in a
northerly direction through Marcclcave to our front line in the vicinitv of
Hamel village. The outer defences, which were in a more advanced
state, were complete with front and support trenches and numerous
communication trenches and were protected by a thick belt of wire on
the eastern side. They crossed the Amiens-Roye road just east of Le
Quesnel, about 13,000 yards from our front line at Hourges, and thence
ran in a general northerly direction to the Somme, which they crossed near
Etinehem. North of the river the line reverted to a scries of posts running
along the eastern edge of Gressaire Wood and Taillcs Wood, whence
it curled gradually north-westwards to the Ancre, about 4,000 yards
south of Albert.
These defences, having been carefully sited for the defence of
Amiens, provided a well-defined objective, "which could be easily recog-
nised by the troops on reaching it and would also afford them a good
line to hold prior to a further advance. The wire was thick, but was
16 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [July-Auo.
sited on the far side of the defences to protect them against an attack
from the east, and it had suffered from time and weather.
Between the inner and outer defences of Amiens there was httle
to stop the advance; small posts and trenches, lightly wired, had been
made by both sides during the fighting in March and early April, and most
of these were easily discernible on the excellent air photographs available.
East of the Amiens outer defences there were no organised defences
as far as the Somme, In the neighbourhood of the Somme, however,
the country, as the result of the battles of 1916, was covered with shell-
holes and partially dismantled wire, which, being overgrown with rank
grass and thistles, might be expected to retard the advance of the infantry
and render the employment of cavalry and tanks almost impossible.
As it turned out, the existence of this shell-crater area, the near edge of
which ran approximately from Le Quesnoy-en-Santerre, through Lihons
and Foucaucourt, to Frise, had an important influence on the later stages
of the battle.
From the above it will be seen that the enemy had entirely neglected
to strengthen his position by means of entrenchments, and it is interesting
to note that General Ludendorff at the time ascribed the success of our
operation in a great measure to the slackness and apathy of the garrison
in the use of the spade.^
The Fourth Army had been confronted for some time past by seven
divisions in line between the Luce and Albert. Of these the 13th, 41st,
and 233rd ^ Divisions had been in line for one month,
iSVoM?e^my ^he 43rd Reserve and 54th ^ Reserve Divisions for one
month and a half, and the 109th Division for three and a
half months. The 27th Wiirttemberg Division, which was fresh and a good
1 In an order issued by German General Headquarters on August 11th, a copy of which
order was captured during our advance, General Ludendorff said : —
" According to the report of the officers sent by G.H.Q. into the area of operations of the
Second Army, the reasons for the defeat of the Second Army are as follows : —
" 1. The fact that the troops were surprised by the massed attack of the tanks, and lost
their heads when the tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken through under the
protection of natural and artificial fog.
" 2. The fact that scarcely any positions or obstacles worth mentioning existed, either in
the forward battle zone, or in the villages and broken ground farther back, to make a methodical
resistance possible there.
" 3. The fact that the available artillery, allotted to the battalions at rest and to the reserve
at the disposal of the higher command was wholly insufficient to establish fresh resistance with
artillery support against the enemy who had broken through, and against his tanks.
" The following conclusions are drawn from these facts : —
" 1. As I have already ordered in my tele-writer message la. 9718, Secret op. of the 8th August,
considerably more must be done to obtain information regarding the enemy's intentions by taking
prisoners, watching the ground by means of special observation posts, report centres, aerial recon-
naissance and listening sets, as owing to the present situation we must also expect surprise attacks
on other fronts. The closest vigilance is necessary at daybreak and in the early hours of the
morning, as surprise attacks usually begin at this time, and because a certain lassitude is often
prevalent among the men in the morning, after the strain on their nerves and endurance during
the night. The supervision of the troops at this time is especially necessary, in view of our late
experiences. Sufficient has been said on my part with regard to the organisation of infantry and
artUlery in depth.
" 2. Far more must be done than has hitherto been the case in the construction of trenches
and in the construction of defences against tanks. The dislike of the troops for trench digging
must be combated by all means possible.
" 3. The principle that troops, even if they are enveloped, must, if necessary, defend their
battle zone for days, to the last roimd and to the last man, if they do not receive any further orders,
appears to have been forgotten." * North of Morlancourt.
JuLY-AuG] PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE 17
fighting division, had only been brought down from the Lille area a few
days before in order to carry out an attack in the Morlancourt sector on
August 6th .1 It was not, however, proposed to attack along the whole
of the army front; hence, on that part of the front selected for owe
offensive, namely from the Amiens-Roye road to Morlancourt, it was
estimated that we should be opposed by six divisions. These divisions
were, it was believed, distributed as under : —
South of the Luce . . . . 225th Division (Prussians).
Hangard Wood Sector . . 109th Division (East Prussians).
Villers Bretonneux Sector . . 41st Division (East Prussians).
Accroche Wood Sector . , 13th Division (^Vestphalians).
Astride the Somme . . 43rd Reserve Division (Guard Corps
Depot).
Morlancourt Sector . . 27th Division (Wiirttembergers).
In consequence, however, of the advance of the Canadian Corps being
in a south-easterly direction, it was certain that soon after the start of
the attack the Canadians would come in contact with the 14th Bavarian
Division. The above divisions belonged to three corps, namely the
LI Corps holding south of the Luce, the XI Corps from the Luce to just
south of the Somme, and the XIV Corps thence northwards. All the
above corps formed part of the Second German Army commanded by
General of Cavalry von der Marwitz.
With regard to the enemy's reserves, it was anticipated that the
Germans would be able to reinforce the front with eight divisions by the
evening of August 11th. This number was an under-estimate, as will
subsequently be seen.
From the examination of prisoners, captured by our troops during
the period between July 18th and August 8th, it was ascertained that
General Mangin's victory on Jvily 18th had seriously affected the moral of
both officers and men. Moreover, according to prisoners recently returned
from Germany, the moral of civilians had been also very adversely
affected. The ability of the French to carry out such a successful
counter-stroke, after repeated assertions that the whole of the French
reserves were exhausted, had seriously shaken the confidence in the
German High Command, not only of the army, but also of the German
people.2
1 See page 26.
' The following order, issued by General Ludendorff on August 4th, shows how necessary he
must have considered it to raise the drooping spirits of his troops even before he received the
news of the attack on August 8th : —
" C.G.S. of the Field Army. G.H.Q.,
la. No. 9670. op. 4/8/18.
" I am under the impression that, in many quarters, the possibility of an enemy offensive
is viewed with a certain degree of apprehension. There is nothing to justify this apprehension,
provided our troops are vigilant and do their duty.
" In all the open warfare operations in the course of their great defensive battle between
the Marne and the Vesle, the French were only able to obtain one initial tactical success due to
surprise, namely that of July 18th, and this success ought to have been denied them. In the
fighting which followed, the enemy in spite of his mass of artillery, was unable to obtain the
lightest tactical advantage ; and yet, far from occupying prepared positions, our troops were
fighting in open country and were merely holding the positions which they had chanced upon at
the end of a day's battle. All the enemy's attacks broke down with sanguinary losses. It was
18 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [July-Aug.
The initial object to be attained by the operations of the Fourth
Army and the First French Army was to disengage Amiens and the
Paris-Amiens Railway by seizing the Amiens outer
"*' 'of th?auack"''' defences on the line Hangest-en-Santerre-Harbonnieres-
Mericourt-sur-Somme, at the same time establishing a
strong flank to the north of the Somme by the capture of the Chipilly
spur and the high ground south of Morlancourt. Such an operation,
if successful, would ease the situation enormously at the junction of the
allied armies, and would render Amiens safe from bombardment.
As the preparations progressed, however, it became apparent that the
situation offered such favourable opportunities for greater results that
General Foch decided to enlarge the scope of the operations by employing
French troops further to the south. On August 5th the Fourth Army
received orders that, if the initial attack was successful, the operations
should be continued by pushing south-eastwards in the direction of the
line Roye-Chaulnes with the least possible delay, thrusting the enemy
back in the direction of Ham and thus facilitating an attack by the
French from the front between Noyon and Montdidier.
The basis of the whole plan was secrecy, and the first essential,
therefore, was to ensure that the knowledge of the contemplated operation
should be in the possession of as few persons as possible.
^thrptafof^aUack' ^t the first conference, held by Sir Henry Rawlinson
on July 21st at Fourth Army Headquarters at Flixecourt,
only the Chief Staff Officer and Artillery Commander of the Fo\ui:h Army,
and the Commanders and Chief Staff Officers of the Canadian and
Australian Corps, together with a representative of the Tank Corps,
were present. Subsequent conferences were held every few days, but in
different places, so that the constant gathering of commanders would be
less likely to attract attention. The numbers attending the conferences
gradually increased as the date of the attack approached and it became
necessary for more officers to be consulted. The principle followed was
for staffs and formations to be informed as late as possible, but in sufficient
time to ensure that complete preparations could be made.
The first intimation given to divisions of the proposed operation was
on July 31st, and on August 4th the Army Commander held a conference
not the enemy's tactical successes which caused our withdrawals .but the precarious state of our
rearward communications.
" The French and British infantry generally fought with caution ; the Americans attacked
more boldly but with less skill. It is to the tanks that the enemy owes his success of the first
day. These, however, would not have been formidable if the infantry had not allowed itself to
be surprised, and if the artillery had been sufficiently distributed in depth. At the present moment,
we occupy everywhere positions which have been very strongly fortified, and we have, I am
convinced, effected a judicious organisation in depth of the infantry and artillery. Henceforward,
we can await every hostile attack with the greatest confidence. As I have already explained,
vfc should wish for nothing better than to see the enemy launch an offensive, which can but hasten
the disintegration of his forces.
" Commanders and men must be imbued with a bitter determination to conquer, both in the
defensive as well as in the offensive. This is a consideration which must not be lost sight of during
training. Hence, we must not, under the present circumstances, neglect the organised defensive
by devoting ourselves too exclusively to offensive tactics ; generally speaking, the organised
defensive is the more difficult. It is the latter, in fact, which imposes the greatest test upon the
spirit of the troops
" (Sgd.) LUDENDOBFF "
JuLY-AuG.] PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE 19
at the Cavalry Corps Headquarters at Auxi-le-Chateau, at which he
explained his plans to the divisional and brigade commanders of the
Cavalry Corps. The result of this secrecy was that the troops in the
firing line were not acquainted with the Army Commander's intentions
till about thirty-six hours before " zero." ^
As the Canadian Corps had been kept in reserve and had not been
involved in the March fighting, the enemy would certainly expect an
early offensive wherever it was identified. The first problem, therefore,
was to camouflage the move of the Canadian Corps from the First Army,
on which front the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions had recently gone into
the line, to conceal their presence in the Foiirth Army area until the
last possible moment, and to draw off the enemy's attention elsewhere.
With this object two Canadian battahons, two Canadian casualty clearing
stations, and the Canadian wireless section were moved by General
Headquarters to the Second Army and took over a portion of the fine in
the vicinity of Kemmel Hill, a very important tactical feature, which the
enemy had captured, and which he would naturally expect that we should
be anxious to regain. No Canadian troops were placed in the front line
on the Fourth Army front until just before " zero " on " Z " day.
It was realised that the large concentration of troops in the back
areas wovdd become knowTi to a number of junior officers and other
ranks of the administrative services and railways who must necessarily
assist in the move. This was bound to resiilt in a great deal of discussion
as to the object of the movement, and rumovu-s of it might reach the
enemy through his secret service in time to give him warning. Fortunately,
an excuse was forthcoming. In accordance with the orders of General
Foch, a British corps had been held in reserve west of Amiens, behind
the junction of the Foiuih Army and the First French Army. This
corps, the XXII, had recently been moved south to assist the French
armies on the Marne front. As soon as the concentration began to
become known it was allowed gradually to leak out that the Canadian
Corps, together with a brigade of tanks, a squadron of the Royal Air
Force, and a powerful force of heavy artillery, was taking the place of the
XXII Corps and was being concentrated west of Amiens ; also that this
force was to be ready to reinforce the junction of the French and British
Armies, or to move south against the flank of any hostile advance on the
French front. At the same time, in order to cause confusion of
thought, a rumour, previously in circulation, that the Canadian
Corps would relieve the Australian Corps was not denied. The resvdt
of all these conflicting reports was that opinion in England and at the
bases was about equally divided between Ypres, Arras, and Champagne
as the destination of the various reinforcing formations, but whether
they were for offensive or defensive piuposes was not kno^vTi.
In order to ensure concealment from hostile observation, all movements
whether by road or rail were undertaken at night, and aeroplanes patrolled
the army area by day to report any unauthorised movement. Ever\i;hing
also was done to indicate the continuance of normal conditions, and
' " Zero " was the term in use to describe the hour at which the assault would be launched,
and " Z " day the day of attack.
20 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [July-Aug.
work was actually continued on our rear defences up to the evening of the
day prior to " Z " day.^
With regard to the artillery, it was all-important that the enemy's
suspicions should not be aroused by an increase of fire prior to the attack.
In order to ensure surprise all registration of guns and previous bombard-
ment were prohibited, except in accordance with the normal artillery
activity on the front. In order to support the advance of the infantry with
a creeping barrage, accurate registration of the supporting artillery is
essential, and, however carefully g\ins may be calibrated and their
positions resected, it is always advisable to check calculations with a
few rounds in order to ensure that there shall be no error. In consequence,
programmes were carefully worked out giving the times at which guns
should fire and the number of rounds to be fired, so that, even though the
amount of artillery in the line had been doubled, the enemy should not
appreciate it. No work on positions likely to be visible by aerial observa-
tion was permitted, the guns being camouflaged and remaining silent.
The precautions taken were fully justified in the result, and the
success of the operation must be attributed in no small degree to their
faithful observance.
With the exception of the Cambrai offensive in November, 1917,
the operations in view differed in certain main essentials from any which
had been undertaken in 1916 and 1917. In the battle
afiMUng°°he'S °^ *^^ Sommc in 1916, at Arras and Messines in April
and June, 1917, and at the third battle of Ypres in
July, 1917, the attacks were launched against organised defensive
systems of great depth, provided with dug-outs, and, in 1917, with
' In order to bring home to every officer, non-commissioned officer, and man in the Fourth
Army his personal responsibility for maintaining absolute silence in regard to what was going
on around him, the following pamphlet, known as " Keep your mouth shut," was issued to all
ranks and pasted into the official small books carried by every officer and man : —
"KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUTl"
" The success of any operation we carry out depends chiefly on surprise.
" Do NOT T.4iK. — \\1ien you know that your unit is making preparations for an attack,
don't talk about them to men in other units, or to strangers, and keep your mouth shut, especially
in public places.
" Do not be inquisitive about what other units are doing ; if you hear or see anything, keep
it to yourself.
" If you hear anyone else talking about operations, stop him at once.
" The Success of the Operations and the Lives of yoxm Comhades depend upon your
.SnENCE.
" If you should ever have the misfortune to be taken prisoner, don't give the enemy any
information beyond your rank and name. In answer to all other questions you need only say,
' I cannot answer.' He cannot compel you to give any other information. He may use threats.
He will respect you if your courage, patriotism, and self-control do not fail. Every word you
say may cause the death of one of your comrades.
" Either after or before you are openly examined, Germans, disguised as British officers or
men, will be sent among you or will await you in the cages or quarters or hospital to which you
are taken.
" Germans will be placed where they can overhear what you say without being seen by you.
" Do NOT BE TAKEN IN BY ANY OF THESE TrICKS."
A copy of an order, issued by the 54th Reserve Division on or about August 21st, was
captured by the 47th Division. An extract from which ran as follows : —
"The Examination presented great difficulties, as the prisoners, especially those of the
23rd London, were apparently excellently schooled in the way they should behave if taken
prisoner, and gave very clever evasive answers. The captured sergeant refused absolutely any
information."
JuLY-AuG] PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE 21
concrete " pill-boxes " ; moreover, these systems were in all cases protected
by belts of strong wire. The situation, therefore, necessitated a preliminary
bombardment of considerable duration, which at once indicated to the
enemy not only the approximate front, but also the approximate date of
attack. Strategical surprise under such conditions was therefore
impossible. At Cambrai, on the other hand, a svirprise attack was
successfully launched against a strongly fortified position, but here the
ground lent itself exceptionally well, not only to the concealment of the
artillery, but, more important still, to the employment of large numbers
of tanks. In August, 1918, the conditions as regards the ground on the
Fourth Army front were very similar to those at Cambrai, and in addition
the attack was to be made, not against a strongly organised position, but
against one on which little work had been expended and which the enemy
continued to regard as an offensive front. A strategical surprise was, there-
fore, possible. It was, in consequence, decided that there should be no
artillery bombardment previous to " zero." The next factor that had to
be carefully considered was the question of man-power. Our losses in
March and April both in men and material had been very heavy, and,
although the material had in a large measure been replaced, the pro\ision
of men, especially trained men, caused grave anxiety. It was essential,
if the offensive was to be prolonged and produce large strategical
results, that economy in men should be looked upon as of outstanding
importance. The experiences of the Australians at Hamel on July 4th had,
it was hoped, provided the solution of the problem by the employment
of comparatively few infantry lavishly supported by tanks and artillery.^
During the previous six months, owing to tlae brilliant success of
the Cambrai attack, the expansion of the Tank Corps had been rapid.
Not only had the numbers of tanks available largely increased, but the
tanks themselves had been improved very materially in pace, ability to
mancBU\'Te, and in mechanical efficiency and reliability. Apart from this,
the training of the personnel both tactically and mechanically had been
put on a sound footing, and the Corps, as a whole, had reached a high state
of efficiency.
The front on which it was decided to attack extended from near
Moreuil on the south, as far as the Ancre on the north, a distance of
about 30,000 yards. Of this, the front from the Amiens-
the attack ° Roye road inclusive to the northern limit of attack
was allotted to the Fourth Army, and was subdivided
among the three corps as follows : —
Canadian Corps. — From the Amiens-Roy e road to the Villers
Bretonneux-Chaulnes railway (both inclusive), a total of 7,500 yards
as the crow flies, and about 9,500 along the British front fine.
' Previous to the Hamel operations, the Australian battalions, which were to carry out the
attack, had been very carefully trained, not only with tanks, but with the actual tank units
which were going to work with them in battle. With tanks, even more if possible than with
artillery, close liaison with the infantry is essential to success, and the results of the fighting at
Hamel emphasised very clearly the value of this training. Every effort was therefore made in
he time available to ensure that as many battalions as possible should carry out exercises with
anks before the battle commenced. This was possible with the Australian and III Corps
roops which had been with the Fourth Army throughout the summer, but could only be carried
ut in a minor degree with the Canadian Corps, owing to its having so recently joined the army.
22 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [July— Auo.
Atistralian Corps. — From the Villers Bretonneux-Chaiilnes rail-
way (exclusive) to the Somme, 7,500 yards,
/// Corps. — From the Somme to the Ancre, 7,000 yards.
North of the Ancre the front of the III Corps was to be held
defensively as far as the northern limit of the army front on the high
ground north-west of Albert. On the right of the Fourth Army, the
Commander of the First French Army allotted the front from Moreuil
to the Amiens-Roye road to the XXXI French Corps, on the right of which
acain the front was to be held defensively until such time as the situation
should develop with the advance of the Fourth Army. To the AustraUan
and Canadian Corps, assisted by the cavalry, fell the honoiir of carrying out
the main attack, whilst the XXXI French Corps on the right and the
III Corps on the left formed the defensive flanks.
The final objective ^ to be reached in the main attack, if possible on the
first day, was the Amiens outer defence hne, which has been previously
described. At the furthest point this objective entailed
The objectives an advance of 14,000 yards, whilst the average distance
from the " starting line " ^ was about 10,500 yards.
Even if strong opposition were not encountered, the mere distance to be
traversed would entail considerable fatigue to the infantry, which
would necessitate the relief of the leading bodies of infantry at different
stages in the advance. The Canadian Corps solved this problem on
the left by forming up two divisions on comparatively narrow fronts
and arranging for brigades of the same divisions to " leap-frog " ^ each
other ; on the right by placing one di\asion on a Avider front and " leap-
frogging " a reserve division through it. The Australian Corps solved it
by disposing two of its divisions on wide fronts and then " leap-frogging "
two reserve divisions through the front line divisions. The principle was
the same in both these methods.
The advance was to be made by bounds from objective to objective.
The first boimd covered a distance of between 3,500 and 4,000 yards,
that is to say, approximately the limit of range at which an effective
field artillery barrage could be maintained without moving the guns
forward. It was also anticipated that a very large number of the hostile
batteries, which had been located in the Cerisy-Gailly-Warfusee-Abancoiui;
valley, were within this distance and would be captured in the first bovmd.
The advance from the first objective to the second objective covered
a distance varying from 2,000 to 5,000 yards, and was arranged so as to
*)f » The objectives are shown on Map No. 3, " The attack of August 8th," as follows : —
Green line — First objective for all corps.
Red line — -Second objective for all corps.
Blue line — Third objective for the Australian Corps.
Blue dotted line — Third objective, or line of exploitation, for the Canadian Corps.
' The " starting line " is the line from which the infantry assault is launched. It is also
often called the " jumping off " line.
3 " Leap-frogging " is the term applied, in an attack against more than one objective, to
the method of advance whereby the leading unit or formation captures the first objective and then
halts, whilst the second unit or formation passes through it and attacks the next objective
Should there be a stiU further objective, the second unit then remains on the second objective whilst
a third unit passes through it and attacks the third objective. The term was introduced to
distinguish this method of dealing with a succession of objectives from that previously in use,
to which the leading unit or formation went right through to the furthest objective.
JuLY-AuG] PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE 23
bring the leading troops to a favoiirable line for consolidation, should a
fiirther advance on the first day be impossible. The advance of the
infantry and tanks from the first to the subsequent objectives was covered
by mobile groups of artillery. These were specially detailed to infantry
brigades beforehand, and held in readiness to advance in support of the
infantry as soon as the forward movement began. To give time for this
artillery to move forward, and for the " leap-frogging " troops to reach
their positions for the next advance, it was arranged that there should
be a halt of two hours after the capture of the first objective on the
Canadian and Australian Corps fronts before the advance was resumed.
The advance to the first objective was synchronised along the whole
of the Fourth Army front. The French troops, however, which were to
h ■ • co-operate on the right, had no tanks to assist them,
ySie att^k'°° ^^'^ *^^^i^ advance was therefore timed to begin forty
minutes after that of the Fourth Army, in order that
the enemy's positions in front of them might be subjected to an artillery
bombardment. After the initial assault it was only possible to synchronise
the successive advances of the Australian Corps and those of the two
northern divisions of the Canadian Corps, as the attacks of the III Corps
and of the southern division of the Canadian Corps were necessarily
independent, on account of the rough natiire of the groimd in the case
of the former, and of the difficulties presented by the crossing of the
Luce in the case of the latter.
Ten battalions of heavy tanks were available.^ Four of these bat-
talions were allotted to the Canadian Corps, four to the Australian
The allotm nt Corps, and one to the III Corps ; the remaining
of tanks*" battalion, which had recently been employed with the
First French Army, being held in army reserve. The
total number of fighting tanks available on August 8th was 456, of which
96 were whippet tanks.
The role given to the cavalry was to push through the leading infantry
of the Canadian and Australian Corps as soon as opportunity offered, and,
^^ J taking advantage of any opening that might occur, to
the cavalry secure the Amiens outer defences and hold them until
the arrival of the infantry. Subsequently the cavalry
was to move south-eastwards in the general direction of Roye and Chaulnes,
with a view to cutting the enemy's communications and to easing
the situation in front of the French. In order to ensure that no oppor-
tunity of passing through the infantry should be missed through the
■ Two kinds of heavy tanks were employed : the Mark V and the Mark V star. The Mark V
tank was exceptionally handy to manoeuwe, being able to twist and turn with a rapidity which
a year before would have been thought impossible. The Mark V star tank was similar in armament
and in its mechanism to the Mark V, but was six feet longer, this extra length having been given
to it with a view to enabling it to span a wider trench, and also to enable it to be used as a carrier
for infantry or machine-guns. It had, however, by this increase in length lost the power of
quick mancEu\Te and thus became an easier prey to the enemy's anti-tank guns. In both the
Canadian and Australian Corps one battalion of Mark V star tanks was assigned the task of
carrying mfantry or machine-gim detachments to the final objective. On arrival, the detach-
ments were to have been disembarked and to have held the position gained until the arrival
of the remainder of their units. As it turned out, the detachments in most cases were unable
to withstand the fumes and the heat of the engine, and, disembarking shortly after the start,
followed the tanks to the objective on foot.
24 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [July-Auo.
cavalry not being in the closest touch with the infantry, the 3rd Cavalry
Division was placed temporarily under the orders of the Canadian Corps
Commander, and one brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division under those of
the Austrahan Corps Commander. This arrangement was to continue
until such time as these bodies of cavalry had passed through the infantry,
when they were again to come under the direct command of the Cavalry
Corps Commander. Two battalions of whippet tanks, capable of moving
at a rate of about seven miles an hour, were allotted to the Cavalry Corps.
Of these, one company (sixteen tanks) from each battalion was detailed to
accompany the leading troops of the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions respec-
tively, their role being to assist the cavalry in exploiting any success
which might be gained.^
The control of the air throughout the days of preparation was of
the greatest importance, if the enemy were to be kept in ignorance of the
forthcoming attack. For some weeks prior to August 8th
RoyMAir°Force ^^^ Royal Air Force was busily employed in ensuring
a mastery over the enemy's aeroplanes, a work in which
it was entirely successful. The number of hostile aeroplanes engaged in
long distance reconnaissance was small, and only very few of the enemy's
machines crossed the line and operated over our forward area. When
they did succeed in doing this, they were prevented by our anti-aircraft
defence and aeroplane line patrols from obtaining any useful information
or doing any serious damage. It was essential to maintain this supremacy
throughout the battle. To achieve this the Army Commander had at his
disposal the 5th Brigade, Royal Air Force, consisting of the 22nd (Army)
Wing of eight scout squadrons, the 15th Wing of six corps squadrons, and
three other squadrons for bombing. He could also rely on the assistance
of the scout squadrons of the 9th Brigade, Royal Air Force, from General
Headquarters, and on that of seven bombing squadrons lent by other Army
Wings.
The six corps squadrons of the 15th Wing were allotted as follows :
the 35th and 5th Squadrons and the 3rd Australian Squadron
worked with the III, Canadian, and Australian Corps respectively. The
8th Squadron worked with the Tank Corps, and the 6th Squadron with
the Cavalry Corps. The remaining squadron, the 9th, was allotted the
duty of keeping the machine-guns of the III and Australian Corps supplied
with small arm ammunition on the second and third objectives.^
The duty of the corps squadrons was to keep the formations with
which they were working supplied with information regarding the progress
of the attack, and to carry out such additional tasks as were required of
them, e.g. drowning the noise made by the tanks when assembling, forming
smoke screens, and observing for the artillery. The eight scout squadrons
of the 22nd Wing were to be employed exclusively in bombing and engaging
with their machine-gvms suitable targets on the ground on the whole
army front. The scout squadrons of the 9th Brigade were to maintain
constant patrols at a high altitude over the battle front. The objectives
' See Appendix K. " The Adventures of a whippet tank on August 8th."
' Ammunition was dropped from the aeroplanes to the troops in the ordinary S.A.A. boxes
(containing 1,000 rounds) by means of small parachutes especially designed for this purpose.
JuLY-AuG] PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE 25
of the day and night bombing squadrons were the railway centres at
Chaulnes, Roye, Nesle, and Peronne, the crossings over the Somme, and
the roads and billeting areas which the enemy was likely to use.
It is not possible to describe in detail the work allotted to the Artillery,
Engineers, and Machine Gun Corps, nor adequately to record the important
The role of the P^^ played by these arms during the whole course of
ArtiUery, Engineers, and the operations which began on August 8th. Although
Machine Gun Corps little mention is made of the individual work of units of
these arms in this narrative, yet their work went on continuously with
little respite, and their infantry comrades are fully aware of what they
owe to their devotion and skill.^
Broadly speaking, for the attack on August 8th the artillery was
allotted two tasks. The first, to be carried out by about one-third of
the total number of guns available, was to form a creeping barrage,^
covering the advance of the infantry. The second, in which all the
remaining guns were to be employed, was the bombardment of every
locality known to harbour hostile guns, thus preventing the enemy from
cither using or removing them, whilst the long-range guns also dealt with
the villages and other localities suspected of being assembly places for
German reserves. At " zero " the creeping barrage was to fall 200 yards
in front of the infantry " starting line " and then pause for three minutes
while the infantry closed up under its protection. The barrage was then
to be lifted 100 yards every two minutes until it had advanced a further
200 yards, after which it was to slow down to lifts of 100 yards every
three minutes until it had moved forward a total of 1,000 yards from the
line on which it originally fell. From then onwards, up to the hmit of
range of the guns, it was to advance at the rate of 100 yards every four
minutes. The object of gradually reducing the rate of advance of the
barrage was to enable the infantry to keep close to it, and thus gain full
benefit from the protection it afforded.
In order to supply the staffs of formations and the fighting troops
with full information regarding the ground over which the attack was to
. take place and the nature and condition of the enemy's
and'p^hotogra'phr defences, a large nvmiber of special maps and photo-
graphs had to be printed and circulated. This entailed
an immense amount of work on the photographic section of the Army
Printing and Stationery Services, and on the Field Survey Battalion.
It was the task of the former to reproduce, to piece together as
mosaics, to distribute to the fighting troops and the headquarters of
formations, and in some cases to enlarge, the photographs taken by the
Royal Air Force. ^ Some idea of the amount of work involved will be
gathered from the fact that, between August 1st and 6th, 37,825 whole
plate photographs, 1,840 enlargements, and 4,500 mosaics were issued
' For details as regards the organisation and tactics of the Machine Gun Corps, see Appendix J
- See map No. 18, which illustrates the system of the creeping barrage.
3 Both vertical and oblique photographs were taken from the air. Vertical photographs
covering a large area were pieced together and then cut up into smaller areas to suit the
requirements of the various divisions. These mosaics were particularly valuable when used
in conjunction with the oblique photographs covering the same areas, and were used practically
as maps.
E
26 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 6th
to the troops, many being distributed to company, platoon, and section
commanders. The difficulty experienced was not so much the numbers
of photographs to be taken as the shortness of the time available in
which to reproduce them. This was due to the necessity for keeping
the attack secret for as long a time as possible.
The work thrown on the Field Survey Battalion was equally great.
It began in their case on July 29th, and within ten days 160,000 maps
were issued to the troops, while 119,300 special maps were printed. The
work of the Field Survey Battalion, however, was not confined to maps,
as the arrival of artillery units new to the area necessitated much work
in the field, including the fixing of positions for 128 new batteries.
A serious danger to be feared during the days prior to the attack
was a hostile bombardment with Yellow Cross gas. On several occasions
The danger of hostue during the preceding months the enemy had caused
gas shelling during heavy losscs and consequent disorganisation to our
the assembly of troops troops by means of concentrated bombardments of this
gas. Although not so lethal as the other kinds of gas, it was a much
more difficult type to combat, owing to its smell being so slight, and to
the consequent difficulty found by the troops in realising in time the
danger to which they were exposed. Moreover, its effects were often not
experienced until many hours later. In addition. Yellow Cross gas did not
disperse, but hung about for many days, especially in woods and enclosed
places, and, in the event of heavy gas shelling, experience had sho'wn that
the only effective remedy was to move the troops from the affected area.
Prior to the attack, when the whole area must of necessity be thick
with troops and batteries, this would be obviously impossible without
causing great confusion and altering the dispositions of troops just at the
moment when it was least desirable to do so. In order to reduce the
risks, therefore, L'Abbe Wood and other areas which had constantly
been subjected to gas shelling in the past were avoided as much as possible.
Arrangements were also made to open a heavy counter-battery fire on
any hostile gun positions from which gas should be fired, and, for this
purpose only, on the night preceding the attack, all available guns, whether
they had recently arrived in the area or not, were specially authorised
to fire should the enemy open a gas bombardment.
Two incidents which occurred shortly before the attack caused no
little anxiety as to whether the enemy would thereby obtain information
Minor hostile attacks regarding our impending operations. In the early
on August 3rd and morning of August 3rd an Australian post on the
August 6th Amiens-Roye road at Hotirges on the south bank of
the Luce was captured, and the enemy succeeded in taking prisoner a
sergeant and four men. Inquiries were at once set on foot, and it
was ascertained that not only was the garrison of the captured post
ignorant of our plans, but that the men had been overheard only the day
before discussing the prospects of another long spell in the line owing to
their having taken over a new front. Three days later, soon after dawn
on August 6th, before the divisional reliefs consequent upon the extension
of the III Corps front dowTi to the Somme had been completed, the enemy
attacked on a front of about 4,000 yards. The attack was made south
DIAGRAM So. I.
ASSEMBLY AREAS OF AUSTRALIAN CORPS PRIOR TO AUG.8^?*
Hot \o 3c».\e: Y)\st3.ncrsa are only &pproxims^is
^
>:^
/^
Third Ohjechve (Slzje I^ine)
Second Objec/ive ( 7?eJ Ljnc)
?
o
o
o
■o
Fm^} OhjecJive ((^reen L^ne)
Br:rj:h Fronl L. -.-:.■
M
JBJs. 3rJAuS.Div
IBJs 2nJAusDiv
IBJe
4ih.Aus.Div.
IBJe.
■4-}hAas.DJv.
\
V
JBJe
SlhAusDiv.
1 BJe
5}h AusDiv.
iBJe. 4-ih Aus.Div
IBde. 6 A AasBiv
IBJe
' 3rJAo3DJv.
JBJe.
3rJAu2Div
]BJe
2nJ.Aus.Div.
JBJe
2nJAusDiv
Holdinq irte Linp.
To capJure 3econJ
>■ OhjecJive AnJ ThirJ
Objective.
To c&pJure
Flr-jJ Oi>jecIive
To face page 27.
August 7th] PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE 27
of Morlancourt against the positions which had been gained by the 5th
Austrahan Division on July 29th. The 18th Division, which was holding
the sector, was at the time actually engaged in carrying out an inter-
brigade relief, always a most unfortunate moment at which to be attacked,
as the scheme of defence must necessarily be temporarily disorganised, and
the communications blocked by the incoming and outgoing troops. The
attack was carried out by the 27th AViirttemberg Division, which had
been brought down hurriedly from the Lille front with a view to stopping
the rot which had set in owing to the offensive policy of the Australian
Corps. The Wiirttembcrgers succeeded not only in penetrating our
lines to a maximum depth of 800 yards, but also in capturing some 200
prisoners, including some artillerymen engaged at the time in establishing
forward dumps of ammunition ready for the guns when they were brought
into position for the offensive. Luckily, either these prisoners did not
know of the contemplated operations owing to the system of secrecy
that had been in force, or, if they did, none of them disclosed what they
knew.^ The next morning an attack by the 18th Division partially
restored the situation and resulted in the capture of 70 prisoners. These
operations of necessity caused a local dislocation of plans on the front
of the III Corps, since they affected the " starting line " of the infantry,
and consequently the artillery programme. They also reduced both the
strength and vigour of the troops which were to be used in the main
operations, and caused the enemy to be much more on the alert than on
other parts of the front. The general situation, however, was in no way
affected.
The assembly of the infantry, owing to the large numbers of troops
of all arms in the forward zone, entailed very careful staff arrangements
and good march discipline, to ensure that everything
^''IhTteoo^ps °' worked smoothly and without undue fatigue to the
men. As the divisions of the Australian and III Corps
were already east of Amiens, only comparatively minor readjustments
were in their case required, but, even so, the assembly of the troops of
these two corps was no easy matter, as a brief explanation of the forming
up of the Australian Corps will show.
In view of the distance to which it was proposed to penetrate, and
of the great depth of the infantry formations throughout the attack, the
assembly of the infantry of the Australian Corps was organised in such a
manner as to reduce, to the greatest extent possible, the distance to be
covered by the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, which were detailed for
the capture of the most distant objectives. They assembled, therefore, in
areas between those occupied by the 6th and 10th Brigades of the 2nd
and 3rd Divisions, which were holding the line at " zero," and the areas
occupied by the remaining four brigades of those two divisions. The
6th and 10th Brigades were not to take part Avith their divisions in the
attack on the first objective, but were to be collected and brought into
'■ The records of the examination of these prisoners by the German Intellisience, as well as
that of the five Australians, were found amongst German documents subsequently captured. From
a study of these examinations it is clear that the Germans obtained no useful information or inkling
of our attack. This fact reflects the greatest credit on the manner in which our prisoners avoided
giving information to the enemy which could be of use to him.
28 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 7tti
reserve after the whole of the attacking troops had passed through them,
subsequently moving forward to rejoin their divisions. At " zero," there-
fore, the attacking troops of the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions were to
pass through the assembly areas of the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions,
and then through the brigades of their own divisions which were holding
the line. The relative positions in which the divisions were disposed for
forty-eight hours before " zero " is shown diagrammatically in Diagram I.
This arrangement, while it achieved its object, necessitated very good
control and accurate work on the part of the commanders and staffs, and
the fact that all went according to plan is a testimony to the organising
ability and discipline of the Australian Corps.
The divisions of the Canadian Corps had to be moved up gradually
from their concentration areas, which extended far to the west of Amiens,
and units had to be timed to reach their assembly positions at the appointed
hour.
Arrangements for the forward movement of the reinforcing artillery
were even more difficult ; not only was there a vast amount of traffic on
the roads which impeded their movement, but, in the case of that of the
Canadian Corps, it had to share the positions on the Gentelles plateau
with the French artillery.
The assembly of the tanks was no easy matter, owing to the necessity
for all movement taking place at night and for their being hidden away
or camouflaged by daylight. In addition, the noise of over 400 tank
engines droning away behind the army front was certain to be heard by the
enemy unless arrangements were made to cover it. This was carried out
by the Royal Air Force, which, for the four or five nights previous to the
attack, kept several machines flying over the line. On the night of
August 6th the tanks were moved up in groups to their preparatory
positions, which, in most cases, had to be reached across country and were
sited some two or three miles behind the front line. On the night of the
7th they were moved up to their assembly positions about 1,000 yards
behind the infantry "starting line," and there deployed into the exact
positions from which they were to advance in the early morning of the
8th. The exact route of every tank was minutely reconnoitred beforehand,
obstacles were removed, and in many cases tape lines to guide the drivers
were laid out.^ It speaks volumes for the efficiency of the officers and
men of the Tank Corps that almost every tank detailed for the initial
attack arrived to time and in its allotted position.
The Cavalry Corps, which had been concentrated in the valley of the
Somme between Amiens and Flixecourt, closed up into close billets and
bivouacs just west of Amiens on the night of August 6th, and, on the
night of the 7th, started at dusk and marched through Amiens to its
assembly position on the open ground in the fork between the Villers
1 Only one untoward incident marked the assembly of the tanks. One company of supply
tanks which had been allotted to the 5th Australian Division was assembled in an orchard in the
vicinity of Villers Bretonneux. During the afternoon of August 7th a lucky shot during a hostile
area shoot in this vicinity struck one of the tanks carrying petrol, setting it on fire. The fire
thus caused attracted the attention of the hostile gunners, and the enemy immediately subjected
the orchard in which the tanks were concealed to a heavy concentrated bombardment, destroying
almost the whole company of 25 tanks and their loads. The incident caused some uneasiness
as it was thought the enemy had discovered the presence of the tanks
DIAGRAM No. //.
fsA Wa'^c . L c^t'n^ Coy 5 of ea>c
/orm /St. if Ave m ts^o //nc
2nd VVA^e;
3 re/. WAve , Formed in SfrioJt\
^er^iort columns . /"*■/,
^ th Wi>.ve ; Formeef in
SmAlt section c ol un^ns
fhe M 0':> a-nd T M'^.
det^tfiJ to Qo XorwArd
v^ith Att&ck . K'/7/ <4CCC>/»7
jpc^ny f^his i^Ave a/so
Bd&- ForY>^&.r d Sinn&l
PAXty. ^
.5/A W(>ve ; darners . 1 ^■
from e&c/i Coy. in \ -
'3mA// columns. J
Note.:- Ciyides t^nd M^tker^ thui ^
Ta,pe.s And 'Pc.g:s •>
DIAGRAM SHOWING THE FORMING UP OF A BRIGADE
FOR A TRENCH-TO-TRENCH ATTACK
To face page 29.
August 7th] PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE 29
Bretonneux and the Roye roads. The two battalions of whippets, which
had arrived from the vicinity of Doullens on the night of the 6th and had
assembled under cover of the trees in the outer boulevards of Amiens,
joined the column as it passed. The column of three cavalry divisions
was a very long one, and only one road out of Amiens was available.
Only the most careful timings, therefore, and the strictest march discipline
enabled them to reach their assembly positions by " zero " (4.20 a.m.
August 8th). Forward of the assembly positions the mass of giins and
infantry, which was crowded behind the front line, necessitated a special
track being made by which the cavalry could advance without either
interfering with the infantry, through whose reserves they would have
to pass, or masking the artillery. This track was not made until the
night of the 7th and was very expeditiously constructed by the engineers
of the Cavalry Corps, assisted by a battalion of American engineers.
After the marshalling of the infantry divisions and brigades in their
allotted assembly areas, there remained yet another preliminary measure
to be taken which required care and accuracy. This
'^^the'^Jtotry ° Consisted in the lajdng out of the tapes from which the
leading infantry was to start off to the attack.^
An example of a method of forming up a brigade is shown in Diagram
II. Before " zero " the imits were led up to their positions by guides,
and were met on the tape line by markers who had gone up in advance.
Once in position the troops were not to move off their alignment until the
assault began.
" Zero " was fixed for 4.20 a.m., just over an hour before sunrise.
This hour was chosen so that the infantry could break the crust of the
enemy's defence under cover of darkness, and also in
"zero*' ° order that there should be sufficient light, before they
had gone more than a few hundred yards, to enable
them and the accompanying tanks to keep their direction.^
The preceding pages will give some idea of the difficulties that had
to be overcome, and of the magnitude of the task placed on the shoulders
of the commanders and staffs of all formations in pre-
'^'the'froopr °* paring for this operation. There were, however, very
few novices in the art of mounting an attack, and, in
spite of the short time available for completing the preUminary arrange-
' In laying out such tapes, certain considerations have to be borne in mind : —
1. It is essential that the troops should advance straight to their front, as a change of direc-
tion during the assault nearly always leads to loss of direction and consequent disorganisation.
2. The distance to be traversed by the infantry before reaching the enemy's front line must
not be too far.
3. The forming up position should be, if possible, on the enemy's side of the area on which
the hostile protective barrage is usually put down.
4. The necessary preliminary arrangements must not be observed by the enemy, or he
will receive warning of the impending attack. To ensure this, strong patrols should be pushed
out in front to cover the preparations.
2 The decision as to the hour of attack must alwajrs be difficult, especially when infantry
attack with the aid of tanks, as the requirements of the two arms must often be antagonistic.
Cover from view is desirable to protect a tank from hostile anti-tank fire, but a tank is valueless
unless it has sufficient light to keep its course and use its armament. For the infantry, on the
other hand, darkness is usually preferable in order to neutralise the enemy's machine-gun defence
and to avoid the risk of being caught in daylight in their assaulting positions, which must often
be in the open. The hour chosen was a compromise between the various claims, ajid subsequent
events proved the choice to have been quite satisfactory.
80
THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 7th
merits, all was ready by the evening of August 7th. It only remained to
hope for fine weather.
And so the morrow was eagerly awaited. Never before in the war had
the prospects of a great success seemed brighter, and nothing could have
exceeded the confidence in success which was felt by all ranks of the Fourth
Army from the highest to the lowest. Nothing on August 7th was more
remarkable than the spirits and supreme confidence of all the troops, to
whatever arm they belonged. It may be said without exaggeration that
so strong was this feeling, so high the moral, and so fixed the determination
to reach the furthest objectives at whatever cost, that the Battle of Amiens
was really won before the attack began.
CHAPTER III
THE BATTLE OF AMIENS ; THE ATTACK OF AUGUST 8TH
Maps 2 and 3 ; and Panoramic Photograph 1.
A summary of events on August 8th — The plan of attack of the Canadian Corps — The attack of
the 3rd Canadian Division — The Franco-British liaison force — The advance of the 1st and
2nd Canadian Divisions to the first objective — Their further advance to the second objective
— The advance of the 4th Canadian Division to the third objective — The capture of the
third objective by the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions — The result of the day's fighting bj
the Canadian Corps — The Australian Corps plan of attack — -The advance of the 2nd and 3rd
Australian Divisions to the first objective — The capture of the second objective by the
4th and 5th Australian Divisions — The Armoured Cars — The advance of the 4th and
5th Australian Divisions to the third objective — The result of the day's fighting by
the Australian Corps — The action of the Cavalry Corps — The III Corps plan of attack
— The disposition of the troops at " zero " — The attack on the first objective — The
advance against tlie second objective — The result of the day's fighting by the III Corps
— The work of the Royal Air Force — The attack by the First French Army — The situation
on the Fourth Army front on the evening of August 8th — The orders for August 9th.
The night of August 7th was fine, and the inactivity of the enemy's
artillery confirmed the view that he was in ignorance of the coming blow.
No untoward event marred the assembly of the
^on' August s^tT" ^ troops, and, except north of the Somme, the curse of
gas was absent.
Punctually at 4.20 a.m., with the first gleam of da^\^l of a typical
August day, the storm broke, and the British Army, which only a few
months before was in danger of defeat, had begun its march to the Rhine.
The first to start were the tanks, which, leaving their position of
assembly about 1,000 yards behind the infantry " starting line " some
minutes before " zero," had to time their advance so as to arrive close
up to the artillery barrage at the moment it fell. At " zero " our artillery
opened, and the creeping barrage fell 200 yards in front of the infantry
" starting line," and was then Hfted according to the prearranged
time-table.i
For some days previously the sound-ranging sections ^ and flash-
spotting observation posts, ^ sited well forward, had been engaged in locating
' See page 25.
2 These sections, which formed part of the Field Survey Battalion, were supplied with very
delicate instruments which measured to the minutest fraction the pace at which sound travelled,
and, by a very ingenious and accurate method of recording the noise of an explosion from several
positions some distance apart, could locate the position of hostile guns when they fired. Sound-
ranging was one of the many innovations which the discoveries of science introduced during the war.
^ These observation posts, scattered along the front, located the direction of the flashes of
hostile guns by visual observation, and, by taking cross bearings from two or more posts, were able
to locate the exact position of any particular gun when it fired
SI
32 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 8th
the enemy's battery areas in conjunction with the Royal Air Force. Con-
sequently, the moment the assault began the enemy's batteries, especially
those in the valley south of Demuin, around Wiencourt-l'Equipee, and in the
Cerisy-Gailly-Warfusee-Abancourt valley, were deluged by a hurricane
bombardment and neutralised to such an extent that the hostile artillery
retaliation was almost negligible.^ That the fire of the heavy artillery was
most effective was also proved by the number of dead horses found lying
in and about the enemy's battery positions.
There was a thick mist in the early morning which did not clear
completely imtil nearly 10 o'clock. Although this assisted us very
materially by concealing from the enemy the launching of the attack, it
made it difficult for the infantry and tanks to maintain direction. More-
over, communications were rendered difficult both for the enemy and
ourselves, and visual signalling was impossible. For the same reason,
the work of the contact aeroplanes co-operating with the infantry was at
first much restricted owing to the poor visibility, and early news of the
attack was slow in coming through.
South of the Somme the enemy was taken completely by surprise,
and all opposition was quickly swept aside by the impetuosity of the
Canadian and Australian advance. By 6.20 a.m. the first objective on
the greater part of Canadian and Australian Corps fronts had been
reached, and, after the pause of two hours arranged to allow the troops
destined for the next advance time to get into position, the assaulting
waves again went forward.
Nothing could stop the infantry and tanks, and the cavalry, eagerly
grasping the longed-for opportunity, went through. From that moment
the issue of the day was never in doubt ; thousands of prisoners and
hundreds of guns were captured. The disorganisation and rout of the
enemy were complete, and it was only distance and fatigue which caused
a halt on the final objective given to our troops for the day. North of
the Somme our advance was not so rapid. The enemy clung tenaciously
to the woods and gullies and gave grovmd only after determined fighting.
Sir Arthur Currie's plan, drawn up in circumstances of con-
siderable difficulty,^ was to attack on a front of three divisions, the
3rd Canadian Division on the right, the 1st Division in the centre, and
the 2nd Division on the left. Owing to the difficulties of the ground on
' The fire of our heavy artillery on all villages east of the second objective and south of the
Amiens-Chaulncs railway, with the exception of Le Quesnel, ceased at 10.50 a.m., six and a half
hours after " zero," so as to fit in with the infantry and cavalry programme ; on the latter village
it ceased an hour later.
2 Owing to the shortness of the time available between the arrival of the Canadian Divisions
in the area and the date of the attack, the Canadian Corps had little time in which to complete its
arrangements. The ground, which was new to the corps, had to be reconnoitred, and the plans
for the attack had to be made simultaneously with the concentration of the troops in the area
This task, already sufficiently formidable, was made yet more difficult by the fact that, for pur-
poses of secrecy, it was necessary for the 4th Australian Division to continue to hold the front
line until just before "zero." On August 4th, the Canadian Corps took over its sector
of attack from the Australian Corps, and, during the next three days, completed the relief of the
Australian troops in the support area. It was not, however, until the early hours of August 8th
that Canadian troops relieved the 13th Australian Brigade in the front line, the actual relief being
completed and the Australian troops withdrawn into reserve at 2.10 a.m., a little over two hours
before " zero." On relief, the 13th AustraUan Brigade moved to Aubigny to join the 1st Australian
Division.
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August 8th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 83
the right, it was desirable that the attack between Rifle Wood and Demuin,
both inclusive, should be carried out by one formation. This front com-
prised nearly half of the whole of that allotted to the
'^he^'cTnadian Corps° Canadian Corps, and it was considered that a whole
division would be required for its capture. The task was
allotted to the 3rd Canadian Division, the division, however, was only required
to carry the attack as far as the second objective (red line), after which
the 3rd Cavalry Division and 4th Canadian Division were to pass through
and capture the third objective (blue dotted line). The ground on the
left half of the corps front did not present the same difficulties, and it
was divided between the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions, which
were ordered to carry the attack through to the third objective (blue
dotted line). Of the four battalions of heavy tanks detailed to co-operate
with the Canadian Corps, one battalion of Mark V tanks was allotted to
each of the three leading divisions, and a battalion of Mark V star tanks
to the 4th Canadian Division to be employed in carrying forward Lewis
and machine-gun teams to the third objective.
On the right of the Canadian attack an Independent Force was formed
under Brig.-Gen. Brutinel, the commander of the Canadian Machine Gim
Corps. This force consisted of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine
Gun Brigades, the Canadian Cyclist Battalion, and one section of medium
trench mortars mounted on lorries. The role assigned to it was to pass
through the 3rd Canadian Division, form a flank to the corps bv
making good the line of the Amiens-Roye road between the second and
third objectives, and support the cavalry should it be able to advance
beyond the third objective.
The ground, which it was the task of the 3rd Canadian Division,
commanded by Maj.-Gen. L. J. Lipsett, to capture, consisted of a
TT, *f v f fi, 9 ^ plateau intersected by some deep ravines which ran
cUSnoLLion do^™ to the Luce. The river, which protected the
northern flank of the plateau, was an unfordable
obstacle with very marshy ground on both banks, the marsh being in places
as much as 200 yards wide. On the enemy's side of the river we onlv
held the small bridgehead at Hourges, and this was completely dominated
from the German trenches on the forward slopes of the plateau.
These slopes, however, were slightly convex, so that an advance of
about 1,000 yards from the bridgehead at Hourges would secure
dead ground. The difficulty was to assemble troops and tanks in this
small bridgehead, and to deploy them outwards from such a cramped
position.
Maj.-Gen. Lipsett decided to mass the 9th Canadian Brigade in the
bridgehead before " zero," at which hour a portion of it was to advance
rapidly, seize the edge of the plateau, and thus secure dead ground in
which the brigade could deploy. The remainder of the brigade was then
to move round eastwards along the river under the edge of the plateau
and outflank the enemy's defences. When the 9th Brigade had captured
the first objective (green line), the 7th Brigade was to pass through and
carry on the advance to the second objective (red line) on the whole
divisional front. The 8th Canadian Brigade was to capture Hangard, and,
34 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August Sth
operating along the north bank of the Luce as far as Demuin, was to assist
the right flank of the 1st Canadian Division.
The 3rd Canadian Division was assisted by the 5th Mark V Tank
Battalion, of which two companies, each consisting of fourteen tanks, were
allotted to the 9th Brigade, one company of fourteen tanks to the 8th
Brigade, and six tanks to the 7th Brigade.^ One of the tank companies
allotted to the 9th Brigade was assembled during the night of August 7th
on the south bank of the Luce, having, by permission of the 42nd French
Division, crossed the river before " zero " by the bridge at Thcnnes,
which was outside the 3rd Canadian Division boundary. The other
company assembled on the north side of the river close to the bridge at
Domart. It was not considered advisable for this company to cross the
river before " zero," as the danger of the enemy hearing the noise of the
engines crossing the bridge, which was less than 1,000 yards from his
lines, was too great. In spite of the difficulties caused by the lack of
crossings over the Luce and by the bad approaches to the bridges, the
assembly of the troops and tanks was carried out in silence and without a
hitch. The Australians were relieved, and the Canadian troops were in
their starting positions by 4 a.m.
All the tanks started from their assembly positions eight minutes before
" zero " ; at " zero " the artillery barrage opened, and the infantry,
keeping well up to it, advanced to the assault. The particularly heavy
mist which hung over the Luce valley, while undoubtedly helping to
reduce our casualties, made it very difficult for the troops to keep direction.
The 9th Brigade on the right attacked with the 43rd, 116th, and 58th
Battalions from right to left in the front line, and with the 52nd Battalion
in support ; the 8th Brigade, Avhich had a smaller front and a more
limited objective, attacked with the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifle Bat-
talion leading, and the 2nd C.M.R. Battalion in support ; the 4th and 5th
C.M.R. Battalions were held in divisional reserve. The hostile barrage,
which did not come doAvn until about five minutes after " zero," was
rather wild and not particularly heavy, though Domart bridge, as had
been expected, received a great deal of attention. Luckily, the soil on
each side of the road at this point was very marshy, and the effect of the
shells bursting on the soft ground was very much localised.
The task of the 43rd Battalion on the extreme right of the 9th Brigade
was a particularly difficult one. Owing to the glacis slope running down
to the Luce from the edge of Rifle Wood, a direct attack would probably
have been very costly. The 43rd Battalion, therefore, moved eastwards
a short way along the Luce and enveloped the wood from the north.^
Detachments entered the wood soon after 5 a.m., but it was not until
' In addition four supply tanks for carrying engineer material, ammunition, and stores were
allotted to the division, of which two were allotted to the 7th Brigade, which had the furthest
distance to go, and one to each of the other two brigades.
2 The care and thoroughness with which subordinate commanders worked out their detailed
arrangements for the attack are well illustrated by the accompanying sketch, which shows the plan
of the 43rd Battalion for the capture of Rifle and HoUan Woods. While one company made a
direct frontal attack, the remaining three companies moved to the north. These three companies
then swung to the south in succession, one company attacking Rifle Wood from the north, another
company similarly swinging round on Hollan Wood from the same direction, and the last company
making straight for Vignette Wood, which was known to contain a battery of guns.
Ort
ATTACK OF THE 9™ CANADIAN BEIGADE
"^ i^^^^ AUGUST S ■ leiB
copo yify
No. 12.
To face page 35.
CANADIAN ENGINEERS KILLING IN THE CRATER BLOWN BY THE
GERMANS IN THE BRIDGE AT HANGARD.
Bv kind pcrmissiott of the Canadian Goi'ernment.
No. I 3.
CANADIANS CAPTURING A l,tR.\L-VN C.UN NEAR MEZIERES.
By kind permission of the Canadian Government.
August 8th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 85
7.30 a.m. that the machine-gun nests were disposed of, and the wood
finally captured. Hangard fell into the hands of the 8th Brigade without
difficulty, and by 6.10 a.m. Demuin was occupied by the 58th Battalion.^
About 6.15 a.m. the 116th Battalion, by a turning movement, drove the
enemy from the Rifle Wood-Hangard road, thus assisting the 43rd
Battalion to clear Rifle Wood. By 8.30 a.m. the 9th Brigade had cap-
tured Hollan Wood, the 8th Brigade had reached its objectives, while
the 7th Brigade, which had followed up the 9th Brigade, was advancing
eastwards from Rifle Wood to its starting position for the advance to
the second objective. A gap of eighteen feet was found in the bridge
at Hangard, but it was promptly repaired by the Canadian Engineers,
and by 11 a.m. was ready for the passage of field artillery.
The advance from the first to the second objective met with little
resistance, many guns and prisoners were taken, and by 12 noon the
whole of the second objective within its divisional boundaries was in the
hands of the 3rd Canadian Division.^ This completed the task of the
division for the day, and the 4th Canadian Division began to pass through
on its way to the third and last objective of the Canadian Corps (blue
dotted line).
During the advance it was of the utmost importance that close touch
should be kept by the 3rd Canadian Division with the left of the First
French Army, especially as the latter was attacking
liaison'Torce ^^rty minutes later than the Fourth Army. This was
successfully accomplished by an international liaison
force which was commanded by a French officer and consisted of 30 men
of the 42nd French Division, with one mitrailleuse, and a platoon of the
43rd Canadian Battalion. The liaison force thus formed acted under the
orders of the officer commanding the 43rd Battalion. It proceeded along
the southern edge of Rifle Wood and assisted in the capture of Hollan
Wood.
Simultaneously with the 3rd Canadian Division, the 1st Canadian
Division, under the command of Maj.-Gen. A. C. MacDonncU, and the
The advance of the ^?^ Canadian Division, under that of Maj.-Gen.
1st and 2nd Canadian Sir H. E. Burstall, in the centre and on the left of
Divisions to the first the corps front respectively, advanced under cover of
objective ^.j^g barrage. The frontage allotted to both divisions
was practically equal and was about 2,500 yards wide at the " starting
hne," narrowing down to 1,500 yards and 2,000 yards respectively
on the final objective (blue dotted line). Each division attacked
on a front of one brigade, resuming the advance, as each successive
objective was reached, with fresh brigades which " leap-frogged "
the brigades which had carried out the previous attack. In the centre
the 1st Canadian Division detailed the 3rd Canadian Brigade and the 4th
Mark V Tank Battahon, consisting of forty-two tanks, to capture the first
> It was during this advance that Corporal Harry Miner, 58th Canadian Battalion, 2nd
Central Ontario Regiment, so distinguished himself. See Appendix E, No. 37.
- In this attack the 3rd Canadian Division completely defeated the 225th (Prussian) Division,
which was withdrawn the following day, having lost in prisoners alone 44 officers and 1,732 other
ranks. The Canadians also captured men of the 14th Bavarian Division and 192nd Division,
but the greater part of these divisions was opposed to the French.
86 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August Sta
objective. This brigade was reinforced by two battalions, one from each
of the reserve brigades, to ensure sufficient weight being available to
break the enemy's main line of resistance without delay. Regardless of
hostile posts which held out, the forward troops pushed on boldly and
quickly, leaving these strong points to be dealt with by the troops who
followed them.^ As a result of these tactics, fighting was at one time
going on simultaneously between Morgemont Wood and Aubercourt, an
area more than 2,000 yards in depth. In Hangard Wood a strong hostile
post at first checked a company of the 13th Canadian Battalion, but
Corporal H. J. Good dashed forward alone and killed several of the gar-
rison, the remainder then surrendering. ^ The western portion of the wood
was speedily cleared with the aid of tanks, as was also Morgemont Wood,
where a post with eight machine-gims was captured. The strongest
resistance offered by the enemy was in a trench running across the divisional
front just west of Aubercourt, and covering some of his main artillery
positions. Thence the advance met little opposition, and the first objective
was reached within the scheduled time at 6.20 a.m.
On the left the 2nd Canadian Division attacked with the 4th Canadian
Brigade leading, assisted by two companies of fourteen tanks each of the
14th Mark V Tank Battalion. In the initial stages of the advance consider-
able resistance was encountered by the 19th Battalion from a trench about
1,000 yards east of the "starting line," but this was quickly overcome with
the timely aid of the supporting tanks, which accounted for many nests
of machine-guns. The co-operation of the 7th Brigade of the 2nd Aus-
tralian Division on the left of the Canadians was also most effective.
The Amiens-Chaulnes railway, the boundary between the Canadian and
Australian Corps, had been strongly organised for defence, and there
were many instances of the Australians assisting the advance of the 2nd
Canadian Division with Lewis gun fire, as well as by sending small parties
of infantry to assist in the capture of machine-gun posts along the railway,
and of similar assistance rendered to the Australians by the 2nd Canadian
Division.
Soon after 6 a.m., when the heavy artillery lifted off Marcelcave, the 19th
and 21st Battalions, parties of which had worked round to the north of
the village, rushed it from the north and west. Heavy fighting occurred
in the southern portion of the village, but, with the assistance of the tanks,
the infantry succeeded in capturing the whole of it by 6.45 a.m., together
with a large number of prisoners. Meanwhile, the mist was lifting and
the enemy's field artillery and anti-tank guns, stationed east of the
village, directed a heavy fire on OTir tanks over open sights. This unfor-
timately resulted in heavy casualties to the tanks and their personnel,
but, to compensate for this, the 5th Brigade Canadian Field Artillery
and the 2nd Battalion Canadian Machine Gun Corps gave such efficient
close support to the advance that the 19th and 21st Battalions reached
their objectives by 6.55 a.m., and somewhat later Cancelette Wood ravine
was captured by the 18th Battahon. By 7.45 a.m. the first objective
• The capture of one of the strongest of these posts was achieved practically single-handed
by Private John Croak, 13th Canadian Battalion, Quebec Regiment. See Appendix E, No. 13.
' See Appendix E, No. 19.
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August 8th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 37
had thus been secured along the whole front of the 2nd Canadian
Division.
As soon as the leading brigades of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions
had reached the first objective, the creeping barrage was halted, and a
protective barrage was put down a few hundred yards
f^fh'J^ln'/.hi^Z in advance of the captured positions in order to deal
to the second objective u 'I-i ^ . .. i -r» • 4.u
With any possible hostile counter-attacks. During the
pause of two hours previously arranged, the 1st and 5th Canadian Brigades
closed up and, passing through the brigades on the first objective, formed
up ready to continue the advance. At 8.20 a.m. the artillery lifted its
fire, and the advance was renewed. The troops of the 1st Brigade went
forward without difficulty as far as Ignaucourt and Lemaire Wood.
Hostile machine-guns holding the western edge of Lemaire Wood disputed
our advance, but were forced to surrender their positions when shelled
by the supporting field artillery. On the right of the attack the Canadians
came under heavy direct fire from the hill north of Cayeux. The village
was, however, taken at a inish, and by 11.30 a.m., after some resistance
on the southern edge of Ruisseau Wood and on the high ground north
of Cayeux, the second objective had been gained without further difficulty
along the front of the 1st Canadian Division. On the left the 5th
Brigade encountered little resistance from the enemy's infantry, but a
stubborn defence was put up by a large number of machine-guns
scattered throughout the area. Many of these machine-guns were con-
cealed in the standing crops, and had to be dealt with one by one by the
infantry and tanks, as their positions were not sufficiently defined for the
artillery to engage them with success. On the other hand in Pieuret
Wood, where our advance was held up for a short time by the fire from
nests of machine-guns, the field artillery was of great assistance and very
soon drove the enemy from the wood towards Wiencourt-l'Equipee. By
this time the gradual improvement in visibility materially assisted the
enemy's machine-gunners in engaging our troops, and consequently a
number of casualties were suffered when crossing the crests of the ridges
during the advance.
Little opposition was encountered in Wiencourt-l'Equipee, but there
was heaxy fighting in and around Guillaucourt, which was effectively
shelled by the Canadian field artillery, assisted by three guns and two
howitzers captured from the enemy in Pieuret Wood. By 12.10 p.m.
Guillaucourt had been captured, and the 5th Canadian Brigade moved
forward to its objective. Soon after this the second objective was reached
on the whole front of the 2nd Canadian Division.^
At 5.20 a.m., exactly an hour after the attack began, the 4th Canadian
Division, under the command of Maj.-Gen. Sir David Watson, began its
1 In this attack the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions were opposed, contrary to expectation,
by two divisions, namely, the 117th and the 109th, the latter being in process of relief by the
former. This was fortunate for us, as, first, we found the enemy in a state of disorganisation owing
to the relief, and, secondly, our attack practically overwhelmed two divisions, one of which would,
but for the fact of this relief, have been available as a reserve in back areas. Both these di^^sions
suffered heavy losses, 48 officers and 1,810 other ranks of the 117th, and 25 officers and 869 other
ranks of the 109th being captured. These divisions were withdrawn from the line on August 11th
and 12th respectively, and the 109th division was shortly afterwards disbanded. One regiment
of the 41st Division was also in this area.
38 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 8th
advance and moved forward to the general line of the HoUan Wood-Demuin
road. It had been detailed to pass through the 3rd Canadian Division,
The advance oi the 4th ^^^' following up the 3rd Cavalry Division, to seeure
Canadian Division to the third objective. The 1st Tank Battalion, which
the third objective -^vas attached to this division, consisted of thirty-
four Mark V star tanks, each of which carried one machine-gun and two
Lewis gun detachments. The tanks were to precede the infantry, and,
having reached the third objective, were to disembark the detachments,
which were to hold that line until the arrival of the infantry.
It was not possible to foretell the exact hour at which the division
would pass through the 3rd Canadian Division on the second objective,
but, as soon as news was received that the second objective had been
captured, Maj.-Gen. Watson issued orders for the advance to begin;
at 12.40 p.m. the leading brigades with the tanks passed through the
3rd Canadian Division. The advance was made with the 11th Brigade
on the right, the 12th Brigade on the left, and with the 10 th Brigade and
the 4th Battalion Canadian Machine Gun Corps in support.
About three hours before the 4th Canadian Division began to
advance from the second objective, the 3rd Cavalry Division had
passed through the 3rd Canadian Division, with the Canadian Cavalry
Brigade leading. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade captured Beaucourt
village and reached the outskirts of Beaucourt Wood, which was
found strongly held. A gallant attempt to gallop the wood was
not successful. When the 11th Canadian Brigade arrived on the
scene, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was holding the eastern edge of
Beaucourt village, but all attempts to advance beyond this were held
up owing to machine-gun fire from Beaucourt Wood, which swept the
open ground over which the advance must be made. The commanding
officer of the 54th Battalion, after a daring personal reconnaissance,
realised that no further headway could be made until the wood was taken,
and that unless it was taken at once the advance of the whole brigade,
and also of the division, was in danger of being checked. Notwithstanding
that the wood was outside his own line of advance, he decided to attack
it. No artillery, trench mortar, or machine-gun support was immediately
available, but without any hesitation he deployed two platoons of his
reserve company, and at a given signal led his men to the assault.
Despite the entire absence of cover and the deadly intensity of the enemy's
machine-gun fire, the gallant survivors effected an entry into the wood.
At this moment the 102nd Battalion most opportunely arrived, and, with
the assistance of the 72nd Battalion of the 12th Brigade, which attacked
simultaneously from the north-west, succeeded in clearing the wood by
4.30 p.m. after stiff fighting, and in establishing a line on its southern
edge.
South of Beaucourt Wood the ground was very open and devoid of
cover ; consequently, when attempts were made to push forward to Le
Quesnel, the Canadians suffered a considerable number of casualties from
machine-gun fire from Fresnoy-en-Chaussee and the outskirts of Le Quesnel.
As the resistance increased towards the evening it was decided to postpone
the attack on Le Quesnel until next morning, and o\ir line was consolidated
August 8th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 39
on the eastern edge of the plateau north of Fresnoy-en-Chaussee and
along the southern edge of Beaucourt Wood.
On the left of the 4th Canadian Division advance, the 12th Brigade,
upon emerging from the Peronne and St. Quentin woods, came under
heavy fire, chiefly from the right front, where the enemy had many
machine-guns posted on the edges of the woods and in the chalk pits.
The opposition was finally overcome by successful co-operation between
a company of the 78th Battalion, the 13th Battery of Canadian Field
Artillery, four or five tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion, and a medium
trench mortar, during which the company of the 78th Battalion was
handled with conspicuous skill by Lieut. Tait.'^ The 12th Brigade then
pressed forward and by 6.15 p.m. had occupied the final objective.
In the meantime, about 11.15 a.m., while the 2nd Canadian
Division was employed in clearing Guillaucourt, the 9th and 2nd
Th ture oJ the Cavalry Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division, which
third objective by had followed closely behind the infantry, passed
the 1st and 2nd through and reached the Amiens outer defences
Canadian Divisions ^^^^j^ ^j ^^^ railway. Behind them on the right,
the 2nd Canadian Brigade, which had assumed the lead in the
1st Canadian Division, started from the second objective at 11.30 a.m. ;
advancing rapidly, it cleared Caix and arrived at its final objective about
1.15 p.m. On the left the 6th Canadian Brigade, detailed to carry forward
the advance of the 2nd Canadian Division to the final objective, was at
1 p.m. in position east of Marcelcave waiting for orders to move through
the 5th Brigade. These orders were not received until 2.30 p.m. o^^^ng
to the difficulties which had been experienced by the 2nd Canadian Division
in maintaining its communications. By 4.30 p.m., however, the 6th
Brigade had passed the second objective, and, advancing without meeting
any resistance, arrived at the final objective on the Amiens outer defences
at 5.35 p.m.
As the result of the day's fighting, the Canadian Corps had
captured the villages of Hangard, Demuin, Aubercourt, Marcelcave,
The result of the Beaucourt, Ignaucourt, Cayeux, Wiencourt-l'Equipee,
day's fighting by Guillaucourt, and Caix, and had secured the whole of its
the Canadian Corps objectives except on the right, where the enemy
still stubbornly defended the village of Le Quesnel. On the left the
2nd Canadian Division had penetrated the enemy's territory to a depth
of 14,000 yards, and had established connection with the Australian
Corps on the Amiens outer defences south-east of Harbonnieres. On the
right the Independent Force had done fine work during the day and
had materially assisted the advance of the left of the XXXI French
Corps, especially in the capture of Mezieres. At nightfall the Canadian
Corps was in touch with the French on the Amicns-Roye road north of
Fresnoy-en-Chaussee. One hundred and foiu-tccn officers, 4,919 other
ranks, and 161 guns were captured by the Canadians, together with
several hundred machine-guns and large quantities of Avar material.
The manner in which the Canadian Corps, in spite of the short time
it had had for preparation and of the difficulties it had to overcome on its
* See Appendix E, No 42.
40 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 8th
right, carried out the task allotted to it on August 8th will always rank
as one of the finest performances accompUshed by this famous corps during
the Great War,
On the left of the Canadians, the Australian Corps was to attack
between the Amiens-Chaulnes railway and the Somme. Sir John
Monash decided that the operation should be
'**' ^^^'of ^ta^cr'' carried out on a front of two divisions. He detailed
the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions, on the right and
left respectively, to capture the first objective, on reaching which there
was to be a pause of two hours in the advance. This pause was arranged
to give time for the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions to pass through and
captui-e the second and third objectives, the latter including the Amiens
outer defences. It was synchronised with a similar pause of two hours
in the advance of the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the Canadian Corps. The
1st Australian Division, which had only arrived from the north on
August 7th, was held in corps reserve about Allonville and Daours.^
At 4.20 a.m. the 2nd Australian Division, under the com-
mand of Maj.-Gen. C. Rosenthal, and the 3rd Australian Division,
The advance of the 2nd Under that of Maj.-Gen. J. Gellibrand, attacking with
and 3rd Australian the 7th and 5th, and the 9th and 11th Brigades,
Divisions to the first respectively, moved steadily forward under the
objective barrage towards their objectives. Each attacking
brigade was allotted one company of twelve tanks of the 2nd and
13th Mark V Tank Battalions, of which, generally speaking, sections
were sub-allotted to battalions.^ Notwithstanding the hea'\'y mist
which, combined with the smoke shell and the dust raised by
the barrage, made the maintenance of direction difficult, the attack
was driven home with great energy. The resistance met with
was generally weak, hostile machine-gun nests and strong points
cavising the only difficulties. One of these strong points which was
temporarily holding up the advance was dealt \vith by Lieut. Alfred
Gaby, 28th Australian Battalion, who, single-handed, compelled the
surrender of 50 Germans with four machine-guns. ^ Some stout-hearted
Germans in the neighboiu-hood of Warfusee-Abancourt put up a good fight,
but an encircling movement by the infantry assisted by tanks soon resvdted
in their capture, together with a 5"9-inch battery complete with its officers.
It had been expected that the capture of Accroche Wood, which lay just
within the enemy's lines, would prove a difficult task, but the surprise
of the enemy was so complete and the fog so dense that the garrison, which
was a large one, was overwhelmed and driven by our barrage into its
dug-outs, from which for the most part it emerged only to surrender. At
different points, where the groimd was more difficult, the rate of advance,
^ M)wing to the fact that the 13th Australian Brigade had been ordered to hold the Canadian
Corps front of attack until the early morning of August 8th, the 1st Australian Brigade had been
lent to the 4th Australian Division to replace it. The 4th Di\Tsion, on August 8th, therefore
consisted of the 1st, 4th, and 12th Brigades, whilst the 1st Division consisted of the 2nd, 3rd,
and 13th Brigades.
' One supply tank, loaded up with ammunition and engineer stores of all kinds, was also
allotted to each infantry brigade.
^ See Appendix E, No. 18.
i
s= *
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August 8th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 41
owing to the density of the mist, was slower than had been expected,
and the infantry was iinable to keep close up to the barrage. The dangers
resulting from this were neutralised, however, by the good work of the
tanks which were of the greatest possible assistance in attacking strong
points, thus enabling the infantry to capture them at small cost.
On the right a liaison force of two infantry companies was given
the task of ensuring the maintenance of touch with the 4th Brigade of
the 2nd Canadian Division, which also detailed a party for the same
purpose. As a result the closest touch and excellent co-operation were
maintained throughout the advance.
3yjG.20 a.m., or soon afterwards, the whole of the first objective had
been captured'; the creeping barrage was then halted, and the protective
barrage was put down while the infantry reorganised.
During the pause on the first objective the 5th Australian Division,
under the command of Maj.-Gen. Sir J. J. T. Hobbs, and the 4th Aus-
The capture of the tralian Division, under that of Maj.-Gen. E. G. Sinclair-
second objective Maclagan, which had been following behind the 2nd
by the 4th and 5th and 3rd Australian Divisions, passed through them, the
Australian Divisions ^^^^^ g^,^^ ^2th^ ^^^ ^^^ Brigades leSding, from
right to left, and took up their positions ready to continue the advance
at 8.20 a.m. There were attached to each of these four brigades
a brigade of field artillery and a section of an engineer field
company, the whole forming a brigade group under the infantry brigade
commander. The field artillery of these two divisions had previously
been assisting in the barrage which covered the advance to the first
objective, but had kept its gvm teams handy, and, directly the infantry
had reached the first objective, it limbered up and moved forward to
join its brigade groups. Each division was given thirty Mark V tanks,
which had not been engaged in the first phase, from the 2nd, 8th, and
13th Tank Battalions, and was also given one and half companies of the
15th Tank Battalion, equipped with Mark V star tanks, to carry machine-
gun and Lewis gun detachments. These tanks advanced close in rear
of the attacking brigades, ready to move forward to the third objective as
exploiting detachments as soon as the second objective had been reached.
Meanwhile, behind the attacking divisions the 1st Cavalry Brigade,
with sixteen whippet tanks, moved up in the closest touch with the infantry,
ready to dash forward the moment the opportimity arrived. The 17th
Armoured Car Battalion, consisting of twelve cars, also moved up as soon
as the crews, helped by the 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion, had repaired
the road sufficiently for the cars to pass.
Ptmetually to time, at 8.20 a.m. the advance to the second objective
began. The enemy's artillery retaliation on the front of the 5th Australian
Division was shght, and, shortly after leaving the first objective, the infantry
came upon the enemy's battery positions. In the majority of cases the
detachments had already abandoned their guns, but in some cases they
stuck manfully to their positions and only surrendered when the batteries
were captured at the point of the bayonet. On the right just east of
Marcelcave, a battery of 5'9-inch howitzers was encountered firing at the
infantry over open sights. One company of the 57th BattaUon, 15th
/
I
42 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 8th
Brigade, manoeuvred to attack the howitzers, while a tank drove straight
at the battery, only to be knocked out at forty yards' range before
reaching it. Meanwhile, a second tank worked round the flank, and, as
soon as it was discovered, the enemy jumped out of their gun-pits and
surrendered. The village of Bayonvillers was not attacked frontally
until after it had been outflanked by the leading battalions. The 58th
Battalion, assisted by six Mark V tanks, was given the task of " mopping "
it "up,"^ which was accomplished without much difficulty. By about
9 a.m. the leading battalions of the 5th Australian Division had reached
the second objective, and about a quarter of an hour later the 1st Cavalry
Brigade pushed its advanced guards through the right brigade of that
division.
On the left the 4th Australian Division was almost equally successful,
but, as the attack of the III Corps had not been able to progress as rapidly
as that of the Australians, the enemy's artillery and machine-gun fire
from the Chipilly spur, north of the Somme, caused casualties among the
infantry and unfortvmately knocked out a large number of tanks. In
spite of the severity of this fire, the attacking units advanced in good
order, meeting with some resistance on the right from Lena Wood.
This was speedily overcome, and several guns were captured. Prisoners
came in freely throughout the advance, and many field and heavy
guns and howitzers fell into our hands. In many localities machine-
g\in nests were encountered ; these were either dealt with by tanks or quickly
outflanked and rushed by the infantry. By 10.30 a.m. the 4th Australian
Division had reached the second objective all along its front.
Shortly before the second objective was reached, the 17th Armoured
Car Battalion, seeing that there was httle resistance to the advance,
went through the infantry along the main Amiens-
The armoured gj-jg j-^ad, and after passing through a light
artillery barrage, succeeded in obtaining excellent
targets. After reaching La Flaque the crews of the armoured cars
inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy by shooting do^vn the valley
west of Foucaucourt. The road here soon became blocked with hostile
transport, the drivers of which, taking alarm at the sight of the cars,
lost control of their animals, and many of the vehicles collided and fell
across the road. The armoured cars then tm*ned north and south to
Proyart and Framerville. At the latter place many of the enemy were
killed, much of his transport was destroyed, and the hostile rear services
were thoroughly disorganised. At Proyart the armotired cars surprised some
of the staff of the LI Corps Headquarters snatching a hasty meal, appar-
ently ignorant that the battle had come so near. Their surprise was
short-lived, for fire was opened on them through the windows of the room
in which they were sitting. It was an unlucky chance that the Corps
Commander had left in his car only about half an hour before the arrival
of the armoured cars. The cars then patroUed the area until dusk, greatly
adding to the enemy's demoralisation.
1 " Mopping up " is a term commonly used to describe the clearing of trenches, dug-outs,
fortified posts, etc., in which the enemy continues to hold out after the leading waves of an
attack have passed.
z
z
s
August 8thJ THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 43
So rapid had been the advance to the second objective that the
Mark V star tanks, which had been detailed to follow up the cavalry to
the Amiens outer defences, were not able to come up
4th and 5th Australian in time, and the 15th and 8th Brigades of the 5th Aus-
Divisions to the third tralian Division, and the 12th and 4th Brigades of the
obiective ^^j^ Austrahan Division, after a short interval for re-
organisation, decided to push on without them. The 15th Brigade
and its attendant tanks, having " mopped up " Harbonnieres and
hoisted the Australian flag on the church tower, arrived at the third
and final objective without difficulty about 10.30 a.m., the 8th
Brigade reaching it about half an hour later. The brigades of the
4th Australian Division, owing to the losses incurred from the hostile
fire on the left flank, were not ready to advance as early as those of the
5th Australian Division. They moved off from the second objective
about 11 a.m. and again incurred heavy casualties, as the enemy had
brought more guns into action on the north bank of the river. Taking
advantage, however, of the folds in the ground and of all other available
cover, and making light of the enemy's machine-gun defence, the division
pushed gallantly on, using clever enveloping tactics, and soon after noon
reached the final objective. As the troops on the extreme left were
exposed to enfilade fire and to fire from their rear, the flank of the left
battalion was s-v\Ting back south of Mericotu-t-sur-Somme. As soon as
it was seen that the advance north of the river was checked, the 1st
Brigade, which had been held in reserve to the 4th Australian Division,
established an outpost line along the southern bank of the Somme west-
wards from Morcourt.
The final result of the day's fighting by the Australian Corps was the
capture of the whole of the objectives allotted to it, except a small portion
The result of the day's *^^ ^^^ extreme left. The villages of Warfusee- Abancom't,
fighting by the Lamottc-en-Santerre, Bayonvillers, Harbonnieres, Mor-
Austraiian Corps com-f, Gailly, and the greater portion of the village
of Cerisy-Gailly had been taken, and touch had been established on the
right with the Canadian Corps. On the left, however, a junction with the
III Corps had not been effected, the situation north of the river still
being obscure.
One hvmdred and eighty-three officers, 7,742 other ranks, ^vith
173 guns and numerous machine-guns, trench mortars, and anti-tank
rifles were captured during the day, whilst the casualties of the corps
were not only very slight, but were much less than the number of prisoners
taken.i Never had the Australian Corps had such a successful day, and,
as it was the first time it had been in action as a corps of five divisions,
the result was especiaUy satisfactory both to it and to its commander.
Sir John Monash. Moreover, not only their careful preparation for the
attack itself, but all their laboiu- and' persistent offensive tactics of the
previous three months were reaping a splendid harvest.
' In this attack the Australians were opposed by the 41st (East Prussian) and 13th (West-
phalian) Divisions on cither side of the Amiens-Brie road, as well as by elements of the 108th
and -ISrd Reserve Divisions, which were relievinc; each other astride the Somme. So severely
were the 108th and 43rd Reserve Divisions handled in this and the subsequent days' fighting
that they were both shortly afterwards disbanded.
44 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 8th
Before describing the attack of the III Corps north of the Somme,
it is necessary to give a more detailed accovint of the dashing work done
by the Cavalry Corps in the main attack on the opening
"JaU'ry'Sofpf' d^y of the Battle of Amiens.
At " zero " the troops of the Cavalry Corps, having
passed through Amiens, were concentrated in the triangle formed by the
Villers Bretonneux and Roye roads east of Longueau. At 5.20 a.m.
the heads of the 1st and 9th Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division (1st,
2nd, and 9th Brigades), commanded by Maj.-Gen. R. L. MuUins, were
about one mile north-east of Cachy. The 3rd Cavalry Division (6th, 7th,
and Canadian Brigades), commanded by Maj.-Gen. A. E. W. Harman, was
also well forward just west of Cachy, with the Canadian Brigade lead-
ing. The 2nd Cavalry Division (3rd, 4th, and 5th Brigades), commanded
by Maj.-Gen. T. T. Pitman, was in reserve at the road junction east of
Longueau. Following the Canadian Corps as it advanced, the 3rd Cavalry
Division Avas confronted with the difficulty of crossing the Luce, but,
owing to the successful reconnaissance carried out by the cavalry patrols
which had accompanied the infantry, and to the excellent arrangements
made for crossing trenches, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade started to cross
at Ignauco^irt at 9.20 a.m.
At this time the two leading brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division were
astride the Villers Bretonneux-Chaulnes railway near Marcelcave, with the
9th Cavalry Brigade south of the railway following the 2nd Canadian
Division, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade north of the railway in rear of the
5th Australian Division. The remaining brigades of the 3rd and 1st
Cavalry Divisions were following close behind, and the 2nd Cavalry
Division, with the reserve whippet tanks, was massed on the plateau
between Cachy and L'Abbe Wood.
The 3rd Cavalry Division, having crossed the Luce at Ignaucourt,
passed through the infantry. On approaching Beaucoiirt, which was
held by the enemy, two parties of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade worked
roimd to the north and south of the village. The southern party, consist-
ing of two troops of Strathcona's Horse, reached the Amiens-Roye road
without difficulty, and penetrated as far as Fresnoy-en-Chaussee, where
125 prisoners were captured. The further advance of this party was,
however, held up south-west of Beaucourt Wood. The northern party,
consisting of the Royal Canadian Dragoons M'ith eight whippets, was
also checked north-west of the wood. The whippet tanks came into
action in support, but were unable to reach the wood on account of the
fire of the enemy's field guns. Beaucourt village was captured by the
main body of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade with great dash, but it was
unable to advance east of the village. The situation in front of Beaucourt
Wood remained unchanged until the arrival of the 11th Brigade of the 4th
Canadian Division, which passed through the Canadian cavalry and
captured the wood later in the day.^
On the left of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, the 7th Cavalry Brigade
pushed forward south of Cayeux and carried the wood south of the village
at the gallop, taking 200 prisoners. It then gained the high ground south
* See page 38.
•^
a:
02
O
'J
August 8th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 45
of Caix in the next bound and captured another 100 prisoners, five machine-
guns, and six heavy guns. The 7th Cavalry Brigade was followed by the
6th Cavalry Brigade, which, after passing through Cayeux Wood, advanced
in a southerly direction towards Le Quesnel. Hostile machine-guns in
Beaucourt Wood and Le Quesnel checked the right of the brigade, but
the left pushed forward in conjunction with the 7th Cavalry Brigade, and
by 2.35 p.m. had occupied the Amiens outer defences, which it held until
the arrival of the 4th Canadian Division.
Hearing of the resistance encountered in Beaucourt Wood, Sir
Charles Kavanagh ordered two brigades of the 2nd Cavalry Division
forward from corps reserve with a view to their assisting the left of the
3rd Cavalry Division by moving north of the Luce ; the successful advance,
however, of the 7th Cavalry Brigade enabled the 3rd Cavalry Division to
reach its objective on the left unaided.
Meanwhile, the 1st Cavalry Division passed through the infantry of
the 2nd Canadian and 5th Australian Divisions when they reached
the neighbourhood of Guillaucourt and Bayonvillers. The 1st Cavalry
Brigade, north of the railway, advanced rapidly to Harbonnieres,
which it enveloped, moving north and south of the village. The 5th
Dragoon Guards from the 1st Cavalry Brigade then pushed on towards
Vauvillers, but, finding it strongly defended, masked it with one squadron
and swung round to the north between it and Framerville. During this
movement the regiment captured a train full of reinforcements, securing
600 prisoners and a battery of guns. The opposition now became too
great to allow of a further advance eastwards, and in consequence the 1st
Cavalry Brigade, about noon, moved southwards to help the 9th Cavalry
Brigade, which, operating south of the railway, had encountered considerable
opposition from enemy machine-guns between Caix and Guillaucourt.
Avoiding these machine-guns, the 9th Cavalry Brigade gained the valley
south of Harbonnieres and, working up the valley, had by 1 p.m.
reached the Amiens outer defences south-east of Harbonnieres, on the
right of the 1st Cavalry Brigade. In order to secure the third objective
east of Caix, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which had followed up the advance
as far as Guillaucourt, was ordered at 1 p.m. to secure Caix and the Amiens
outer defences east of that village. This was successfvilly carried out
in conjunction with the 2nd Canadian Brigade, and touch was established
with the 7th Cavalry Brigade on the right, and with the 9th Cavalry Brigade
on the left, on the line of the final objective. The 1st Cavalry Division
endeavoured to make further progress, but patrols from the 2nd and 9th
Cavalry Brigades found Vrely and Rosieres-en-Santerre strongly occupied.
When it was found that their assistance was not required, the two
brigades of the 2nd Cavalry Division, which had been sent forward to
reinforce the 3rd Cavalry Division, advanced north of the Luce and crossed
the Amiens outer defences with the object of exploiting the enemy's
disorganisation to the full. They found, however, that the hne
Beaufort-Warvillers-Vrely-Rosieres-en-Santerre was strongly held by the
enemy's reinforcements, chiefly machine-guns, and they were unable, there-
fore, to make any serious progress. During the night of August 8th the 2nd
Cavalry Division relieved the 3rd Cavalry Division.
46 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH AR^F^ [August 8th
The cavalry on August 8th did much useful work. In addition
to the large number of prisoners, guns, and material which it actually cap-
tured, its rapid advance and the bold manner in which it had been handled
had a very marked effect on the enemy's moral. It was the first occasion
on which, since the war began, the cavalry in France had been able to
move rapidly across open country against a beaten enemy, and reap the
fruits of a successful infantry and tank attack.
The task that had been given to the III Corps in the operations was
to secure the Amiens outer defences between the Somme and the Ancre,
as a flank to the main attack of the Canadian and
oUn™ attack Australian Corps south of the Somme. Owing to the
difficulties of the ground, which have already been
described, it was not considered possible for this task to be completed on
the first day of the offensive, and a less distant objective was in conse-
quence decided upon for August 8th. Sir Richard Butler's plan was to
attack with three divisions. On the right, the 58th (London) Division,
under the command of Maj.-Gen. F. W. Ramsay, and the 18th (Eastern)
Division, under that of Maj.-Gen. R. P. Lee, were to attack shoulder to
shoulder, with the right of the 58th Division making liaison on the Somme
with the left of the Australian Corps. The 36th Brigade from the 12th
(Eastern) Division was attached to the 18th Division to take the place
of the 54th Brigade, which had been involved in the hostile attack by the
27th Wiirttembcrg Division on August 6th. On the left, and north of the
18th Division, after a gap of 500 yards on which no attack was to take
place, the 12th Division, less the 36th Brigade, under the com-
mand of Maj.-Gen. H. W. Higginson, was to attack on a front of
2,000 yards. It was to capture a portion of the slopes leading down to
the Ancre, with the idea of encircling Morlancourt in conjunction with the
attack on the right and thus compelling the enemy to evacuate the
village.
The attack was to be carried out in two phases. In the first phase,
the 58th Division, of which two battalions of the 175th Brigade were
retained in corps reserve, and the 18th Division were to capture the first
objective, which included Sailly Laurette and Malard Wood. In order
to give the troops of the 58th Division a straight run at Malard Wood, it
was very important that the attack on Sailly Laurette should be success-
ful. The capture of this village was, therefore, to some extent regarded
as a separate and preUminary operation, and a battalion was specially
detailed for the purpose. After an hour's halt on the first objective, to
enable the " leap-frogging " troops to get into position, the second phase
was to begin. This phase entailed the capture of the second objective,
which included the Chipilly spur, Gressaire Wood, the southern portion
of Tallies Wood, and the Brickyard; the line to be reached bending
back thence to the " starting line " on the left of the 18th Division
front.
For these operations three companies of tanks of the 10th Mark V
Tank Battalion (twenty - two tanks) and twelve supply tanks were avail-
able. Of these, one company was allotted to the 58th Division, and two
companies to the 18th Division ; of the supply tanks the two brigades
August 8th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 47
destined for the final objective had three each, while each of the other
three brigades engaged had two each.
The disposition of The III Corps was disposed at "zero" as follows :
the troops at
"zero" Main attack.
58th Division — right attack —
174th Brigade for first objective (Green line), and
2/lOth London (from 175th Brigade) to attack Sailly Laiirette.
173rd Brigade (less 1 Battalion) for second objective (Red hne).
1 Company, 10th Mark V Tank Battahon.
1 Battalion (173rd Brigade) 1 j
1 Battalion (36th Brigade) / ^° ^^^serve.
18th Division— left attack —
86th Brigade (less 1 Battalion) \ for first objective
and 1 Battalion (55th Brigade) J (Green hne),
53rd Brigade for second objective (Red line).
2 Companies, 10th Mark V Tank Battalion.
54th Brigade 1 j^ reserve
55th Brigade (less 1 Battalion) J
Subsidiary attack.
12th Division —
35th Brigade.
37th Brigade (in reserve).
Corps reserve.
175th Brigade (less 1 Battalion).
1/lst Northumberland Hussars.^
50th Battalion Machine Gun Corps.
Defensive front.
47th Division and 130th American Regiment.
Under Army Headquarters.
33rd American Division, less 1 Regiment.
Owing partly to the uncertainty as to the exact position of the front
line on the 18th Division front, due to the hostile attack on August 6th,
and partly to the darkness of the night and some
^flrst'ob^ect'ive^^ hostile gas shelling, great difficulties were encountered
in launching the attack.^ Nevertheless, a good start
was made in the thick mist, which, here as elsewhere, enveloped the battle-
field. A powerful artillery barrage of 350 giuis, as well as the fire of some
200 heavy howitzers and long-range guns, supported the infantry and tanks
1 Each division was allotted one troop from the 1 Ast Northumberland Hussars.
' The task of the 36th Brigade was made especially difficult by the fact that it was only
placed at Maj.-Gen. Lee's disposal on August 7th to replace the 54th Brigade. It had, therefore,
no time for previous reconnaissance of the ground In spite of this the brigade was ready on
the " starting line" by 3.30 a.m
48 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 8th
of the 18th and 58th Divisions. On the attack being launched it was
found that the enemy's barrage was not formidable, but the hostile
infantry, and especially the machine-gunners, resisted the advance with
determination. At the time that the 174th Brigade was due to be in
possession of Sailly Laurette and Malard Wood, the village had been
taken, but the hostile posts in the wood were still uncaptured and for
some hours continued to offer resistance. As was to be anticipated, the
vmcertainty of the position on the front of the 18th Division at " zero "
made the advance of the 36th Brigade riore difficult, and, at the moment
when it should have been on the first objective, the situation was obscure
and caused some anxiety. By 9 a.m., however, the position had been
made good, partly by the troops originally detailed for the task, and
partly by the 53rd Brigade moving up on its way to the second objective.
On the left the subsidiary operation of the 12th Division, which was
carried out by the 7th Norfolk and the 9th Essex of the 35th Brigade,
went entirely according to plan and completed the success of the first
phase of the attack.
The second phase of the attack proved a more arduous task. On
the right the 173rd Brigade was strongly opposed from the western slopes
of the Chipilly spur by portions of the 108th and 43rd
^e swjo^d'objeeule* Reserve Divisions, which, as has already been stated,^
were relieving each other astride the Somme.
Our troops, advancing towards the second objective, on emerging
from Malard Wood were met by heavy machine-gun fire from Chipilly
and the Chipilly spur, and during August 8th it was not found possible
to advance ovir line beyond the eastern outskirts of the wood, except for
some small parties which worked their way forward in the first attack.
On the left the 53rd Brigade had some hard fighting before it
reached its starting position on the first objective. From there the left
of the brigade pushed on against considerable opposition. The 7th
Royal West Kent on the left, and the battalion commander and about
eighty men of the 10th Essex in the centre, reached a line running south-
eastward from the Brickyard ; the 8th Royal Berkshire, on the right
of the 10th Essex, advanced along the northern edge of Malard Wood,
but was unable to reach its objective, and parties of the enemy with
machine-guns, working westward from Gressaire Wood, were thus able to
attack the advanced troops of the 53rd Brigade in flank and rear. These
advanced troops were in consequence compelled to withdraw, and only
isolated detachments of our troops remained between the first and second
objectives.
Meanwhile, on the extreme left of the III Corps, the 12th Division
had, as already described, gained the whole of its objective, and, except
in the case of the 1/lst Cambridgeshire on the right, the position which
had been reached was maintained. This battalion was forced back, but,
attacking again at 12.15 p.m., was completely successfvd in regaining the
lost ground.
The eight hours' fighting of the morning, although yielding a substantial
measure of success, had not given us all the ground we wanted, and
1 See note to page 48.
Panoramic photograph A'o. 2, to face page 48.
>'j..0fom.< p/.D(orrdp* ,Vo. 2, in jm pat/ 48.
-ChipiUy Spur-
Thc CHIPILLY Spur from ihe CERISV— MORCUUR'l' ru.,J,
r\
August 8th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 49
in particular the Chipilly spiir. That such should have been the case was
due partly to the stubborn resistance with which the enemy met the
The result oi the attack, and for which he must be given full credit, and
day's fighting by partly to the fact that the infantry was not able to
the m Corps establish satisfactory co-operation with the tanks. The
mist in the early morning and the gas shelling dxiring the night were
probably the principal causes for this lack of co-operation between the
two arms. Careful arrangements had been made beforehand for rendez-
vous between tanks and individual infantry units, in many cases verbally,
directly between the officers in command of the units concerned. These
arrangements, unfortunately, could not be carried out. Neither the
173rd Brigade nor the 53rd Brigade, whose role it was to go forward from
the first to the second objective, found tanks awaiting them on the first
objective as expected. Tlie 36th Brigade began operations without tanks.
The 174th Brigade was more fortunate, as its tanks arrived to time and
were of the greatest assistance in securing the first objective on the
58th Division front. On the corps front as a whole, however, the two
arms seem to have been by force of circumstances compelled to work
independently. It must also be remembered that the ground in the
III Corps sector, cut up as it was by deep ravines from the Somme valley
in the south and from the Ancre on the north, was a far less favourable
area for tanks to operate in successfully than were the areas of the
AustraUan and Canadian Corps south of the Somme.
The remainder of August 8th was fully occupied on the III Corps
front in clearing up the ground gained, and in dealing with counter-
attacks. One such counter-attack, which was delivered early in the day
by the 27th Wiirttemberg Division and forced the advanced troops of
the 18th Division round the Brickyard to withdraw, has already been
mentioned. During the afternoon the artillery was called upon on three
occasions to deal with hostile concentrations, and on each occasion was
able to prevent the attack from materialising. The " mopping up "
of the captured territory was, however, a more arduous matter, as parties
of the enemy continued to hold out in Malard Wood after its capture,
and a considerable time elapsed before their resistance was overcome by
the 58th Division. As a result of the day's fighting the first objective
on the front of the 58th and 18th Divisions, and the final objective of tlie
12th Division, had been captured. While the casualties had been com-
paratively heavier than in the main attack south of the river, they were
by no means excessive and compared favourably with the large number
of prisoners taken, which totalled 2,388, including 75 officers. About
forty guns, together with numerous machine-guns and other material,
were also captured. It was unfortunate that the III Corps, which had
to advance over such difficult country, should have found the enemy
expecting a counter-attack on account of the success of his operation
on August 6th. The element of surprise, whicli helped us so much on
the rest of the front, was, therefore, to a great extent lacking on the front
of the III Corps. When the spirited nature of the enemy's resistance,
the difficulties the 18th and 58th Divisions encountered, and the fact
that they had been heavily engaged on many occasions earlier in the
50 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARJilY [August 8th
year ,^ are taken into account, the manner in which these divisions, largely
composed as they were of young and only partially trained soldiers,
endeavoured to carry out their task was worthy of all praise.
Throughout the battle most valuable work was performed by the
Royal Air Force. During the early morning flying was restricted by the
thick mist, but directly the weather cleared our aero-
^yaT°^ Force plancs could be seen everywhere hovering over the
enemy's territory at various altitudes searching for
prey. Apart from the usual artillery and contact patrol work, two, and
sometimes three, scout squadrons flew over each corps front, engaged
solely in attacking the enemy's troops and transport from low altitudes.
Flying very low, which, even in trench warfare, is extremely dangerous
on account of the machine-gun fire from the ground, otu* aeroplanes
completed the demoralisation of the enemy by attacking his retiring troops
and transport with bombs and machine-gun fire, and by shooting gun
teams in the act of withdra^nng the guns. Early in the morning, some
low-flying aeroplanes discovered an 11-inch long-range railway gun,
which had been used in the bombardment of Amiens, busily firing, although
our infantry was advancing within about 1,000 yards of its position.
Swooping down close to the gun our airmen dropped a number of bombs
on it with such effect that, when the troops of the 5th Australian Division
arrived on the spot, they found the whole gun crew of about twenty men
either killed or wounded. We lost on August 8th about forty aeroplanes,
many of which were brought down by machine-gun fire from the ground.
The results obtained, however, were well worth the losses incurred.^
As soon as the advance began our observation balloons were pushed
well forward with the greatest rapidity. They obtained much useful
information and performed valuable service in directing the fire of the
mobile artillery.
At 5 a.m., forty minutes after the attack of the Fourth Army was
launched, and just as the infantry of the 3rd Canadian Division was
entering Rifle Wood, the troops of the First French
F^strJench^Army Army advanced to the assault. Their attack was
preceded by a very heavy artillery bombardment of
the enemy's position, which began at 4.20 a.m., up to which hour only
normal artillery activity had been permitted. The attack against the
commanding ground in the angle between the Avre and the Luce was
made by two divisions of the XXXI French Corps, while a third division
was told off to capture the town of Moreuil. The enemy resisted stub-
bornly, but was gradually driven back and Moreuil Wood captured, thus
securing the flank of the Foixrth Army. The French advance then
continued until the villages of Villers-aux-Erables and Mezieres were
reached. At the former village some British tanks had been detailed to
co-operate with the French should they require assistance, but the tanks were
unable to come up in time. The Canadian Independent Force, however,
co-operated with the French most successfully and assisted them in the
> They both suffered severely in the March retreat.
* The pluck and endurance of our airmen are well illustrated by the story of Captain Feli-x
West, 8th Squadron, Royal Air Force. See Appendix E, No. 48.
.Vo- 20.
To face />«?'• '^'-
THE II-1.\CH NAVAL GUN ON KAILWAV MOUNTING CAPTURED BY THE
ROYAL AIR FORCE AND AUSTRALIANS ON AUGUST 8tII.
By kind ptTinission of the Australian Gcnrriimttit.
.\o. il.
FRENCH AND CANADIAN TROOPS ON THE ROYE ROAD.
By kiitJ piTmiision oj the Canadian Government.
A'O. 22.
To face page 5 1 .
British official photograph.
No. 23.
SOMK Ol- THK GUNS TAKIiN ON AUGUST 8tH.
SOME OF illE
PRISONERS CAPTURED ON AUGUST 8tH.
/I'ri/iJ' (ftfi.ial tihalti\fTiiph.
August 8th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 51
capttire of both Villers-aux-Erables and Mezieres, which were in French
hands bv 1 p.m.
By "the end of the day the First French Army had made valuable
progress and, though Fresnoy-en-Chaussee was still in the enemy's hands,
Moreuil and Plessier-Rozainvillers were in the possession of the French,
and the junction of the Allies was assured by the Canadian Independent
Force. As a result of the fighting about 150 officers, 3,000
other ranks, and a number of guns were captured by the French.^
On the evening of August 8th the situation on the Fourth Army
front was most satisfactory. The main attack south of the Somme had
been successful almost beyond the most sanguine
Fourtr'^y^ front on expectations, and the Canadian and Austrahan Corps
the evening of had reached their final objectives, except for a small
August 8th portion on their extreme northern and southern flanks.
The losses of these two corps had been exceptionally light, the largest
capture of prisoners and guns taken on any one day during the war
on the western front had been made, and, in addition, the enemy's
troops were thoroughly demoralised. Prisoners from eleven different
divisions had been captured by the Fourth Army, there were few hostile
reserves immediately available, and the prospects of further success on the
follownng day were extremely bright.
Orders were accordingly issued by Sir Henry Rawlinson for the
advance to be continued next morning with a view to reaching the
general line Roye-Chaulnes-Bray-sur-Somme-Dernan-
^^ugustlth" court. The Canadian Corps was to establish itself on
the general line Roye-Hattencourt-Hallu. The
Australian Corps, conforming in the first instance with the advance of the
Canadian Corps was to establish itself on the general line Lihons-
Framerville-Mericourt-sur-Somme, while the III Corps was to secure the
Etinehem spur and the high ground north of it, joining up with the
original front line at Dcrnancourt, and forming a strong defensive flank to
the army. When the III Corps reached its objective, the Australian
Corps was to swing forward to the general line Lihons-ChuignoUcs. A
study of the map will show that the main advance would thus be on
the Canadian Corps front in a south-easterly direction. Special emphasis
was laid in the army orders on the importance of the III Corps attaining
their objective, and of securing the left flank of the army. The hour of the
Canadian attack, with which the Australian Corps was to conform, was left
to the discretion of the Canadian Corps Commander, while north of the
Somme the III Corps Commander was authorised to fix the time for
launching his own attack. The Cavalry Corps was ordered to operate
on the right of the army front so as to assist the Canadian Corps in gaining
its objectives and to facilitate the advance of the First French Army.
' In this attack prisoners were taken from seven German divisions, of which the 1-ith Bavarian
Division, which also lost severely to the Canadians, suffered the heaviest casualties.
CHAPTER IV
THE BATTLE OF AMIENS (continued), AUGUST 9TH— llTH,
AND THE EVENTS OF AUGUST 12TH — 21ST
Maps 1, 2, 3, and 4
August 9th ; the Canadian Corps — The capture of Le Quesnel — The action of the 2nd and 1st
Cavalry Divisions — The advance of the 3rd, 1st, and 2nd Canadian Divisions — The Australian
Corps — The III Corps operations — Tlic attack on the Chipilly spur — The situation on the
night of August 9tli — The re-allotment of front between the Australian and III Corps —
The orders for August 10th — August 10th ; the Canadian Corps ; the Chilly and Le Qucsnoy
operations — The Australian Corps ; the advance on Lihons — The attacks astride the Somme
by the 3rd and 4th Australian Divisions and the 131st American Regiment- — The complete
occupation of the Amiens outer defences by the III Corps — The orders for August 11th —
August 11th ; the Canadian Corps — Heavy hostile counter-attacks — The Australian Corps ;
the capture of Lihons — The general situation on August 11th ; the Army Commander's
conference — A lull in the battle — Events from August 12th-16th — August 17th ; instructions
from General Headquarters — The progress of the First French Army, August llth-20th —
The reorganisation of the front of the Fourth Army — The German dilemma — The results of
the Battle of Amiens.
It was originally intended that the general advance on the front of
the Canadian Corps should begin at 10 a.m. on August 9th. The 3rd,
1st, and 2nd Canadian Divisions were to attack,
°^"^dian Corpus *°*" ^^^^ ^^'^ Division passing through the 4th Division
after the latter had captured Le Quesnel. Owing,
however, to the difficulties of communication and other causes, the
general forward movement did not begin till 11 a.m., and in the case
of some brigades not till 1 p.m. As a result, the fighting was of a very-
disjointed nature throughout the day, the attacks of the various divisions
and brigades starting at different times. Some of the attacks were
covered by artillery or supported by tanks ; others were carried out by
infantry without the support of the other arms, but, whatever the circum-
stances, the troops engaged carried out their tasks with great determination,
in spite of the fatigue consequent on the exertions of the previous day.
^Mien the Cavalry and Canadian Corps began their advance, the
enemy's defence was very uneven in character. For instance, in Rosieres-
en-Santerre and Vrely the defence was very determined until the afternoon,
while other villages were secured with little or no fighting by the cavalry,
which started ahead of the infantry. During the day the enemy, who
was very disorganised, attempted to fill the gaps in his line by bringing up
reinforcements by 'bus and lorry, but there were few, if any, serious
attempts at a counter-attack.
52
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August &rH] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 53
It will be remembered that the cavalry and the 4th Canadian Division
had met with determined resistance in Le Quesnel on the previous evening,
and that Sir Arthur Currie had decided to postpone
"^^ QuSnei"' ^' the capture of the village until the early hours of
August 9th. During the night the village was heavily
bombarded, and at 4.20 a.m. the 75th Battahon of the 11th Canadian
Brigade attacked under cover of an artillery barrage. Almost at once
the battalion came under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from the \-illage
and from the high ground to the south of it, and the advance of the leading
troops sustained a temporary check from the fire of a strong nest of
machine-guns situated at the western entrance to the village. This
resistance was overcome by the prompt initiative of the commanding
officer, who himself led a detachment against the machine-guns and
succeeded in killing the machine-gunners and capturing all the guns.
As a result of this gallant action, the enemy's resistance weakened sufii-
ciently to enable the whole battalion to advance and capture the \allage.^
In order to secure the whole objective, our men had to advance beyond
Le Quesnel, and several parties of the enemy were encountered in the wood
south-east of the village.^ By 11 a.m. all resistance was overcome by
the infantry, assisted by the fire of the trench mortars of the Canadian
Independent Force.
Pushing forward in advance of the infantry, the 2nd Cavalry Di\'ision
captured Folies, but was checked by machine-gun fire in the wood west
The action of the 2nd of Beaufort, and was not able to advance until the
and 1st Cavalry village was Captured by the 1st Canadian Division in
Divisions ^jjg afternoon. The 2nd Cavalry Division then, working
roimd Warvillers and Vrely which were left to the infantry to deal with,
pushed on towards Meharicourt, and by dusk had reached the western
outskirts of Maucourt. Further north the 1st Cavalry Division almost
immediately encountered formidable opposition from the newly-arrived
119th Division north-west of Rosieres-en-Santerre, and made no progress.
It suffered hea\'y casualties in the several gallant attempts made to
advance, both from machine-gun fire from near the railway north of the
village, and from artillery which was very active in this neighbourhood.
All attempts to advance north of Yrely were unsuccessful until that
village was captured by the 2nd Canadian Division. At nightfall the
1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions were relieved by the infantry of the Canadian
Corps and withdrawn to the vicinity of Cayeux for the night.
The Canadian Independent Force, working in close touch with the
2nd Cavalry Division, the infantry of the 3rd Canadian Division, and with
The advance of the 3rd, the French, was fighting along the Amiens-Roye road
1st, and 2nd Canadian vcrv Successfully all day. It passed the night between
Divisions Arvillers and Bouchoir.
Advancing at noon, the 8th Canadian Brigade of the 3rd Di^'ision
reached Folies at 4.20 p.m. After having co-operated with the French
1 Le Quesnel had on August 8th contained a German divisional headquarters, and, although
the staff had escaped, much valuable material was secured.
^ From the examination of prisoners captured in this action, it was found that the leading
troops of the 1st Reserve and 82nd Reserve Divisions had arrived on the battlefield, which
accounted for the increasing opposition met with in this sector.
54 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 9th
in their attack on Arvillers, the brigade advanced against Bouchoir, which
it captured after heavy fighting, and estabhshed an outpost Hne for the
night east of the village. It was then in touch with the French east of
Arvillers, and was supported by the 7th Brigade which had moved up close
behind it.
Further north, starting at about 1 p.m., the 1st Canadian Division
had captured Beaufort by 3.30 p.m., and, after some severe fighting,
occupied the villages of Warvillers and Rouvroy-en-Santerre before dusk.^
It established outposts east of Rouvroy-en-Santerre in touch with the
3rd Canadian Division to the south, and with the 2nd Canadian Division
to the north near Mcharicourt.
When they began their advance about 11 a.m. on the left of the
Canadian Corps, both the 6th and 5th Brigades of the 2nd Canadian
Division were unsupported on either flank, and met with strong opposition.
This weakened appreciably as the advance of the 1st Canadian Division
to the south, and that of the 5th Australian Division to the north, devel-
oped. The 2nd Division then pressed on and, largely owing to the
bravery and initiative of Lieut. John Brilliant of the 22nd Canadian
Battalion,^ captured Vrely. Rosieres-en-Santerre was also secured, and
!Meharicourt fell to a combined attack of the infantry and the 9th
Cavalr}^ Brigade.
The 6th Brigade, which had suffered heavy casualties, was now rein-
forced by a battalion of the 4th Brigade, and the advance continued.
By 9 p.m. the 2nd Canadian Division had established an outpost line 500
yards east of Meharicourt and 1,000 yards east of Rosieres-en-Santerre,
in touch with the 1st Canadian Division at Meharicourt, and on the
north with the 1st Australian Division on the railway.
As the result of the day's fighting the Canadian Corps had made
another deep advance all along their front and had captured eight more
villages, together with many prisoners.
The task allotted to the Australian Corps was to advance its line
between the Amiens-Chaulnes railway and the Amiens-Brie road, and,
refusing its left, to protect the flank of the advance
The AustraUan Corps of the Canadian Corps. It was originally intended
that the 1st Australian Division should pass through
the right brigade, and the 2nd Australian Division through the
left brigade, of the 5th Australian Division which was holding the
line on a two-brigade front. Owing, however, to its late arrival
on the battlefield on August 8th and the long approach march
which followed, the 1st AustraUan Division was unable to reach its
assembly position in time to co-operate with the advance of the Canadian
Corps. Consequently, the 5th Australian Division was ordered to
continue the advance, assisted by seven tanks of the 8th Mark V Tank
Battalion. This division captvired Vauvillers by 1 p.m. without the
assistance of an artillery barrage.
1 It was in this fighting that Sergeant Zengel, 3th Battalion Saskatchewan Regiment, and
Corporal Coppins and Private Alexander Brereton, 8th Battalion (90th Rifles), Manitoba Regi-
ment, showed such splendid gallantry and initiative. See Appendix E, Nos. 50, 12, and 6.
* See Appendix E, No. 7.
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August 9thJ THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 55
At 1.40 p.m. the 2nd Brigade of the 1st AustraHan Division, passing
through the 5th AustraHan Division, reached its starting position, and
carried on the advance towards Lihons, supported by fourteen tanks of
the 2nd Mark V Tank Battalion. The 7th and 8th Battahons, which led
the advance, immediately encountered heavy machine-gun fire from the left
flank, which was much exposed owing to the postponement of the attack
of the 2nd Australian Division to a later hour. Considerable opposition
was also encountered on the other flank from isolated machine-guns north
of Rosieres-en-Santerre, and it was found necessary to divert two companies
to attack them.^ Later in the afternoon the enemy was found to be
holding in strength some trenches on the western slopes of Lihons Hill,^
where he had posted a number of machine-guns and supported them with
field guns placed in forward positions. The direct fire of these field
guns across the open played havoc with the tanks, which were in conse-
quence unable to give the requisite support to the infantry. The
battalions in the front line were then reinforced, and a footing on the
western slope of the hill was secured. The consolidation of the line
gained was begun, and covering patrols pushed out during the evening
and night to cover working parties. Some of these patrols advanced
beyond Crepey Wood and occupied a portion of the trench system running
through the western outskirts of Lihons. ^
In the meantime, the 2nd Australian Division had advanced through
the left brigade of the 5th Australian Division, and at 4.30 p.m. attacked
Framerville with two brigades, the 7th Brigade on the right and the 5th
Brigade on the left. The enemy's machine-guns in the outskirts of the
village contested the advance, but their opposition was eventually over-
come by the determination of the Australians, who succeeded in occupying
the village and captured over 300 prisoners.
During the course of the day's fighting the Australian Corps secured
500 prisoners. Large numbers of the enemy were also kiUed, particularly
by the troops of the 1st Australian Division, who themselves suffered
fairly heaw casualties.
During the night of August 8th the situation on the front of the
III Corps remained unchanged, except on the right, where the advanced
parties of the 58th Division were withdrawn to the
operatioM^^ eastern edge of Malard Wood. The three divisions of
the III Corps, which had been engaged in the hea^y
fighting of the 8th, were not considered sufficiently strong to gain the
objective without further assistance. Sanction was therefore obtained
for the employment of the 131st Regiment of the 33rd American Division,
which it had not been intended to employ in offensive operations, and
which was in biUets near Heilly on the Ancre, some distance behind the
I The heroism of Private Robert Beatham, 8lh Australian Battalion, greatly facilitated the
advance of his battalion. See Appendix E, No. 4.
* Lihons Hill, which was intersected with trenches, the remains of the old French defensive
system of 191C, was a position of great natural strength of which the village of Lilions, situated
on its summit, was the key. The ground rises in a gradual slope to this point from all sides for a
considerable distance, while the surrounding country is particularly open, and the whole position
is admirably adapted for defence.
' The ist Australian Brigade rejoined its division during the day, and was held in divisional
reserve
56 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 9th
battlefield. It had been originally intended to resume operations on the
III Corps front early in the morning of August 9th, but, on account of the
impossibility of moving up the American troops in time, " zero " was
postponed until 5.30 p.m. The Etinehem spur was excluded from the
objectives for the day.
For the main operation against Gressaire Wood, Tallies Wood, and the
Amiens outer defence line extending from Tallies Wood northwards to
Dernancourt, the 131st American Regiment, the 175th Brigade
(less the 2/lOth London) of the 58th Division, reinforced by the
8th London and 5th Royal Berkshire from the 174th and 36th
Brigades respectively, and the 37th Brigade of the 12th Division were
employed from right to left. Twelve tanks of the 10th Mark V Tank
Battalion were allotted to the 58th Division, and eight tanks to the 12th
Division. The Americans were placed under the orders of the commander
of the 58th Division. In conjunction with this attack, the 174th Brigade,
less one battahon, the 173rd Brigade, and the 2/lOth London of the 175th
Brigade were to attack Chipilly and the Chipilly spur, and thereby
protect the right flank of the Americans and clear the left flank of the
Australians.
The advance of the 174th and 173rd Brigades was strongly opposed
by the enemy, and as a result the right American battalion suffered heavy
casualties from hostile fire on its right flank. The
'"^''cwpmy'spur*''^ brigades reached the sunken road running north from
Chipilly, but were unable to make any further progress
in face of the hostile enfilade machine-gun fire from the terraces north of
Chipilly. However, the 2 /10th London succeeded in working its way
through Chipilly and along its northern edge, and attacked the enemy
machine-gun posts on the terraces in flank and rear. The battalion was
then held up for a time by machine-gun fire from the valley north-west of
the Chipilly spur, but a company of Americans went to its assistance,
and helped to drive the enemy out of the valley. The enveloping move-
ment was eventually successful, and the enemy was driven from the
terraces. This success brought about the capture of the whole of the
Chipilly spur.
The main attack against Gressaire Wood, Tallies Wood, and the
Amiens outer defences, in a north-easterly direction was launched on a
front of about 7,000 yards, and was completely successful. Although the
Americans had to double for the last mile in order to reach their assembly
positions in time, they advanced to the attack in fine style. Led by their
commander, Colonel J. B. Samborn, the Americans swept everything before
them, and the German resistance collapsed. So precipitate was the retreat
of the enemy that a German battalion commander fled from his dug-out,
abandoning his orders, maps, and telephone switchboard. The Americans
were so impetuous that they outstripped the British on the left, and it
was due to them that the objective was so quickly and rapidly gained
on the front of the 58th Division.
On the left of the 58th Division the 12th Division had been stoutly
opposed near Morlancourt by heavy machine-gun fire, but the devoted
heroism of Sergeant Thomas Harris of the 6th Royal West Kent, who
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August 9th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 57
was killed while rushing hostile machine-gun posts, prevented the advance
from being checked.^ Ultimately, after obstinate fighting, the division
secured all objectives, except that part of the Amiens outer defences which
lies south-west of Hill 105.
The result of the day's fighting was another big advance on the
whole army front, extending to as much as 9,000 yards in the south. The
line we had now reached ran approximately Bouchoir-
The situation on the Rouvrov-en-Santcrrc - Meharicourt - Framerville - Meri-
nigUt 01 AnglUt Sen •' , -i • ^ r-^ ■ tit ^ m -n
court-sur-Somme (exclusive) - Gressaire Wood- laiiles
Wood-Demancourt. On the right of the Fourth Army the First French
Army had also made progress and reached the general hne Pierrepont-
Arvillers.
Large additions had been made to the tale of prisoners, guns, and
material, and, although the enemy's resistance was felt to be stiffening,
no counter-attack in any strength had so far materialised. Troops from six
more hostile divisions had been encountered, the 1st Reserve, 82nd Reserve,.
107th, 119th, 233rd, and 243rd, making a total of seventeen German divisions
engaged by our twelve divisions in the two days' fighting. No information
had yet been obtained from prisoners or from other sources as to any line
of defence which the enemy proposed to occupy, or even whether such a
line was to be east or west of the Somme. On the other hand our casual-
ties, except in a few cases, had not been severe, and, with the exception
perhaps of two of the divisions of the III Corps, all the divisions in the
army were fit to continue the operations. In addition, the 32nd Division,
which had been released from general reserve and allotted to the Canadian
Corps, had so far not been employed. During the evening orders were
issued by Sir Henry Rawlinson to the Cavalry, Canadian, Australian, and
III Corps to continue the advance towards the general line Roye-Chaulnes-
Bray-siu--Somme-Dernancourt. It was still felt that, if the determined
pressure exerted on August 8th and 9th was continued, the enemy's
resistance might be definitely broken down. The chief difficulty with
which we had to contend was the very broken ground which had now been
reached. It was most unsuitable for the employment of tanks and
cavalry, and favoured enormously the enemy's delaying tactics and his
lavish use of machine-guns in the defence.
Notwithstanding the successful advance of the III Corps on August
9th, the junction between it and the Australian Corps south of the river
The reaiiotment of front '^^^ not satisfactory. While the Somme itself afforded
between the Australian a well-defined line of demarcation, it was found that
and m Corps ^}^g tactical interdependence of the slopes on each side
of the river made it an unsatisfactory boundary. Sir Henry Rawlinson
therefore decided to place the Australian Corps astride the Somme and
to make the Corbie-Bray-sur-Somme road the inter-corps boundary.
Instructions to this effect were accordingly issued, and the 131st
American Regiment was transferred from the III to the Australian
Corps.
The same objectives were given to the three corps for August 10th
as had been given them for the previous day, that is to say, the
* See Appendix E, No. 22.
I
58 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August ioth
approximate line Roye - Chaulnes - Bray-sur-Somme - Dcrnancourt, the
objective for the AustraUans, however, was extended to include
the Etinehem spur. The 3rd Cavalry Division was
^Aug^fioth" detailed to work with the Canadian Corps, the 1st and
2nd Cavalry Divisions being held in reserve.
During the night of August 9th, the 32nd Division, under the command
of Maj.-Gen. T. S. Lambert, moved up in close support of the 3rd Canadian
August loth; the Canadian Division, ready to pass through on the right. At
Corps ; the ChUiy and 4.20 a.m. the 8th Canadian Brigade, assisted by four
Le Quesnoy operations tanks, advanced on Le Quesnoy-en-Santerre, and, after
encountering heavy machine-gun fire which was overcome with the assist-
ance of the tanks, captured the village and established a line on its eastern
edge. Thence the advance continued, and the trench area north-east of
the village was occupied by 9.30 a.m. Soon afterwards the troops of the
32nd Division, who had followed close on the heels of the Canadians,
passed through them, and, in spite of strong opposition and the very
difficult nature of the ground, advanced our line to the western outskirts
of Damery and Parvillers. On the right of the 32nd Division the Canadian
Cavalry Brigade endeavoured to push forward Avith the object of securing
the high ground north and east of Roye, while a brigade of the 2nd Cavalry
Division moved in the direction of Nesle.^ Owing to the hostile machine-
gun fire and the difficulties of the ground, which was intersected by old
trenches and belts of wire hidden by the long grass, cavalry action was found
to be impossible. At nightfall, therefore, the whole Cavalry Corps was
withdrawn into reserve to localities in the valley of the Luce, where water
was more plentiful.
On the left of the 32nd Division, the 4th Canadian Division passed
through the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions and attacked at 10.15 a.m.,
the hour of assault having been postponed to alloAV the tanks, of which
nineteen were eventually mustered, time to get into position. The village
of Fouquescourt was allotted as objective to the 10th Brigade, while
Chilly was the objective of the 12th Brigade. Unfortunately, owing to the
hostile artillery fire, very few tanks were able to cross the Rouvroy-en-San-
terre-Meharicoui-t road, many being destroyed by direct hits, and of those
that escaped this fate the greater part were " ditched " in the intricate ground.
While the tanks were suffering so severely in their self-sacrificing efforts
to assist the infantry, the situation from the standpoint of the assaulting
troops was the reverse of satisfactory. Confronted with a more determined
and organised resistance, they were obliged to attack in the open over
level fields with comparatively little artillery support and without assist-
ance from the tanks. It was only after very severe fighting, in which
all ranks displayed the greatest gallantry and determination, that the
enemy's resistance was overcome and a footing established in Maucourt
and on the high ground south of Fouquescourt. At a later stage of the
fighting three tanks arrived at Fouquescourt and rendered valuable
assistance in the capture of the village, which was completely in the
1 The 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions had been ordered forward from reserve, as very optimistic
reports were received during tlie morning as to the demoralisation and retirement of the enemy.
These reports proved to be exaggerated.
A'o. 29.
'To face page 5S.
MARK V TANKS ADVANCING ACROSS THE OPEN NEAR LE QUESNOY.
liy kind permission of the Canadian Governmeut.
Xo. 30.
^■=^"S^
^^m^m^t^^^
CANADIAN CA\AI.R>- R I- .■> 1 1 N . , ON \ L i . L M lOIH.
Hy kind permission of ihe Canadian Gorernmenl.
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August 10th] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 59
hands of the 44th Canadian Battalion of the 10th Brigade by 5 p.m. The
50th Battalion on the left of the 10th Brigade then pushed on and reached
the railway south-west of Hallu, but the enemy still held out east of
Fouquescourt.
On the front of the 12th Brigade desperate fighting took place in
Chilly about noon, but by 12.30 p.m. the 72nd Battalion had cleared the
village. The 78th Battalion then passed through and, taking advantage
of the enemy's temporary demoralisation, captured Hallu without much
opposition. Further north the attacking troops of the 85th Battalion
found great difficulty in advancing on account of heavy machine-gun fire
from Lihons, which at that time had not been captured by the Australians.
Finally, however, the 85th and 38th Battalions cleared the country as
far as the Chilly-Lihons road.
Open warfare tactics were impossible owing to the way in which the
ground was broken up by the old trench system, of which the enemy took
the fullest advantage. There was, therefore, an enforced and very
unwelcome reversion to trench warfare, involving slower progress and
more numerous casualties. At 3.30 p.m. the 119th German Division ^ began
to develop a counter-attack from the north-east against the exposed flank
of the 78th Battalion which had pushed forward to Hallu. The attack
was brought to a standstill within fifteen yards of our trenches. Regard-
less, however, of the heavy losses sustained in this counter-attack, the
enemy made a further attempt at 7.30 p.m. For the second time he was
beaten off, leaving many dead in front of our trenches, the result of well-
controlled and effective rifle and Lewis gun fire, in which the battalion
headquarters took a by no means unimportant part.
On the left of the Canadian Corps the 1st Australian Division, with
the 2nd Brigade on the right and the 3rd Brigade on the left, renewed
the advance at 8 a.m., at which hour it was originally
the\^raS''o'L?ii!ons intended that the Canadians should also attack. The
1st Brigade was in reserve. The objectives of the
division included Crepey and Auger Woods.
The advance was only covered by a thin artillery barrage, and the
right flank of the advance was exposed, with the result that severe fighting
took place before the Australians reached a line running roughly north and
south through the eastern end of Crepey Wood. The wood itself was still
held in force by the enemy, and formed a pocket in our line. It was
eventually captured by a company of the 10th Battalion after very bitter
fighting. All the defenders were either killed or captured, and posts were
established on the eastern edge ; the company of the 10th Battalion,
when it had completed its task, was reduced to twenty of all ranks.
During the afternoon two determined counter-attacks were made
on the left of the 1st Australian Division. The first was driven off with
heavy loss to the enemy ; the second succeeded, after some of our posts
east of Crepey Wood had been totally destroyed by artillery fire, in gaining
a footing in the wood itself. Our troops on the flanks of the hostile attack
closed in, and thus isolated the Germans who had penetrated into the
wood ; these refused to surrender and fought to the last man. Once more
1 This division arrived to reinforce the Second German Army on August 9th.
60 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August ioth
there was a bitter struggle in the wood from which the Austrahans emerged
triumphant, over 90 of the enemy's dead being counted after the fight
was over. In the evening it was decided to consohdate the position
gained, with a view to making adequate preparations for the renewal of
the attack next day.
During daylight on August 10th the remainder of the Australian
line south of the Somme remained almost unchanged, except for a small
advance on the right of the 2nd Australian Division north of Crepey Wood ;
during the night of the 10th, however, considerable progress was made
about Etinehem.
The command of the right divisional front of the III Corps between
the Bray-sui'-Somme-Corbie road and the Somme passed to the Austrahan
Corps at 10 a.m. on August 10th. Early in the evening
the^Somme'^by^the^Ld ^^ ^^^^ same day the 3rd Australian Division relieved
and 4th Australian Divi- the portion of the front held by the 4th Australian
sions and the 131st Division south of the Somme. Thus, on the night of
American Regiment j^^^^^^^ -^^q^^ ^^le Australian Corps front was held, from
right to left, by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions south of the Somme, and
by the 4th Division, to which the 131st American Regiment was attached,
north of the river.
The village of Etinehem itself was of no tactical importance, being
tucked away in a small re-entrant on the northern bank of the Somme.
North-west of the village the ground rose steeply towards Tallies Wood,
while to the north the re-entrant, in which the village itself lay, developed
into a crescent-shaped valley with gentle slopes in the vicinity of the
Bray-sur-Somme-Corbie road. On the east Etinehem was dominated by
the high ground which rises steeply from the river to the bluff overlooking
Bray-sur-Somme. In many ways the Etinehem spur resembled that east
of Chipilly, and, as regards observation of the Somme valley, constituted
an important tactical feature which it was most necessary to secure
prior to any advance south of the river. In conjunction with the operation
for the capture of Etinehem, it was decided to encircle Mericourt-sur-
Somme, clear up the ground formed by the bend in the river between
]Mericourt-sur-Somme and Etinehem, and gain the ridge east of Proyart.
North of the Somme the attack was carried out by the 13th Brigade,
which had rejoined the 4th Australian Division, and the 131st American
Regiment, and, south of the river, by the 9th and 10th Brigades of the
3rd Australian Division. The tactics employed both north and south of
the river were almost entirely identical, a silent encircling movement
imder cover of darkness.
On the 13th Brigade front the 50th and 49th Battalions, supported
by tanks, advanced at 10 p.m. in an easterly direction along the Corbie-
Bray- sur- Somme road and the river road to the south, one battalion
moving along each road. The southern battalion, the 50th, encircled
Etinehem, M'hich it captured and " mopped up." The northern battalion,
the 49th, attacked down the Etinehem spur, secured almost the whole of
it, and on the left formed a defensive flank along the Bray-sur-Somme-
Corbie road as far as the junction with the III Corps at the cross roads
about 500 yards east of Tailles Wood.
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South of the Somme Mericourt-sxir-Somme was occupied with sUght
opposition, but further south the operation was not so successful. The
10th Brigade, which was to carry out the first part of the operation,
advanced along the main Amiens-Brie road early in the evening, supported
by tanks. Its object was to encircle Proyart from the south, and thus
establish itself on the high ground east of the village. Unfortunately the
enemy discovered this movement and, by heavy shelling of the forward
area and some effective bombing, caused considerable confusion and heavy
casualties ; as a result the operation had finally to be abandoned.
On the front of the III Corps a hostile counter-attack, at about 3 a.m.
on August 10th, resulted in a temporary withdrawal of our line at the
, . „„ junction of the 58th and 12th Divisions east of Tallies
The complete occnpa- 4x' j u *. 4-u j i j. ^i • j
tion of the Amiens >» ood, but the ground lost was promptly regamed.
outer defences by the Strong patrols from the 58th and 12th Divisions
m Corps advanced during the morning and were closely
supported by strong detachments. By 10 p.m. the whole of the
Amiens outer defences had been secured from the Bray-sur-Somme-
Corbie road to Dernancourt. The new line was consolidated during the
night and thereafter held in its entirety.
On the evening of August 10th orders were issued by Sir Henry
Rawlinson, acting on instructions from General Headquarters, for the
attack to be continued on the 11th with the object
Augnlt^lith' °^ pressing the enemy back on to the Somme, and
securing the crossings between Offoy, about four miles
east of Nesle, and Bray-siu--Somme. The left of the First French Army
was at the same time directed on Ham. The objective allotted to the
Canadian Corps was the river line between Offoy and St. Christ ; and
that allotted to the Australian Corps the line of the river from
St. Christ to Bray-sur-Somme. The bulk of the cavalry was ordered
to assist the Canadian Corps, while one brigade was attached to the
Australian Corps. The III Corps was ordered to maintain a defensive
flank on the north on the line of the Amiens outer defences.
The enemy's counter-attacks during the'llth, and the severe fighting
which ensued, proved that the hostile resistance was stiffening and
prevented any progress being made. Owing to the
cTadian Corps increase of hostile artillery fire, the difficult nature of
the ground, and the lack of tanks and sufficient
artillery support, the Canadian attacks were cancelled by Sir Arthur
Currie early on the 11th, after consultation with Army Head-
quarters. The attack of the 32nd Division, however, against Damery
and Parvillers was launched at 9.30 a.m., before the cancelling order
reached the troops. It was checked by strong machine-gun fire and heavy
wire, and at 11 a.m. orders not to press the attack were received.
About 12 noon, after a heavy bombardment, the enemy launched
determined counter-attacks against Chillv and between Damery and
Heavy hostile counter- fo^q^^SCOUrt In the Vicinity of Hallu OUT /troops
attacks ^^^^^ seen withdrawmg from the village, and the situation
for a time was obscure. It subsequently transpired
that the enemy had concentrated in Hallu Woods and had attempted to
62 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August iith
work round the flanks. The 50th Battalion, in view of the enemy's con-
centration, threw back its left flank and the hostile attack was thus
anticipated. When, therefore, the Germans advanced in mass formation,
they afforded an exceptionally good target for the 50th Battalion and the
78th Battalion on its left. The attack was completely repulsed by
the combined fire of all available guns, machine-guns, and rifles, and the
enemy suffered very heavy casualties, the ground in front of our trenches
being strewn with the German dead.
Later in the evening our advanced troops in the vicinity of Hallu
were withdrawn to the main line in front of Chilly, in order to avoid un-
necessary casualties. Meanwhile, the enemy's attack south of Fouques-
court met with partial success, but an immediate counter-attack by the
32nd Division succeeded not only in restoring the situation, but in
advancing the line to the western outskirts of Damery. Throughout
the remainder of the afternoon, the enemy's attacks in the area east of
Le Quesnoy-en-Santerre continued with unabated vigour. Although
supported by intense concentrations of artillery fire, they were all beaten
off, and our line remained intact. \Vhile the losses sustained by the
enemy in these attempts to arrest the victorious advance of the
Canadian Corps were very severe, especially in the 79th Reserve and
119th Divisions, those sustained by the Canadian Corps were by no
means light, and it became necessary to relieve the 32nd and the 4th
Canadian Divisions. On the night of August 12th, therefore, the 32nd
Division, holding the Damery-Parvillers sector, was relieved by the 3rd
Canadian Division, and the 4th Canadian Division by the 2nd Canadian
Division on the Chilly front.
After the heavy fighting of August 10th Maj.-Gen. T. W. Glasgow,
commanding the 1st Australian Division, realised that the period of
semi-open fighting had temporarilv passed. He also
^hefaito^SnV ^aw that on the old Somme battlefield, covered with its
complicated systems of trenches, a definitely organised
attack would be necessary in order to capture the important tactical
locality of Lihons Hill, to retain which the enemy would be certain to
employ all his available resources. He decided to cover the advance of
the infantry with a creeping barrage moving at the rate of 100 yards in
three minutes, and to employ such tanks as were available to lead the
attack, the infantry following immediately in rear of them.
At 4 a.m., the hour fixed for the attack, it was foggy and dark, but
the conditions were otherwise favourable. O^ving to the fog, only one
tank was able to reach its position by " zero " ; the remainder lost direction
in the intricate ground, although the majority of them succeeded in
catching up the infantry later in the morning. The attack, which was
undertaken by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, Avith the 1st Brigade in reserve,
was at once met by very heavj' machine-gun fire, which luckily, owing
probably to the fog and darkness, was very ^vild and entirely failed to
check the Australians. By 5.15 a.m. Lihons and Auger Wood had been
captured, and our troops were well down the east side of the hill.
The tactical value of the position had not been over-estimated, and
the 1st AustraUan Division was now in possession of a commanding
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August 11th] THE BATTLE OF A:\IIEXS 63
ridge, from which a fine view was obtainable over the enemy's positions
to the north, south, and east.
The Germans promptly attempted to recover the lost ground, and
at 6 a.m., employing the 5th Bavarian Division and the newly-arrived
38th Division, began a series of powerful counter-attacks against the
1st Australian Division. At 8.30 a.m. one of these counter-attacks broke
the line, and parties of the enemy, working do^^Tl behind our position on
the hill towards Crepey Wood, for a time made our hold on the hill pre-
carious ; the Australians, however, fought with the greatest tenacity and
succeeded in beating off all attacks with heavy loss to the Bavarians.
By the evening our hold on the whole position was firmly established, and
a dashing and hard-fought operation of great tactical importance was
brought to a successful conclusion. The 2nd Australian Division also
made considerable progress. It captured Rainecourt and advanced its
line to near Herleville, keeping touch with the 1st Australian Division
north of Lihons.
At 3 p.m. on August 11th Sir Henry Rawlinson held a conference of
Corps Commanders at Villers Bretonneux, and discussed the general
The general situation on situation. From all the reports which had been received
August 11th ; the Army it was quite evident that the enemy's resistance had
Commander's conference stiffened, and that he had been able to bring up fresh
troops and to reinforce his shattered artillery. In addition, he was holding
the western edge of a broad belt of country admirably suited for defence,
which was difficult for the infantry to advance over, and practically
impossible for tanks or cavalry. It was now certain that the Germans
had decided to make a stand west of the Somme, but whether this was
only a temporary effort to cover a withdrawal across the river, or was a
new defensive line which they were determined to hold to the last, was
not yet clear. On the other hand, all our divisions had been
engaged in the battle. The troops had performed wonders ; twenty-fovir
hostile divisions had been engaged and defeated by thirteen of our divisions
and part of one American division ; but it was realised that, in the stress
of modern battle, with its never-relaxing strain on nerves and sinews,
there are limits to human endurance. For many days the infantry,
machine-gunners, and artillery had been continually on the move, and
most of the units had been in action several times. The tanks had
been fully employed since the battle began on August 8th, and the
constant strain of continued action, especially on August 10th, when the
majority of the tanks operating with the Canadian Corps were constantly
under heavy artillery fire, had begun to tell on the crews. The tanks
themselves, too, had suffered considerable wear and tear, and required
overhauling and refitting before they could be used again. Our casual-
ties certainly had so far been light— as compared with the number of
prisoners taken and the losses inflicted on the enemy ; we had
achieved the maximum of result with the minimum of loss, but the
situation as regards the supply of reinforcements did not permit
of risks being taken. It had, moreover, not been possible up to
date to bring up all the heavy artillery, and to supply it with am-
munition. In addition to these considerations, previous experience had
64 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 12th
shown that, once the first impetus of an offensive was over and the enemy
had been able to reorganise his defences, infantry attacks, even with the
co-operation of tanks, became more and more costly. This was chiefly
because it was difficult to avoid making them more or less disjoin tedly
and on narrower fronts, and also because the available artillery support
was bound to be considerably less than in the initial attack. Experience
had definitely showTi that, if casualties were to be avoided, it was essential
for the infantry to attack on a wide front, well supported by artillery, and
in the closest co-operation with the tanks. Sir Henry Rawlinson, therefore,
decided that no attempt should be made to force the position by in-
dependent effort on the part of formations, nor until we could bring into
action our overwhelming strength in artillery.
As a result of the conference, instructions were issued on August 11th
that for the time being only minor alterations were to be made in the line,
and that such alterations should be designed to assist
A lull in the battle in obtaining a good "starting line " for a general attack
which was fixed for August 15th. For the moment,
therefore, the advance was checked. Owing to the difficulties which had
to be surmounted in moving forward the heavy artillery, and to the time
taken to make the necessary reliefs of divisions, this date was first post-
poned for twenty-four hours and subsequently " sine die," but ready to
be undertaken at twenty-four hours' notice.
On August 12th the whole of the Cavalry Corps was withdrawn into
reserve in the valleys of the Luce and the Avre.
On the front of the Canadian Corps reliefs were
^'^^^gtHeth''^' carried out, and patrols were pushed further towards
Damery and Parvillers, but this gain of ground was not
made without considerable hostile opposition. The fighting in places
was very strenuous, as is proved by the fact that two Canadians, Sergeant
Spall, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and Private Dinesen,
42nd Battahon, Quebec Regiment, won the Victoria Cross in the fighting
near Parvillers. Sergeant Spall deliberately gave his life in order to
extricate his platoon from a most difficult situation. Private Dinesen
was the outstanding man in his company during ten hours' hand-to-
hand fighting, which resulted in the capture of over a mile of strongly
garrisoned trenches.^
The enemy's resistance, as had been anticipated, gradually increased,
and was particularly strong on the front of the Canadian Corps,^ where
the famous Alpine Corps had made its appearance on August 11th. Here
the enemy carried out a number of local counter-attacks, which were
supported by heavy concentrations of artillery fire from field and high
velocity guns, large quantities of gas shell being employed. Undeterred
by these attempts of the enemy to regain the initiative, the 3rd Canadian
Division succeeded in capturing Damery and Parvillers on August 15th.
The German artillery retaliation was exceptionally severe, and was shortly
afterwards followed by a counter-attack delivered by the 121st Division
and the Alpine Corps. This was successfully repvilsed, 200 prisoners and
• See Appendix E, Nos. 40 and 16.
* Nine fresh divisions had come in against the Canadian Corps since the 8th.
August 12TH-17TH] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 65
40 machine-guns being captured, and casualties, estimated at 1,500, were
inflicted on the enemy.
Further north the Australian Corps materially improved and straight-
ened the line between Lihons and the Somme by a series of local actions
carried out by the 2nd and 5th Divisions. Numerous prisoners were
captured, and the enemy was allowed no rest.
On August 12th, just before it was relieved, the 3rd Australian
Division secured Proyart. In the attack on this village Sergeant Statton,
40th Battalion, armed only wath a revolver, rushed four of the enemy's
machine-gun posts in succession. This had an inspiring effect on the
troops, who cheered him as he returned, and his daring exploit enabled
the battalion to gain its objective.^
North of the Somme the Liaison Force^ and the III Corps^ also
harassed the enemy. At dawn on August 13th a successful attack was
carried out by the 13th Australian Brigade, whereby the whole of the
Etinehem spvu-, a part of which had been retaken by the enemy on the
11th, M'as recaptiH-ed vnth 200 prisoners and a large nvunber of machine-
guns. On the same day the 12th Division estabUshed a footing on
HiU 105.
While this continual pressure was being maintained on the enemy,
the preparations for the general attack, which had been planned along
August 17th ; instruc- ^^c front of the Canadian and Austrahan Corps, were
tions from General still going forward. On August 17th,* however, in-
Headquarters structions were received from the Commander-in-Chief
that the attack was not to take place in view of the heavy losses which an
attempt to capture such a strong position might involve. The Canadian
Corps was to be withdrawn into general reserve, the First French Army
would extend its front northwards to compensate for the withdrawal of
the Canadians, and the 33rd American Division was to leave the Fourth
Army in order to rejoin the American Army.
The Commander-in-Chief had decided that the next big British
attack should be made on a part of the line where the Germans were not
so fully prepared, and that the Fourth Army should mark time until a
more favourable opportunity should arise for continuing its advance. It
was hoped that in the interval we should be able to find out whether
the enemy meant to hold his ground west of the Somme, for which piu-pose
he would have to reinforce that front with both men and guns, or whether
he would retire across the river, in which case we should gain a further
advantage without loss. If he adopted the first alternative, an attack
' See Appendix E, No. 41.
* On August 12th, in order to relieve the 4th Australian Di\-ision for a well-earned rest, a
provisional formation known as the Liaison Force was formed under the command of Brig.-Gen.
E. A. Wisdom, commanding the 7th Australian Brigade. This force took over the front from the
Somme to the Bray-sur-Somme-Corbie road, and its task was to ensure complete liaison between
the Australian and the III Corps. It was composed of the 13th Australian Brigade and the
131st American Regiment, with the necessary auxiliarj- troops. This force was broken up on
August 20th on relief by the 3rd Australian Division, and the troops composing it returned to
their formations.
' On August 11th the command of the III Corps had been taken over temporarily from
Sir Richard Butler by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Alec. Godley, the commander of the XXII Corps.
* The gist of these orders was communicated verbally to Sir Henry Rawlinson by General
Headquarters before August 17th
66 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARIVIY [August 17th-218t
from the north in the direction of Bapavime, would place his troops west
of the Somme in a very precarious position.
The Fourth Army, meanwhile, was not to remain idle, as it was
essential that the enemy should not realise what the next move was to
be. He must be made to expect an attack at any moment, and every
method of gaining ground, which could be employed without incurring
serious losses, was to be undertaken. These instructions entailed no
change in the army policy, and the harassing of the enemy by minor
operations was maintained until August 21st, the day prior to the opening
of the second phase of the battles of the hundred days. On August 21st
our line had reached approximately Damery-La Chavatte-Fransart-
Chilly-Lihons-Rainecourt-Proyart-Etinehem and along the Amiens outer
defences to Dernancourt.
During the period from August 11th to August 20th, the First French
Army, operating south of the Amiens-Roye road on the right flank of the
The progress of the First Canadian Corps, had made good progress and advanced
French Army, August its line to within machinc-gun range of Roye. This
nth— 20th advance was materially assisted by the Third French
Army, which on August 10th attacked south of Montdidier in a north-
easterly direction, and finally effected a junction with the First French
Army north-cast of that town.^ The advance of the First French Army
automatically shortened the front held by the French. This enabled
the French High Command to withdraw from the line the Third French
Army, which held the front between the First and Tenth French Armies.
When the instructions came from General Headquarters on
August 17th for the withdrawal of the Canadian Corps, it was holding
a front extending from Damery to just south of Lihons, with two divisions
in line and two in reserve. It was to be withdrawn as soon as possible
and placed in general reserve ; later it was to be transferred to the First
Army on the Arras front, where it was eventually to take part in a further
attack. In accordance with these orders the 2nd, 3rd, 1st, and 4th
Canadian Divisions, in the order named, were gradually withdrawn and
concentrated in the Longueau area, being subsequently moved by rail
to the First Army. The withdrawal of the Canadian Corps necessitated
a considerable shortening of the front held by the Fourth Army, if it was
to maintain its offensive attitude. It was arranged, therefore, by Sir
Douglas Haig with Marshal Foch, that the front of the Canadian Corps
should be taken over by the First French Army. The first half of the
rehef, that of the 3rd Canadian Division, began on the night of August 19th
and was completed on the morning of August 22nd. On this date the
Canadian Corps Headquarters were withdrawn, and moved by road to
the First Army area, while the front of the 4th Canadian Division came
temporarily under the command of the Australian Corps Commander. The
second phase, which involved the relief of the 4th Canadian Division, did
not begin until August 23rd and was completed on August 27th.
The 33rd American Division was rejoined, about August 20th, by
' Until August 16th the First French Army was under the orders of Sir Douglas Haig, but
at 12 noon on that date it reverted to the command of General Fayolle, commanding the Group
of Armies of the north and north-east.
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August 218T] THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 67
the 131st and 132nd American Regiments from the Australian Corps,
and was concentrated at Poulainville, prior to moving by rail on
August 23rd to join the First American Army in the French zone near
Verdun. The 33rd American Division had been training with the Fourth
Army for several months, and the first action in which any of its troops had
taken part had been with the 4th Austrahan Division at Hamel on
July 4th. From its commander do^vnwards, the officers and men who
composed it had gained the respect and admiration of all by their gallantry
in action, their keenness, and their determination to miss nothing during
their training that would help them to beat the Germans.
Before further operations could be carried out by the Fourth Army,
it was essential that as many as possible of the divisions that it was going
The reorganisaHon of ^^ retain should be given a short period of rest in order
the front o£ the Fourth to regain their full fighting efficiency. All the divisions
Army pf ^j^g Australian Corps were given short periods of rest
between August 12th and 23rd. In order to do this, the 17th Division,
released temporarily from general reserve, was employed to hold the line
from the Amiens-Brie road to the Somme between August 12th and 16th,
after which it again reverted to general reserve.^ On August 17th the
32nd Division was transferred from the Canadian to the Australian Corps.
On the morning of August 22nd the situation on the Fourth Army
front was as follows : —
The Australian Corps held a frontage of 23,000 yards, extending from
Fransart to the Bray-sur-Somme-Corbie road, with five divisions in the
line — 4th Canadian, 4th Australian, 32nd, 5th Austrahan, and 3rd Australian
— from south to north, and with three divisions in reserve, the 1st Canadian,
2nd Australian, and 1st Australian. The length of front held by the
III Corps, which extended from the Bray-sur-Somme-Corbie road to just
north of Albert, remained unchanged. There were three divisions holding the
line — the 47th, 12th, and 18th — ^from south to north, with the 58th Division
in reserve.^ On this date it was estimated that the Fourth Army was
opposed by eleven divisions, of which five, including the Alpine Corps,
might be reckoned to possess more than the average fighting spirit.
Apart from those divisions which the enemy had withd^a^^Tl exhausted
from the battle, he was believed to have five divisions in reserve.
The enemy opposite the Fourth Army was obviously in an
extremely awkward situation. He was faced with two alternatives :
cither to reinforce the troops west of the Somme and
The German dUemma build up a new defensive line, taking full advantage of
the existing trenches and wire, or to retire east of the
Somme to his old reserve line of 1917 and make use of the river as an
obstacle to our advance. At first it was not apparent which of these
alternatives he would adopt. The danger he would incur by endeavovu^ing
' During its time in the line the 17th Division did not take part in any operations, but sus-
tained a number of casualties from hostile gas shelling, which at times was very severe. Its fighting
efficiency was not, however, affected.
^ The 18th Division had been withdrawn from the line on August 10th and brought round
to relieve the 47th Division, which was holding the line opposite Albert. The latter division,
under the command of Maj.-Gen. Sir G. F. Gorringe, had then taken over the part of the line
held by the 58th Division on the night of August 13th and 14th.
68 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 2ist
to make a stand with an obstacle such as the Somme behind him was
obvious, especially in view of the further severe drain on his resources in
men and material which such a course would entail. On the other hand,
we had to remember that the enemy had held a similar position for four
months in 1917, and that he must reahse that any further retirement
was bound to have a lowering effect on his already shaken moral. Cir-
cumstances, however, since 1917 had changed considerably, and the question
of economising man power at this time was of even greater importance
to the enemy than to ourselves. Faced with the heavy losses consequent
on the failure of his spring and summer offensives, in which he had
cherished the hope of gaining a decisive victory, he was now confronted
with the menace of the increasing strength of the American Army. It
became evident, therefore, that the enemy, if pressure was applied, must
withdraw east of the river.
Before passing to the next phase of the operations, it may be of interest
to consider the results of the Battle of Amiens, in order to appreciate
its influence in determining the ruthless offensive
BLluTS^A^iens^ policy of the Allied Armies, which ultimately achieved
one of the most decisive victories in history and the
final defeat of Germany .^
From the opening of the battle on August 8th to its conclusion on
August 11th, the Fourth Army penetrated the enemy's defences to a
maximum depth of twelve miles, forcing the enemy back to the borders
of the old Somme battlefield, where there existed practically no accommoda-
tion for his reserve troops, and where the roads were exceedingly poor.
During the period of fighting from August 8th to 21st, 23,064 prisoners
and 400 guns of all calibres, with many hundreds of machine-guns and
trench mortars, were captured. In addition, large ammunition dumps,
enormous quantities of engineer material, and a considerable amount of
rolling stock were secured. Such heavy losses in prisoners naturally
compelled the enemy to throw in reserves.^ These he could ill afford to
spare in view of the wide extent of the allied offensive which at this
time extended from Rheims to Albert.
From the identification of the German divisions, it was ascertained
that Prince Rupprecht's reserves, numbering thirty-six divisions early in
July and destined for a big attack in the Ypres salient, were rapidly being
dra^Ti into the battle. On August 16th he retained only nine divisions
in reserve available for employment between the sea and Albert.^
The result of the attack of August 8th also immediately influenced
events as far south as the Oise. On August 8th the battle front lying
between the rivers Luce and Oise was held by the First and Third French
Armies, whose sectors lay respectively north and south of Montdidier.
On that date the First French Army, by its advance in co-operation with
^ As already pointed out, this story was written before General LudendorfTs Memoirs were
published.
* By the evening of August 21st, twenty-seven different hostile di\'isions had been engaged
by the Fourth Army, many of which had been heavily defeated, and withdrawn to rest or disbanded.
» Prince Rupprecht's offensive had apparently been definitely postponed about July 20th,
and from that date his reserves had been steadily withdrawn southwards, first to the Marne front
to meet General Mangin's offensive of July 18th, and later to the Somme to meet our attacks.
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THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 69
the Canadians, threatened to cut off the retreat of the German troops in
the Montdidier sahent. It thus facilitated the attack of the Third French
Army, when it was launched on August 10th between Montdidier and the
Oise. This compelled the enemy to beat a hurried retreat on a front
extending from Chevincourt, six miles north of Compiegne, to Gratibus,
three miles north of Montdidier, that is to say a distance of twenty-five
miles, and to an average depth of approximately 9,000 yards.
The moral effect of the battle of Amiens was of even greater im-
portance. In the first place the battle demonstrated that the British forces
had lost none of their fighting qualities, in spite of the reverses sustained
in the enemy's March and April offensives. It proved that the British Army
was as capable of carrying out a big offensive as it had been in 1916 and
1917, in spite of the heavy casualties it had suffered. Before August 8th
there were many, not only in the German Army, but among the French, and
even in our own Army and in England, who doubted this. On the other
hand, it showed the German High Command that the German infantry was
no longer of the same quality as that which had resisted so determinedly
during the five months of the Somme battle of 1916. Even the machine-
gunners had deteriorated. A brief inspection of the prisoners streaming
westwards sufficed to dispel any doubts that might have been entertained
as to the condition of the enemy's moral. The physique of the men was
fairly good, and their power of endurance still high, but many expressed
evident pleasure at being captured and thus being relieved of the necessity
of fighting a losing game. In several cases new arrivals were greeted
with cheers by parties which had been captured earlier in the day. A
more thorough examination of the prisoners showed that there was a
prevalent conviction among both officers and men that Germany could
not win the war.^ One reason for this was that they had realised, during
1 Various orders issued by German General Headquarters and lower formations during this
period are of interest, of which two examples are perhaps worth quoting : —
Extract from an order of the Second Army, dated 25/8/18.
It passes all comprehension that inconceivable rumours have been spread about behind the
front during the last few days by people who have lost their nerve. People with anxious tempera-
ments see everywhere squadrons of tanks, masses of cavalry, and dense lines of enemy infantry.
It is in fact high time that our old battle-tried soldiers spoke seriously to these cowards and weak-
lings, and told them of the deeds that are achieved in the front line. Tanks are no bogey for the
front line troops, who have artillery in close support. For instance, a battery-sergeant-major
with his gun destroyed 4 tanks ; one battery destroyed 1-1 ; and a single division in one day 40.
In another instance, a smart corporal climbed on to a tank and put the crew out of action with
his revolver, firing through an aperture. A lance-corporal was successful in putting a tank out
of action with a hand grenade.
The English cavalry, which has been engaged many times, has been shot to pieces and reduced
to a skeleton force by our infantry and artillery. Our riflemen and machine-gunners never had
better targets.
With regard to the enemy's infantry, stress must again be laid on the fact that in most cases
they have only received drafts of 18-year old men. Therefore there are no reasons for any panic.
On the contrary, the troops in the front line have never before considered themselves victors in
the way that they do at present.
This Army order is to be read out to aU units.
(Sd.) Von dek Maewttz,
General.
Extract from an order of the 2nd Guard Division, dated 27/8/18.
According to reports received by Army Headquarters the infantry of other divisions in the
battle hardly made any use of their rifles. The whole defence had been left to the machine-guns
70 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 21st
the French offensive on the Marne front in July, that American troops in
large numbers had arrived in the battle area, had given a very good account
of themselves, and had thus proved in the most forcible manner that
the unrestricted " U " boat campaign had failed.
The conservation of man power constituted a very important feature
of the battle. Between August 8th and August 21st we had lost 1,423
officers and 25,856 other ranks, killed, wounded, and missing ; the
enemy's losses in prisoners alone during that period amounted to some
23,000, while his losses in killed and wounded were known to be very
heavy.
This was a satisfactory balance sheet, and, if the same proportion of
losses could be maintained, it was certain that we should be able to outlast
the Germans in the final struggle.
and artillery. A large number of cases have also been substantiated in which companies of
infantry have passed through the artillery lines, and have taken no notice of the request of the
artillery to protect them. The strongest and severest measures will be taken to prevent conduct
which points to such neglect of duty. By order of the Army, artillery officers are empowered
to ascertain and report the name of any imit and commander refusing protection to the artillery.
Men who come back from the front and are met by the military police without their arms are to
be punished by court-martial.
Subordinate commanders are to use every opportunity for the delivery of controlled rifle-
fire. Control is to be exercised by regimental and battalion commanders. In this respect, I
particularly call attention to the special necessity in defensive warfare of having reliable non-
commissioned officers behind the front. On every occasion, it must be made absolutely clear
to the men that their rifles are their best means of defence, and that the attacking enemy must
be shot down.
(Sd.) Von Freideburg.
CHAPTER V
THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE, AUGUST 21ST — 30TH
Maps 2, 4, and 5
August 21st ; the opening of the second phase ; the general policy — The III Corps plan of attack
for August 22nd — August 22nd ; the artillery support — The attack by the 47th and 12th
Divisions— The capture of Albert by the 18th Division — The advance of the 3rd Australian
Division — The German counter-attack in the Happy Valley — August 23rd ; the operations
of the Australian Corps south of the Somme — The general plan of attack — The first phase
of the Australian Corps attack — The second phase — The third phase ; the capture of Chuignes
— The action of the 32nd Division — The capture of Tara and Usna Hills — August 24th ;
the capture of Bray-sur-Sonime and Becordel-Becourt by the Australian and III Corps — The
situation on the Fourth Army front on the night of August 24th — The readjustment of the
Australian Corps front south of the Somme — August 25th ; the capture of Ceylon Wood and
Fricourt — Our artillery policy — The enemy's retirement in front of the Third Army — The
events of August 26th — The action of the hostile artillerj- — August 27th ; the renewal of the
pressure south of the Somme — The co-operation of the First French Army with the Australian
Corps — The events north of the Somme — The capture of Trones Wood by the 18th Division —
The events of August 28th — The events of August 29th ; our troops reach the banks of the
Somme south of Peronne — The advance north of the Somme on August 30th.
In his despatch of December 21st, 1918, Sir Douglas Haig has
explained his reasons for extending the front of attack northwards to the
area between the Somme and the Scarpe in the follo^^^ng
August 21st ; the open- ^^.^^0 .
ing of the second phase ; »*uiu& .
the general policy » rj.^^ ^^^^^ jjj ^^^ ^^^^ prepared to meet an
attack in this direction, and, owing to the success of the Fourth
Army, he occupied a salient the left flank of which was already
threatened from the south. A further reason for my decision was
that the ground north of the Ancre River was not greatly damaged
by shell fire, and was suitable for the use of tanks. A successful
attack between Albert and Arras in a south-easterly direction would
turn the line of the Somme south of Peronne, and gave every promise
of producing far-reaching results. It would be a step forward to the
strategic objective St. Quentin-Cambrai. ... It was arranged that on
the morning of August 21st a limited attack should be laimched north
of the Ancre to gain the general line of the Arras-Albert railway, on
which it was correctly assumed that the enemy's main line of resistance
was sited. The day of August 22nd would then be used to get troops
and guns into position on this front and to bring forward the left of
the Fourth Army between the Somme and the Ancre. The principal
71
72 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 218T
attack would be delivered on August 23rd by the Third Army and
the divisions of the Fourth Army north of the Somme, the remainder
of the Fourth Army assisting by pushing forward south of the river
to cover the flank of the main operation. Thereafter, if success
attended our efforts, the whole of both Armies were to press forward
with the greatest vigour and exploit to the full any advantage we
might have gained."
The centre of gravity of the British offensive was, consequently,
transferred for a time from the front of the Fourth Army to that of the
Third Army north of Albert. At 4.55 a.m. on August 21st, Sir Julian
Byng launched eight divisions against the enemy's defences between
Grandecourt, five miles north of Albert, and Moyenneville, seven miles
south of Arras, on a front of some 16,000 yards.
News of the battle was eagerly awaited by the Fourth Army, as it
was kno^^'n that, if all went well on August 21st, offensive operations were
to be resumed on the Fourth Army front between the Somme and Albert
on August 22nd as a preliminary to a general advance on Peronne. Early
news was received that Beaucourt, Achiet, and Courcelles had been
captured with 2,000 prisoners, and that the enemy was holding the line
of the Albert-Arras railway very strongly. This was a satisfactory
beginning, and no doubt was felt that the enemy's resistance would soon
be broken, and his troops compelled to retire.
There were at this time indications that the Germans were contem-
plating a withdrawal in front of the First Army south of the Scarpe.
Moreover, although the enemy was fighting very stubbornly against the
Third Army north of Albert, the moral and general condition of his troops
along the whole of the Allied front was now known to be such that, if
bold and resolute tactics were adopted, his total collapse appeared
probable. This was fully realised at General Headquarters, and an order
was issued by Sir Douglas Haig on August 22nd to all Army Commanders
defining a ruthless offensive policy designed to achieve the final downfall
of the German Armies.^ The efforts of the Fourth Army for the next
1 " I request that Army Commanders will without delay bring to the notice of all subordinate
leaders the changed conditions under which operations are now being carried on, and the con-
sequent necessity for all ranks to act with the utmost boldness and resolution in order to get full
advantage from the present favourable situation.
" The effect of the two very severe defeats and the continuous attacks to which the enemy
has been subjected during the past months has been to wear out his troops and disorganise his
plans. Our Second and Fifth Armies have ♦aken their share in the effort to destroy the enemy
and already have gained considerable ground from him in the Lys sector of our front. To-day
the Tenth French Army crossed the Ailette and reports that a Bavarian division fled in panic,
carrying back with it another division which was advancing to its support.
" To-morrow the attack of the Allied Armies on the whole front from Soissons to Neuville
Vitasse, near Arras, is to be continued. The methods which we have followed hitherto in our
battles with limited objectives, when the enemy was strong, are no longer suitable to his present
condition. The enemy has not the means to deliver counter-attacks on an extended scale, nor
has he the numbers to hold a continuous position against the very extended advance which is
being directed against him. In order to turn the present situation to account, the most resolute
offensive is everywhere desirable. Risks which a month ago would have been criminal to incur
ought now to be incurred as a duty.
" It is no longer necessary to advanCe in regular lines and step by step. On the contrary,
each division should be given a distant objective which must be reached independently of its
neighbour, and even if one's flank is thereby exposed for the time being. Reinforcements must
be directed on points where our troops are gaining ground, not where they are checked. A vigorous
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ten days were, therefore, directed towards Peronne, in co-operation with the
advance of the Third Army on Bapaume, and with that of the First French
Army on Ham.^ Thus the second phase of the operations of the Fourth
Army in the battles of the hundred days, which opened with the attack
of the III Corps between the Somme and the Ancre on August 22nd,
formed part of the general advance of the Allied Armies from Soissons
to the Scarpe.
As a prelude to any renewal of the advance north of the Somme, it
was necessary to eject the enemy from the trench system which he was
holding opposite the Amiens outer defences. This system, although only
recently established, was well organised and was supported by a substantial
weight of artillery. It was also necessary, in order to enable the V Corps
on the right of the Third Army to advance east of the Ancre, that the
enemy should be driven out of the positions in and around Albert which
he had been holding for the past four months. Since August 6th our
patrols had occupied positions in the western portion of Albert, but had
been unable to drive the enemy from the remainder of the town. North
of Albert the swampy reaches of the Ancre were impassable except by
means of bridges and causeways ; these would have to be constructed
if an advance was to be made across the river by the V Corps. As the
construction of these bridges wovdd involve considerable labour, time,
and casualties, it was decided first to clear Albert, and then to pass troops
of the V Corps through the town in order to turn the enemy's positions
east of the Ancre from the south.
On August 22nd the III Corps was to attack between the Bray-sur-
Somme-Corbie road and Albert inclusive, whilst, on the right of the III
Corps, the 3rd Australian Division was to advance its
B?ack™oSus?22nf ^^ft in order to protect the right flank of the attack.
The immediate object of the operation was to secure
the high ground which lies north of Bray-sur-Somme, east of the well-
known Happy Valley, and between the Chalk Pit and Becordel-Becourt,
also the western slopes of Shamrock and Tara Hills. The task of
securing the high ground east of the Happy Valley, and between the
Chalk Pit and Becordel-Becourt, was allotted to the 47th and 12th
Divisions, their final objective representing an advance of some 3,000
yards. There was also an intermediate objective for these two divisions
about 1,000 yards west of the final objective on the western slopes
of the Happy Valley. On the right Maj.-Gen. Gorringe, commanding
the 47th Division, detailed the 141st Brigade to capture the first objective.
The 142nd Brigade in support was then to " leap-frog " the leading
brigade and secure the final objective ; the 140th Brigade was in reserve.
The 12th Division, under Maj.-Gen. Higginson, operating on a
offensive will cause hostile strong points to fall and in due course our whole Army will be able
to continue its advance. This procedure will result in speedily breaking up the hostile forces
and will cost us much less than if we attempted to deal with the present situation in a half-hearted
manner. The situation is most favourable. Let each one of us act energetically and, without
hesitation, push forward to our objective."
' These three towns were important road junctions and of considerable strategical value to
the enemy, as is apparent from a study of the Somme campaigns of 1916 and 1917, wherein they
played a most conspicuous part and represented the main centres of the enemy's resistance.
L
74 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 22nd
slightly broader front, employed the 35th and 36th Brigades, attacking
side by side, to capture both objectives, with the 37th Brigade in reserve.
Orders were issued for all ground gained to be consolidated and organised
for defence in depth, as it was possible that a temporary halt might have
to be made on this line, until a further advance by the Third Army
should threaten the enemy's communications.
The task of the 3rd Australian Division on the right of the 47th
Division was to ensure the security of the southern flank of the III Corps
by advancing its left to the high ground immediately north of Bray-
sur-Somme. This necessitated an advance of approximately 2,000 yards,
and the task was entrusted to the 9th Australian Brigade.
On the left, the crossing of the Ancre between Dernancourt and
Albert, and the clearing of Albert, presented numerous difficulties. This
task was assigned to the 18th Division. Maj.-Gen. Lee decided to
employ the 54th Brigade to secure the ground between Meaulte and
Albert ; the 55th Brigade to complete the capture of Albert and secure
the southern portion of Tara Hill, and Shamrock Hill ; the 53rd Brigade
was retained in divisional reserve.^
In order to ensure that no opportunity should be missed of pressing
forward on the heels of the enemy, should he show further signs of with-
drawal, the reserve brigades were organised ready to assume the role of an
advanced guard if the situation so demanded. In addition, a force of two
squadrons of the III Corps Cavalry, supported by six whippet tanks and
one troop of Australian Light Horse attached to the 3rd Australian
Division, was organised for the purpose of pushing forward as far as the
small woods on the high ground north of Suzanne, some 4,000 yards
beyond the objective allotted to the 47th Division.
Sir Alec. Godley retained the 58th Division in corps reserve, but
instructed Maj.-Gen. Ramsay to move one brigade at " zero " to an
assembly position in rear of the 18th Division, and two brigades to a
position just west of Morlancourt.
The preparations for the attack were made with the utmost effort
to ensure secrecy. There was no preliminary bombardment other than
the normal harassing fire which was maintained until " zero." Neverthe-
less, the enemy appears to have discovered that trouble was brewing.
This was proved not only by the statements of prisoners, but by the
weight of the enemy's counter-preparation during the night of August
21st. This bombardment was especially heavy at 4 a.m. on the morning
of August 22nd, only forty-five minutes before " zero," when a consider-
able quantity of gas shell was fired, making it necessary for our troops
to adjust their gas helmets. The assembly was not, however, seriously
hampered.
At " zero," which had been fixed for 4.45 a.m., the barrage from 250
guns came down 200 yards in front of the leading waves of the 47th and
12th Divisions. This was the signal for the assembled infantry and tanks
of these divisions to advance under cover of a creeping barrage, moving
' As soon as Albert had been cleared of the enemy, the 38th Division, under the command
of Maj.-Gen. T. A. Cubitt, which formed the right of the V Corps, was to pass through the town
and operate in a north-easterly direction.
August 22nd] THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE 75
forward at the rate of 100 yards every four minutes. The 18th
Division moved forward covered by the fire of four brigades of field
artillery, which fired on centres of resistance, and pro-
^artmery^support*^ vided a dense smoke screen designed to conceal the
movements of the attacking troops and tanks. A smoke
screen was also placed on the high ground which formed the objective,
thus depriving the enemy of valuable observation points.
The 47th and 12th Divisions, each supported by ten Mark V tanks,
made good progress. The enemy's resistance was not formidable, with
the result that by 6.45 a.m. the whole of the inter-
■'?nVl2th KfoS'"" mediate objective, about 2,000 yards from the "starting
line," was in our possession, except at one point near the
Filiform Tree close to the boundary between the two divisions. Here a
party of Germans stubbornly defended the crest of the rise and defeated
all attempts to dislodge them.
The barrage was halted for ten minutes covering the intermediate
objective, before moving forward again in advance of our troops to
the final objective. Once again the infantry surged forward, but found
its progress more strongly opposed. On the front of the 47th Division
small parties of the enemy, concealed by the numerous folds in the ground
on the eastern slopes of the Happy Valley, checked our advance, and were
only " mopped up " after hard and stubborn fighting. Some of these
parties in the northern end of the valley also helped to stiffen the resistance
offered earlier in the morning in the vicinity of the Filiform Tree, and no
further progress was made at this point. Elsewhere the 47th Division
reached the final objective. The 12th Division succeeded in clearing the
whole of Meaulte, and secured the high ground along the Bray-sur-Somme-
Albert road south-east of the village, but, as Avith the 47th Division, its
further progress was checked by the party of Germans, who clung
desperately to the position near the Filiform Tree. Thus, at the close of
the first phase of the battle, the 47th and 12th Divisions had seciired
their objectives except in the vicinity of the Filiform Tree.
As soon as the 47th Division reached the final objective, the two
squadrons of corps cavalry moved forward to carry out their role of
exploitation. The moment they left the shelter of the Happy Valley
and appeared over the crest of the rise which our troops were
consolidating, heavy artillery and machine-gun fire was directed
upon them. It at once became apparent that the situation was
not suitable for the employment of mounted troops, and the cavalry
was therefore withdrawn. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately,
the whippet tanks, which should have accompanied the cavalry,
were unable to move forward in support owing to mechanical trouble and
other causes, and consequently did not take part in the action. Even
if they had moved forward with the cavalry, it is very doubtful whether
they would have been able to render any assistance, as the enemy was
completely ready and prepared for our attack.
On the left, the 18th Division, assigned the difficult task of clearing
Albert and its environs of the enemy, was assisted by four Mark V tanks.
On the evening of August 21st strong patrols of the 54th Brigade had
76 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 22nd
succeeded in crossing the Ancre at dusk, and had gained a footing on the
Albert-Meaulte road, south of Albert and north of Vivier Mill. This very
well executed enterprise simplified the task of the 5-ith
]^^he''lsth Division Brigade, as it to a great extent rendered unnecessary
the difficult, and probably costly, operation of forcing
the passage of the Ancre and its^marshes in the face of strong opposi-
tion.
Following on the brilliant patrol work of the 54th Brigade, came the
gallant achievement of the 55th Brigade, which carried out the difficult
operation of dislodging the enemy from his well-concealed and strongly-
defended posts in the ruins of Albert. It was work which could not be
hurried, and required exceptional thoroughness and individual initiative.
The operation for capturing the town was divided into three phases. The
first phase began at 4.45 a.m., when a heavy bombardment was directed
on the whole of that portion of Albert which lies east of the Ancre. This
bombardment lasted for an hour, during Avhich time the 8th East Surrey
worked its way through that part of the town which lies west of the river.
For the second phase, the bombardment was lifted on to the strong
points on the eastern outskirts, where it remained stationary until 6.45
a.m., while the 8th East Surrey cleared the town east of the river. In
the final phase the bombardment was lifted clear of the town. By
9.10 a.m. the 8th East Surrey had overcome the enemy's resistance and
was in complete occupation of Albert.
Meanwhile by " zero," under cover of the patrols, the 11th Royal
Fusiliers and three companies of the 6th Northamptonshire, of the 54th
Brigade, had silently assembled east of the Ancre along the Vivier Mill-
Albert road. The remainder of the latter battalion, which had been
unable to cross the Ancre south of Vivier Mill, fought its way forward to
the western exit of Meaulte, which it reached a little before 5.30 a.m. A
quarter of an hour later, the two attacking battalions swept forward from
the line of the Vivier Mill-Albert road, under cover of a creeping barrage,
supported by the four Mark V tanks which had been allotted to the
division. The enemy was holding his position with pairs of machine-guns
disposed in depth along the front ; over 80 of these were captured,
and many more destroyed by shell fire. By 8 a.m. the 6th Northampton-
shire had gained the slopes of Shamrock Hill, and was in touch with the
12th Division east of Meaulte. On its left the 11th Royal Fusiliers, after
meeting with strong opposition from the direction of Albert, Bellevue
Farm, and Shamrock Hill, had reached a line 500 yards east of Bellevue
Farm. About 10 a.m. the 7th The Buffs, of the 55th Brigade, which was
supporting the attack of the 8th East Siurey on Albert, debouched from
the town and endeavoured to advance towards Tara Hill, but was unable
to proceed beyond the eastern outskirts of the town owing to the
severity of the machine-gun fire. During the afternoon a company of
the 2nd Bedfordshire, supporting the attack of the 54th Brigade, moved
through the advanced troops and secured the summit of Shamrock Hill,
from which the German machine-guns had been particularly active.
Starting at " zero " and keeping close up to the barrage, the 9th
Australian Brigade, operating on the right of the 47th Division, advanced
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to the first objective, a distance of about 1,000 yards from the
"starting line," The enemy's resistance was quickly
'^luSiarLS^S overcome, and the advance was so rapid that many
machine-guns were captured before the crews could
bring them into action.^
After a halt of an hour on the first objective, the advance of the
Australians was resumed. This halt had allowed the enemy time to shorten
his artillery barrage, which caused a number of casualties, but, in spite
of this, the final objective was gained by 8.30 a.m. In this latter stage
of the attack the troops of the 47th Division, which were operating im-
mediately on the left of the 9th Brigade, diverged too much to the left,
probably on account of the resistance encountered in the Happy
Valley, and a company of the 34th Battalion of the 9th Brigade was in
conseqvience sent forward to strengthen the left flank. This company
succeeded in capturing the Chalk Pit, where it was relieved later in the
day by troops of the 47th Division. While these operations were in
progress the 3rd Australian Pioneer Battalion, which was holding the
Etinehem spur from the Bray-sur-Somme-Corbie road to the river,
advanced our line to the Crucifix, from which point the whole of the village
of Bray-sur-Somme was under observation.
In order to reap full advantage from the success gained by the
III Corps and the 3rd Australian Division, orders were issued by Sir
Henry Rawlinson, on the evening of August 22nd, for a combined attack
to be made by the III Corps north of the Somme, in conjunction with an
attack by the Australian Corps south of the river. The attack by the
Australian Corps had already been arranged for the early morning of
August 23rd. Sir Alec. Godley accordingly issued orders for an attack
to be launched on the whole front of the III Corps on the 23rd, but a
change in the situation, caused by a German counter-attack in the Happy
Valley on the afternoon of the 22nd, necessitated a modification of his
plans, and it was finally decided to carry out the attack only on the
northern part of the front held by the ISth Division.
Throughout the afternoon of August 22nd the enemy shelled the
Happy Valley and the high ground to the east of it, where the advanced
The German counter- troops of the 47th Division were digging in. Unfor-
attack in the Happy tunatcly the cresccnt-shapcd formation of the high
Valley ground east of the Happy Valley had necessitated the
troops on the right of the 47th Division taking up a position in a semicircle,
and this minimised the effectiveness of the protective barrage. At
5.30 p.m. the shelling increased in volume, and the enemy in considerable
strength attacked the 142nd Brigade of the 47th Division. Although
the consolidating troops offered a stout resistance, they were forced to
withdraw west of the Happy Valley, finally taking up a position along the
Bray-sur-Somme-Albcrt road. On the extreme right of the 142nd Brigade,
two companies of the 22nd London held their ground for some time, but were
finally forced to withdraw, thus leaving the flank of the 3rd Australian
Division dangerously exposed. After a hard fight the Chalk Pit was
' A German battalion commander and his staff, captured in the fight, could speak of nothing
but the rapidity with which our men were upon them and surrounded their machine-guns.
78 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 22nd
secured by the enemy, but was recaptured almost immediately by a
company of the 33rd Battalion of the 9th Australian Brigade. This
company, in conjunction ^vith the two companies of the 22nd London,
then formed a defensive flank along an underspur running into the Happy
Valley. Reserve machine-guns were sent forward to take up positions
on the high ground immediately north of the Bray-s\ir-Somme-Corbie road,
and the 140th Brigade was pushed forward as a further reserve to provide
against contingencies, but no further attack developed. The enemy placed a
number of machine-guns in the Happy Valley, the fire of which inter-
mittently swept the area held by the 3rd Australian Division north of the
Bray-sur-Somme-Corbie road, and was a constant source of trouble to
reinforcements and ration parties moving forward to the front line.
On account of this check, and owing to the casualties suffered by the
142nd Brigade, the 47th Division was unable to continue the attack on
August 23rd, as had been originally intended. The 175th Brigade of the
58th Division was moved up from corps reserve, and was placed at the dis-
posal of ]\Iaj.-Gen. Gorringe for the relief of the 142nd Brigade. This
relief was effected on the night of August 22nd, and the relief of the 47th
Division by the 58th Division was completed on the morning of August 24th.
South of the Somme, no untoward incident interfered with our plans,
and the attack of the Australian Corps, with the 32nd Division on the
right and the 1st Australian Division on the left, was
ti(fiw of the Aus^traiian' carried out on a front of foiu- miles, extending from
Corps south of the Herleville to the Somme. The 5th Australian Division,
Somme which was holding the sector immediately south of the
Somme on the night of August 22nd, remained in position until the
assembly of the 1st Australian Division was complete, when it was with-
drawn into reserve.
Sir John Monash decided to carry out the attack, the object of which
was the capture of the general line Herleville-Chuignes-Square Wood, in
three phases. The objectives of the first phase in-
'^mckllS>mS^^ eluded Herleville and ChuignoUes, and the Plateau
Woods and the Arcy Woods. Here the enemy had
constructed an organised defensive system since August 12th, and,
although these defences were by no means formidable, a certain
amount of resistance was to be expected. Sir John Monash considered,
therefore, that ample artillery and tank support must be provided, and
that a carefully organised attack must be prepared by the 32nd Division
and the 1st Australian Division. In the second phase the line to be
reached ran along the foot of the eastern slopes of the ChuignoUes
Valley, from near Chuignes to the Somme. This attack was to be carried
out by the 1st Australian Division without artillery assistance, as no serious
opposition was expected. Finally, the third phase, the execution of
which was dependent upon the success of the preceding phases, involved
an attack by the 1st Australian Division against the high ground east of
the ChuignoUes Valley, as far as the Chuignes-Cappy road and the western
outskirts of Cappy. The objective also included the village of Chuignes.
On the right, Maj.-Gen. Lambert detailed the 97th Brigade for the
attack on Herleville. On the left. Maj.-Gen. Glasgow employed the 2nd
August 23rd] THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE 79
and 1st Australian Brigades, operating on the right and left respectively,
while the task of captxiring the final objective was allotted to the 3rd
Brigade.^
The field artillery barrage covering the initial advance of the infantry
to the first objective was furnished by fifteen field artillery brigades,
six of which were to support the advance of the 32nd Division, and nine
that of the 1st Australian Division. A smoke screen was placed on the
Bray-sur-Somme spur north of the Somme, but, contrary to the usual
custom, smoke shells were not employed in the barrage to define the
various stages of the advance. Throughout the operation the task of the
heavy artillery, in addition to the requisite counter-battery fire, was to
keep the crossings over the Somme at Cappy and Eclusier under a steady
fire, and to bombard selected targets in the vicinity of Foucaucourt and
the roads further east.
Twelve tanks of the 8th Mark V Tank Battalion were detailed to
co-operate with the 32nd Division in the attack on Herleville, while
the 1st and 2nd Australian Brigades Avere each allotted twelve tanks
from the 13th and 2nd Mark V Tank Battalions respectively. In addition,
each attacking brigade was allotted three tanks of an older type for
carrying forward additional ammunition and supplies. By dawTi on
August 22nd all the tanks had been assembled within 3,000 yards of the
front line, and at 9.30 p.m. that night they moved forward to their
" starting line," which was approximately 1,000 yards in rear of that of
the infantry.
The attack, which was timed to start simultaneously ^"ith that of
the 18th Division against Tara Hill, was launched at 4.45 a.m. on
The first phase of the the morning of August 23rd. As soon as the
Australian Corps artillery barrage, which was in all respects excellent,
attack came down, the infantry moved forward followed
by the tanks. The latter were well up to time with the exception
of those supporting the 2nd Australian Brigade, which were a little late
in arriving at the " starting line," and only succeeded in catching up the
infantry at a later stage of the advance.
On the 32nd Division front the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light
Infantry and 10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of the 97th Brigade
attacked Herleville, and the village was soon in our possession. Heavy
fighting occurred near the church, where the enemy was in considerable
strength and fought with determination.
On the 1st Australian Division front the assaulting troops of the
2nd and 1st Australian Brigades, keeping close up to the barrage, made
good progress and quickly overran the enemy's outpost line. South of
the Amiens-Brie road considerable opposition was encountered by the 2nd
Brigade in the neighbourhood of the St. Denis Woods, where it was
difficult for the troops to advance as the ground was broken bv a deep cnilly
and sunken roads. The St. Denis Woods were strongly defended, and
enfilade machine-gun fire from the southern portion of the St. 3Iartin
Woods delayed their capture for a short time, vmtil the timely arrival of
' The 32nd Division, in the first phase, attacked on a front of 2,000 yards, and the 1st Aus-
tralian Division on a front of 5,000 yards.
80 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 23rd
the tanks enabled the infantry to clear them. Further north it took
some time to " mop up " the large expanse of the St. Martin Woods,
but, as this work was done chiefly by the supporting troops, the advance
was not delayed, and the 2nd Brigade was able to keep well up to the
barrage and made good progress.
At 5.15 a.m. the infantry of the 1st Brigade was entering the Matto
Woods, after having overcome the enemy's resistance on the outskirts
with the assistance of a tank. Robert Wood, which was strongly held,
was surrounded by our troops, and the enemy surrendered freely. In the
sunken road between the Matto Woods and Robert W^ood many Germans
surrendered to the 1st Brigade without attempting to fight. ChuignoUes
was surrounded and " mopped up " with the effective assistance of the
tanks, and almost immediately afterwards ChuignoUes Wood fell into
our hands. Owing, however, to the heavy machine-gun fire which was
encountered, it was found necessary to make a temporary withdrawal
to its southern outskirts. On the extreme left of the 1st Brigade German
machine-guns caused trouble from the outset of the attack, and it was
only after stiff fighting that our troops reached their objective.
It had been arranged for the barrage to halt at 5.30 a.m. for fifteen
minutes some distance short of the first objective, to ensure that the
infantry should not lose it. When this hour arrived the situation was
well in hand, and the infantry was almost everywhere in touch with the
barrage. At 5.45 a.m. the barrage was again lifted, and the advance to
the first objective was resumed. The troops of 32nd Division pushed for-
ward, and the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry gained its objec-
tive on the light without difficulty, but considerable opposition was
experienced on the left from the fire of machine-guns posted in the Herle-
ville Woods. One of these copses was held by 50 Germans who were sur-
romided, and eventually surrendered to three of our men after the officer
in command had been shot.
Owing to the increasing opposition met from the Herleville Woods,
the troops of the 2nd Australian Brigade on the right began to lose the
impetus of their initial attack, and the advance became slower. The
splendid leadership of Lieut. William Joynt of the 8th Battalion,
however, here stood the 2nd Australian Brigade in good stead. Realising
that the men of the leading battalion had lost all their officers and had
become disorganised, Lieut. Joynt rushed forward across the open from
his own battalion, under very heavy fire, to join them. Having got the
men under cover of some dead ground, he re-formed them, and linked
them up with his o\vn men. A personal reconnaissance showed him
that the fire from the Herleville Woods was holding up the whole advance.
Without any hesitation he dashed forward, calling on the men to follow
him. By sheer force of example he inspired them to make a brilliant
bayonet charge, which was successful in reaching and entering the woods. ^
Although fighting in the Herleville Woods continued most of the day,
by 7 a.m. the 2nd Brigade had worked through or round them and had
reached the first objective. The 1st Brigade similarly met with deter-
mined resistance from the high ground north-east of the St. Martin Woods,
1 See Appendix E, No. 28.
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August 23rd] THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE 81
but the attack was resolutely pushed home, and, with the admirable
co-operation of the tanks, the high ground which constituted the objective
at this point was secured.
At 7 a.m., although the first objective had been gained, the 1st
Australian and 32nd Divisions had lost touch with each other, and a gap
of some hundreds of yards existed between them, through which the
enemy was endeavouring to force his way. A company of the 8th
Australian Battalion, however, was at once moved up, and succeeded
in filling the gap and regaining touch.
The second phase, which really became merged into the first phase,
consisted of a number of small attacks against the numerous small
woods and copses north-east of Chuignolles, without
The second phase the support of an artillery barrage. The opposition
was very local, and by about 7 a.m. the whole area
inside the second objective was clear of the enemy .^
The attack on the third objective was carried out by the 3rd Australian
Brigade which advanced in artillery formation, with the 12th and 9th
^ .^- , ^ XV Battalions leading, the 11th in support, and the 10th
The third phase; the • rm_ /-> i ■• .■•
capture oi Chuignes ^^ reserve. The Germans, who were under the im-
pression that our advance had come to an end, were
holding this high ground in considerable strength. At 2 p.m. the 12th
and 9th Battalions deployed west of the Long Woods and Luc "Wood,
and advanced through the 1st Brigade and across the valley, under cover
of a creeping barrage provided by three field artillery brigades which had
been pushed forward rapidly during the early phases of the advance. The
high ground overlooking Chuignolles, and at the Marly Woods and Froissy
Beacon, was stormed, and the enemy fell back in confusion to Garenne
Wood and Square Wood. On the left, however, the enemy's artillery
fire was heavy and caused the 9th Battalion numerous casualties, and
the 10th Battalion, from reserve, was sent up to protect the left flank
of the advance. The 11th Battalion, which diu-ing the advance had
followed in close support of the 12th Battalion, was employed in the
actual capture of the Marly Woods and Froissy Beacon. Turning due
north, while the 12th Battalion continued its advance, this battalion
attacked the enemy in flank and took him completely by surprise. ^
Meanwhile, the 12th Battalion reached the outskirts "of Garenne Wood,
which was held too strongly to permit of its being captured by a frontal
attack. An enveloping movement was, therefore, carried ' out, and
resulted in the capture of the wood with seventy prisoners. At the same
time Square Wood was secured, and our troops were able to follow the
retreating enemy to within 400 yards of Cappy. One companv, after
penetrating as far as the \nllage itself, eventually withdrew without difficulty.
During this fighting the remaining brigades of the 1st Australian
Division had not been idle. The 1st Brigade, under cover of the barrage
which supported the attack of the 3rd Brigade, gained possession of
' In the Arcy Woods there was found a 15-inch gun on a huge mounting. The gun, which
was one of those employed for bombarding Amiens, had been cither blown up intentionally or
accidentally destroyed by a premature explosion.
» Although capturing over 100 prisoners, the total casualties of the llth Battalion for the
day amounted to two.
M
82 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 23rd
Chuignes, and of the spur and small valley immediately south of the village.
The 2nd Brigade on the right pushed forward patrols, but, o^ving to the
number of casualties the brigade had suffered during the earlier stages
of the advance and to the resistance offered by the enemy, very little progress
was made.
While the 97th Brigade of the 32nd Division was attacking the
enemy's positions around Herleville, the 96th Brigade on its right, under
cover of the creeping barrage which was extended to
^^ ^^ Division ^ ° ^^^ south as far as Lihons, pushed forward strong
patrols and succeeded in advancing the line 500 yards
south of Herleville.^
During this very successful day's fighting the 1st Australian and
32nd Divisions again greatly distinguished themselves by skilful leader-
ship, intelligent use of the ground, and the dash and gallantry of all ranks.
The 1st Austrahan Division secured 2,596 prisoners, 23 guns, and 167
machine-guns, and the 32nd Division 311 prisoners and many machine-
guns.
Before the V Corps on the right of the Third Army could make
any progress, it was essential to capture the Tara Hill-Usna Hill
ridge, astride the AJbert-Bapaume road, and thus
^and^uSaHUk"^ secure the flank of the V Corps. Consequently,
after consultation with Maj.-Gen. Cubitt, command-
ing the 38th Division, Maj.-Gen. Lee arranged for the 53rd Brigade,
which had been in reserve on August 22nd, and which he reinforced with
the 7th The Queens, to attack this ridge at dawn on August 23rd in
conjunction with the 113th Brigade of the 38th Division. The latter
brigade was to move through Albert and attack Usna Hill, after deploying
east of the marshy reaches of the Ancre immediately north of Albert.
In order to make it possible to assemble the 113th Brigade, the 55th
Brigade, which was holding Albert, advanced its line about 500 yards
during the night astride the Albert-Bapaume road. This allowed the
113th Brigade svifficient space from which to debouch from the eastern
exits of Albert. The assembly positions of the latter brigade to the north of
the town were reached with some difficulty, as the troops had in some cases
to wade waist high through the swamps east of the Ancre. At 4.45 a.m.,
after overcoming all difficulties, the 53rd Brigade on the right assisted by
six Mark V tanks, and the 113th Brigade on the left formed up with its
back to the floods, launched a frontal attack against Tara and Usna
Hills and captured the ridge by 6 a.m.
These operations improved our position very materially and gave us
a good footing on the slopes of the high ground overlooking Albert. This
high ground, it was realised, would be our next objective, as soon as the
advance of the Third Army towards Bapaume began to threaten the rear
of the enemy's position on the Longueval-High Wood-Pozieres ridge,
and as soon as the remainder of the troops of the III Corps were ready to
advance.
' The 4th Australian Division also made incursions into the enemy's lines, in one of which
Lieut. McCarthy, 16th Australian Battalion, took 5 machine-guns and 50 prisoners almost
single-handed. See Appendix E, No. 32.
August 24th] THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE 83
On the evening of the 23rd, as the result of the success gained during
the day, Sir Henry Rawlinson issued orders for the pressure to be main-
tained along the whole army front north of the Somme.
The capture of Tara and Usna Hills, on the morning of the 23rd,
concluded the initial phase of the operations north of the Somme, and the
August 24th; the capture remainder of the day was spent in consolidating the
of Bray-sur-Somme and position and in organising tor a lurther advance. As
B6cordei-B6court by the the weather was perfect and the moon full, it was
Australian and HI Corps ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^ry the tactics, and to attempt an advance
by night all along the front north of the river.
Prior to the attack Bray-sur-Somme and La Neuville-les-Bray, as
well as the centres of hostile activity east and south of these places, were
harassed with artillery fire. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the
3rd Australian Pioneer Battalion, as soon as it was sufficiently dark,
crossed the river south of Bray-sur-Somme by bridges, which it had
thrown across the night before, and by midnight had cleared La Neuville-
les-Bray and the peninsula formed by the bend in the river.
The main attack by the 3rd Australian, 47th, 12th, and 18th
Divisions, in the order named from south to north, started at 1 a.m. in
brilliant moonlight. On the right the 40th Australian Battalion attacked
the village of Bray-sur-Somme. It encountered opposition on the out-
skirts of the village, and after experiencing some difficulty in maintaining
touch and direction in the village, succeeded in establishing a line
along the eastern edge. One hundred and twenty-five prisoners and
22 machine-guns were captured in Bray-sur-Somme, as well as a large
dump of timber and ammunition and three loaded trains which were taken
in the railway sidings.
To the north of the Australians the troops of the 47th and 12th Divisions
advanced without difficulty, except in the centre, east of the Filiform
Tree, where, as on the 22nd, the attack was at first held up by a strong
post of the enemy. It was not until the operations had been in progress
for two hours that the hostile artillery fire became at all heavy, but, from
3 a.m. until 8 a.m., the ridge east of the Happy Valley was heavily shelled
with high explosive and gas shell. At 8 a.m., the enemy laimched a strong
counter-attack, the concentration for which was luckily observed by one
of our aeroplanes and at once reported. Our artillery promptly responded
to the call, and, with the aid of the scout aeroplanes which were patrolling
in the neighbourhood, and which attacked the enemy with bombs and
machine-guns, the counter-attacking troops were overwhelmed before
they could approach our lines.
Further north the troops of the 12th Division succeeded in capturing
the hamlet of Becordel-Becourt, and established themselves without
difficulty on the high ground south-east of the village. Working in con-
junction with the right of the V Corps, whose first objectives were Ovillers-
la-Boisselle and La Boisselle, the 18th Division advanced against Chapes
spur. By 5 a.m. it had captured the spur and thrown out a defensive
flank facing south, north of Becourt Wood. The La Boisselle crater,
which had been blown on the first day of the Battle of the Somme over
two years before, afforded the enemy a strong locahty of which he made
84 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 24th
full use. He held on to this position until 8 p.m., when a brilliant
attack by the 8th Royal Berkshire finally dislodged him, and resulted
in the capture of 250 prisoners and several machine-guns. During the
day strong patrols " mopped up " Becourt Wood, and cleared the northern
end of Sausage Valley in conjunction with the 38th Division.
During the morning there were signs that the enemy was about to begin
a general withdrawal north of the Somme. He evacuated the commanding
position on the ridge east of the Filiform Tree, which had been the cause
of so much trouble to the 12th Division during the early hours of the
morning. Patrols of this division then occupied the position and pushed
forward several hundred yards beyond it, thereby reducing to a certain
extent the sharp salient formed by the advance of the 47th Division east
of the Happy Valley,
During the fighting from August 22nd to August 24th the enemy
had on the whole offered a stout resistance to our advance. On the
The situation on the 22nd portions of three divisions participated in the
Fourth Army front on coxuiter-attack, which resulted in the recapture by the
the night of August 24th enemy of the Happy Valley. It also transpired that
the attack of the 18th Division in the vicinity of the Sausage Valley, on
the morning of the 24th, had forestalled by one hour a counter-attack by
detachments of three German divisions, the object of which was the
recapture of Tara Hill. This resistance, at first sight, naturally conveyed
the impression that the enemy contemplated making a determined
stand.
Throughout the three days' fighting, however, no new hostile divisions
had been identified, and the enemy's reinforcements were all drawn from
those divisions which had been already engaged in the battle since August
8th. This, combined with the fact that aeroplane photographs taken on
August 22nd disclosed new trenches on the eastern side of the Somme
south of Falvy and north from Voyennes,^ and also a report from the
French further south that digging was in progress east of the Canal du
Nord between Noyon and Nesle, proved fairly conclusively that the
enemy contemplated a retirement to Peronne, and that the resistance
offered was only of a temporary character, to stem our advance until his
defensive preparations coxild be completed.
During August 24th, after the failure of the German counter-attack
east of the Happy Valley, there were more and more signs of demoralisa-
tion amongst the enemy's troops north of the Somme. The pressure of
the Third and Fourth Armies was evidently too strong, and, if it could be
increased, or even maintained without relaxation, there was every reason
to believe that the enemy's arrangements for an orderly retirement
behind the line of the Somme could be upset, and that he would be com-
pelled to retreat before they were complete. Consequently, in accordance
with tne policy contained in Sir Douglas Haig's instructions, which appear
at the beginning of this chapter,^ orders were issued that all formations
should spare no effort to harass the enemy's withdrawal, and should allow
him no respite.
' North-east and east of Nesle respectively.
^ See note to page 72.
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August 25th] THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE 85
South of the Somme, the night of August 24th was remarkable for a
very heavy hostile concentration of gas shell fired on the front of the
The readjustment of Australian Corps. It was particularly severe on gullies
the Australian Corps and woods, and on the extreme right in the vicinity of
iront south ol the Lihons. This bombardment came at a most unfortunate
omme time, as the XXXVI French Corps was in process of
relieving the 4th Canadian Division south of Lihons, and the 4th Australian
Division on a portion of their front between Lihons and Lihu. Moreover, on
the same night the 32nd Division was extending its front southwards as far
as Lihu, thus releasing the whole of the 4th Australian Division from the
line. The unavoidable movement of troops, consequent on these reliefs,
led to a large number of casualties both amongst the French troops and
in the 4th Australian Division. The gas concentration was unusually
dense and drifted over the area of the 32nd Division, which also suffered
a number of casualties.
On relief, the 4th Canadian Division was concentrated in the Longueau
area and quitted the Fourth Army on August 27th. The whole Canadian
Corps had now left the army. By its determination and gallantry
it had taken a large share in the successes of the Fourth Army on
August 8th and during the following days. The Fourth Army's loss was,
however, the First Army's gain, and the Canadians later took a prominent
part in our successes further north.
In accordance with the general plan of operations, the advance of
the Fourth Army was continued on August 25th north of the Somme
August 25th; the cap- in conjunction with that of the Third Army,
ture of Ceylon Wood while the troops south of the river contented them-
and Fncourt selves with improving their positions and preparing
for a further advance.
At 2.30 a.m. the III Corps, with the 3rd Australian Division on its
right, advanced without any preliminary bombardment or creeping barrage ;
the artillery, when called upon to do so, supporting the infantry by engaging
fleeting targets and centres of resistance. The 3rd Australian Division,
advancing on a two-brigade front, met with little resistance as the infantry
climbed the open slopes of the Bray-sur-Somme spur, on the eastern edge of
which stands Ceylon Wood, until the old trench system on its crest was
reached. Here small parties of the enemy endeavoured for a short time
to check the advance, but by dawn the ridge had been gained, and a
position established along the top of the cliffs overlooking the river north-
east of Cappy, and along the western edge of Ceylon and Trigger woods.
North of the Australians the 58th Division, advancing on a front of two
brigades, and the 12th Division on a front of one brigade, although
slightly delayed at the start by the heavy ground mist, met with little
opposition on the plateau south-west of Carnoy and Mametz, but the 58th
Division was checked opposite Billon Wood. Further north again the
18th Division, advancing on a two-brigade front, and in touch mth the
38th Division of the Third Army, made good progress. The Fricourt mine
craters were taken soon after daylight by the 18th Division, and, by 10 a.m.,
patrols had cleared Fricoiart and Bottom Wood and were approaching
Mametz Wood, the scene of so much hard fighting in July, 1916. There
86 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 25th
was now no doubt that the enemy was in full retreat along the whole of
the front north of the Somme, and was retiring in bounds protected by
rearguards. The enemy's artillery activity was limited to the fire of a
few long-range high-velocity guns firing at extreme range, which harassed
some of the forward roads, and to that of a small number of field guns
which he employed to support his rearguards. These guns were well
handled and, firing over open sights from the many small woods that
are scattered over the area, caused our infantry considerable trouble.
The advance, however, pressed on, and Billon Wood was captured by the
173rd Brigade. By nightfall our line had also been advanced east of
Mametz and along the eastern edge of Mametz Wood, whence it was con-
tinued by the 38th Division. During the day over 500 prisoners were
captured.
In conjunction with the advance north of the Somme, the left brigade
of the 1st Australian Division moved forward at 4 p.m. under cover of an
artillery barrage. Considerable opposition was encountered, but the line was
advanced to a depth of approximately 500 yards, between Chuignes and
the river.
At this stage of the operations the withdrawal of the enemy's giins
and transport over the shell-crater zone of the old Somme battlefield was
restricted to a few roads, all of which, as well as the
Our artillery policy crossings over the Somme, which were not numerous,
were well known to us. South of the river the main
road junctions which the enemy was obliged to use were those at Villers
Carbonnel, Barleux, and Herbecourt, while those north of the river were
at Clery-sur-Somme, Maurepas, and Combles. The main river crossings were
at Peronne, Brie, and St. Christ. These road junctions and crossings,
therefore, were kept constantly under the fire of our long-range guns,
both 6-inch and 60-pdrs. The gims were pushed well forward regardless
of risk, in one instance to the extent of coming under machine-gun fire,
and the roads were shelled with shrapnel and high explosive with
instantaneous fuses .^ The success achieved by this policy was afterwards
apparent by the number of dead horses and abandoned vehicles on the
roadside.
On the left of the Fourth Army, as the result of the continued pressure
of the Third Army from Albert to Neuville-Vitasse (south-west of Arras),
The enemy's retirement the enemy became very disorganised and began to
in front of the Third withdraw on August 24th. The troops of the Third
^^™*y Army pursued the enemy with untiring energy, forcing
back his rearguards step by step. By the evening of the 25th a con-
siderable advance had been realised, and the villages of Contalmaison,
Martinpuich, Le Sars, Favreuil, Sapignies, and Behagnies had been
captured. Bapaume, the immediate objective of the Third Army, was
strongly defended by the enemy.
In spite of the fact that some of our troops were becoming exhausted,
especially those of the III Corps, which had been almost continually
1 These fuses were used so as to avoid damaging the roads themselves, which would be of
great importance to us later.
Ao. 45.
To fact page 87.
^cs^s^;
AUSTRALIANS CLEARING A DUG-OUT NEAR CAl'PY ON AUGUST 26tII.
B\ kind iMriiiissioii of i/.'c .■liisiruli<iii Gmcruiiiciii.
A(/. 4(1.
MONTAUBAN
lirilish OJficiiil pbolograph
August 26th] THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE 87
engaged under difficult conditions since Augiist 6th, there was no
wish or intention to relax the pressure, as all ranks
'^ugusTsfith' ^^^^^ imbued with the determination to pursue the
beaten enemy.
Immediately south of the Somme the 1st Australian Division resumed
the advance at 6 a.m. on August 26th with strong fighting patrols.
Batteries of field artillery were pushed well forward to support the advance,
and were chiefly employed in dealing with machine-guns. By clever use
of the groimd the 2nd Brigade secvired the woods east of Chuignes, and
reached the western outskirts of Fontaine-les-Cappy. On the left the
village of Cappy was cleared by the 3rd Brigade, and by nightfall the line
had been advanced 2,000 yards east of the village. Further south an
attempt, made by troops of the same division, to advance astride the
Amiens-Brie road was not successful, as Foucaucourt was strongly defended
by machine-guns which had been well sited with an admirable all-round
field of fire.
Meanwhile, north of the river, the III Corps and the 3rd Australian
Division had not been idle. During the night and early morning the
Australians advanced in conjunction with the 58th Division, and by
8.30 a.m. had captured Suzanne. The enemy made little attempt to
check the advance against the village itself, but, when our patrols
debouched from its eastern outskirts, they encountered heavy fire from
the machine-guns posted on the high ground on the east of, and over-
looking, the village. During the afternoon, however, the enemy was
driven back from this position after some hard fighting, in which forty
prisoners were captured and over a hundred Germans killed. The 3rd
Australian Division then established its line forward of the crest of the
ridge which runs from the west of Vaux Wood to Maricourt.
Further north the three divisions of the III Corps moved forward at the
same hour as the Australians. Each division employed one brigade as
advanced guard, one in support, and one in reserve. The 58th Division
was directed on Maricourt and Support Copse, the 12th Division on the
Maltz Horn Farm knoll (north of Hardecoiu-t-aux-Bois), and the 18th
Division on Trones Wood. At first the enemy's resistance was fairly
strong, but it was apparent that our troops were only being opposed
by rearguards. On the right the 58th Division advanced to within some
500 yards of Maricourt ; in the centre the 12th Division captured Carnoy ;
and on the left the 18th Division gained possession of ]\Iontauban together
with sixty prisoners. The enemy defended this village successfully with
machine-guns, imtil the advance of the 38th Division on the left enabled the
machine-gunners of the 18th Division to bring their fire on to Montauban
from Marlboro' Wood. This flanking fire was of the greatest assistance
to the infantry, and the prisoners asserted that it made retreat impossible.
After the capture of Montauban, the 18th Division prepared to
advance with the 55th Brigade as advanced guard. Patrols approached
Bernafay Wood, but, when the enemy was found to be holding the
wood in considerable strength, it was decided to establish an out-
post line east of Montauban, and to attack Bernafay and Trones woods
88 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 2©rH
the next morning. Meanwhile, the 58th and 12th Divisions were unable
to make any further progress, and in the evening formed an outpost line
west of Maricourt and east of Carnoy.^
Since August 22nd the artillery activity of the enemy had fluctuated
considerably, but, as a general rule, the volume of fire was never great
and conveyed the impression that the Germans were
^hostiie*artmer*y^ employing comparatively few guns, the fire of which
was continuous and distributed over a wide front.
The successful attack of the Australian Corps south of the river on
August 23rd necessitated the withdrawal of the enemy's batteries to the
east of Cappy, and into the wooded district north-west and south of
Estrees. After the attack, his high-velocity guns were particularly
active and harassed our forward communications assiduously, whilst
any attempt we made to advance provoked fairly heavy retaliation, but
more during the later than during the initial stages of the attack.
From August 24th to 26th the fire of the enemy's guns increased
considerably south of the Somme, in which part of the battlefield his
field artillery was well distributed in depth.^ During this retirement
there were three noticeable features in the tactics employed by the
Germans in the withdrawal of their artillery. First, a retrograde move-
ment of the guns was usually prefaced by an intense bombardment,
doubtless for the purpose of using up all the ammunition dumped near
the artillery positions. Secondly, the withdrawal of the field guns was
covered by the increased activity of the high-velocity and heavy guns,
and "vice versa." Lastly, the bold and skilful handling of sections and
single guns, by which they essayed to cover the retirement of the infantry
and to delay oiu" pursuit. This last feature was well illustrated on August
25th and 26th when our infantry, advancing towards Maricourt and
astride the Somme, met with considerable opposition from field guns firing
from the copses and woods which abotmd in this area. On this occasion
trench mortars in some cases kept up the bombardment after the field
guns had been withdrawn.
The successful advance of the 1st Australian Division against Cappy
on August 26th concluded, for the time being, the operations of this
August 27th ; the division, and on the night of August 26th it was relieved
renewal of the pressure by the 5th and 2nd Australian Divisions. On com-
south of the Somme pletion of the relief the front of the Australian Corps,
south of the river, was held as follows : the 32nd Division from Lihu to
south of Foucaucourt ; the 5th Australian Division from south of Foucau-
court to Fontaine-les-Cappy, exclusive of the village ; the 2nd Australian
Division from Fontaine-les-Cappy inclusive to the Somme. Each division
held the front line with one brigade, and kept one brigade in support
and one in reserve. The Australian Corps, in order to maintain
continuous pressure on the enemy and to avoid heavy losses, decided to
carry forward the advance with strong fighting patrols. These tactics
' From prisoners captured during the day it was ascertained that the enemy had reinforced
the front opposite the III Corps with three new divisions, the 2nd Guard, the 87th, and the 232nd,
which had not been previously engaged in the battle.
2 The sound-ranging sections located the German field artillery in positions from 2,000 to
8,000 yards behind the front line.
August 27th] THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE 88
were begun at da-wn on the morning of August 27th, and considerable
progress was made, as in many parts of the front the enemy's forward
positions were found to have been vacated.
On the right of the AustraUan Corps the First French Army had
received indications from prisoners and other sources that the enemy
The co-operaHon oi the contemplated a general retirement opposite its front.
First French Army with In consequcncc, in Order to anticipate the enemy's
the Australian Corps -withdrawal, the First French Army pushed forward
along its whole front simultaneously with the Axistralian Corps. South
of Chaulnes the enemy's resistance was slight, and Roye was captured
without difficulty. Chaulnes itself, however, which, up to the beginning of
the Battle of Amiens, had been one of the enemy's most important railheads
in this area, was strongly defended, and all attempts to capture it during
August 27th failed. Some progress was made north of Chaulnes by the
French in conjunction with the 32nd Division, and, although the enemy
offered determined resistance, most of the woods north of Chaulnes were
captured during the afternoon. The 32nd Division also gained possession
of Vermandovillers.
The patrols of the 8th Brigade of the 5th Australian Division were
checked at the outset of their advance by the fire of machine-guns holding
the trenches round Foucaucourt. The artillery at once placed a heavy
concentration on the trenches and on the ruins of the village, while the
infantry of the 8th Brigade enveloped it under cover of the bombard-
ment, and forced the enemy to surrender. Thirty-five prisoners and
sixteen machine-guns were captured in Foucaucourt. Meanwhile, the 6th
Brigade, which was the advanced guard brigade of the 2nd Australian
Division, also encountered some resistance ; machine-guns, hidden in a
small wood, caused a temporary cheek. By evening, however, the
Australian patrols had penetrated to within a few hundred yards of
Dompierre and Frise, and had gained touch with the 3rd Australian
Division on the river just north of Vache Wood. As the result of
the day's fighting the Australian Corps south of the Somme held the
general line Vermandovillers-Foucaucourt-Fontaine-les-Cappv- Vache
Wood.
North of the river some troops of the 3rd Australian Division advanced
during the night, and, by 3 a.m. on August 27th, had secured Vaux Wood
V nts north th ^"^ ^^^ ^^^ south of the village of Vaux, thereby
*^'^SoLme ° ® obtaining observation up the valley of the Somme
almost as far as Peronne. Long-range machine-gun
fire from the direction of Maricourt had been the chief difficulty with which
the Australians had to contend, but heavy casualties were avoided by
the skilful manner in which company and platoon commanders selected
covered lines of advance.
At 8 a.m. the 11th Australian Brigade, co-operating with the 58th
Division on its left, pushed forward along the bank of the river towards^
Fargny Mill.^ The mill was captured during the morning, but the enemy,
' It was during these operations that Lee.-Corp. Bernard Gordon, 41st Battalion,
captured, almost single-handed, 2 officers, 61 other ranks, and 6 machine-guns. See Appendix E„
N
90 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 27th
supported by fire from the high ground to the north, still held on to the
greater portion of Fargny Wood.
Meanwhile, the advance of the III Corps met with varying success.
Against an opposition which was never inconsiderable, the 58th and 12th
Divisions pressed forward some 4,000 yards, and captured Maricourt and
the important Maltz Horn Farm knoll after strenuous fighting.
On the left the 18th Division found itself faced for a second time
with the problem of capturing Bernafay and Trones woods. ^ When
The capture of Trones Sir Alec Godley issued instructions for the attack on
Wood by the 18th these woods, it was believed that the high ground
Division round Longueval and Delville Wood was in the hands
of the 38th Division, and that in consequence the left flank of the attack
would be secure. Maj.-Gen. Lee, therefore, planned that the attacking
troops shovild advance along the northern divisional boundary ^ on a front
of about 1,000 yards, and that, after reaching the eastern edge of the
northern portion of Trones Wood, they should turn southwards and clear
the remainder of Bernafay and Trones woods from the north.
At 4.45 a.m. the artillery barrage opened, and the 8th Royal Berkshire
and the 7th Royal West Kent of the 53rd Brigade, which had formed up
without difficulty, advanced. Almost immediately the former battalion
was taken in flank by machine-gvm fire from the Longueval ridge, not-
withstanding which, the attacking troops gallantly pressed on and, despite
severe losses, secured the northern portion of Trones Wood.
Two companies, which had been detailed previously for the task,
then wheeled to the south, and, advancing through Bernafay Wood and
the southern portion of Trones Wood, cleared the whole of these woods
and the intervening ground. Unfortunately the left flank south of
Longueval was so weakened by casualties, that an immediate counter-
attack by the enemy at about 6.30 a.m., from the direction of Delville
Wood, forced our troops out of the northern portion of Trones Wood.
This was followed, about an hour later, by a heavy counter-attack against
the southern portion of Trones Wood by a fresh battalion, belonging to
the 2nd Guard Division, which had been brought forward during the
night of August 26th. This counter-attack succeeded in forcing ovir
troops out of Trones Wood, but, thanks to the gallantry of the officers and
men of the 53rd Brigade, it was checked west of the wood.
Owing to our losses and the intermingling of units, an immediate
counter-attack to recover the lost ground was considered inadvisable,
preparations were, however, at once put in hand for a deliberate counter-
attack to be made with adequate artillery support. From 7.30 p.m. to 8 p.m.
a bombardment with artillery of all calibres was placed on the southern
portion of Trones Wood, and a well-planned attack was launched at
8 p.m. by a force of two composite companies of infantry, formed from all
three battalions of the 53rd Brigade, under the commander of the 8th
Royal Berkshire. The wood was strongly defended by a battalion of the
Emperor Francis Joseph's Prussian Guards. A bloody hand-to-hand
' In July, 1916, the 18th Division had taken a prominent part in the capture of these localities.
' This boundary ran approximately due west and east through the Quarry just north of Trones
Wood.
August 28th] THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE 91
conflict ensued, which resulted in the gallant survivors of the 53rd Brigade
emerging from the eastern edge of Trones Wood, tired but victorious.
In clearing the wood of its battle debris over 50 of the enemy's dead and
40 machine-guns were found, and, in addition, 73 prisoners were captured.^
By this time the 38th Division, on the left of the 18th Division, had
advanced to the Longueval \yindmill and the western edge of Delville
Wood, thus securing the left flank of the 18th Division in Trones Wood.
During the night of August 27th the 53rd Brigade, somewhat
exhausted after its successful exertions during the day, was relieved by
the 54th Brigade. No advance was made by the 18th Division on August
28th, and the 38th Division on the left also had a brief rest.
Although the Australian Corps and the III Corps needed no urging
or encouragement, orders were issued on the evening of August 27th for
the advance to be continued on the 28th. The Aus-
Augnirasth tralian Corps was given Peronne, and the III Corps
Bouchavesnes and St. Pierre Vaast Wood, as objectives.
Early in the morning of the 28th the First French Army, on the right
of the Australian Corps, entered Chaulnes and, pressing vigorously forward,
forced the enemy to withdraw more rapidly than he intended, with the
result that by midday he was in full retreat along the whole front from
Noyon to Chatdnes. The French, taking advantage of the enemy's
confusion, pushed forward cavalry patrols, which succeeded in reaching
the Somme south of Epenancourt. Attempts to capture Noyon failed
on the 28th, but, on the following day, the enemy's resistance ceased,
and the town was entered. On the evening of the 28th the First French
Army was established along the general line of the Canal du Nord from
the north of Noyon as far as Rouy-le-Grand, thence along the western
bank of the Somme to Epenancourt. ^
In conjunction with the rapid advance of the First French Army on
the 28th, the 32nd Division pushed patrols forward at dawn, and, meeting
with little resistance, occupied Ablaincourt, Soyecourt, and Deniecourt.
During the afternoon, however, opposition was encountered north of
Marchelpot, and at Berny-en-Santerre. This opposition grew stronger
towards dusk, and it became apparent that the 32nd Division would be
unable to advance further that evening without incurring considerable
casualties. Consequently an outpost line was established east of Gener-
mont and west of Berny-en-Santerre, while the French formed a flank
facing north from Epenancourt to Marchelpot.
Fvuiher north the 5th and 2nd Australian Divisions were more
stubbornly opposed, but, by dint of vigorous exploitation, they had realised
a big advance by the end of the day. On the right, the 5th Australian
Division moved forward, with the 8th Brigade as advance guard, and
gained touch with the enemy's rearguards early in the morning. The
enemy withdrew behind a screen of machine-guns, supported by some
1 Although not of such long duration as in July, 1916, the struggle for Trones Wood had been
no less bitter. It was a commanding position, giving good observation overthe country to the
eastward, which the enemy could iU afford to lose ; its occupation by us, together with that of the
important knoll to the south of it, was of great tactical importance.
' The Canal du Nord runs from Noyon to Nesle. It is not shown on Map 2, but the northern
end of it, near Nesle, is shown on Map 4.
92 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 28th
cyclists. The village of Fay soon fell into our hands, and the line moved
steadily forward until the outskirts of Estrees were reached. The
resistance stiffened momentarily in front of this place, but it was overcome
by 1.45 p.m.i A general line was then established in some old trenches
east of Estrees, where, owing to the broken nature of the country and the
maze of trenches and wire, a temporary halt was made, while patrols
moved forward to reconnoitre the ground towards Belloy-en-Santerre.
The advance was resumed later in the afternoon, and the infantry, although
the men were beginning to show signs of fatigue, pressed on and, by
9 p.m., had captured Assevillers. The advance was checked in front of
Belloy-en-Santerre by machine-gun fire from the copses west and north-
west of the village, and, as it was by this time almost pitch dark, an outpost
line was formed south-west and west of Belloy-en-Santerre and east of
Assevillers.
On the left of the 5th Australian Division the 2nd Australian Division
advanced on Dompierre and Frise. Although the enemy offered some resist-
ance at Dompierre and at Triangular Wood, he was quickly driven out of
these places, and two field guns were captured in the village. On the
extreme left, the advancing infantry met with strong opposition at the
village of Frise, but, after half an hour's intense bombardment by the
field artillery, the village was captured. The maze of trenches west of
Mereaucourt Wood again, however, held up the advance, and the clearing
of these trenches and the wood took some time ; eventually the wood
was surrounded and captured with 50 prisoners and 15 machine-guns.
Meanwhile, patrols on the right of the division had occupied Becquincourt,
and had advanced over 1,000 yards beyond the village. Our line was
finally established for the night west of Herbecourt and along the eastern
edge of Mereaucourt Wood.
The 3rd Australian Division, which had pushed on to Curlu and the
marshy reaches of the Somme to the south of that village, finally cleared
the peninsula north of Frise and established an outpost line on the high
ground east of Curlu. On the left of the 3rd Australian Division the
58th and 12th Divisions pushed forward strong fighting patrols to secure
Hardecourt-aux-Bois. The enemy defended the ruins of this village
stubbornly ; it was, however, eventually surrounded and captured after a
severe struggle, and the high ground north and south of the village was
also secured.
Considerable progress had been made on the front of the Fourth Army
during the day, and the general impression was that the opposition, which
in the south was weak, gradually stiffened towards the north. The
enemy, it seemed, intended to hold a bridgehead about Peronne as long
as possible, in order to enable him to withdraw the accumulation of guns
and transport, which had been gradually pressed into the angle formed by
the bend of the river, and to allow of more time for the destruction of
all the crossings over the Somme at and near Peronne.
The advance was resumed along the whole front of the army during
the night of the 28th, and early in the morning of the 29th. On the
1 During this advance an 8-inch howitzer was captured in Touffu Wood, and a train con-
sisting of 20 carriages and 30 trucks was secured intact in the valley north of the wood.
Shub Ma. n (« fatt patt D.I
Mdik M- Uuf niin Mnai and i^
i- ^'^^fX .
-"N.^
PERONXE and MONT ST. QUENTIN frum LA MAISONETTE.
^
August 29th] THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE 93
extreme right, the enemy's resistance was neghgible, and the 32nd
Division gained the western bank of the Somme without experiencing any
_- t f A t difficulty, effecting a junction with the First French
29th ; our troops Army about 1,000 yards south of Cizancourt. On the
reach the banks of the left of the 32nd Division the 5th Australian Division
Somme south oiP6ronne(.j^pt^red Belloy-en-Santerrc, Villers Carbonnel, and
Barlevix without opposition, but was checked for a short time by machine-
guns defending the high ground overlooking Eterpigny on the west.
It was evident that this was only a temporary stand, made to cover the
retreat of the last remnants of the enemy across the river, for by 9.20 a.m.
our patrols had gained the river bank, and had some good shooting at the
last parties of the enemy as they crossed the river. Not to be restrained,
a strong patrol of the 8th Australian Brigade set out in pursuit and crossed
the canal at Eterpigny, returning with 20 prisoners. Operating imme-
diately south of the Somme, the 2nd Australian Division continued the
advance. On the right the 6th Brigade, although the men were suffering
from physical fatigue and want of sleep, had captured Herbecourt and
Flaucourt by 7.30 a.m. The 7th Brigade then passed through and
advanced on La Chapelette and Biaches. On the left the 5th Brigade
occupied Feuilleres.
The Somme was a formidable obstacle, and, if the Germans succeeded
in retiring across it and destroying the bridges after them, we should be
confronted with great difficulties before bridgeheads could be established
on the eastern bank. East of the general line Flaucourt-Feuilleres,
moreover, the ground fell away to the river both to the north and the
east, and all movement east of this line could be observed from
Mont St. Quentin and from the high ground east and south-east
of Peronne, while the terrain was a maze of old trenches and ■ware. These
factors added to the difficulties of forcing a passage at this point. ^
There was just a possibility that, by following close on the enemy's heels
and taking advantage of his confusion, a crossing might be made over one
or more of the existing bridges before the enemy had time to destroy
them. Sir John INIonash and Maj.-Gen. Rosenthal knew well the impor-
tance placed by the Army Commander on securing the bridges intact,
and the 2nd Australian Division made a determined attempt to force a
passage without delay before the bridges could be destroyed. The 7th
Brigade on the right was given as its objective the high ground south-east
of Peronne, and the 5th Brigade on the left the Mont St. Quentin heights.
Two battalions of the latter brigade were to attempt to cross the river
west of Halle, while the remaining two battahons were to cross by the
causeway in the river bend at Ommiecovu-t-les-Clery.
On the right the 7th Brigade gained the canal bank by 9.30 a.m.,
meeting with only slight resistance at La INIaisonette from machine-guns
1 Every detail of the ground round Peronne on both banks of the river was known to the
commander and staff of the Fourth Army.
The Fourth Army had fought over the same ground during the early spring of 1917, and the
same problem of how to force a crossing had confronted Sir Henry Rawlinson when the Germans
began their retreat to the Hindenburg Line in March of that year. The first troops to reach
the eastern bank on that occasion had been those of the 48th Division. They had secured Biaches
and La Maisonette, and then, forcing a crossing where the embankment of the Canal du Nord
crosses the Somme south-west of Halle, had seized Mont St. Quentin.
94 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 29th
which were covering the enemy's withdrawal across the river. Small
parties on the left of the brigade worked round behind these machine-guns,
causing the enemy to abandon his guns and make a rapid retirement.
Our patrols found all the crossings blo\vn up except the railway bridge
at La Chapelette. Repeated attempts were made to force a crossing at
this point, but they were all unsuccessful on account of the enemy's machine-
gun fire ; at 2.30 p.m. the enemy succeeded in blowing up the bridge, and
further attempts to cross at this point had to be abandoned. On the left
the 5th Brigade met with no more success. Encoiintering little resistance
in the advance to the canal, three companies of the 18th Battalion crossed
the canal by means of the footbridge of the lock at the bend in the canal
south-west of Ommiecourt-les-Clery, and had established themselves on
the northern bank by 9 a.m. South of this point all crossings on the
brigade front were destroyed. The 18th Battalion attempted to push
forward, but was unable to make any progress owing to heavy machine-
gun fire from Ommiecourt-les-Clery, Clery-sur-Somme, and the high
ground east of the latter village. Consequently, it was decided to make
no further attempt to continue the advance, until Clery-sur-Somme
had been captiired by troops operating on the northern bank of the
river.
In the meantime, north of the Somme the 3rd Australian Division,
advancing in conjunction with the 58th Division on the right of the III
Corps, had cleared the broken groiuid in the vicinity of Hem, but was
held up on the ridge west of Clery-sur-Somme by the enemy's vigorous
machine-gun fire. Further north the troops of the III Corps realised
a considerable advance during the day. In the vicinity of Maurepas
the opposition offered by the enemy's rearguards checked the advance
of the 58th and 12th Divisions for some time. Maurepas itself was
ultimately cleared after some stiff fighting, but the enemy, who held
Le Forest in strength, prevented our making any further progress.
On the extreme left the 18th Division moved steadily forward
throughout the day in co-operation with the 38th Division of the
Third Army. Guillemont was captured, and, after a short struggle,
our line advanced to the eastern outskirts of Combles. Strong
nests of machine-guns in the vicinity of Priez Farm for the time being
rendered a further advance impossible.
During the evening and early part of the night the enemy's resistance
west of Clery-siur-Somme slackened, and by 10 p.m. the village was in
our hands, except for a few houses on the eastern edge. The enemy
counter-attacked several times during the night, and the eastern portion of
the village changed hands several times.
During the 29th the Third Army had made good progress and had
captured Bapaume.
On the morning of August 30th the attack north of the river by
the 3rd Australian Division was continued. On the right the enemy's
The advance north of resistance was strong enough to prevent our infantry
the Somme on August from advancing beyond the limits of Clery-sur-Somme
30th until the evening. On the left, however, less resistance
was encountered and satisfactory progress was made. The line was
p
n
P
'73
Q
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<
z
z
o
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August soth] THE ADVANCE TO PERONNE 95
eventually advanced to Clery Copse and to the western edge of Road
Wood.
At dawn on the 30th the 58th and 47th Divisions^ resumed the
advance on the right of the III Corps. The 58th Division advanced to
the western edge of Marrieres Wood, meeting with more and more vigorous
opposition as the advance progressed, and an unsuccessful attempt to
seize the wood about midday showed that the enemy held it in con-
siderable strength as part of his main line of defence. Similarly, on the
left the 47th Division pressed forward, meeting increased resistance until
the line Marrieres Wood-Priez Farm was reached at 7.30 a.m. Patrols
were pushed forward towards the Bouchavesnes-Rancourt road, but were
met with machine-gun fire, and were forced to withdraw. Meanwhile, with
its right held up at Priez Farm, the 18th Division made no attempt to
advance during the day, but contented itself with consolidating its
position east of Combles, touch on the left being maintained with the
V Corps north of Rouleaux Wood. North of the Somme, the enemy's
defence had hardened considerably.^
> The 47th Division relieved the 12th Division in front of Le Forest during the night of
August 29th.
2 The action of the Australian Corps south of the Somme on August 30th will be described
in the next chapter, as it forms an important part of the story of the capture of Mont St. Quentin
and Peronne.
CHAPTER VI
THE BATTLE OF MONT ST. QUENTIN, AUGUST 80tH— SEPTEMBER 2ND,
AND THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 3RD AND 4TH
Maps 4, 6, and 7
The situation on August 30th — The forcing of the river crossing ; the Australian
Corps plan — First phase ; August 30th ; the seizure of a bridgehead south-east of C16rj'-sur-
Somme — Second phase ; August 31st ; the attack on Mont St. Quentin by the 5th Australian
Brigade — The advance of the 6th Australian Brigade — The action of the 3rd Australian
Division and the III Corps — September 1st ; the attack continued — The 14th Australian
Brigade enters Peronne — The capture of the village of Mont St. Quentin by the 6th Australian
Brigade — The advance of the 3rd Australian Division — The operations of the III Corps ; the
attacks of the 58th and 47th Divisions — The 18th Division attack — The situation on the
evening of September 1st — September 2nd ; the exploitation of success — The attack of the
5th Australian Division — The attack of the 2nd Australian Division — The operations of
the III Corps — The events of September 3rd and 4th — The results of the Battle of Mont
St. Quentin — The general situation on September 4th.
Although the Australian Corps had reached the banks of the Somme
on the whole of its front from St. Christ to Clery-sur-Somme by the evening
of August 29th, all attempts up to the evening of the
^^aS^oV 30^h *o secure a bridgehead on the right bank east of
Clery-sur-Somme had been foiled by the enemy's
machine-gun defence. Between Marrieres Wood and Morval the III Corps
had been opposed during the 30th by six divisions, which had maintained
a resolute resistance. For the first time, moreover, since August 22nd
distinct signs were noticed that the enemy's batteries were being grouped
and organised for vigorous defence ; the hostile shelling also had increased.
It was clear, therefore, that the enemy intended to make a determined
stand on the line of the Somme as far north as Peronne, and thence along
the heights of Mont St. Quentin, Fregicourt, and Morval.^
• The following order, captured later in the advance, shows that these premises were correct :
119 Inf. Div. Div. H.Q.,
la No. 4056. Secret. 29/8/18.
Instructions for the Conduct of the Defence in Winter Positions.
Fighting will be conducted for the retention of the main line of resistance. All available
effectives will be employed for this purpose, with the exception of an emergency garrison in the
artillery protective line, which must not be employed forward of this line.
In the main line of resistance, the defence must be organised in such a manner as to ensure,
by means of infantry and machine-gun fire, the prevention of a crossing of the Somme valley
by the enemy. Single machine-guns (including heavy machine-guns) must be pushed forward
in front of the main line of resistance to the river bank, so as to have undisputed command of
the river, especially at favourable crossing places (machine-guns on the banks). The machine-
96
irrtb A'e. 4, U /ilrV puf 57-
Mnnl Si. Qiicniin \Voa<\
Mont St. Uucntm Vi1l,.p
KmiKol Ftu<1l.>u
MONT ST. QUEXTIN Irum tl,L BAPAL.ME-PEROXM
/•• ,/'d«.J.,/.j,.
o
August 3(>TH] THE BATTLE OF MONT ST. QUENTIN 97
All the crossings over the river had been destroyed, and the forcing
of the passage of the river, with its marshes from 400 to 500 yards broad,
presented a difficult problem. A frontal attack had little chance of
success, and would in any case be costly against the enemy's machine-gun
defence. Furthermore, it was doubtful if a sufficiently strong force could
be passed across to resist the counter-attacks which the enemy would
undoubtedly deliver against it.
Sir Henry Rawlinson, therefore, determined to turn the enemy's
position on the line of the Somme, and to seize the high ground north of
the Cologne river from Buire Wood to Nurlu. Orders were accordingly
issued on the evening of August 30th, for the III Corps to attack this
position from the west, and for the Australian Corps simultaneously to
force a crossing of the river at as many places as possible at, and north of,
the Peronne railway bridge. The Australians were then to attack the
Buire Wood-Nurlu position from the south-west, working up the three
ridges which ran down to the river from Buire Wood, Aizecourt-le-Haut,
and Epine de Malassise. South of Peronne the Australian Corps was to
confine itself to seizing any opportunity that offered of gaining a footing
on the east bank of the river. As the advance towards the Buire Wood-
Nurlu position progressed, the Australian Corps, pivoting on Peronne,
was to form a flank facing south-eastwards along the high ground north
of the Cologne river.
The commanding height of Mont St. Quentin, north of Peronne,
was the key of the position. It was a veritable bastion, the capture of
which would enable us to enfilade the enemy's positions covering the river
to the south and threaten the safety of his whole line. If it could be
seized by a coup de main, not only would the rest of the task given to the
III and Australian Corps be much simplified, but much time would be
saved. Time was the ruling factor in the situation. It was of the greatest
importance that no respite shoidd be given to the enemy's tired troops,
and that they should be allowed no time in which to improve a position
of great natural strength, and thus increase the difficulties of an already
formidable task.
The position of Mont St. Quentin, however, was an extremely strong
one, and its slopes, covered with thick belts of \vire and intersected with
the remains of the old trench systems, afforded great possibilities for a
stout and prolonged defence. From the ruins of the village on the western
slope of the hill, the country for a considerable distance lay exposed
guns in the river bank emplacements must be permanently manned, but should only open fire
in the event of a hostile attack. SheU-proof emplacements are not necessary ; the chief requisite
is adequate concealment.
Patrols must be pushed forward into the Sonmie valley by night, in order to obtain early
intimation of any attempt on the part of the enemy to cross the river. Attempts by the enemy
to effect a crossing are to be expected. By skilful patrolling it should be possible to annihilate
any hostile detachments which may attempt to reconnoitre the conditions of the river valley
with a view to effecting a crossing, and to bring in prisoners from them.
The troops must on no account allow themselves to be lulled into a sense of security by the
fact that the Somme forms an obstacle to the possibilities of an enemy advance. A determined
enemy will carry out an attack at this point simply for the reason that it is least expected.
The enemy must be prevented from gaining a foothold on the eastern bank of the Somme
at all costs. Demolition detachments must be sent out each night until the bridges have been
thoroughly destroyed, and the remaining portions removed. Portions which cannot be reached
must be destroyed by medium minenwerfer fire.
O
98 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August both
to the enemy's observation and fire. Every movement on the stretch
of river marsh from Peronne to near Clery-sur-Somme could be observed,
and the passage of the river presented the same difficulties as it did further
south. The examination of prisoners revealed that the German High
Command had issued instructions that the Mont St. Quentin area was to
be defended at all costs, and, to ensure the position being held, had
entrusted its defence to the 2nd Guard Division.
Sir John Monash fully realised the importance of seizing Mont St.
Quentin at once He had held a conference of his divisional com-
The forcing of the zanders on the evening of the 29th, and, anticipating
river crossing ; the his ordcrs, had made his plan. Moreover, some of the
Australian Corps' plan preliminary moves had been completed. He had decided
that Mont St. Quentin must be taken from the direction of Clery-sur-
Somme, and that Peronne could then be captured by troops entering it
from the north-west. To the 2nd Australian Division was allotted the
task of atta king Mont St. Quentin, while the capture of Peronne was
entrusted to the 5th Australian Division. Maj.-Gen. Rosenthal selected
the 5th Brigade, under Brig.-Gen. E. F. Martin, for the attack on Mont St.
Quentin, while Maj.-Gen. Hobbs detailed the 14th Brigade, under Brig.-
Gen. J. C. Stewart, for the capture of Peronne. The operation was
planned to be undertaken in two phases. The first phase, beginning on
August 30th, involved the seizure of a bridgehead south-east of Clery-sur-
Somme by the 5th Brigade, which w^as to move along the north bank of
the river through the area of the 3i'd Australian Division. The second
phase comprised the assault of Mont St. Quentin, and the capture of
Peronne and the high ground east of that town.
On the night of August 29th the 2nd Australian Division held the
front from Eterpigny to the bend in the canal south-west of Clery-sur-
ist phase; August 30th; Sommc with the 7th and 5th Brigades, on the right and
the seizure of a left respectively. Early on the morning of August 30th
bridgehead south-east the 17th, 18th, and 20th Battalions of the 5th Brigade
of cigry-sur-somme ^^^^ withdrawn from the line, and by 7.15 a.m. were
concentrated near Mereaucourt Wood. Although the withdrawal had been
carried out in daylight these battalions suffered no casualties. The 19th
Battalion was left in the line covering the brigade front.
At 10.30 a.m. the approach march to Clery-stir-Somme began, and
the column moved off with the 20th Battalion leading, followed by the
17th and 18th. Crossing the river at Feuilleres, where the bridge had been
repaired, the column proceeded eastwards along the north bank of the
river. As it was difficult to ascertain the exact situation in the vicinity
of Clery-sur-Somme, the troops of the 5th Brigade took the precaution
of making as much use as possible of the existing trenches. This
precaution was well repaid, as the enemy was found to be holding the
trench system north and east of the village. By 9 p.m. these trenches
had been cleared of Germans, and the 17th Battalion, following
behind the 20th, debouched from Clery-sur-Somme ; the 18th Battalion
remained in the village in reserve. In the short time available, it had
not been possible to arrange a creeping barrage, but artillery fire was
maintained on areas and objectives selected by the infantry commanders
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MUiNT ST. QUENTIN from the south-west.
August 31STJ THE BATTLE OF MONT ST. QUENTIN 99
according to their requirements. The advance progressed satisfactorily,
and by 10.30 p.m. a hne had been estabhshed in the old trench systems
from the river near the western end of Limberlost Wood to a point
south of Berlin Wood— a suitable position from which the attack could
be launched next morning. During this fighting 120 prisoners and
7 machine-guns were captured.
A bridgehead had now been established, and reconnaissances revealed
that the bridge at Ommiecourt-les-Clery could be made passable for
troops. This work was immediately put in hand, and the 19th Battalion
was ordered to cross the river by means of this bridge at 3 a.m. on
August 31st.
In order to enable the 2nd and 5th Australian Divisions to carry out
the second phase of the operations, it was necessary for the frontages
of these two divisions to be substantially decreased. This was effected
on the night of August 30th by an extension northwards of the front held
by the 32nd Division as far as Lamire Farm, and the side-slipping of the
5th Australian Division as far as Sword Wood. The 6th and 7th Brigades
of the 2nd Australian Division were concentrated in the old trench system
south of Mereaucoxu"t Wood and at Flaucourt, and were thus in a position
to support the operations of the 5th Brigade. The 5th Australian Division
held its front with the 15th Brigade, and retained the 8th and 14th Brigades
in readiness for the capture of Peronne.
In the early hours of August 31st the 19th Battalion crossed
at Ommiecourt-les-Clery, and by 4 a.m. the 5th Brigade was ready in
the position from which the attack was to be launched.
sTst"; ^he^attack^on The 19th Battalion was on the right, the 17th in the
Mont St. Quentin by Centre, and the 20th on the left ; the 18th Battalion
the 5th Austeaiian ^yas held in reserve in the eastern portion of Clery-
rigade (see ap ) gur-Somme. While our troops were assembling, the
enemy opened machine-gun fire from Park Wood, but this was promptly
dealt with by a company of the 17th Battalion.
Supported by five brigades of field artillery and one brigade of heavy
artillery, the attack started at 5 a.m., the 19th Battalion being directed
on the trenches between Anvil Wood and Mont St. Quentin village,
the 17th on Mont St. Quentin village, and the 20th on
Feuillaucourt. The 19th Battalion made good progress until it reached
the rising ground south-west of Mont St. Quentin village. Here our men,
who were on the hne Save Trench-Galatz AUey-Agram Alley, encountered
heavy machine-gun fire from the direction of Anvil Wood, the Aerodrome,
and St. Denis. From the two former places hostile field guns were
also firing at point blank range, and further progress was impossible
until our artillery could deal with this opposition. The Germans
made several counter-attacks, which were repulsed, but the 19th
Battalion suffered considerable casualties from the fire to which
it was exposed. Meanwhile, the 17th Battalion in the centre had over-
come all resistance, and at 7 a.m. two of its companies were established
on its objective east of Mont St. Quentin village. On the left, also, the
20th Battalion had reached its objective, and had captured Feuillaucourt.
Only a few of the enemy were found in the ruins of either of
100 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August 31st
these villages, but large numbers were observed retiring
eastwards. The attack of the 5th Brigade had evidently come
as a complete surprise. Unfortunately, on the left of the 5th Brigade,
the attack of the 3rd Australian Division, which was designed
to capture the high ground which lies south of Bouchavesnes and just
west of the Mont St. Quentin-Bouchavesnes road, had been unable to
progress beyond the first ridge, with the result that a gap existed between
the 3rd Australian Division and the 20th Battalion which had occupied
Feuillaucourt.
Shortly after 7 a.m. a determined counter-attack, preceded by heavy
shelling and supported by a battery of field artillery, developed against
the 17th Battalion, which was holding Mont St. Quentin village. The
main attack was launched from a north-easterly direction, simultaneously
with a subsidiary attack from east of the village. Our troops sustained
heavy losses, and, as many of the officers had become casualties, our fine
was withdrawn to the trench system just west of the Peronne-Bouchavesnes
road. The enemy launched five successive bombing attacks against our
new positions, which were all successfully beaten off. At this time the
situation between Mont St. Quentin and Feuillaucourt was very obscure,
and at 9 a.m. the 18th Battalion from reserve in Clery-sur-Somme was
moved up in close support. One of its companies was sent up to reinforce
the junction of the 17th and 20th Battalions, and two companies to
reinforce the right flank of the 19th Battalion, which was held up in
front of Anvil Wood. The opposition from Anvil Wood, however, was
still very determined, and only a slight advance was realised by the
reinforcing troops.
At 11.20 a.m., although the situation between Mont St. Quentin
village and Feuillaucourt had been cleared up, the 20th Battalion, which
was holding Feuillaucourt, was still out of touch with the troops of the
3rd Australian Division on the left. During the afternoon the enemy,
taking advantage of this gap in our line, worked round the north end
of the village, and gained a position which threatened the exposed flank
of the 20th Battalion. As this battalion was subjected to enfilade fire
from both field guns and machine-guns, it was withdrawn from Feuillau-
court, and subsequently held the line of Oder Trench, 500 yards west of
the Peronne-Bouchavesnes road.
Meanwhile, as the advance of the 5th Brigade had made good progress,
and the bridgehead had been extended eastwards, the 6th Brigade started
to move from its concentration area north-east of
et^AiuteaHan Brigade Herbecourt at 11.30 a.m. with the object of extending
our gains towards Peronne. The brigade crossed the
river by a temporary bridge at Buscourt, and, moving along the north bank
through Clery-sur-Somme, about 4 p.m. advanced in artillery formation
towards Park Wood and Halle. The 23rd Battalion acted as advanced guard,
and was followed by the 24th and 21st ; the 22nd was left in reserve west of
Clery-sur-Somme. Although the advancing troops came under machine-
gun fire from Prague Trench when passing through Halle and Park Wood,
the fire was not sufficient to check their advance. By 5 p.m. Fiorina Trench
was cleared, it was not found possible, however, to effect a junction with the
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right of the 5th Brigade. One company of the 23rd BattaUon succeeded
in fighting its way as far as the church north of Ste. Radegonde Wood,
but was not able to maintain its position there, and withdrew to Fiorina
Trench. While the advance of the 6th Brigade was in progress, the
19th Battalion, on the right of the 5th Brigade, had improved its line
north of Anvil Wood.
During the morning of the 31st the 14th Brigade of the 5th Australian
Division also crossed to the north side of the river with a view to carrying
out the task assigned to it of attacking Peronne from the north-west. It
was obliged to cross at Buscourt, the Ommiecoui-t-les-Clery crossing having
by then become impassable owing to the intensity of the hostile artillery
fire. As, however, the 5th Brigade had not been able to maintain ite
position east of Mont St. Quentin, it was impossible for the 14th Brigade
to carry out the operation against Peronne. It was, therefore, concentrated
in the shelter of the valley east of Clery-sur-Somme, together with two field
artillery brigades, reaching this position by 8.30 p.m. While this movement
was being carried out, the enemy's artillery was shelling the area east of
Clery-sur-Somme and the banks of the Somme to the south unceasingly.
This did not, however, stop the steady flow of companies moving in Indian
file to their assembly positions. At one time the bank of the river between
Clery-sur-Somme and the canal by Lost Ravine swarmed with troops,
gathered well under the side of the steep bank, playing cards, smoking,
and waiting for the word to move on. In front of them the shells falUng
in the river threw up great spouts of water, while behind them, on the
slopes of the hill, the hostile barrage fell with great regularity and precision,
but luckily well clear of the thickly packed troops. It was an anxious
time, although fortunately there were few casualties.
As the result of the day's fighting our line at 8.30 p.m. was held
along Fiorina Trench by the 6th Brigade, and thence past the brickworks
north of Anvil Wood, along Gott Mit Uns Trench, Deus Trench, Elsa
Trench, IMoineville Alley, and Oder Trench by the 5th Brigade. From
there to a point on the Canal du Nord east of Freckles Wood, where
rested the right of the 3rd Australian Division, there was a gap of about
1,000 yards along the Canal du Nord.
The attack on Mont St. Quentin by the 5th Brigade, with only hastily
arranged artillery support and without a creeping barrage, ranks as one
of the most notable examples of pluck and enterprise during the war.
Confronted with the task of storming a very strong position defended
by picked troops, this brigade, comprising only 1,800 fighting troops,
overcame every difficulty and gained a footing on Mont St. Quentin, which
it maintained in spite of the enemy's numerous counter-attacks.
It was a soldiers' battle, throughout which the physique, individuality,
and bravery of the Australians were always conspicuous. There were
only about 1,200 men in the three leading battalions when they attacked,
and it is doubtful if at the end of the day there were more than 600 men
covering a front of 4,000 yards. Owing to the intense hostile fire, and
with men so widely scattered, control by company officers was well nigh
impossible, but the fighting spirit of the men carried them through.
This spirit is well expressed by the exhortation of an officer who was heard
102 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [August sist
to shout down the hne at a critical moment in the fight " Come on, boys,
let's do it in the good old ' digger ' fashion."
On the left of the main operations against Mont St. Quentin, the
front of attack was extended by the 3rd Australian Division and the
The action of the 3rd 58th and 47th Divisions of the III Corps. At 5.42
Australian Division and a.m., forty-two minutcs after the advance of the 5th
the m Corps Brigade had started, the 10th and 9th Australian
Brigades on the right and left respectively, with the 11th Brigade in
support, advanced against the high ground west of the Mont St. Quentin-
Bouchavesnes road. The 10th Brigade, after reaching the crest of the
nearest ridge, established itself on the line held by the enemy before
their big retirement in 1917. It was unable, however, to maintain its
position on the further crest, with the result that a gap existed ^ between
its right and the left of the 20th Battalion of the 5th Brigade. The 9th
Brigade captured Road Wood, crossed the Mont St. Quentin-Bouchavesnes
road, and captured the important locality of Quarry Farm.^ Later in
the day the enemy launched a strong counter-attack against this position,
which drove our troops out of the farm, but the enemy's attack was
checked at the Old Quarry south of Bouchavesnes. During the day the
3rd Australian Division captured a large number of guns, the detachments
of which fought most stubbornly and in many cases were bayoneted at
their guns.
At 5.30 a.m., twelve minutes before the advance of the 3rd Australian
Division began, the troops of the 58th and 47th Divisions of the III Corps
moved to the attack. The 58th Division had some hard fighting before
it was able to gain possession of Marrieres Wood, which was stubbornly
defended. By the evening the division had established a line on the
high ground west of the Mont St. Quentin-Rancourt road overlooking the
village of Bouchavesnes.
The 47th Division was even more successful. Its troops, compara-
tively fresh after a four days' rest, went straight through and by 8.30 a.m.
had gained Long Wood, just west of the Mont St. Quentin-Rancourt
road, with the left of the division thrown back to the eastern edge of
Arderlu Wood south-west of Priez Farm. Patrols were then pushed for-
ward towards Rancourt, where the enemy was located holding a trench
line from north of Bouchavesnes to Priez Farm. A little before noon the
enemy launched a strong counter-attack down the valley south-west of
Rancourt ; but this was driven off by rifle and machine-gun fire, except at
one or two points where a short hand-to-hand encounter took place, which
ended in oiir favour. The chief feature of the enemy's resistance through-
out the day was the retaliation from his heavy guns, which shelled the
whole of the front of the III Corps and the country for some distance in
the rear.
On the extreme left flank of the Fourth Army the 18th Division did
not attempt to advance, as it was known that the enemy was holding the
1 See page 100.
* In this attack Private George Cartwright, 33rd Battalion, single-handed, put out of action
the crew of a machine-gun that was holding up his battalion in Road Wood, and thus enabled the
advance to be continued. See Appendix E, No. 9.
September 1ST] THE BATTLE OF MONT ST. QUENTIN 103
Priez Farm-Fregicourt position in strength ; it was decided to post-
pone the attack until the next day, when the Third Army would be able
to co-operate by making a simultaneous attack on Morval.
The results of the day's fighting had been very satisfactory. Good
progress had been made in the attempt to turn the enemy's defences on
the line of the river, and it was felt that, if the initial advantage that had
been gained could be utilised without delay, the operation would be
crowned with complete success.
As is always the case in hand-to-hand fighting, the casualties had
been heavy, and the 5th Australian Brigade had suffered severely in the
struggle round Mont St. Quentin. Maj.-Gen. Rosenthal, therefore,
decided that the 6th Brigade, which had been moved forward during the
31st in rear of the 5th Brigade, and one battalion of which was holding
Fiorina Trench, should complete the capture of Mont St. Quentin. On
the right it was arranged with the 5th Australian Division that the 14th
Brigade should take over Fiorina Trench during the night, and should
attack simultaneously in a south-easterly direction so as to clear the area
west of Peronne and capture the town. On the left the 3rd Australian
Division and the III Corps were to continue their operations, in co-operation
with the 38th Division of the Third Army on their left.
In trench warfare, when there is severe fighting, it is as a rule im-
possible to locate definitely the exact positions of the leading troops until
after dark. The battle of the 31st had been no excep-
a«ack ^'continued ^ *'°"' ^^'^ ^^^ furthest positions reached by our troops
were not definitely known. Conferences were held by
the commanders of the 2nd and 5th Australian Divisions about
10 p.m. on the 31st, at which it was decided to continue the
attack at 6 a.m. next morning. An earlier hour would have been
preferred, so that the approach march could be made in the dark,
but this was impossible, as sufficient warning could not be given to the
troops. It was nearly midnight before the conferences broke up, and
in the six hours remaining before " zero " the orders had to reach the
troops, the troops had to be moved to their starting positions, and artillery
programmes had to be made out and passed down to batteries. There was
no time to spare. Luckily, as with Sir John Monash and Maj.-Gen.
Rosenthal on the 29th, Brig.-Gen. Robertson, commanding the 6th Brigade,
had anticipated his orders.^ Brig.-Gen. Stewart's arrangements were also
rapidly made, and during the morning the 14th Australian Brigade moved
south from its assembly position east of Cl^ry-sur-Somme and took over
Fiorina Trench from the 23rd Battalion of the 6th Brigade. The last part of
the approach march was carried out under artillery fire, as the enemy's guns
opened in reply to the fire of the artillery of the 2nd Australian Division
which began at 5.30 a.m., half an hoiu- before " zero." The 54th
1 Originally ordered to be prepared to extend the front of attaek by advancing his brigade
on the south of the 5th Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robertson realised during the afternoon that the
situation would not permit of this plan being carried out. He thought it more likely that he
would he required to go through the 5th Brigade in the morning and complete the capture of
Mont St. Quentin village. At 4 p.m., therefore, he met his commanding officers, discussed the
latter operation with them, and issued warning orders. At midnight when the divisional confer-
ence broke up, he only had to give his final instructions to his commanding officers, who were
waiting outside the conference. Several hours were thus saved.
104 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARIVIY [September 1st
Battalion assembled with its right on the river without difficulty, but the
53rd Battalion on its left was unlucky enough to find a portion of Fiorina
Trench in the enemy's possession. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued
amidst thick belts of wire and broken ground before the battalion reached
its •' starting line." The 6th Brigade, which assembled on a two-battalion
front, the 23rd Battalion on the right and the 24th Battalion on the left,
had a similar experience. The 23rd Battalion moved across from Fiorina
Trench, which it had been occupying since the afternoon of the 31st,
and met with strong opposition in the southern end of Gottlieb Trench,
which was to be its " starting line " for the attack. The advanced patrols
of the battalion were held up here by German posts, and the company
commander of the right company sent off his runner, Pte. MacTier, to
ascertain the cause of the delay. MacTier worked along the trench until
he found a German post ; this he bombed, threw the hostile machine-gun
over the parapet, and killed the crew. Further on he found a second
post, which he dealt with similarly, but unfortunately, when jumping
over the parapet to make further investigation, he was killed by a bullet
from a third post.^ This gallant action considerably assisted the assembly
of his battalion, which, however, only completed the clearing of the
trenches a few minutes before " zero."
There had been no time to arrange for a creeping barrage to cover
the advance of the infantry, and heavy concentrations of artillery fire
were, therefore, placed on known and suspected points of enemy resistance,
this fire being lifted on to fresh targets at fixed times as our advance
progressed. Four brigades of field artillery south of the Somme supported
the advance of the 5th Australian Division, while the attack of the 2nd
Australian Division was supported by five brigades of field artillery north
of the river, and by three brigades on the south. To each division was
allotted one brigade of heavy artillery.
With its right on the Somme, the 14th Brigade moved forward at
6 a.m., coming immediately under heavy enfilade machine-gun fire from
the direction of Mont St. Quentin. By 6.45 a.m. the
B?gad'*e''nt^5t'nne54th BattaHon, having cleared Ste. Rad^gonde village
and wood without difficulty, had reached the causeway
leading over the moat surrounding Peronne, which the enemy blew up
as they retired into the to^vn. On the left the 53rd Battalion, with
portions of the supporting battalions, which had become involved in the
fighting near the " starting line," met with considerable opposition from
the enemy holding Anvil Wood. The " mopping up " of this wood took
a long time, and was much hampered by machine-gun fire from the direc-
tion of St. Denis and the Sugar Factory. Quickly grasping the situation,
three privates of the 53rd Battalion, under heavy artillery and machine-
gun fire, manned a captured field gun and silenced the machine-guns.^
Largely as the result of this gallant action. Anvil Wood was cleared of
» See Appendix E, No. 33.
* This gun had previously been captured by Pte. William Currey of the same battalion,
who during the early stages of the advance, seeing that the gun was causing heavy casualties by
firing over open sights at very close range, dashed forward and despite a withering machine-gun
fire directed on him from either flank succeeded single-handed in capturing it, and killing the entire
gun detachment. See Appendix E, No. 14.
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September ISTj THE BATTLE OF MONT ST. QUENTIN 105
the enemy, and the cemetery north-east of the wood captured by 7.30 a.m.
All attempts to advance beyond the cemetery were checked by converging
machine-gun fire from the ramparts of Peronne, and, as the left of the
53rd Battahon had lost touch with the 6th Brigade, it was decided not to
push further forward until the situation had improved on that flank.
One company of the 55th Battalion was moved up to form a defensive
flank on the left of the 14th Brigade at the brickworks north of the ceme-
tery. By 8.40 a.m. the 54th Battalion had succeeded in reaching the
centre of Peronne, having crossed the moat north-west of Peronne by
means of two narrow foot-bridges, in the face of heavy artillery fire and
of sweeping machine-gun fire from the houses. Moving southwards through
Peronne, the " mopping up " proceeded satisfactorily, and by 8.45 a.m.
connection had been established with the 15th Australian Brigade at the
causeway south of the town.^ Peronne was now practically in our hands
with the exception of the isolated north-east portion around the Faubourg
de Bretagne.
The 6th Brigade moved forward simultaneously with the 14th Brigade.
As the situation of the leading troops of the 5th Brigade was not
The capture of the clear at the time of the assembly of the 6th Brigade,
village of Mont St. the 23rd Battalion on the right formed up in Gottlieb
Quentin by the 6th and Save Trenches, and, in order to avoid the possi-
Austrahan Brigade ^jjj^^ ^^ shelling any of our troops who might still be
holding out in Elsa Trench, our artillery bombardment was placed just
east of the Peronne-Bouchavesnes road. The result was that the leading
troops of the 6th Brigade had to advance about 1,000 yards without
close artillery support over ground in which there were small parties
of the enemy still offering resistance. Although subjected to very heavy
machine-gun fire from the direction of St. Denis and Peronne, and in
spite of the fact that in two companies all the officers and all the
sergeants except one became casualties, the leading troops of the
23rd Battalion with great determination pressed on and reached Elsa
Trench, where some parties of the 5th Brigade were found. On the left
the 24th Battalion, immediately it advanced, encountered the same heavy
machine-gun fire. Notwithstanding this, skirting Feuillaucourt, the
battalion reached a line east of the Peronne-Bouchavesnes road on
which, owing to the intensity of the fire from Plevna Trench and the
Canal du Nord, a halt had to be made.
Orders were at once issued by Brig.-Gen. Robertson for a heavy bom-
bardment of the enemy's position on the hill and in the village, after which
a further advance was to be made. The 21st Battalion was also brought
up from reserve to reinforce the 23rd Battalion. From 1 p.m. to 1.30
p.m. the village of Mont St. Quentin was bombarded by every gun and
howitzer which could be made available, and at 1.30 p.m. the attack was
renewed. Two companies of the 21st Battahon rushed the northern half
of the village, and the 23rd Battalion the southern half, while at the
same time the 24th Battalion advanced on the north of, and one company
of the 21st Battalion on the south of, the viUage. A desperate struggle
' Corporal Hall and Corporal Buckley, 54th Battalion, greatly distinguished themselves
during this advance and in the fighting in Peronne. See Appendix E, Nos. 21 and 8.
P
106 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [September 1st
ensued.^ The defenders were picked troops who fought hard, but the
impetus of the first rush carried the advance to Mont St. Quentin Wood,
which was captured, and our hne established along its eastern edge. The
24th Battalion cleared Plevna and Koverla Trenches, and, on the extreme
left, reached its objective in Tortille Trench, 500 yards south-west of
Allaines. During the afternoon touch was gained with the 14th Brigade
on the right, and, as the fighting had been exceptionally severe and the
casualties heavy, no further advance was attempted. Machine-gtms were
pushed forward, and our line consolidated east of Mont St. Quentin village
and wood, and along Koverla and Tortille trenches to the Tortille river.^
The pressure on the left of the 14th Brigade was somewhat relieved
by the successful attack of the 6th Brigade, and fresh attempts were
made to push forward east of the cemetery north of Peronne. Heavy
machine-gun fire from the ramparts, however, again rendered all these
efforts unsuccessful, until at 5 p.m. the 53rd Battalion advanced to the
outskirts of St. Denis in spite of the enfilade fire to which it was exposed.
At 6.30 p.m. the situation was unchanged; fighting was still in
progress in the northern portion of Peronne ; the Germans held the ram-
parts of the town and St. Denis in strength, and were also defending the
sugar factory north-west of St. Denis. While these positions were still
in the enemy's possession it was impossible to advance, and, as some
parties of the 53rd Battalion had reached the neighbourhood of St. Denis,
it was not possible for our artillery to open fire on these points of
resistance. At 8.30 p.m., therefore, the advanced parties at St. Denis
were withdrawn, and our line was established along the eastern outskirts
of Peronne, and east of the cemetery to the Brickworks.
At 5 a.m., thus preceding the advance of the 2nd Australian Division
by one hour, the 11th Brigade of the 3rd Australian Division continued
the attack between the Canal du Nord and Bouchavesnes.
8r?A^Sn°Divi On the right the 43rd Battalion met with strong resist-
ance from the trenches north of Allaines, but by 6 p.m.
it had secured the southern slopes of the spur north-west of that village,
and was in touch with the 2nd Australian Division at the Canal du Nord
500 yards west of Allaines. ^ Good progress was made on the left by
the 41st and 42nd Battalions, and, early in the afternoon, our line was
established on the high ground south-east of Bouchavesnes. The position
of the troops of the 58th Division was at this time a little obscure, and
consequently one company of the 44th Battalion was moved to Quarry
Farm to support the left flank of the 11th Brigade. Four himdred and
five prisoners and 15 machine-guns were captured by the 3rd Australian
Division during the day.
The operations on the front of the III Corps were very successful.
On the right the 58th and 47th Divisions, attacking in conjunction with
' The conspicuous gallantry and initiative of Sergeant Lowerson, 21st Battalion, in this
attack materially influenced the situation at a critical period. See Appendix E, No. 31.
' The machine-gunners of the 2nd Australian Machine Gun Battalion were of great assistance
to the infantry in this attack, and Lieut. Towner's gallant behaviour did much towards
ensuring success. See Appendix E, No. 43.
' Lce.-Corp. Weathers during this attack was instrumental in capturing 180 Germans and
3 machine-gims. See Appendix E, No, 47
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September 1st] THE BATTLE OF MONT ST. QUENTIN 107
the 3rd Australian Division, made good progress. The resistance offered
to our advance was not so serious as that on the previous day, and the
Th ti ns f the hostile artillery retaliation was comparatively light. "^
m Corps ; the attacks Bouchavesnes was captured by the 58th Division, and
oJ the 58th and 47th Rancourt by the 47th Division, a considerable number
Divisions ^j prisoners being taken in both places. By 11 a.m.
the high groiind east of Bouchavesnes had been gained, and the 47th
Division had reached the south-western edge of St. Pierre Vaast Wood.
The task of the 18th Division on the left was to connect up the
attack of the 47th Division on Rancourt \vith that of the 38th Division on
Morval by the capture of the Sailly-Saillisel-Combles
SackTee°iTp°7" valley, across which the enemy held the line Priez
Farm-Fregicourt-Haie Wood, all of which had been
strengthened considerably during the past few days.
In order to avoid making a frontal attack against the enemy's position
in the valley, Maj.-Gen. Lee decided to attack only the southern
portion of the position opposite Priez Farm.^ His plan was to push straight
through to St. Pierre Vaast Wood on this part of the front Avith one
battalion, and to mask the remainder of his front with the fire of artillery,
trench mortars, and smoke. The leading battalion was to be followed by
two others, which would in turn change direction, attack northwards
and thus take the enemy's position in flank and rear. The attack, which was
carried out by the 55th Brigade, was a complete success. The 8th East
Surrey in the van, after capturing Priez Farm, where the fighting was very
bitter, reached its final objective with comparatively little loss.^
Following behind the 8th East Surrey, the 7th The Buffs and the
7th The Queens moved through the area of the 47th Division, turned
northwards, and successfully carried out their tasks, the latter battalion
capturing 300 prisoners at Fregicourt, out of a total for the division
of 700.
Not content with the brilliant success of these tactics, Maj.-Gen.
Lee placed the 7th Royal West Kent at the disposal of the 55th Brigade,
and at 7 p.m., after a brief struggle, this battalion captured Saillisel in
conjunction with the troops of the 38th Division, whose objective was
Sailly-Saillisel, the northern end of the same block of ruins which had
been the scene of such hard fighting in the winter of 1916.
On the evening of September 1st the situation on the front of the
Fourth Army was most favourable. The Australians had stormed the
The situation on the enemy's positions on, and north of, Mont St. Quentin,
evening of September and held the greater part of Peronne. The divisions
"^'' of the III Corps had driven the enemy from his strong
positions on the heights between Bouchavesnes and Morval, where he had
undoubtedly intended to make a stand. Moreover, the enemy's losses
' This was probably because the enemy, when he was driven from his positions on the previous
day, had been compelled to withdraw his guns well back owing to the lie of the ground.
• Priez Farm was actually in the 47th Division area, and the 8th East Surrey formed up
south of the divisional boundary.
' Near Priez Farm a hostile strong post which held out was heavily bombarded by the 142nd
Trench Mortar Battery of the 47th Division. Eventually the battery commander and one man
went out and accepted the surrender of the whole garrison of 80.
108 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [September 2nd
had been very heavy, especially in the vicinity of Mont St, Quentin and
Peronne, and in the neighbourhood of the Bouchavesnes ridge, Priez
Farm, and Fregicourt.
Information obtained from prisoners showed that the front north of
Peronne had been heavily reinforced at the expense of the front south of
the town, where the enemy relied on the Somme to strengthen his
position. His battalions were much below strength, and consequently a
large number had been engaged. Thirty-four battalions of eight different
divisions had been identified during September 1st ; several machine-gun
and pioneer battalions had reinforced the infantry battalions, proving
conclusively that the enemy's situation in regard to reinforcements was
precarious, and that his losses had been unusually severe.
During the night of September 1st the AustraHan Corps pushed the
bulk of its field and heavy artillery across the river in order to support
the advance of the infantry on September 2nd. On
exp*ioi^io^Q 0° success *'^^ ^ Corps front, during the same night, the 58th
Division was relieved by the 74th (Yeomanry) Division,
under the command of Maj.-Gen. E. S. Girdwood, which had joined the
Fourth Army on August 30th. Sir Alec. Godley decided to use this
division to drive the enemy across the Canal du Nord, storm the Nurlu
heights, and secure the high ground to the south of that village. The
47th and 18th Divisions, further north, were ordered at the same time to
establish a defensive flank on the high ground north and north-east of
Moislains, the 18th Division operating in conjunction with the 38th
Division on the right of the Third Army.
In order to ensure the success of this plan it was necessary for the
2nd Australian Division to push forward with its left flank on the Canal
du Nord, and secure the high ground around Aizecourt-le-Haut, so as to
protect the right flank of the 74th Division as it advanced. Concurrently
with these operations the 5th Australian Division was to seize the high
ground from Doingt to Bussu, including the two prominent localities,
Flacques Wood and Racquets Wood.
The advance of the 5th Australian Division was entrusted to the
14th and 15th Brigades. The former employed the 56th Battalion,
supported by two companies of the 55th, to work
6th Aus*raiian°Division eastward north of Peronne, and the 54th Battalion to
complete the " mopping up " of the north-eastern
portion of the town. The latter brigade moved the 58th, 59th, and 60th
Battalions across the Somme during the night by the causeway south of
Peronne in support of the 14th Brigade. The 58th was ordered to assist
the 54th in clearing Peronne, while the 59th and 60th were to support
the attack of the 56th north of the town.
The attack, which was launched at 6 a.m., was preceded by half an
hour's bombardment of the ramparts on the northern outskirts of Peronne,
where a considerable amount of machine-gim resistance was anticipated.
At " zero " the bombardment was lifted and directed on to various centres
of resistance, which were kept under fire until attacked by the infantry.
This preliminary bombardment provoked very heavy retaliation from the
enemy's artillery, which continued throughout the operation.
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September 2nd] THE BATTLE OF MONT ST. QUENTIN 109
Moving forward from their assembly positions at " zero," the troops
of the 14th Brigade met with a withering fire from the ramparts north
of Peronne and from St. Denis. Under this converging fire the advance
sustained a temporary check, but the two companies of the 55th BattaHon,
from support, worked forward on the left and gained a footing in the
Sugar Factory, and by 7.45 a.m. had penetrated to the Brickworks on
the outskirts of St. Denis, thereby forcing the enemy to evacuate the
village. By 10 a.m. the 59th Battalion of the 15th Brigade had pressed
forward north of Peronne, and, supported by the 60th, held a
line from the ramparts to the outskirts of St. Denis on the right of the
55th and 56th Battalions. About this time also the north-eastern ram-
parts of Peronne were cleared by the 54th Battalion, assisted by the
58th. In the afternoon patrols advanced across the St. Denis-
Mont St. Quentin road, but, as numerous casualties were sus-
tained in approaching St. Denis Wood, it was finally decided to take
up a position west of the road. This was accordingly done, and at 6 p.m.
a line was established by the 5th Australian Division along the south-eastern
and eastern outskirts of Peronne, and about 100 yards west of the St.
Denis-Mont St. Quentin road. In the course of the afternoon patrols,
which endeavoured to force a passage across the river near La Chapellette,
were unable to effect a crossing on account of the severity of the
machine-gun fire from the eastern bank ; attempts to cross the marshes
at Flamicourt were equally unsuccessful.
North-east of Mont St. Quentin the 2nd Australian Division attacked
on the left of the 5th Australian Division, with the 7th Brigade operating
on a three-battalion front. The attack was supported
2nd AusLSn DiSon ^y seven brigades of field artillery which put down a
series of standing barrages, each brigade being allotted
an area on which to direct its fire. The heavy artillery co-operated by a
bombardment of AUaines, Haut-Allaines, and other selected points in
rear.
At 5.30 a.m. the 7th Brigade passed through the 6th Brigade, which
was holding the line, and advanced to the attack. Almost immediately,
the 26th Battalion on the right encovmtered heavy machine-gun fire
from the right flank, as the troops of the 5th Australian Division did not
begin their advance until half an hour later. The troops on the extreme
right of the brigade, therefore, after making slight progress, faced south-
wards and consolidated Koros and Kurilo Alleys, thus forming a defensive
flank. On the left the 27th Battalion was also checked by machine-gun
fire. As a result of this temporary check, the artillery barrage outpaced
the infantry, and the fight developed into an infantry attack against
numerous well-sited machine-gun nests held by determined men. Section
leaders, however, showed splendid initiative and daring in dealing with
these nests, and the advance was resumed.^ After exceptionally heavy
fighting AUaines and Haut-Allaines were finally captured, and about 600
of the enemy were seen retreating in confusion over the flat country north
of Aizecourt-le-Haut.
■ In one of these nests, situated in a mine crater near the Mont St. Qucntin-Haut-Allaines
road, 17 machine-guns and 2 trench mortars were captured.
110 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [September 2nd
At 7 a.m. a defensive flank, facing south-east, was established north
of, and almost parallel to, the St. Denis-Aizecourt-le-Haut road up to
within 1,000 yards of the latter village, while the 25th Battalion in the
centre reached a line 700 yards beyond the Bussu-Haut-AUaines road.
Immediately east of Haut-AUaines the infantry found itself under the fire
of field guns firing over open sights, and established itself well clear of the
village. On the left, north of Haut-Allaines, a gap existed in our line
near the Canal du Nord, and, as the advance of the 74th Division north
of the canal did not make the progress that had been anticipated, a defen-
sive flank was thrown back through the northern outskirts of Haut-
Allaines to AUaines. The position of the 7th Australian Brigade, forming
as it did a sharp and narrow salient, was at first somewhat precarious,
but additional machine-guns were pushed forward, and a good defensive
position was established with the troops distributed in depth. At dusk
the 43rd Battalion of the 11th Brigade of the 3rd Australian Division
moved forward, established a post on the canal north of Haut-Allaines,
and cleared the trenches near the canal north-west of AUaines, thus
obtaining connection with the 7th Brigade on the right and with the 74th
Division on the left, and closing the gap which had previously existed.
It had been a stiff day's fighting, for the enemy resisted stubbornly ;
in spite of this, the 7th Brigade had crossed the fire-swept slopes
and had reached their objectives, capturing over 200 prisoners, 93 machine-
guns, 8 minenwerfers, and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.
North of the Canal du Nord the 74th and 47th Divisions, operating
against Moislains, encountered a much more vigorous resistance than had
been anticipated. Starting at 5.30 a.m. down the
The o^rabons o£ the ^gstcm slopes of the Tortille valley, the troops of the
74th Division at first made rapid progress. They
advanced south of Moislains, crossed the Canal du Nord, and by 8 a.m.
were advancing up the eastern slopes of the valley towards Niu-lu. Shortly
afterwards, however, a counter-attack, supported by the fire of machine-
guns and artillery, drove our troops back over the canal and through
Moislains, where there was heavy fighting. Eventually the troops of
the 74th Division, much weakened by the enemy's counter-attack, were
unable to maintain their hold along the western bank of the canal, and
established a line of resistance along a trench line on the western bank
of the Tortille. On the left of the 74th Division the 47th Division
advanced about 1,000 yards, finally holding a trench running about
300 yards west of Moislains.^ Meanwhile, the 18th Division, which was
operating on the northern portion of the army front in conjunction with
the 38th Division of the Third Army, was engaged in clearing up St.
Pierre Vaast Wood. This work was successfully completed dvu-ing the
day ; about 100 prisoners were captured, and Government Farm was
occupied.
During the next two days our patrols made continuous efforts to gain
ground east of Peronne and Mont St. Quentin, and to force the line of
' The attack of the 47th Division was much assisted by the courage and initiative of Private
Jack Harvey, l/22nd London, who, single-handed, compelled 37 Germans to surrender. See
Appendix E, No. 23.
Sept. 3rd & 4th] THE BATTLE OF MONT ST. QUENTIN ill
the Canal du Nord. Patrols of the 5th Australian Division gained a
footing in Flamicourt on September 3rd, and, on the foUowng day,
cleared the village and gained possession of Chair Wood,
Septe^er 3rT and 4th which lies to the east of it. East of Mont St. Quentin
the 2nd Australian Division gained a little ground,
and advanced their left along the Canal du Nord slightly, but as the enemy's
machine-gim fire was still very active, no serious effort was made to
continue the advance.
All attempts made by the 74th and 47th Divisions on September 3rd
to eject the enemy from Moislains and force a crossing over the Canal du
Nord were unsuccessful, but, Avhen the pressure was renewed on the
morning of September 4th, although at first the resistance appeared to be
as strong as ever, our troops succeeded in establishing posts on the farther
side of the canal. By the evening Moislains had been completely cleared,
and oiu- line was firmly estabhshed east of the canal at the foot of the
slopes leading up to the Nurlu heights. Meanwhile, on September 3rd
the 18th Division pushed patrols through Vaux Woods, which met with
very little resistance, as the Germans were in process of retiring in front
of the V Corps on the left. By the evening of September 3rd the troops
of the 18th Division were established along the western bank of the Canal
du Nord. On the following day the progress of the V Corps, combined with
the energetic action of our patrols, made Riverside Wood, east of the
Canal du Nord, untenable for the enemy, and by the evening the 18th
Division was firmly established on the eastern edge of the wood.
The battle of Mont St. Quentin may be said to have ended on
September 2nd, when the Australian Corps had secured Peronne, St. Denis,
The results of the Mont St. Quentin, and Haut-Allaines, and the III Corps
BatUe of Mont St. was in possession of the Bouchavesnes ridge and St. Pierre
Quentin y^ast Wood. Mont St. Quentin and Peronne were
the dominating features in the enemy's defences, and their capture by
the 2nd and 5th Australian Di\nsions, very materially assisted by the
action of the 3rd Australian Division, will always rank high amongst the
many brilliant feats of arms performed by' the Austrahans. They
captured the position from the enemy's picked troops and maintained ft
against numerous counter-attacks.^ The whole operation was a triumph
for the Australian Corps. It was conspicuous for the excellent preparatory
work of the commanders and staffs, as well as for the initiative, courage,
and resolution of the regimental officers and men.^ The spirit of the
Australian soldier is well exemplified by an epitaph, which the visitor to
the battlefield of Mont St. Quentin mky still find inscribed on a small
white cross roughly put together from "timber collected from the ruins
of the village : —
" Here lie six Boches.
They met a Digger."
The operations of the III Corps were also worthy of the highest
,. . '. ^" all, the enemy made fifteen counter-attacks to recover the position. He employed nine
divisions in his attempt to stem the advance of the Australian and III Corps, and to prevent our
troops crossing the Canal du Nord.
» In the three days' fighting round Mont St. Quentin the Australians captured 2,600 prisoners
mcluduig men from the 2nd Guard, 14th Bavarian, 21st, 38th, and 185th Divisions.
112 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [September 4th
praise. The advance of the troops of this corps, from the capture of Albert
on August 22nd until they crossed the Canal du Nord on September 4th,
covered a distance, as the crow flies, of some fourteen miles, over the desolate
shell-pitted area of the old Somme battlefields. The operations require
to be studied in greater detail than is possible here before the magnitude of
the task the troops were asked to perform, and the demands on the officers
and men which such an advance in face oJf determined opposition entailed,
can be fully realised. The spirit, however, of the young soldiers of the
12th, 18th, 47th, and 58th Divisions successfully overcame every difficulty,
and well did they answer every call made on them, and uphold the best
traditions of the British soldier by their cheerfulness and endurance.^
The situation as regards the German troops who opposed us was,
from our point of view, very satisfactory, and, thanks to our Intelligence,
we were kept well informed both as regards their future
^: KmbSr intentions and their condition.
It had been ascertained from prisoners that the
German withdrawal to the line of the Somme and the Canal du Nord had
been timed to begin on August 24th. The enemy had started his retreat
on that day in the Albert area, while he had evacuated Roye on August
26th. This retirement, especially south of the Somme, when once begun,
had been very rapid. It had been, however, covered by rearguards, and
it was evident from the number of counter-attacks delivered, especially
north of the Somme, that the enemy had no intention, if he could prevent
it, of allowing our troops to push forward faster than he wished.
Between August 21st and September 4th, however, in order to
prevent a disaster, the enemy had been compelled to throw into the line
fourteen more divisions ; of these the 2nd Guard, 14th Reserve, 25th,
83rd, 87th, 232nd, and 233rd Divisions were engaged for the first time,
the remainder had been engaged in the battle before. This gave a total
of thirty-three divisions which had opposed the Fourth Army between
August 8th and September 4th, eight of which were engaged twice ^ ;
against these the Fourth Army had employed sixteen divisions. The
disorganisation of the German forces was extreme. Owing to our
sweeping successes, the enemy had been forced to throw his reserve divi-
sions into the line on widely separated parts of the front, regiment by
regiment, as they arrived on the field of battle. For instance, in Bernafay
Wood on August 27th, prisoners belonging to twenty-one different
battalions of six different divisions had been taken, and again on September
1st between Peronne and Rancourt, prisoners belonging to thirty-four
battalions of eight different divisions were captured. No troops could
suffer such defeats as had the Germans without serious loss of moral,
and ample evidence was forthcoming that this was affecting the German
Army as a whole. Certain formations, indeed, had fought well,
noticeably the 2nd Guard Division and the Alpine Corps, while the
Machine Gun Corps still retained its high reputation. It was ominous
' The prisoners captured by the III Corps, between August 31st and September 2nd alone,
amounted to over 2,300.
2 36.209 prisoners, of whom 838 were officers, had been captured since August 8th. Of
these, 3,397 prisoners belonged to the 225th Division, 2,760 to the 117th Division, 2,557 to the
41st Division, and 2,483 to the 14th Bavarian Division.
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September 4th] THE BATTLE OF MONT ST. QUENTIN 113
for the enemy, however, that on more than one occasion machine-gun
crews had surrendered without firing. The situation, too, from the
enemy's point of view, with regard to reinforcements was very serious.
In Jiily, as the result of their losses, the Germans had been compelled to
disband two divisions, while in August nine more had been broken up.
This, therefore, reduced the enemy's strength on the western front from
207 divisions, including four dismounted cavalry divisions, in June — ^the
maximum strength to which he ever attained — ^to 198 divisions at the
beginning of September ; moreover, a number of battalions had been
reduced from four to three companies.
The result of the battle of Mont St. Quentin left the enemy in a very
difficult position in front of the Fourth Army now that the line of the
Somme had been turned. It was obvious that the number of troops
which had sufficed to hold the crossings over the river south of Peronne,
would not suffice to hold a position of equal length further east %vithout
an obstacle such as the Somme in front of them, and that this part of the
front, which had been denuded of troops to provide reserves for the counter-
attacks further north, would have to be reinforced. Nor was this all, for
the Third Army had made rapid and consistent progress diu-ing the last
few days and had carried its advance well beyond Bapaume.^
The storming of the famous Drocourt-Queant line by the First
Army on September 2nd, and the advance of the French to Ham, had
added still further to the enemy's difficulties. It appeared that, pivoting
for the moment on the well-wired defences on the high ground about
Nurlu, the enemy was continuing his retreat in front of the First and
Third Armies, and that this retirement was to be followed later by a
withdrawal in front of the Fourth Army and the French.
The enemy could not be allowed to carry out this manoeuvre without
interference, and, either the Nurlu heights would have to be captured,
or the thin screen holding the Somme south of Peronne would have to be
driven in.
In view of the strength of the enemy's defences on the Nurlu
heights, and the losses that a premature frontal attack on such a strong
position would entail. Sir Henry Rawlinson, decided, on September 3rd,
while continuing to make every preparation for an attack on the Nurlu
position, to attempt to force a passage over the Somme by a siu-prise
attack at St. Christ, and so open up the crossing at Brie. This operation
if successful, combined with an attack in a south-easterly direction from
Peronne, would clear the Hne of the Somme and thus render feasible an
eastward advance along the whole front of the Australian Corps south of
the town. The Australian Corps at once began preparations to carrv out
these orders, but, before they were completed, the situation had developed,
and the enemy had begun his retirement to the outer defences of the
Hindenburg Line along the whole front of the Fourth Army. On the
evening of September 4th the indications of this retirement became
definite, and orders were issued for the III and Australian Corps to follow
him up energetically with strong advanced guards.
' On the evening of September 4th the troops of the V Corps crossed the Canal du Nord
between Manancourt and a point east of Hermies.
CHAPTER VII
THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE — SEPTEMBER 5TH-28tH
Maps 1, 2, 4, 8, and 9 ; and Panoramic Photographs 4 and 5
The readjustment of the front — September 5th ; the enemy in full retreat — September 6th and
7th ; the pursuit — The co-operation of the Royal Air Force — The events of September 8th
— The situation on September 9th — September 10th ; the fighting on the flanks at Holnon
Wood and Epehy — September 11th ; the arrival of the IX Corps ; the readjustment of the
front — The general situation on September 11th — Sir Henry Rawlinson's proposals — The
proposals approved — September 12th to 17th ; minor operations — The preliminary arrange-
ments for the attack on September 18th — The objectives — The frontages of attack — The
artillery arrangements — The allotment of tanks — A summary of the Fourth Army attack
on September 18th — The assembly of the IX Corps — The first phase of the IX Corps attack
— The second phase — The result of the day's fighting by the IX Corps — The assembly of
the Australian Corps — The first phase of the Australian Corps attack — The second phase —
The third phase — The result of the day's fighting by the Australian Corps — The assembly
of the III Corps — The first phase of the III Corps attack — The 74th Division attack — The
18th Division attack — The attacks of the 12th and 58th Divisions — The second phase of the
III Corps attack — The result of the day's fighting by the III Corps — The situation on Sep-
tember 19th — The events on the IX Corps front on September 19th and 20th — The events
on the III Corps front on September 19th and 20th — The decision to attack the Hindenburg
Line ; the Fourth Army reinforced — The readjustment of the front — The III Corps attacks
on September 21st-22nd — The IX Corps operations on September 24th — The pressure
maintained by the IX Corps on September 25th and 26th — The bombardment of the
Hindenburg Line begun on September 26th — Minor operations by the 27th and 30th
American Divisions on September 26th and 27th — The attacks of the Allied Armies on
other parts of the front — The situation on the Fourth Army front on September 28tb.
When orders were issued, late on September 4th, for the
Austrahan and III Corps to follow up the enemy, the Australian Corps
held the southern portion of the front of the Fourth
® 'the^front^° ° Army from south of Cizancourt, where it was in touch
with the First French Army, to the Canal du Nord
about 1,000 yards north of Haut-AUaines. The 32nd Division and the
5th and 2nd Australian Divisions held the line on this front from right
to left ; the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Australian Divisions were in reserve.
The northern portion of the army front, to its junction with the
Third Army on the southern outskirts of Manancourt, was held by the
III Corps, with the 74th, 47th, and 18th Divisions in line from right to left,
and with the 12th and 58th Divisions in reserve. In the army area, but in
general reserve, were the IX Corps Headquarters and the 6th Division.
As the 2nd Australian Division was feeling the effects of the strenuous
work it had just accomplished, it was relieved on the night of September
4th. This was effected by the 74th Division and the 5th Australian
Sept. 5th] THE ADVANXE TO THE HIXDEXBURG LINE 115
Division extending their fronts to the south and north respectively, and
joining hands on the new inter-corps boundary, which ran east and west
from north of Mont St. Quentin through Bussu and Roisel.^
The withdrawal of this division left the 32nd Division and the 5th
Australian Division, each with two brigades in the line, holding the whole
front of the Australian Corps. As, however, it was essential that the
pursuit of the enemy should be maintained with unabated vigour in order
to prevent him from destroying the roads and railways west of the
Hindenburg Line during his retirement, the 3rd Australian Division, on
the evening of September 5th, took over a portion of the line held by the
5th Australian Division, while the 5th Australian Division took over part
of the 32nd Division front. On completion of this readjustment on
September 6th the troops of the Australian Corps were organised for the
ptu-suit ; the 32nd Division on the right, as far north as the Brie-Vermand
road ; the 5th Australian Division in the centre, operating between the
Brie-Vermand road and a line running east and west through Cartigny ;
the 3rd Australian Division on the left.
The whole front covered by the Australian Corps amounted to some
15,000 yards. This was too extensive for the troops at the disposal of
the Australian Corps Commander, in view of the hard fighting which
they had been through since August 8th, and of the losses they had incurred.
It was, moreover, probable that, now the Somme had been passed, the
weight of the enemy's opposition would be equally distributed along
the whole front of the Fourth Army. This was represented to General
Headquarters, and the Fourth Army was shortly afterwards reinforced
by the IX Corps with four divisions, in order that the front of the
Australian Corps might be reduced, and strong pressure be maintained
against the retreating enemy.
The changes necessary on the III Corps front before the advance was
resumed were not so extensive. During the night of September 4th the
18th Division was relieved by the 12th Division, which had been resting
since August 30th, and moved into reserve for the first time since the
commencement of the Battle of Amiens on Augiist 8th. For the greater
part of a month the 18th Division had been fighting incessantly and
successfully, and had covered in its advance from the Ancre to the
Canal du Nord a distance of approximately seventeen miles. The 47th
Division remained with the Fourth Army until the evening of September
7th ; it was then withd^a^^^l to join the Fifth Army. This division also
had taken a conspicuous part in the advance of the III Corps since
August 22nd.
Early on September 5th the enemy began to retire along the front
of the Australian Corps, covered by strong rearguards. On the right
rearguards of the 5th Bavarian and 119th Divisions
enemy™m^hiii retreat defended the crossings of the Somme at St. Christ and
Brie. Early in the morning, however, a platoon of the
15th Highland Light Infantry of the 32nd Division crossed the swamps
of the Somme at Eterpigny undiscovered, and surprised one of the
'_ The 2nd Australian Division, on relief, was withdrawn to the vicinity of Cappy, where it
remained for some weeks.
lie THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept 5th-7th
enemy's posts. This platoon was quickly reinforced by the remainder
of the 14th Brigade, which cleared Brie and St, Christ after a stiff fight.
The engineers and pioneers of the 32nd Division then carried out the
construction of bridges at Brie and St. Christ with such skill and rapidity
that, by noon on September 6th, not only the whole of the 32nd Division,
but also a considerable number of French troops had crossed the river
by these bridges. Meanwhile, advancing at da\vn on the 5th, patrols of the
5th Australian Division worked forward under cover of a smoke screen and
captured Doingt and Bussu after slight opposition. Further opposition
was encountered, mainly from machine-guns and isolated field guns,
which, although causing a temporary delay, did not impede the general
advance to any great extent. During the day 150 prisoners were
captured.
The III Corps also pressed forward at dawn on the 5th. The 74th
Division on the right, and the 47th Division in the centre, advanced rapidly,
seized Aizecourt-le-Haut, and cleared the ground east of the main Peronne-
Nurlu road to the outskirts of Driencourt. On the left the troops of the
12th Division were subjected to a heavy gas concentration while forming
up for the attack in the early morning. Nevertheless, they pressed on at
daybreak, and, in spite of a number of casualties from machine-gun fire,
succeeded by skilful manoeuvring in making a considerable advance
during the day. They penetrated the first system of trenches and wire
of the Templeux-la-Fosse-Nurlu defences, and by evening had established
themselves in the trenches on the western edge of Nurlu.^ An attack,
which was laimched in the dark against Nurlu village, was unsuccessful,
and provoked considerable retaliation from the enemy's artillery. A
footing, however, had now been established on the Nurlu heights, which
deprived the enemy of satisfactory observation for his artillery fire, and
when the advance was resumed next morning Nurlu was occupied after
slight resistance by the 12th Division.
The pursuit was resumed on September 6th, and very little resistance
was encoimtered along the whole army front until the evening of
September 7th. The 13th Austrahan Light Horse
?h™uif('eetlj?' Regiment and the Australian Corps Cyclist Battalion
formed the advanced screen of the Australian Corps,
while the Northumberland Hussars performed a similar duty for the
III Corps.
The advance was closely supported by field artillery brigades, of
which sections accompanied the advance guard battalions. The German
rearguards were thus continually harassed, and the isolated machine-gun
nests, left behind by the enemy in order to impede ovu" progress, were in
most cases destroyed, or forced to withdraw without fvdfiUing their
mission. On the Australian and III Corps fronts the patrols of the 13th
Australian Light Horse Regiment and the Northumberland Hussars
maintained contact with the enemy's rearguards throughout his
retirement.
Athies and Cartigny were entered early on September 6th, and by
• This area was defended by the newly arrived 6th (dismounted) Cavalry Division, prisoners
being captured from regiments of each of its three brigades.
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Sept. 5th-8th] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 117
the evening of September 7th the advanced troops of the Australian
Corps had estabUshed themselves along the high ground east
of Beauvois, and thence through Villevecque, Soyecourt, and Bernes,
and along the western slopes of the ridge east of Roisel. During the
same period the III Corps effected an advance of some 4,500 yards, and
captured Aizecourt-le-Bas, Longavesnes, and Lieramont during
September 6th. Following this up on the 7th with the capture of
Villers Faucon, Saulcourt, and Guyencourt, its advanced troops established
an outpost line on the spurs 1,000 yards east of the Roisel-Epehy railway
as far north as Ste. Emilie, and wthin 1,500 yards of Epehy and Pcizieres.
Meanwhile, on September 6th the First French Army entered Ham,
and by the evening of September 7th had advanced to the St. Quentin
Canal at St. Simon and Tugny, and was holding a line running northwards
to Fluquieres and Vaux (see Map 2), A number of prisoners and a few
guns were captured in the advance, but in many parts of the battlefield
the enemy withdrew so rapidly that touch was lost for several hours.
During our advance most valuable work was again accomplished
by the 5th Brigade, Royal Air Force. The weather was ideal at this
period, and our airmen made full use of their opportunity,
ti^^Royai'to'Force ^J^^S ^ver the battle area from dawn to dusk. On
September 5th very few hostile aeroplanes were
encountered, but on the following day a large number were engaged, eight
of which were destroyed and five driven down out of control by our airmen.
Early on the morning of the 6th several of the enemy's observation balloons
were in the air around Epehy observing for their heaw guns, and watching
the movements of oiu- troops. Within two hovu-s of taking the air, these
had all been destroyed or forced to descend by our airmen. The
enemy's retreating troops also offered good targets for the machine-guns
and bombs from our aeroplanes. ^
The pursuit was renewed early on September 8th, but it soon became
apparent that the enemy's resistance was stiffening. His artillery had
been withdrawn, and was apparently in position cover-
Seplember 8th ^^g *^^ general line Attilly-Maissemy-Jeancovut-
Templeux-le-Guerard-Epehy. South of the river
Omignon the hostile sheUing was chiefly from field guns and was dispersed
over the forward area, but north of that river the enemy's heavy guns
' Magnificent work was performed by a flight of S.E. 5's of No. 84 Squadron under Captain
Beauchamp-Proctor. On the morning of September 5th, this flight of six machines set out on
an independent mission, with the object of doing as much damage as possible to the retreating
enemy. Flying low round Roisel, small parties of the enemy were seen and engaged with machine-
gun fire. The flight then proceeded from Roisel to Hancourt, and thence to Mons-en-Chaussee. No
Germans were seen, but, while passing over Athies, our aeroplanes were fired on by a field gun in the
open. Captain Beauchamp-Proctor dived at the gun, killing some of the crew with his machine-gim
fire, while the remainder fled. Another of the airmen dropped a bomb on the limber, which
scattered the drivers and killed some of the horses. One of the enemy attempted to escape on ahorse,
but was pursued and rolled over after a short burst of fire from Captain Beauchamp-Proctor's
machine-guns. The flight, still flying very low, then pursued its course to St. Christ." Our infantry
was seen advancing towards a hostile machine-gun concealed in a sunken road, at which Captain
Beauchamp-Proctor, followed by his flight, at once dived and killed or dispersed the crew. Our
troops were then observed to be pointing towards some trenches about 400 yards from them.
Flying in the direction indicated Captain Beauchamp-Proctor and his airmen observed about
thirty of the enemy attempting to leave the trench where they had been hiding. With the
exception of five of the enemy, who were killed by the infantry, the flight accounted for the
whole of this party. See also Appendix E, No. 5.
118 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 8th-ioth
were also very active. In addition to the increased resistance of the
enemy, there was a break in the weather, which, apart from a few showers,
had been consistently fine since August 22nd. This change hindered the
advance of the troops.
On the front of the Australian Corps verj' little progress was made.
Patrols of the Australian Corps Cyclist Battalion entered Vermand during
the morning without opposition, and found the enemy holding positions
along the left bank of the Omignon at Marteville, VillechoUes, and Maissemy,
and on the high ground about Vendelles and west of Jeancourt. On the
left of the Australian Corps front, the 3rd Australian Division advanced
about 1,500 yards and secured Montigny Farm and Hervilly.
On the front of the III Corps patrols of the 74th Division almost
immediately encountered strong opposition in the Villers Faucon area
from troops belonging to the 56th Straf Kompagnie, one of the discip-
linary companies which had been formed by the Germans from men con-
demned to various periods of imprisonment. In accordance with orders
which it had received not to incur heavy casualties, the 74th Division
did not attempt to press on, and halted on the line it had gained. On
the left the 58th Division advanced against Epehy and Peizieres, and
made some progress.^ During the day patrols of this division entered the
villages of Ep^hy and Peizieres ^ ; they were, however, driven out again by
determined hostile counter-attacks, which were delivered almost immediately
by the Alpine Corps. The advanced troops of the 58th Division at the
close of the day's fighting were established in an existing trench system
on the southern and western slopes of the hill, while the enemy occupied
a position on the western outskirts of Ep^hy and Peizieres, and showed
indications of making a determined stand on what had been the British
main line of resistance in the previous March.'
On September 9th the operations of the Australian Corps were
limited to active reconnaissance. Patrols of the 3rd Australian Division
pressed forward east of Montigny Farm and through
^SepteSbM 9th° Hesbecourt ; they succeeded in advancing 1,000 yards
and in retaining the ground gained.
A counter-attack south-west of Epehy, which was carried out by the
Alpine Corps on the morning of September 9th, and resulted in the loss
to us of a few lengths of trenches, was a further evidence of the increasing
resistance on the front of the III Corps.*
On the morning of September 10th the 32nd Division, on the right
' Before advancing, the 58th Division extended its front southwards in order to take over
the portion of the line which was held by the 12th Division. The latter division was then with-
drawn into reserve. Later in the day the 74.th Division shortened the line held by the 58th
Division by extending its front 1,500 yards to the north.
^ The high ground on which these villages are situated was very important to the enemy for
the defence of the line he had taken up further south. (See Panoramic Photograph No. 5.)
3 All the prisoners captured at this time reported that the enemy proposed to hold
this line.
* During the week following the capture of Mont St. Quentin, the enemy had reinforced his
front with six divisions, of which the 6th (dismounted) Cavalry Division and the Alpine Corps
were probably the most formidable. He had also managed to withdraw the remnants of nine
divisions, the intermingling of whose units had caused such indescribable confusion during, and
just after, the Battle of Mont St. Quentin. These reliefs undoubtedly increased the enemy's
power of resistance for the time being.
Sept. ioth-Hth] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 119
of the Aiastralian Corps, advanced over the high ground east of Beauvois,
and, meeting with httle resistance except at Marteville, estabUshed
oo„f »„,».», inth . th0, posts in the south-west comer of Holnon Wood and
September lOtn ; tne r , . /. -u*^ . -n mi .-j.i j r. i
fighting on the flanks in the Outskirts of Marteville. ihe 5th and 3ra
at Holnon Wood and Australian Divisions, which were being relieved by
Ep6hy ^j^g ^^j^ ^^^ ^^^ Australian Divisions,^ did not attempt
to move forward.
The III Corps on the 10th again attempted to force the enemy's
position at Epehy, in order to test the accuracy of the reports received,
and to ascertain definitely whether the enemy's resistance was a rearguard
action or an organised defence in depth. On the right, south of Epehy
and facing Ronssoy Wood, the 74th Division attacked at 5.15 a.m. and
advanced about 1,000 yards. Our troops were, however, unable to main-
tain their hold, in face of the counter-attacks which were again launched
against them by the Alpine Corps. They, consequently, withdrew to their
starting positions, retaining only a few advanced posts, which succeeded
in withstanding all further attempts of the enemy to force them back.
On the left at the same hour an attack was launched by the 173rd
Brigade of the 58th Division under cover of a creeping barrage, and sup-
ported by a concentration of heavy artillery fire on selected targets.
Good progress was made at first, and our troops gained a footing in both
Epehy and Peizieres, and even penetrated as far east as the railway.
They were, however, driven back by an immediate counter-attack from
the railway embankment, and were compelled to withdraw almost to
their original " starting line." In the day's fighting 100 prisoners of
the AJpine Corps were captured, and it was definitely ascertained that
the enemy was holding Epehy strongly with an organised garrison. This
was a strong position, and it was clear that it could only be captured by
a deliberate assault, supported by all available artillery and tanks.
At 11 a.m. on September 11th Lieut. -Gen. Sir Walter Braithwaite,
commanding the IX Corps, took over command of the 32nd Division and
September 11th ; the ^^^ front it was holding between Holnon Wood and
arrival of the EX Corps ; Vermand, both inclusive, from Sir John Monash. On
"^^ "hf fro'S^"' °' *^^ ^^""^ ^^^ *^^ ^^^ Division, commanded by Maj.-
Gen. T. O. Marden, was transferred from army reserve
to the IX Corps. The 1st Division, commanded by Maj.-Gen. E. P.
Strickland, which was arriving by rail, was also placed at the disposal
of that Corps. On September 19th the 46th Division, commanded
by Maj.-Gen. G. F. Boyd, arrived and was also posted to the IX Corps. ^
During the 11th, continuing its success in Holnon Wood, the 32nd
Division gained a further footing in the south-western portion of this
wood and occupied the greater portion of Attilly. Posts were also
established in Vermand without opposition. During the night of the
11th the 1st Division relieved the left half of the front of the 32nd Division
between Attilly and Vermand. Further north, the 4th Australian Divi-
sion, in conjunction with the 1st Australian Division, made shght progress
' These divisions began to arrive from the rest areas on September 9th.
• The 1st, 6th, 32nd, and •i6th Divisions remained with the IX Corps until the end of the
campaign.
120 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. iith
between Vermand and Hesbecourt. At first the resistance was only slight,
and the 4th Australian Division reached the western outskirts of Jeancourt
without difficulty. On the III Corps front, following on the fighting around
Epehy on September 10th, the enemy under cover of a heavy bombardment
delivered a strong counter-attack against the right of the 74th Division
on the 11th. This resulted in a -withdrawal of some of our advanced
posts, but entailed no further alteration in our line.
Meanwhile, on September 8th Sir Douglas Haig had called for a
general report on the situation, with especial reference to the enemy's
dispositions and moral, together with Sir Henry
?nSep°^bSitr Rawlinson's opinion as regards the prospects of
success of any futiu-e offensive operations on the
front of the Fourth Army.
In reply, Sir Henry Rawlinson on September 11th reported that,
as the result of the operations of the previous days, his troops were close
up to, and in the centre had occupied part of, the old British reserve line
of March, 1918, which included the localities of Holnon, Maissemy,
Jeancourt, Hesbecourt, and Ste. Emilie.
East of this, he pointed out, the enemy possessed five distinct lines
of defence.^ The first of these, which the Germans had held against xis for
some time during their withdrawal in the spring of 1917, and which had
then become the British main line of resistance, contained the important
tactical localities of Fresnoy-le-Petit, the high ground south of Berthau-
court, Le Verguier, Grand Priel Woods, the high ground north and south
of Hargicourt, Ronssoy-Basse Boulogne, and Epehy-Peizieres. These
were all natvu-ally strong positions, and had been very much strengthened
with wire, trenches, and dug-outs both by ourselves and the enemy. This
was the line the enemy was now holding in considerable strength, and he
showed no signs of giving it up without a struggle. So long as it was held
by the Germans we were denied all observation over the main Hindenburg
Line. 2 Some 1,500 to 2,000 yards east of the first hne, and likely to fall
with it, was the old British outpost line, neither strongly wired nor
offering any great difficulties to an attack from the west.
To the east of this again was a third line of defence, which in
1917 was the German outpost position to the main Hindenburg Line.
It ran through Thorigny, Ste. Helene, Buisson Gaulaine Farm, Ruby Wood,
Quennemont Farm, Gillemont Farm, The Knoll, and Little Priel Farm.
When constructed in 1917, this line was not intended to be held against
an attack in force. The importance to us, however, of this line, on
account of the observation it afforded over the main Hindenbm-g
Line, was so obvious that it had been very materially strengthened,
and had become part of the outer defences of the main Hindenburg
Line. The enemy, moreover, had, as the result of oiu- attacks in
1917, realised the advantage of defence in depth. He had prepared
accordingly, and, given sufficient troops of reasonably high moral, he
might. Sir Henry Rawlinson considered, be expected to hold the outer
defences with determination.
> These five lines can best be seen on Map 10, on which all the trenches and wire are shown.
' This line was called the Siegfried Line by the Germans.
Sept. 11th] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 121
Next came the Hindenburg Line proper, of which the St. Quentin
Canal and the Bellicourt and Le Tronquoy tunnels formed the chief
features. This main line of defence was undoubtedly very strong, and
there could be no hope of rushing it. Behind the main Hindenburg
Line there was yet a fifth line, kno^vn as the reserve Hindenburg, or Le
Catelet-Nauroy Line, which, although not so formidable as the main
Hindenburg Line, was well wired and of considerable natural strength.
On the other hand. Sir Henry Rawlinson represented that the enemy's
moral had without doubt much deteriorated. It was true that his
infantry had fought well at Mont St. Quentin and Peronne, and later at
Epehy, but his severe defeat in the Battle of Amiens, his long forced
retirement, and his heavy losses, which he had been unable to replace,
had all told severely. His troops were much shaken, and their power of
resistance had greatly depreciated.^
It was calculated that on the 11th the Fourth Army was opposed by
seven divisions,^ of which six were engaged for the second time, and that
the strength in rifles in the line probably did not exceed 12,000. ^ It was
estimated that, out of the twenty-one divisions that had been withdrawn
from the line since August 8th, only five were immediately fit for active
operations, and that their total fighting strength would not amount to
more than 10,000 to 11,000 bayonets.
In view of the above. Sir Henry Rawlinson asked that he might be
allowed to undertake with the least possible delay a definite operation
on the whole front of the armv to gain possession of
TopSs the outer defences of the Hindenburg Line. Such an
operation, if carried out at an early date, would deny
the enemy any opportunity of reorganising his troops, improving his
defences, or becoming familiar with the scheme of defence. Every day's
respite given to the enemy was of inestimable value to him. Further,
should it be decided to attack the main Hindenburg Line, our troops would
need a short period of rest in which to reorganise their communications *
before undertaking such an important operation. It would be advisable
that this interval should take place after the capture of the outer defences
of the Hindenburg Line, rather than before, so that advantage might be
taken of it for reconnaissance, for the systematic organisation of the
artillery arrangements, and for other important preliminaries, that would
have to be carried out before an attack on a large scale could be under-
taken.
In conclusion. Sir Henry Rawlinson submitted that, although he
was inclined to think that an attack on the main Hindenburg Line on a
^\'ide front and with ample artillery support would be successful, he did
' Some orders captured during the next few weeks give a good idea of the state of the German
moral at this period. See Appendix H.
2 These calculations proved to be approximately correct. There were, in fact, eight divisions
opposing us on September 18th— the 25th Reserve, 79th Reserve, 119th, 1st Reserve, 5th
Bavarian, 38th, 2nd Guard, and the Alpine Corps (from south to north).
2 The strength of companies was known to be down to 25 in many cases, and none had a
strength of more than 70.
* The railway had at that time reached Peronne, but beyond that all food and ammunition
had to go forward by lorry, which caused a great straui on the" roads, m;my of which were in bad
repair.
122 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. i2th-15th
not consider that he could give a definite opinion as to its practicabiUty
until the high ground then held by the enemy, and especially Holnon
Wood, Le Verguier and the high ground north of it, the high ground
about Cologne Farm, and the group of villages round Ronssoy and Epehv
had been captured. The possession of these positions would give us good
observation over the main Hindenburg Line, which was essential before
an attack against it could be contemplated, and would enable recon-
naissance to be made of the best avenues of approach. An attack on these
advanced positions would, moreover, be an infallible test of the enemy's
power of resistance, which was after all the ruling factor, and by the
result of it we should discover the probable chances of success of an attack
against the main Hindenburg Line.
Sir Douglas Haig approved of Sir Henry Rawlinson's proposals.
He authorised the launching of an attack by the Fourth Army at an
early date with a view to capturing the high ground
"^anTov^*^ which gave observation over the Hindenburg Line,
and he arranged for the attack to be extended north-
wards by the Third Army, and for the co-operation of the French to the
south.
The task of the IX and Australian Corps for the next few days
consisted in making preparations for the attack, and in advancing their
September 12th to l'^^» where it was to their advantage to do so, by
17th ; minor opera- vigorous action of strong fighting patrols. These
'*°°* tactics were employed with success. By September
13th the IX Corps had occupied the greater part of Holnon Wood and
Villecholles, while the First French Army on the right had reached the
outskirts of Roupy and Savy. On the night of September 13th the
6th Division relieved the remainder of the 32nd Division on the right of
the IX Corps front. ^
On the Australian Corps front the 1st Australian Division occupied
Jeancourt on September 12th without meeting with much resistance.
On the following day the 4th Australian Division advanced our line several
hundred yards east of Bihecourt and Jeancourt, and secured the ridge
between these two villages, capturing two officers and 96 other ranks. ^
The III Corps made no attempt to advance its line, although both our own
and the enemy's artillery were very active. Our airmen were also fully
occupied at this period, as the weather was generally fine with only a few
occasional showers of rain. Seven of the enemy's observation balloons
were attacked by our airmen and were all forced to descend, three in flames
and one shot adrift.
With the exception of the final clearing of Holnon Wood by the 11th
Essex of the 6th Division, and the capture of part of the high ground
between Holnon Wood and Maissemy by patrols of the 1st Division, no
infantry operations were undertaken on September 14th.
At 5.30 a.m. on September 15th the 1st Division continued its
success by capturing Maissemy and the rest of the high ground to the
' The 32nd Division on relief moved back to the Corbie area for a well-earned rest after 26
days continuously in the line.
' These prisoners belonged to the 1st Reserve and 119th Divisions. The former division
had just relieved the 21st Division, and was now engaged for the third time since August 8th.
Sept. i5th-i7th] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 123
south-east of it against slight opposition ; 78 prisoners 'of the 25th Reserve
and 79th Reserve Divisions and 20 machine-guns were taken. On the
same date the 4th AustraHan Division seized the spur south-west of
Le Verguier, thus weakening the enemy's hold on this important village.
Infantry action on September 16th on the army front consisted only of
some slight advances on the part of patrols. On the other hand, our
airmen were extremely active and successful. During the day, fourteen
hostile machines were destroyed and five shot down out of control, while
we lost only three machines.
On September 17th, in order to improve its " starting line " for the
attack on the outer defences of the Hindenburg Line, the 6th Division,
on the right of the IX Corps, employed the 18th Brigade to attack Holnon
village and Badger Copse in co-operation with the 34th Division of the
First French Army. The 18th Brigade encountered strong opposition
on the edge of Holnon Wood, and suffered heavy casualties from artillery
and machine-gun fire. By 11 a.m. the 11th Essex had secured Trout
Copse, and later on Badger Copse ; Holnon village changed hands several
times during the day, and at night it was doubtful who held the village.
The French, after much opposition, secured the right flank of the IX
Corps by the capture of Savy Wood.
On the rest of the army front, except for some desultory shelling, all
was quiet on the 17th.
In the meanwhile, on receiving Sir Douglas Haig's permission to
carry out the attack, orders had been issued on September 13th defining
The preliminary objectives, the intcr-corps boundaries and those of the
arrangements for the army, and giving the allotment of tanks to corps. On
attack on September receipt of these orders the IX, Australian, and III Corps
^^"* commenced their preparations. Aeroplane photographs
of the enemy's defences to a depth of 4,000 yards were taken, and were dis-
tributed throughout formations to all officers and non-commissioned officers
taking part in the operations. As in the preparations for August 8th,
every provision was made to ensure secrecy. Final instructions were
issued by Sir Henry Rawlinson on September 14th, giving the nature
and rate of advance of artillery barrages, the length of halts in the
advance of the barrage, and other details, and also fixing the date of
attack as September 18th. By the evening of September 17th all
arrangements had been completed, and " zero " was fixed for
5.20 a.m.
The attack was to be carried out along the whole of the front of the
Fourth Army, in conjunction with the XXXVI French Corps of the First
French Army to the south, and the two southern corps
The objectives of the Third Army to the north. The operation was
to be undertaken in three phases. The first phase
included the capture of the enemy's first line of defence ^ or the old British
main line of resistance, and special importance was placed on securing
Selency, Fresnoy-le-Petit, Le Verguier, the Grand Pricl Woods and the high
ground north of them, Ronssoy-Basse Boulogne, and Epehy-Peiziercs.
The objectives of the second phase coincided in many places with the
* See page 120.
124 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH AR^Hf [Sept. i 7th
enemy's second line of defence, or the old British outpost line. It included
the villages of Gricourt, Berthaucourt, and Pontru, Ascension Farm,
Villeret, Cologne Farm, Malakoff Farm, Sart Farm, Tombois Farm, and
Little Priel Farm.
The third phase, or phase of exploitation, depended upon the collapse
of the enemy's opposition, and consisted of gaining a footing in the last of
the outer defences of the Hindenburg Line. This entailed the capture of
Thorigny, Pontruet, Buisson Gaulaine Farm, Quennemont Farm, Gillemont
Farm, and Tlie Knoll. It was not expected that this line would necessarily
be reached on the first day of the operations, but it was considered probable
that, in the event of the attack being successful on September 18th,
vigorous exploitation would shortly afterwards result in this objective
being secured.
The front on which the Foiui;h Army was about to attack was
approximately fourteen miles in width, and extended from Holnon
village to just north of Peizieres. The IX Corps front
® attacif ^^ ° extended from the south-eastern outskirts of Holnon
to a point 500 yards north of Vadencourt, some 7,000
yards in all. The 6th and 1st Divisions were in line on the right and left
respectively, the former holding 3,000, and the latter 4,000 yards. In
the centre of the Fourth Army the Australian Corps held a front of 7,000
yards, from the northern boundary of the IX Corps to the Cologne river
immediately west of Templeux-le-Guerard. This was divided equally
between the 4th Australian Division on the right and the 1st Australian
Division on the left. The III Corps continued the line to a point about
500 yards north-west of Epehy, where it was in touch with the V Corps of
the Third Army. This front of about 7,000 yards was held by the 74th,
18th, 12th, and 58th Divisions, from right to left. The 74th Division
was allotted rather more than 2,000 yards, the 18th Division rather less
than 2,000 yards ; the 12th Division, immediately in front of Epehy,
held over 2,500 yards, and the 58th Division on the extreme left
about 700 yards.
There was to be no preliminary bombardment, reliance being placed,
as on August 8th, on the effect of surprise, a powerfid artillery concen-
tration including intense covmter-battery work, and the
arrangemeSs assistance of tanks at points where the resistance was
expected to be most pronounced. A creeping barrage,
provided by 750 18-pounder guns and 228 4*5-inch howitzers, was to cover
the advance of the infantry to the first objective. This barrage was to
be lifted 100 yards after two minutes, after which it was to advance at
the rate of 100 yards every three minutes until it had moved forward
1,300 yards from the infantry " starting line," after which it was to advance
at the rate of 100 yards every foiu* minutes until the first objective was
reached. It would then form a protective barrage for one hour, after
which it was again to be moved forward at the rate of 100 yards every
four minutes as far as the second objective. The barrage in the second
phase of the attack would be less dense than in the first phase, as, after
the protective barrage on the first objective had ceased, a number of
batteries were to move forward to new positions, under divisional arrange-
Sept. 18th] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 125
ments, with a view to assisting in the third phase of the attack ; their
fire would thus be lost during the second phase.^
The 2nd Tank Battahon had been allotted to the Fourth Army for
this operation and was sub-allotted to corps as follows :
" C " Company of six tanks to the IX Corps.
"^^ ''?*'*^'°* °* " B " ,, „ nine „ „ Australian Corps.
"A" „ „ eight „ „ III Corps.
It was necessary to economise tanks to the utmost, in view of the
probability of an attack being carried out against the main Hindenburg
Line in the near future, for which a large supply of tanks would be
essential. Corps were, therefore, instructed to limit the employment of
tanks to assisting the infantry attacks against certain strong points of
resistance, and to forbid them to advance east of the first objective.^
In accordance with these instructions, out of the six tanks allotted
to the IX Corps, four were detailed to deal with an important trench system
north of Selency called the Quadrilateral, and two were to assist to clear
Badger Copse and attack Fresnoy-le-Petit. Of the nine tanks with the
Australian Corps, five were earmarked to clear Le Verguier and the trench
systems north and south of it, in co-operation with the 4th Australian
Division, and five for the attack on Hargicourt, Villeret, and the high
ground around Cologne Farm, in co-operation with the 1st Australian
Division. The III Corps allotted four tanks to the 18th Division to assist
in the attack on Ronssoy-Basse Boulogne and Ronssoy Wood, and
four tanks for the operations against Epehy and Peizieres. The 5th
Brigade, Royal Air Force, was ordered to co-operate with the 2nd Tank
Battalion in the arrangements for masking anti-tank guns with smoke
bombs, and for the usual low-flying aeroplanes to drown the noise of the
tank engines during their assembly. To supplement the small number of
tanks available, the 1st and 4th Australian Divisions constructed a con-
siderable number of dummy tanks, by means of which it was hoped to
increase the demoralisation of the enemy and make him disperse his anti-
tank fire.^
The assembly of the infantry took place almost without incident,
except on the right of the IX Corps. Although the early part of the
A svimmary oi the night was fine, it was raining heavily when the attack
Fourth Army attack on was launched at 5.20 a.m. ; later the rain ceased, and
September 18th ^ dull cloudy day followed. The light was bad ; the
ground was soft and slippery, and consequently not suitable for the tanks,
of which a certain number were " ditched " in the deep simken roads and
high embankments.
The enemy's resistance varied considerably. It was perhaps most
determined in front of the III Corps and on the right and centre of the
IX Corps ; as a result, these two corps were unable to gain all their
1 In addition to, and in close co-operation with, the artillery barrages, machine-gun barrages
were arranged by all corps.
* The 1st Australian Division was permitted to use its tanks as far as the second objective
as it included Cologne Farm, which was known to be strongly defended.
' These dummy tanks, though excellent imitations of real tanks, were not as successful
as would have been the case had the weather been dry, as the mud quickly clogged the wheels
and rendered the dummies immobile. Even so they drew a good deal of hostile artillery fire.
126 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. i 8th
objectives, although considerable progress was made in each case.^ On
the Australian Corps front the initial opposition was also strong, and it
was not until the crust of the defence had been broken by the rapidity
and impetuosity of the Australian advance, that the enemy began to
surrender freely and in large numbers. The Australians made a remaric-
able advance, and by the evening had established themselves in close
proximity to the line of exploitation, the objective of the third phase of
the attack.
By 5 a.m. the 6th Division, on the right of the IX Corps front, was
assembled with the 71st and 16th Brigades in the line, and the 18th
Brigade in support. The uncertainty as to the position
"^^ k'co"ps°* ""^ of the troops of the 71st Brigade in the neighbourhood
of Holnon village, and the enemy's shelling on this
portion of the front, rendered the assembly and forming up of the troops
of the 6th Division very difficult. On the left the 1st Division formed up
for the attack without incident, the 1st Brigade being on the right, the
2nd Brigade on the left, and the 3rd Brigade in reserve.
In spite of the sodden ground caused by the heavy rain, fair progress
was made when the troops moved forward at " zero," except on the
right of the 6th Division. Here the advance was slow,
the rx 'conis*aUa°ck ^^' from the moment the attack started, considerable
machine-gun fire was encountered from Selency, the
Quadrilateral, and Fresnoy-le-Petit ; also from Round Hill and Manchester
Hill, to the south-west and south of Francilly-Selency respectively, positions
which the French on the right of the IX Corps were unable to secure.^ The
hostile artillery shelling was heavy ; the advance of our troops was made
down bare slopes swept by enfilade as well as frontal fire, and was much
impeded by wire ; while the drizzling rain, accompanied by mist, obscured
the landmarks and made it difficult to keep direction. In consequence, the
71st Brigade made little progress, and the struggle about Holnon village
and Selency continued. The 16th Brigade on the left was at first checked
in front of Fresnoy-le-Petit, but had occupied it by 8.40 a.m. Later in the
day our troops were forced to withdraw from the village. Only two of
the four tanks allotted to the 6th Division succeeded in coming into action ;
these, finding that the infantry was held up by fire from the Quadrilateral,
headed straight for the seat of the trouble. Here very strong opposition
was encountered. One tank became " ditched," and the other, after
engaging the enemy and inflicting heavy casualties, burst into flames and
had to be abandoned. The gallant survivors of both tanks then held a
' An incident which is worth recounting occurred on the right of the III Corps front.
Owing to an error in the synchronisation of watches, some machine-guns opened fire too
soon. This mistake, however, enabled the waiting infantry to realise fully the intensity of the
covering fire they were receiving from machine-gims. Some of our men stated that the noise
of this fire resembled the tearing of a huge sheet of calico, while others compared it to the firing
of a million rifles. It can, therefore, be imagined what effect was produced, not only on the enemy
but on the attacking infantry, when the noise of the fire of these comparatively few machine-guns
was augmented at " zero " by that of 1,488 guns and over 300 machine-guns.
' These two localities " Round Hill " and " Manchester Hill " had played an important
part in our retreat in March, 1918. They had, prior to the German offensive, been organised as
strongholds, or redoubts, each holding a complete battalion provisioned for forty-eight hours
Although completely surrounded, Manchester Hill held out in March for many hours. Both
positions were very strong and dominated the surrounding country.
o
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Sept. 18th] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 127
portion of trench a little in rear of their disabled tanks until relieved later
by the infantry.
Meanwhile, further north the 1st Division made good progress.
The 1st Brigade on the right was somewhat delayed by machine-gun
fire from the valley north of Fresnoy-le-Petit and from the trenches
north-east of that village, but, with the assistance of the 2nd Brigade,
which had reached the first objective at 7.30 a.m., the 1st Brigade secured
its objective by 8.15 a.m. The IX Corps had thus secured the first
objective from Fresnoy-le-Petit northwards to its junction with the
Australian Corps.
The advance towards the second objective from Fresnoy-le-Petit
northwards was resumed at 8.30 a.m., but, as further progress south of
Fresnoy-le-Petit seemed doubtful, the 71st Brigade
The second phase formed a defensive flank in order to seciu-e the flank
of the advance against any counter-attacks which
might be launched from the direction of Selency and the Quadrilateral.
On the right of the 1st Division progress north-east of Fresnoy-le-Petit was
very slow in the face of considerable opposition, and the line was only
advanced a few hundred yards beyond the Fresnoy-le-Petit-Berthaucourt
road. On some parts of the front the barrage gradually outstripped
the infantry, and any attempt to advance had, therefore, to be made
without its assistance. The left of the 1st Division, however, made
good progress and kept well up to the barrage. Berthaucourt was
captured at 10.30 a.m., and the 2nd Brigade, keeping in touch with the
Australians on its left, captured the second objective at 11 a.m. The
troops of the 4th Australian Division at this stage, finding that the
resistance in front of them was slight, had continued their advance
beyond the second objective. In order to maintain touch with them,
the troops of the 2nd Brigade advanced towards Ste. Helene and
estabhshed themselves just west of that hamlet.
At 3.30 p.m. the enemy launched several determined coimter-attacks
against the left of the 6th Division at Fresnoy-le-Petit, and against the right
of the 1st Division south of Berthaucoiu-t.^ North of Fresnoy-le-Petit
these counter-attacks were repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire, but
the situation around Fresnoy-le-Petit became very involved. Fighting
continued also throughout the afternoon on the front of the 6th Division,
especially round Holnon village and Selency, no further progress was, how-
ever, made. Meanwhile, the French division on the right of the 6th Division
had been held up in front of Francilly-Selency, which added to the
difficulties of the 6th Division ; the 2nd Life Guards Machine Gim
Battalion, attached to the 6th Division, was, therefore, disposed in depth
on the high ground near Holnon in order to secxire the safety of the
right flank.
"When darkness set in our line ran along the eastern edge of Holnon
village, where a junction was established with the French, north of Selency,
through the western outskirts of Fresnoy-le-Petit, with a few posts in
' These counter-attacks were carried out by three battalions of the 197th Division (a Jager
formation), which had been sent forward in 'buses, leaving Maretz (6 miles south-west of Le
Cateau) at 10 a.m., to reinforce the 79th Reserve Division.
128 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept 18th
the village, thence due north, keeping just west of Pontruet and Ste.
Helene, near which village the 1st Division was in touch with the
The result of the Australians. As the result of the day's fighting, the
days fighting by the IX Corps had captured 18 officers, 541 other ranks,
rx Corps g f^gi^j guns, and numerous trench mortars and machine-
guns. The casualties had unfortunately been comparatively heavy, owing
chiefly to the determined resistance offered by the 25th Reserve, 79th
Reserve, and part of the 197th Divisions.
In spite of the rain and the muddy state of the ground, the 1st and
4th Australian Divisions completed their assembly in good time. Of the
nine tanks supporting the infantry, eight succeeded
A^Sn Cot*"' i^ reaching the "starting line." On the right of the
Australian Corps the 4th Australian Division assembled
for the attack with the 12th Brigade on the right, the 4th
Brigade on the left, and the 13th Brigade, disposed along the
spiu- south-west of Vendelles, in reserve. The 12th Brigade was
to attack on a one-battalion front throughout the advance ;
the 48th Battalion carrying out the attack against the first, the 45th
against the second, and the 46th against the third objective. The 4th
Brigade was to attack the first objective on a three-battalion front,
the 13th and 15th Battalions passing round Le Vergmer, while the 16th
" mopped up " the village. The two former battalions were then to
continue the attack on the second objective, after the capture of which,
the 14th Battalion was to " leap-frog " them and carry out the exploita-
tion to the third objective. ^
On the left of the corps front the 1st Australian Division was disposed
for the attack with the 3rd Brigade on the right, the 1st Brigade on the
left, and the 2nd Brigade in reserve. The 1st and 3rd Brigades were
to attack the first objective, each on a front of two battalions. The
remaining two battalions of each brigade were then to " leap-frog " the
leading battalions, capture the second objective, and, if possible, secvire
the third objective.
The infantry advanced to the attack at " zero," keeping close behind
the barrage, which was excellent and so dense that the enemy in many
The first phase ol cases " went to ground " and became an easy prey for
the Australian Corps our infantry. The hostile artillery retaliation to our
attack barrage was light and scattered, causing very few
casualties. On the right of the 4th Australian Division the 12th Brigade
encovmtered some fire from machine-gun nests, but these were promptly
outflanked and put out of action by the 48th Battalion.^ On the front
of the 4th Brigade, however, Le Verguier proved a more difficult task.
The enemy had established a number of strong machine-gun posts among
the ruins of the village, and these posts, owing to the smoke of the barrage,
were difficult to locate. This was a disadvantage to the 16th Battalion,
which had been detailed to " mop up " the village, but a distinct advantage
to the 13th and 15th, as it helped to conceal their movements from the
' For details of the machine-gun dispositions to support the attack of the 4th Australian
Division, see Appendix J and Map 19.
' In this advance the capture of an important German machine-gun post by Private James
Woods, 48th Battalion, and three men enabled touch to be gained with the troops on the right.
See Appendix E, No. 49.
yo. 57.
To face page 1 28.
* w * *
mmamam
AUSTRALIANS ADVANCING CLOSE UP TO THH BARRAGE ON SEPTEMBER I8tH.
Jiv kind permission of the .'litstraliaft Concernment.
Ao. ?8.
4.^
>■
AUSTRALIAN RESERXES VVAICIIING HIE BARRAGE CREEPINC; UP THE SLOPES TOWARDS
THE OUTER DEFENCES OF THE HINDENBURG LINE ON SEPTEMBER i8tH.
Hy kind permission of tkc Australian CoirrnmcnI.
Sept. 18th ] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 129
enemy. In the hope of checking the advance, the Germans fired bhndly in a
westerly direction, but the 13th and 15th BattaHons moved round the
flanks, where they were apparently not expected. "^ The 16th Battalion then
proceeded rapidly with the " mopping up " of the village, which yielded
450 prisoners belonging to the 1st Reserve and 119th Divisions, 60 machine-
guns, and several field guns. By 7.35 a.m. the whole of the first objective
on the front of the 4th Australian Division had been secured.
On the left the 12th, 11th, 2nd, and 4th Battalions of the 1st Aus-
tralian Division, which were leading, met with considerable opposition
at several points, chiefly on the 3rd Brigade front. Heavy fighting took
place in Brosse Wood and in the trenches on the western outskirts of the
Grand Priel Woods, where the garrison fought with great determination,
and refused to surrender until all the machine-guns were silenced and
their crews killed. The resistance from Carpela Copse and Fervaque Farm
ceased as soon as these places were outflanked. The Grand Priel Woods,
however, caused considerable difficulty ; here the resistance was very
determined, and severe fighting ensued before they were captured. About
this time a tank,which had been unable to keep up, arrived and, advancing
through the barrage, silenced some machine-guns concealed in the sunken
roads and trenches south-west of Villeret. The action of this tank helped
to break the back of the enemy's resistance in front of the 3rd Brigade,
and the first objective was secured along the whole front of the 1st Aus-
tralian Division, the 1st Brigade having reached it earlier in the morning
without difficulty.
At 8.30 a.m., after halting for an hour covering the first objective,
the barrage was again moved forward on the Australian front, and the
attacking troops advanced. On the front of the 4th
The second phase Australian Division the 45th, 13th, and 15th Battalions
of the 12th and 4th Brigades had by 9.50 a.m. reached
the second objective and captured a large number of prisoners. The
1st Avistralian Division experienced less resistance than during the first phase
of the battle. ^Vhen the advanced troops of both the 3rd and 1st Brigades,
which were now found by the 10th, 9th, 1st, and 2nd Battalions,
encountered some opposition at Villeret, and in the trench systems north
and south of it, one of the tanks rendered timely assistance and largely
contributed to the eventual capture of Villeret. The troops of the 1st
Brigade also cleared the maze of trenches about Cologne Farm in spite
of the heavy fire from the high ground round Quennemont Farm. Thus
the second objective was quickly secured on the whole of the divisional
front.
The protective barrage remained stationary for fifteen minutes
to cover the reorganisation on the second objective, and then ceased
about 10 a.m. By this time some batteries of field
The third phase artillery had moved forward and were in action in
previously selected positions, from which they were
able to support the further advance of the infantry.
' It was during this advance that Sergeant Gerald Sexton of the 13th Battalion displayed
great gallantry and was in a large measure responsible for the success of his battalion. See
Appendix E, No. 39.
S
130 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept isth
The 4th Australian Division pushed forward two battalions, the
46th Battalion from the 12th Brigade and the 14th from the
4th Brigade, but communication with the 1st Division of the IX Corps
on the right was difficult, and the 46th Battalion found its right flank
in the air. Undeterred, however, by the machine-gun fire which
was enfilading it from its right, the 46th Battalion pressed forward and
reached the sunken road running northwards from Ste. Helene, where it was
joined later by troops of the 1st British Division. On the left of the
advance the 14th Battalion was very successful; it obtained a footing
in the outer defences of the main Hindenburg Line, and immediately
commenced to exploit its gains by bombing down the trenches. In
face of the small number of our attacking troops, the enemy's resistance
was now found to be strengthening, and it was, therefore, decided to wait
until the darkness had set in before launching an attack, under cover of a
barrage, to capture the rest of the third objective on the divisional front.
A hot meal was served while the men were waiting for the order to advance
in the sunken road which runs northwards from Ste. Helene. At 11 p.m.
the barrage fell, and the 46th Battalion on the right and the 14th
on the left, advancing from the sunken road, gained a firm footing in
the outer defences of the main Hindenburg Line. By 1 a.m., therefore,
on September 19th the whole of the third objective on the front of the
4th Australian Division had been captured ; in this attack alone 300 prisoners
and numerous machine-guns were taken. This night attack of the 14th
and 46th Battalions was a fine performance in view of the distance
already covered and of the strenuous fighting during the day.
When the artillery barrage, covering the troops of the 1st Australian
Division on the second objective, ceased at about 10 a.m., the 10th and
9th Battalions of the 3rd Brigade, moving forward in conjunction with the
troops of the 4th Australian Division, secured a footing in the trenches
north of Buisson Gaulaine Farm and gained practically the whole of the
Cologne Farm ridge. Heavy machine-gun fire from the direction of
Quennemont Farm, however, prevented a further advance of the left
of the 1st Brigade, and at the end of the day the 1st AustraHan
Division held the greater part of the outer defences of the Hindenburg
Line from its junction with the 4th Australian Division at Buisson
Gaulaine Farm to Malakoff Farm, where connection was established
with the 74th Division of the III Corps.
As the result of the day's fighting, the Australian Corps had penetrated
the enemy's defences to an average depth of 5,000 yards on a frontage
The result of the of four miles. The Australians were now well established
day's fighting by the in the outer defences of the main Hindenburg Line,
Australian Corps ^nd held a position which necessitated some
reorganisation by the enemy of his plans for its defence. All the strongly
fortified localities in the old British line of resistance had fallen, and the
captures amounted to 4,243 prisoners, 87 guns, over 300 machine-guns,
and about 30 trench mortars.
A comparison of the number of troops engaged, the prisoners captured,
and the casualties incurred in this operation, is of particular interest.
The attacking strength of the 1st AustraHan Division was 2,854, that of the
Ao. 59.
To face page 1 30.
A TYPICAL GERMAN TRENCH NEAR COLOGNE FARM.
By kind permission oj the Australian {Juvernment.
No. 60.
•^"-%' tt
i*it*n»j
^'- - »'
' ■! "i itlfcTWMi
GERMANS SURRENDERING TO THE AUSTRALIANS ON SEPTEMBER i8tH.
By kind permission 0/ ibe Auslralian Coicrnmatl.
Sept. 18th] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 131
4th Australian Division 3,048. In both cases this excludes the reserve
brigades, which were not engaged. The prisoners captured by the former
amounted to 66 officers and 1,634 other ranks, as compared with 490
casualties, and by the latter to 99 officers and 2,444 other ranks, as compared
with 532 casualties. These figures speak for themselves, and demonstrate
not only the skill and gallantry displayed by the infantry, but also the
moral effect of the tanks and the accuracy of the artillery and machine-
gun support. The chief resistance came from the enemy's machine-guns,
and the fact that this was overcome with so few casualties indicates that
it was a battle in which success was to a great extent due to the
initiative of subordinate commanders.
Sir Richard Butler, who had resumed command of the III Corps
on September 12th, originally intended to attack with three divisions,
but, owing to the strength of the enemy's defences
""^ "m'co/ps"^ '^^ and the large area of the villages to be "mopped
up," he finally decided to attack with all four
divisions of his corps.
In addition to those caused by the rain, the difficulties of assembly
on the night of September 17th were increased by a considerable amount
of gas shelling on battery positions and assembly areas. Nevertheless,
the infantry was assembled up to time and without confusion. Un-
fortunately, however, only six tanks, out of the eight allotted to the III
Corps, succeeded in reaching the " starting line " by " zero " ; three of these
were to operate with the 18th Division against Ronssoy and Basse Boulogne,
and three with the 12th and 58th Divisions against Epehy and Peizi^res.
On the right of the III Corps the 74th Division was assembled, with
the 230th and 231st Brigades in hne on the right and left respectively,
each strengthened by one battalion from the 229th Brigade. Two
battalions of each of the two leading brigades were allotted the task of
going right through to the third objective, the remaining battalions
were to follow in support and " mop up " the ground gained. In the centre
the 18th and 12th Divisions were allotted the formidable task of capturing
Ronssoy, Basse Boulogne, and Epehy. An important feature on this
part of the front was the basin lying in the triangle Ronssoy-Epehy-
Ste. Emilie. It was decided to avoid this basin in the initial attack, and
that the 18th Division should attack south of the spur running from Ronssoy
to Ste. Emilie, while the 12th Division attacked west of the spur running
from Epehy to Ste. Emilie. After the capture of Ronssoy and Epehy,
the attacking troops were to wheel inwards and roll up the enemy's main
line of defence, which was on the ridge joining these two villages. The
18th Division employed the 54th Brigade, strengthened by one battalion
of the 53rd Brigade, to capture Ronssoy, Basse Boulogne, and the first
objective ; the 55th Brigade was then to advance through the 54th
Brigade and secure the second objective. The 53rd Brigade, less one
battalion detached with the 54th Brigade, was held in divisional reserve.
On the front of the 12th Division the 36th Brigade, less one battalion,
was assembled on the right, and the 35th Brigade on the left facing
Epehy, for the advance to the first objective. In rear of these brigades,
with orders to move through them and secure the second objective, was
182 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept 18th
concentrated the 37th Brigade, with one battalion of the 36th Brigade
attached.
On the extreme left of the III Corps the 58th Division employed
the 173rd Brigade to capture Peizieres and the first objective, after the
capture of which it was to be " squeezed out " by the advance on its
right of the 12th Division, as the latter moved forward to the second
objective. The remaining two brigades of the 58th Division were retained
in corps reserve.
Serious opposition was encoxmtered by the troops of the III Corps
almost from the moment the advance began. It is almost certain that
the attack did not take the enemy by surprise, although
thT'm "orS^^tta'Jk t^^c actual hour of the attack may not have been known. ^
The thick mist and rain, in which the attack was
launched, may have been responsible for the measure of surprise attained, but,
although advantageous in this respect, they were otherwise a disadvantage,
as the bad light rendered it difficult for the infantry and tanks to keep
direction at the beginning of the attack. The enemy's artillery retaliation
to our bombardment was comparatively light and came chiefly from high
velocity guns, the field guns having been previously withdrawn. The
aspect which the fighting assumed differed from the operations carried
out by the III Corps over the old Somme battlefield. Manceuvring on
a large scale against prominent tactical features was impossible, owing
to the complicated trench systems of the old British main line of resistance
in which the fighting took place during the whole day. Every section
of trench was stubbornly defended by either a machine-gun or a few of
the enemy's infantry. The fighting consisted of countless section, platoon,
and company actions for the possession of these trenches and fortified
posts. The chief feature of the battle was the tenacity displayed by
our officers and men in holding on to the ground they had gained, and the
determination with which they continued their endeavours to secvu-e
all their objectives.
The 74th Division made more rapid progress than the divisions on
its left. The 230th Brigade moved forward, keeping close touch with the
1st Australian Division on its right. Under cover
"*' 'lttack"""°° of ^^he artillery barrage and the fire of the 74th Machine
Gun Battalion, this brigade captured Templeux-le-
Gu6rard and cleared the quarries north-east of the village, where twelve heavy
machine-guns were captured with slight loss. The garrison of the quarries
was overwhelmed by the rapidity of our advance. ^ That the enemy failed
to hold on to such a strong position was due, partly to the excellent covering
fire afforded by the 74th Machine Gun Battalion, and partly to the dense
ground mist, which impeded the enemy's observation and thus restricted
his fire. The 231st Brigade on the left also made good progress, and by
9 a.m. both brigades of the 74th Division were established on the first
objective.
' A prisoner captured on September 17th stated that an attack was expected on the morning
of the 18th. This information was confirmed when the enemy subjected the forward and battery
areas to a concentrated gas bombardment on the night of September 17th.
' Forty men of the 5th Bavarian Division, who came out of a dug-out later in the morning,
surrendered to an unarmed groom who had taken his horses to the quarries for shelter.
Sept. 18TH] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 133
The advance of the 18th Division proved to be more difficult. The
7th Royal West Kent, attached to the 54th from the 53rd Brigade,
led the attack, keeping well under the barrage. It ad-
attack '"*'°° vanced through the southern portion of Ronssoy Wood
and the village of Ronssoy, and was then " leap-frogged "
by the 2nd Bedfordshire, which reached the first objective up to time.
The northern portion of Ronssoy Wood was cleared by the 6th North-
amptonshire after stiff fighting, and a footing was gained in Basse Bou-
logne.i By 10 a.m. the trench system round Quid Copse, some 500
yards short of the objective on the left, had been secured, but it was not
until some hours later that the whole of Basse Boulogne village, in which
the enemy held numerous small posts, was " mopped up " with the assist-
ance of two tanks. The 54th Brigade was now in touch with the 74th
Division on the right on the first objective, but had not yet been able to
connect up with the 12th Division on the left. Owing to the continuance
of the fighting in the southern part of Basse Boulogne, not only the
supporting battalions of the 54th Brigade, but also some of the troops
of the 55th Brigade, which was due to pass through the 54th Brigade
and attack the second objective, were drawn into the fight.
On the front of the 12th Division the 9th Royal Fusiliers and the
7th Royal Sussex, of the 36th Brigade, operating immediately south
of Epehy, made good progress and succeeded in clearing
12th and 58th*D^visions ^^^ railway embankment south-east of the village.
The troops of the 7th Norfolk and 9th Essex of the
35th Brigade, however, experienced determined opposition immediately
on reaching the western outskirts of Epehy and lost touch with the barrage.
Even when the leading two battalions were reinforced by the 1/lst Cam-
bridgeshire, it proved a difficult matter to dislodge the Alpine Corps from
the village, which it had been told to hold at all costs, and casualties were
severe on both sides. The tanks, supporting the attack, lost direction in
the mist and were mistaken for hostile tanks by some of our troops ;
this caused some confusion. At 9 a.m. Maj.-Gen. Higginson decided to
stop the barrage from moving beyond the first objective, as it was evident
that the division would not be able to continue the advance beyond the
first objective, until time had been allowed for reorganising the troops.
With great determination the troops of the 35th Brigade pushed slowly
through Epehy, where strong resistance was met with, especially from a
few posts, including Fisher's Keep, which still held out, and from
Germans who had hidden in the cellars.^
On the left of the 12th Division the 173rd Brigade of the 58th
Division made a good start at " zero," the 2/2nd London leading, and by
10.20 a.m. had cleared Peizieres of the enemy except for one post. On
attempting to continue to move forward to the first objective, the right flank
was found to be exposed owing to the slow progress of the 12th Division
in Epehy ; a defensive flank was, consequently, formed astride the railway.
' The courage and initiative of Lee. -Corp. Albert Lewis, 6th Northamptonshire, largely
contributed to the successful advance of his battalion. See Appendix E, No. 30.
' The village was not finally cleared of Germans until after midnight on September 18th.
Fisher's Keep held out till 7.45 p.m. on the 18th when only 17 unwounded survivors remained
of the garrison of 8 officers and 45 other ranks.
184 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept 18th
While the 18th and 12th Divisions were engaged in the heavy fighting
around Basse Boulogne and Epehy, the attacking battalions of the 74th
The second phase of Division moved forward towards the second objective
the in Corps attack shortly after 9 a.m. The 230th Brigade on the right,
(see Map 9) keeping in close touch with the Australians, gained
its objective at 10.30 a.m. On the left the 231st Brigade was not so
fortunate, although a considerable advance beyond the first objective
was made. The slow progress of the 18th Division, east of Ronssoy,
made it necessary to form a defensive flank along the sunken road running
south-east from Basse Boulogne, known as the Bellicourt road. Thus,
although the second objective was gained on the right of the 231st Brigade
as far north as Benjamin Post, prolonging the line held by the 230th
Brigade, the resistance encountered at Benjamin Post prevented any
further advance being made.
Meanwhile, very confused fighting was still in progress in Basse
Boulogne. This delayed the assembly of the troops of the 55th Brigade
which were to pass through the 54th Brigade for the second phase of the
attack, and had caused some of them to be drawn into the fight in the village.
By the time the assembly was completed the artillery barrage had moved
on too far to be of any assistance, and, as the enemy's resistance round
Lempire and east of Basse Boulogne had increased considerably, only
a slight advance was made by the 55th Brigade. Maj.-Gen. Lee decided
to postpone any further attempt to advance until the troops could be
reorganised, and arrangements could be made for adequate artillery and
machine-gun support.
Consequently, about mid-day the situation on the front of the III
Corps was that the 74th Division was established on the second objective
on the right, with its left thrown a little back ; the 18th Division held a
line east of Basse Boulogne and Quid Copse, north of which it joined
with the 12th Division ; this division prolonged the line along the rail-
way east of Epehy ; while the 58th Division was established well east
of Peizieres, but had not succeeded in maintaining connection with the
21st Division on the right of the V Corps, which, attacking further north,
had captured Chapel Crossing and Gauche Wood.
About 5 p.m., by which time the whole of Basse Boulogne had been
cleared of the enemy, the 18th Division renewed the attack towards the
second objective, including Lempire, Yak, and Zebra posts, moving
forward this time under a creeping barrage. The 55th Brigade pressed
forward and succeeded on the right in approaching the second objective at
certain points, but the left of the division made only slight progress.
The enemy had brought up fresh troops, and held X, Y, and Z copses in
strength with machine-guns, which enfiladed the infantry advancing against
Lempire, Yak, and Zebra posts.^ By 7 p.m. it was clear that, so long as
1 From prisoners captured during the afternoon it was ascertained that the strong resistance
encountered by the 18th Division in Lempire and from X, Y, and Z copses, was due to the fact
that the 121st Division had been hurried forward from Maretz, starting at 7 a.m. on the 18th.
On arrival at Bony the division had debussed, and had counter-attacked at 5 p.m. with the object
of regaining Basse Boulogne, Ronssoy, and the original front line held by the enemy on the morning
of the 18th. Although, therefore, its attack had not been successful, the 55th Brigade had to its
credit the repulse of a fresh division and the breaking up of a hostile counter-attack.
Sept. i8th-i^h] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 135
the enemy held these positions, it would not be possible for our men to
retain the ground gained on the right, and accordingly a withdrawal
to the line of the Bellicourt road was ordered and carried out by 9 p.m.
Earlier in the afternoon the troops of the 35th Brigade and the 5th
Royal Berkshire continued the advance of the 12th Division east of Epehy,
with the object of securing the line of the first objective. They made
considerable progress and captured Malassise Farm. The 5th Royal
Berkshire did especially good work and was fighting during most of the
night. In conjunction with this attack, the troops of the 58th Division
endeavoured to establish themselves in Poplar Trench on the line of the
first objective, but were unsuccessful.
By nightfall, beyond the capture of Benjamin Post, which was
skilfully enveloped from the north by the 74th Division, a slight advance
by the 18th Division east of Basse Boulogne, and the withdrawal of the
troops of the 12th Division from Malassise Farm, our line had undergone
no material change since midday.
As the result of very severe fighting, the III Corps had captured the
strongly fortified villages of Ronssoy, Basse Boulogne, Epehy, and
The result of the Peizieres, which had been held by two crack German
day's fighting by the divisions, the Alpine Corps and the 2nd Guard Division.
m Corps The III Corps had also captured 2,300 prisoners, 10
guns, and numerous machine-guns and trench mortars.
On the morning of September 19th the weather was still overcast,
and a high wind was blowing. The Australians, in the centre of the army
front, had now gained practically the whole of their
^eymbei°i9th objectives of the 18th, and devoted the next two days
to consolidation and to adjusting their line at certain
points with a view to improving observation. All attempts by the enemy
to drive in some of the forward posts established by the Australians were
unsuccessful.
On the flanks of the army, on the other hand, neither the IX nor
the III Corps had reached all their objectives on September 18th. The
attack was, therefore, continued on the fronts of these two corps on the
morning of September 19th, as it was essential that all objectives of the
18th should be secured as early as possible, with a view to future operations.
On the IX Corps front the 6th and 1st Divisions endeavoured to
gain ground round the Quadrilateral, Fresnoy-le-Petit, and east of
The events on the Berthaucourt. The 6th Division, attacking with the
IX Corps front on Sep- 71st and 16th Brigades, encountered even greater
tember 19th and 20th resistance at the Quadrilateral and at Fresnoy-le-Petit
than on the 18th, and was unable to make any progress. Similar attempts
by the 1st Division, east of Berthaucourt, were checked by heavy machine-
gun fire ; on the other hand a counter-attack, launched against the 1st
Division at Berthaucourt at 8 a.m., was completely repulsed. The 34th
French Division, operating on the right of, and in conjunction with, the
6th Division, attacked Manchester Hill during the morning, but was
unsuccessful. The situation at Rovind Hill still hung in the balance.
The enemy was now holding naturally strong positions about Francilly-
Selency, at the Quadrilateral, and at Fresnoy-le-Petit, and it was quite
136 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. i^H-2(>rii
evident that he did not contemplate relinquishing them without a deter-
mined struggle. Moreover, after three days' severe fighting, the men of the
6th Division, in whose case the battle had begun on the 17th, were begin-
ning to feel the strain.^ Sir Walter Braithwaite, therefore, decided not to
attempt any further attack, until preparations could be made for one on
a larger scale, supported by organised artillery and machine-gun barrages.
Throughout the remainder of the day fighting of a desultory nature con-
tinued on the whole of the IX Corps front, several bombing encounters
taking place in the neighbourhood of Fresnoy-le-Petit.
During the night of September 19th the troops of the 6th Division
finally gained possession of Holnon village, which for three days had been
the scene of continuous fighting and had changed hands several times.
Except for persistent hostile shelling of Holnon Wood, and for a small
attack by the enemy against Berthaucourt which met with no success,
September 20th passed quietly.
During the night of September 18th the 58th Division, on the left
of the III Corps, had succeeded in gaining the northern part of Poplar
Trench, and the 12th Division had secured Tetard Wood.
The events on the Qj^ ^Y\e morning of September 19th an operation on a
tembeT'r9th'and°20*th larger scale was carried out by the 18th and 12th
Divisions to secure Lempire village, Lempire, Yak, and
Zebra posts, and the trenches along the southern slopes of the Catelet
valley, including Braeton Post, south of Little Priel Farm. This
operation, which was carried out chiefly by means of bombing attacks
along the trenches, met with partial success. The 18th Division
encountered heavy machine-gun fire from X, Y, and Z copses, which had
given so much trouble in the fighting of the previous day, but, after a
struggle, Lempire village was cleared, and Lempire, Yak, and Zebra posts
were secured. The 12th Division captured May Copse and INIalassise Farm,
and our line was advanced 1,000 yards beyond Old Copse; touch was,
however, lost with the 18th Division on the right, and was not regained
until the next day.
September 20th was remarkable for the number of more or less
isolated, and at the same time hotly contested struggles, which took
place for the possession of small lengths of trenches. The enemy in front
of the 18th Division evacuated X, Y, and Z copses, thereby indicating
that he had given up the idea of regaining Ronssoy and Epehy. These
small posts were occupied, but, beyond advancing our line to Sart
Farm, little further progress was made by the 18th Division. The enemy
had taken up new positions in the old British outpost line, and held
Braeton Post and the trenches around Little Priel Farm in strength.
Although the 12th and 58th Divisions gained some ground, they were
unable to capture the whole of their objectives, as the Alpine Corps
defended every post, trench, and copse with great stubbornness.
The fighting of the past three days had now brought the III Corps
to within a short distance of the outer defences of the main Hindenburg
Line. On the right the 74th Division had gained a footing in these defences,
' The 6th Division had had a very trying and difficult time, as, owing to the French being
unable to advance, the right flank of the division was constantly enfiladed.
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but the 18th and 12th Divisions, at the beginning of their task, were
confronted with formidable redoubts such as Duncan Post, Tombois
Farm, Braeton Post, and Little Priel Farm, all of which played a prominent
part in the fighting of the next few days. It now became clear that
another organised attack would have to be made, if we wished to make
further progress on the III Corps front. Preparations for this were at
once begun, as it was essential that we should gain the whole of the
enemy's outer defences as early as possible, especially the important
localities of Quennemont Farm, Gillemont Farm, and The Knoll. The chief
importance of these places to us was that, so long as they were held by the
enemy, it would be very difficult to move our artillery sufficiently far forward
for it to be able to support our attacking troops with an efficient barrage
beyond the main Hindenburg Line. After careful consideration. Sir
Henry Rawlinson decided that they must be secured, even though this
involved a preliminary operation of some magnitude.
Meanwhile, after the success of the British attacks on September
18th, and of the American attack on the St. Mihiel salient on September
The decision to attack ^?^^^' ^* ^^^ ^^^? decided between Marshal Foch and
the Hindenburg Line ; Sir Douglas Haig that four convergent and simul-
the Fourth Army taneous offensivcs should be launched by the Allies,
reinforced ^^g y^y ^^le Americans west of the Meuse in the direction
of Mezieres, the second by the French west of the Argonne in close con-
junction with the American attack and in the same direction, the third by
the British on the St. Quentin-Cambrai front in the general direction
of Maubeuge, the fourth by the Belgian and Allied forces in Flanders in the
direction of Ghent.
The most important and critical of these attacks was the one to be
undertaken by the British Armies against the Hindenburg Line.^
On September 22nd the following orders for the British attack on
the St. Quentin-Cambrai front were issued by General Headquarters —
" The First Army will attack on ' Z ' Day (September 27th) with a
view to capturing the heights of Bourlon Wood in the first instance. It
will then push forward and secure its left on the Sensee River and operate
so as to protect the left of the Third Army.
' In the words of his despatch of December 21st, 1918, Sir Douglas Haig's views were that —
" The results to be obtained from these different attacks depended in a peculiarly large
degree upon the British attack in the centre. It was here that the enemy's defences were
most highly organised. If these were broken, the threat directed at his vital systems of lateral
communication would of necessity react upon his defence elsewhere.
" On the other hand, the long period of sustained offensive action through which the
British Armies 1 ad already passed had made large demands both upon the troops themselves
and upon my available reserves. Throughout our attacks from the 8th August onwards
our losses in proportion to the results achieved and the numbers of prisoners taken had been
consistently and remarkably small. In the aggregate, however, they were considerable, and
in the face of them an attack upon so formidably organised a position as that which now
confronted us could not be lightly undertaken." Moreover, the political effects of an
unsuccessful attack upon a position so well known as the Hindenburg Line would be large,
and would go far to revive the declining moral not onlv of the German Army but of the
(Jerman people.
" These different considerations were present to my mind. The probable results of a
costly failure, or, indeed, of anj^hing short of a decided success, in any attempt upon the
main defences of the Hindenburg Line were obvious ; but I was convinced that the British
attack was the essential part of the general scheme, and that the moment was favourable.
Accordingly I decided to proceed with the attack. . . ."
138 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 20th-22nd
" The Third Army will operate in the direction of the general line
Le Cateau-Solesmes. It will attack on ' Z ' Day (September 27th) in
conjunction with the First Army and will press forward to secure the
passages of the Canal de I'Escaut so as to be in a position to co-operate
closely with the Fourth Army on ' Z ' +2 day (September 29th). The
Third Army will assist the Fourth Army with counter-battery work on
the enemy's guns in the region La Terriere-Villers Outreaux.
" The Fourth Army, protected on its right flank by the First French
Army, will deliver the main attack against the enemy's defences from
Le Tronquoy to Le Catelet, both inclusive, operating in the direction
of the general line Bohain-Busigny. The bombardment will commence
on ' Z ' day (September 27th) and the assault will be delivered on ' Z '
+ 2 day (September 29th)." i
On receipt of the above orders, Sir Henry Rawlinson issued his
own orders for the attack ; these will be explained in the next chapter. *
The following reinforcements were placed at the disposal of the Fourth
Army :
The XIII Corps Headquarters, with the 25th, 50th, and 66th Divisions.
The II American Corps Headquarters, with the 27th and 30th American
Divisions.
Before proceeding with the narrative of events after September
20th, it will be well to relate very briefly the distribution of these
reinforcements, and the consequent changes in dis-
^* ^the^twnt*" ° positions which resulted between September 21st and
25th.
On September 20th orders were issued b}' Sir Henry Rawlinson
for the readjustment of the Fourth Army front, which was to commence
on the night of September 21st ; as the result of it the boundaries
and dispositions of troops prior to the attack on the main Hindenburg
Line would be as follows : —
The IX Corps would have the 6th, 1st, and 46th Divisions in line,
from right to left, and the 32nd Division in reserve, on a front of some
10,000 yards from the junction of the Fourth Army with the First French
Army, immediately north-west of Francilly-Selency, to a point on the ridge
just south of Buisson Gaulaine Farm. This necessitated the relief of the
4th Australian Division by the 46th Division.
The combined Australian and II American Corps would have the
30th and 27th American Divisions in line, the 5th and 3rd Australian
Divisions in support, and the 2nd Australian Division in reserve, from the
northern boundary of the IX Corps, just south of Buisson Gaulaine Farm,
to opposite The Knoll ; a front of 8,000 yards, practically facing the
Bellicourt tunnel. This necessitated the relief of the 74th, 18th,
• The dates in brackets were not in the original order, but were fixed afterwards. The
Franco-American attack in the direction of Mezieres was to take place on September 26th, and
the Allied attack in Belgium on September 28th.
* It must be understood that there were two attacks in view — the preliminary attack against
the outer defences of the Hindenburg Line on the III and IX Corps fronts, and the main attack
against the Hindenburg Line itself on September 29th. The Army Commander's orders, referred
to here, only dealt with the preparations for the main attack, but preparations for the
preliminary attack by the troops already in the line were going on simultaneously.
Sept. 20rH-25TH] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 139
and 1st Australian Divisions by American troops. The whole of the
Australian and American troops were to be under the command of Sir
John Monash, with whom General Read, commanding the II American
Corps, would work in the closest touch ; the reason for this arrangement
will be explained later.
North of the Austrahan and II American Corps, the III Corps, shortly
to be reduced to two divisions owing to the departure of the 74th and
58th Divisions to another army, would hold a narrow front of 3,000
yards to the northern boundary of the Fourth Army east of Peizieres,
with the 12th Division in line and the 18th Division in reserve.
The XIII Corps, with the 25th, 50th, and 66th Divisions, would be in
army reserve.
This redistribution was to be complete by September 25th.
The readjustment was carried out as ordered. On September
19th the 46th Division was transferred to the IX Corps and concentrated
in the Tertry area.^ On the night of September 21st this division took
over the line from Berthaucourt to a point just south of Buisson Gaulaine
Farm, reHeving the 4th Australian Division and a portion of the 1st
British Division. On relief, the 4th Australian Division was moved to
a rest area near Amiens. The 1st Division was now able to side-slip
southwards and thus shorten the front of the 6th Division. This enabled
the IX Corps to hurry on with their preparations for securing the high
ground between Selency, Fayet, and Fresnoy-le-Petit, which it was
desirable to capture as a preliminary to the attack on the main
Hindenburg Line.
On September 22nd and 23rd the 27th and 30th Divisions of the
II American Corps commenced to arrive in the Fourth Army area by 'bus
and train, and were concentrated in the Tincourt and Haut-AUaines areas
prior to going into the line on the Australian Corps front. On the night
of September 23rd the 30th American Division relieved the 1st Australian
Division in the line from a point just south of Buisson Gaulaine Farm
to Malakoff Farm. On relief, the 1st Australian Division was moved
back to a rest area near Abbeville.^
On September 23rd the arrangements necessary to enable the 27th
American Division to take over the remainder of the new front of the Aus-
trahan Corps were completed, and on the night of September 24th this
division reUeved the 74th and 18th Divisions. On relief, the 74th Division
was transferred to the Fifth Army, and the 58th Division to the First Army.
The command of the front of the composite American and Australian
Corps passed to Sir John Monash at 10 a.m. on September 25th.
While these moves in the forward area were in progress, the XIII
Corps, commanded by Lieut. -Gen. Sir Thomas Morland, arrived
in the Fourth Army area from the Fifth Army, and took over the
25th Division, commanded by Maj.-Gen. J. R. E. Charles, the
50th Division, commanded by Maj.-Gen. H. C. Jackson, the 66th
Division, commanded by Maj.-Gen. H. K. Bethell, and the 18th
' Tertrv is about 4 miles west of Holnon Wood.
' Although they did not realise it, the 1st and 4th Australian Divisions had fought their
last, but not least successful, battle in the Great War.
140 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 21st-22nd
Division from the III Corps. Of these, the 18th and 50th Divisions
were both in the III Corps area, and the 25th and 66th, with the XIII
Corps Headquarters, were in army reserve near Albert, ready to move up
as soon as required.^
To resume the narrative of the attacks on the outer defences of the
Hindenburg Line. Little of importance occurred on the front of the IX
The m Corps attacks Corps and on the southern half of the Australian Corps
on September 21st- front between September 21st and 23rd. There was a
^^°^ small hostile attack near Berthaucourt on the evening of
the 22nd, which was easily repulsed.
On the front of the III Corps, however, there was much activity.
It had been decided on the 20th to make an organised attack against the
enemy's advanced positions at Duncan Post, Tombois Farm, Braeton Post,
and Little Priel Farm, which he was holding very strongly, and then with-
out delay to secure Quennemont Farm, Gillemont Farm, and The Knoll,
the capture of which would place the whole of the outer defences of the
Hindenburg Line, north of Bellenglise, in our possession.
In order to attain this object, an attack was launched on the morning
of September 21st along the whole front of the III Corps, assisted on the
right by the 1st Australian Division, which captured Ruby Wood, and
gained a footing in Malakoff Wood, capturing 51 prisoners. At the same
time the V Corps of the Third Army attacked the trench system running
due south from Villers Guislain.
On the front of the III Corps the 74th Division was given as its
objective Quennemont Farm, Quennet Copse, and Gillemont Farm ;
the 18th Division was given The Knoll ; the 12th Division Braeton Post
and Little Priel Farm ; and the 58th Division the trench systems round
Dados Loop, north of Little Priel Farm. Four tanks of the 2nd Tank
Battalion were detailed to assist the 74th Division, and seven tanks of
the same battalion the 18th Division. The assault was delivered at
5.40 a.m. under cover of a creeping barrage. Before " zero " the enemy's
artillery fire was severe ; it increased when our barrage fell at " zero,"
and remained heavy all day. The action which ensued lasted during
the whole of September 21st and continued throughout that night with
unabated violence until the early hours of September 22nd.
On the right, the 74th Division reached both Quennemont Farm
and Gillemont Farm, in addition to Quennet Copse and Cat Post.^ The
tanks assisting this division were unable to give any assistance, as two
broke down before reaching the " starting line," and the remaining two
' These four divisions remained in the XIII Corps until the end of the campaign.
The 25th Division had just been reformed from battalions drawn from the 7th, 23rd, and 48th
Divisions in Italy.
The 50th Division was composed of battalions brought from Egypt and Salonika, in June,
since when they had been training and undergoing treatment for malaria.
The 66th Division was composed of the South African Brigade under Brig.-Gen. Tanner,
and two brigades composed of battalions which had come from Egypt and Salonika, at the same
time as those of the 50th Division, and had since then been training and undergoing treatment
for malaria.
* The enemy, however, foimd his way back into Cat Post through a gap which then
existed between the 74th and 18th Divisions. This post was recaptured during the night by the
10th King's Shropshire Light Infantry in a very gaUant maimer, together with 200 prisoners and
30 machine-guns, although the battalion had been reduced by that time to under 200 men.
Sept. 21st-22nd] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 141
were put out of action by hostile artillery fire early in the day. The 18th
Division secured Duncan Post and Doleful Post, but, on approaching The
Knoll, the attack broke down before the annihilating fire of the machine-
guns holding that locality and Tombois Farm. Five of the seven tanks
which supported the attack were put out of action at various stages of
the advance, and only one reached The Knoll. Those of the crews of
these tanks, who had the good fortune to return from the fight, reported
that the machine-gun fire had often been so hea\y that they had been
unable to work their guns. Before this machine-gun fire was encountered,
the 53rd Brigade of the 18th Division had succeeded in pushing forward
to Egg Post, but was almost immediately counter-attacked and driven
back. While this fighting was taking place, the 12th Division gained a
footing in Braeton Post, and the attack of the 58th Division reached a line
some 300_ yards short of Dados Loop,
Frorri this time onward the enemy's resistance became even more
determined. The troops of the 230th Brigade were ejected from Quenne-
mont Farm by a counter-attack, and eventually held a line slightly in
advance of their original " starting line." The troops of the 231st Brigade,
which had succeeded in reaching Gillemont Farm, held out until 2 p.m.,
and then fell back to the general line which was being consolidated ;
the troops of the 18th Division, which had succeeded in penetrating to
Duncan Post and Doleful Post, were forced to withdraw. The 12th Divi-
sion was unable to advance further on account of heavy machine-gun
fire from Little Priel Farm and He}i;horp Post. By 5 p.m. it was clear
that the objectives assigned for the day's operations could not be gained
without fresh impetus, although attempts were still being made to push
forward.
Exhibiting the same splendid spirit that they had shown all through
their advance, the troops of the III Corps refused to admit defeat without
another attempt to gain their objective. In spite of the heavy fighting
and the many disappointments which the 21st had yielded, all ranks
realised the imperative necessity of pressing forward and allowing the
enemy no respite. At 12.15 a.m., therefore, on September 22nd the attack
was resumed, and the troops advanced in the bright moonlight without
much difficulty. The artillery supplied the requisite support by putting
down a creeping barrage.
By daylight on the 22nd the 7-ith Division again held Cat Post ;
the 18th Division had secured Duncan and Doleful Posts ; the 12th
Division had captured Heythorp Post and Little Priel Farm ; and the
58th Division Dados Loop. Some further progress was made later in
the day, when Braeton Post was again captured. During the afternoon
of the 22nd the enemy launched several counter-attacks ; one against
the 74th Division just south of Duncan Post, and another against the
18th Division in the vicinity of Doleful Post; these were driven off
with heavy loss to the enemy. In the evening, following on the repulse
of another counter-attack from the direction of Gillemont Farm, in which
our artillery caused heavy losses to the attacking infantry, the 11th
Royal Fusiliers of the 18th Division, taking advantage of the confusion
amongst the retreating enemy, left its trenches in pursuit and captured
142 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 22nd-24th
a strong point with 80 prisoners near Duncan Post, which had been hold-
ing them up all day.^ Thus the bitter fighting of the past forty-eight
hours had placed the III Corps in possession of a large part of the important
positions which had been its objectives since September 18th.
During the next few days a number of small operations were under-
taken by the 18th Division with a view to improving our line by capturing
Tombois Farm and Egg Post, but without success. Further north the
12th Division, which had relieved the 58th Division on the night of Sep-
tember 23rd, was driven out of Dados Loop by a hostile counter-attack.
Although the enemy also made persistent efforts to regain the posts he
had lost, the line remained practically unchanged till the III Corps was
relieved by the Americans on the night of September 24th.
It was important for the IX Corps both to gain observation over the
main Hindenburg Line, and to improve the position on its right flank,
The IX Corps opera- prior to the general attack on the 29th, and Sir Walter
tions on September Braithwaite devoted all his attention to attaining these
^^^^ objects. The IX Corps, therefore, resumed operations
on the morning of September 24th against Selency and the Quadrilateral,
which had been causing the 6th Division so much trouble, and also against
Fresnoy-le-Petit and the high ground north of Gricourt. A fresh battalion
of Mark V tanks, the 13th, was allotted to the IX Corps for this attack.
The right flank was to be secured by the First French Army, which was to
attack Francilly-Selency and Manchester Hill.
The attack was launched at 5 a.m. On the right the 6th Division,
supported by eight tanks, moved forward towards Selency, the Quad-
rilateral, and the high ground north of the latter place. The 1st Division
in the centre pressed forward through Fresnoy-le-Petit, and also south
and north of the village towards the high ground about Mont Needle
and the hook-shaped ridge north of Gricourt. Twelve tanks assisted the
attack of the 1st Division, and were employed to reduce the enemy's re-
sistance in Fresnoy-le-Petit and in the wood north-east of the village. Simul-
taneously the 46th Division on the left attacked Pontruet and Ste. Helena.
Although the attack was apparently expected by the enemy, satis-
factory progress was made on the whole of the corps front, except on the
right at the Quadrilateral and Selency. Here, as on previous occasions,
the enemy offered a stout resistance and checked the advance early in
the day. By 8 a.m., however, the 6th Division had gained a footing in
the trench system immediately west of Selency and in the western and
northern portions of the Quadrilateral. The neighbourhood of the Quad-
rilateral was the scene of continuous bombing throughout the day. At
nightfall, there were still some Germans in the Quadrilateral itself, and a
German post still held out south of the Quadrilateral between the right
of the 6th Division and the French. A well executed moonlight attack,
carried out by the 1st Leicestershire of the 71st Brigade about 11 p.m.,
secured the post south of the Quadrilateral.
In the centre the 1st Division made good progress. Fresnoy-le-
Petit was cleared by the 3rd Brigade, but heavy fire from machine-gims
• The stout resistance made in this area was partly accounted for by the reinforcement of the
Alpine Corps and 2nd Guard Division by the 232nd Division.
Sept. 24th] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 143
olding Marronniers Wood was then encountered. Outflanking these
machine-guns, the 3rd Brigade pushed on to its objectives west and south
of Gricourt and secured them by noon. The machine-guns at Marron-
niers Wood held out until finally overcome at 5 p.m., when 5 officers and
130 other ranks were captured in the wood.
On the left front of the 1st Division the 2nd Brigade met with resist-
ance at Cornouillers Wood, and sustained numerous casualties from
machine-gun firing from positions in Pontruet, which the 46th Division
had been unable to capture. Nevertheless, some of the brigade reached
the high ground of the objective north of Gricourt, only to be practically
annihilated by artillery fire, and by enfilade machine-gun fire from Pontruet.
In this fighting the 1st Northamptonshire of the 2nd Brigade particularly
distinguished itself in a very difficult position. A trench line between
Gricourt and Pontruet was consolidated and held, despite numerous
hostile counter-attacks to regain it. At one time, when counter-attacked
by a force of over 400 of the enemy, the garrison, consisting of men of
the 2nd Royal Sussex, finding themselves temporarily short of ammu-
nition, moved a Lewis gun out in front of the trenches, and, under cover of
its fire, delivered a bayonet charge which completely routed the enemy
and succeeded in securing 50 prisoners.^ The 2nd Royal Sussex was
later reinforced by the 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps, which also did
excellent work in repulsing the enemy's counter-attacks.
Although Gricourt itself had not been given as one of the objectives
for the day's operations, the 3rd Brigade captured it in the afternoon
under cover of a hastily arranged bombardment. This operation by the
3rd Brigade, fpllowing on the capture of Fresnoy-le-Petit, was a fine
performance. Ably planned at short notice by the brigade commander,
it was executed with great skill and determination, and well exemplifies
the value of initiative by subordinate commanders. This success was
followed at dusk by a local attack by the 2nd Brigade, which regained the
high ground north of Gricourt.
The failure of the 46th Division to secure Pontruet has already been
mentioned. On the left, however, this division cleared Ste. Helene without
difficulty. Its efforts to secure Pontruet were redoubled, when it was
found that the possession of this village was so important for the success of
the 1st Division attack, and by 8 a.m. the northern portion of the village
had been captured together with a large number of prisoners ; - the
enemy, however, still held the southern portion. At 7.30 p.m. the 46th
Division made a further attempt to capture the southern portion of
Pontruet, but was again unsuccessful.^
On the right of the IX Corps the XXXVI French Corps captured
all its objectives except Manchester Hill, and secured the village of
Francilly-Selency, together with 200 prisoners.
■ These men belonged to two regiments of the 11th Division, which had been alarmed
in its rest billets three hours before "zero" and hurried to the front. This division carried
out three counter-attacks in the Gricourt area during the day and assisted in the defence
of Pontruet.
' It was in this attack that Lieutenant John Barrett, l/5th Leicestershire, so distinguished
himself. See Appendix E, No. 3.
» The total captures of the IX Corps during the fighting on the 24th exceeded 1,500 prisoners.
144 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 25th-26th
Taking advantage of the success attending the fighting of September
24th, the 6th Division pushed forward strong fighting patrols during the
night towards Selency and the Chateau. Bv 10.30 a.m.
The pressure main- "=• , , . p c . u r.i-j.i. j.u »
tained by the K Corps o» the mornmg ot September 25th, the enemy s mam
on September 25th and resistance had been overcome, and the patrols were
^^^ making good progress. Meanwhile, fighting was still
in progress among the maze of trenches constituting the Quadrilateral,
but by 6 p.m. the whole of it was in our hands, and Selency and
Chateau Wood had also been secured. Although counter-attacked
severely north of Gricourt during September 25th, the 1st Division
retained all the ground it had gained on the 24th, and improved its
position.
The situation on the right of the IX Corps front was further improved
on the morning of September 26th, when the 6th Division established
our line well east of Selency and the Quadrilateral, and the French captured
Manchester Hill. Thus the right flank of the Fourth Army was
secure, and sufficient observation of the main Hindenburg Line had been
gained.
Meanwhile, the preparations for the attack to be launched against
the main Hindenburg Line on September 29th were well in hand. At
10.30 p.m. on September 26th the preliminary bombard-
the^ Hindenburg^ Line nicnt for the attack by the Fourth Army on the main
begun on September Hindenburg Line began with " BB " gas shell, ^ which
^'•^ was used until 6 a.m. on the 27th, after which high
explosive and shrapnel were employed. ^ This bombardment continued
without intermission until " zero " on the 29th.
Dixring the night of September 26th the 30th American Division
improved its position at certain points with a view to securing a better
" starting line." Further north the general line of
the°27th*'and"30th Qucnnemont Farm-Gillemont Farm had been selected
American Divisions on as the " starting line " of the 27th American Division.
September 26th and 27th ^g^ however, in spite of great self-sacrifice and gallantry,
the troops of the III Corps had been unable to capture this line before
being relieved, it devolved on the 27th American Division to secure it. In
order to attain this object, the 27th American Division, assisted by one
company of tanks of the 4th Mark V Tank Battalion, attacked at 5.30 a.m.
on September 27th, under cover of a powerful artillery barrage. Determined
opposition was encountered from the 54th German Division, which had
just relieved the 232nd Division, and a very involved situation supervened.
Throughout the morning the fighting was most severe, as the enemy
launched strong counter-attacks whenever any gain of ground was
achieved by the Americans. In the afternoon the situation slightly
improved, but all attempts to ascertain the exact situation failed, com-
' The " BB" gas was almost identical with the German Yellow Cross, or " Mustard," Gas.
' It was originally intended that the preliminary bombardment should begin at 6 a.m. on
September 27th (see Sir Douglas Haig's orders on page 138), but when it was found that 30,000
gas shell, the first consignment of shell filled with our new gas, would arrive from England in
time and could be made available, it was arranged that the forty-eight hour bombardment with
high explosive and shrapnel should be preceded by a gas bombardment lasting eight hours and
beginning at 10 p.m. on the 26th.
Sefi. 26TH-28T11] THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 145
munication with the leading troops being almost impossible. Subsequent
events, however, showed that although small parties of the 27th American
Division had reached their objective and gallantly maintained themselves
there, the line as a whole was not materially advanced by the day's
operations.
Meanwhile, good news had been received from other parts of the
allied front. On September 26th and 27th the French and American
The attacks ol the Armies had attacked on both sides of the Argonne
Allied Armies on other between the Meusc and the Suippe, and had taken
parts o£ the front over 8,000 prisoners. The difficulties, however, of
the country and the communications rendered further advance slow,
and gave the enemy time partially to recover and reorganise. The
Third and First British Armies had attacked on September 27th on a
front of thirteen miles, between Gouzeaucourt and the Sensee river, had
made excellent progress, and had taken 10,000 prisoners. On September
28th the advance of these two armies was continued, and their troops
established themselves on the east bank of the Canal de I'Escaut at Marcoing.
The enemy, however, made most determined efforts to prevent the Third and
First Armies from extending their bridgeheads on either side of Cambrai.
The Canal de I'Escaut formed a very formidable obstacle and rendered a
further advance most difficult. That this would be so had been fully
realised by General Headquarters, and the attack of the Fourth Army
on September 29th was intended to turn the flank of the enemy's defences
on the Third and First Army fronts, and enable a general advance to be
continued. On September 28th the British, French, and Belgians, under
the command of King Albert, had also attacked between the Lys and
Dixmude and had met with complete success ; transpoi-t difficulties, how-
ever, as in the case of the Americans and French, prevented a rapid advance
after their initial victory.
The Fourth Army had now been fighting for 51 days, driving the
enemy from position to position. During this period it had employed
The situation on the ^^ divisions to defeat 41 German divisions. The
Fourth Army front on enemy's losses in prisoners alone, since August 8th,
September 28th amounted to 46,500, including 1,100 officers, while
our casualties in killed, wounded, and missing had reached 72,000.
That the enemy intended to hold the Hindenburg Line to the utmost
of his power and resources there was no reason to doubt ; not a single
trench rumour of a further retirement reached us from prisoners. It was
estimated that our attack on the 29th would be opposed between Le
Tronquoy and Vendhuile by seven divisions, and that this line could be
reinforced within 72 hours by six more divisions from reserve. ^ The
mofal of the German troops, after their severe defeats, had undoubtedly
much deteriorated and would continue to do so with every fi'esh retirement,
but there still remained a considerable number of stout-hearted machine-
gunners who could cause us much trouble, and there were certain regiments,
and even divisions, that retained a good fighting spirit. The moral of our
' Actually eight divisions were encountered : the 2nd, 8th. Hth, 54th, 75th Reserve, 79th
Reserve, 121st and 185th Divisions ; six more joined in the battle within seventy-two hours :
the 2ad Guard, 21st, 23th Reserve, 84th, 119th, and 221st Divisions.
U
146 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 28th
own troops was continuing to rise every day with the consciousness of
superiority over the enemy, and it was further increased by the arrival
of the fresh British and American divisions which had reinforced the
army since the 18th.
We were undoubtedly face to face Avith a very strong position ; but
all ranks realised the far-reaching issues of the result of the forthcoming
attack, and, as on August 8th, there existed in the army the will to
conquer, and the confidence in victory, that foreshadow success.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE, SEPTEMBER 29TH
Maps 2, 8, and 10; and Panoramic Photographs 6 and 7.
The German defences — The preparations for the attack — The communications — Secrecy — The
temporary amalgamation of the Australian and II American Corps — The frontages of attack
— The objectives — The co-ordination with flank armies — The artillery — The preliminary
bombardment — The ammunition supply — The allotment of tanks — The special mission of
the 5th Cavalry Brigade and the armoured cars — The role of the Cavalry Corps— The assembly
of the troops— The assault — The IX Corps ; the action of rthe 1st Division — The capture
of the first objective by the 46th Division — The advance of the 32nd Division to the second
objective — ^The result of the day's fighting by the IX Corps — The Australian-American
Corps ; the attack of the American divisions — The 30th American Division — The 27th
American Division — The action of the 5th Australian Division — The action of the 3rd Aus-
tralian Division— The armoured cars — The III Corps operations — The situation of the
III Corps at dusk — The result of the battle — The orders for September 30th.
The Hindenburg Line was selected and organised for defence in the
latter end of 1916, and the work was continued dui-ing the spring of 1917.
It was the direct result of the battle of the Somme,
The German defences as it was to this line that the Germans retired in
March, 1917, in order to shorten their line and make
good the losses suffered during their defeats of the preceding summer
and autumn. It was first discovered and photographed, by the
4th Brigade, Royal Air Force, in February, 1917, thus confirming
vague rumours of its existence received from refugees repatriated by
the enemy through Switzerland.^ Since March, 1918, when the British
Army had been driven back, the Hindenburg defences had been unoccupied
and more or less neglected.
In addition to our previous knowledge of the line, further valuable
information had been acquired. On August 8th a defence scheme,
complete in every detail, for the Hindenburg Line between the Oise and
Bellicourt, was captured at a German Corps Headquarters. This document
was undated, but was evidently drawn up early in 1917.- That the original
' The country and nature of the defences were well known to the commander and staff of
the Fourth Army, under whose direction careful reconnaissances of the line from St. Quentin to
Havrincourt had been carried out between April and July, 1917.
^ This document, in addition to showing all the treriehes and wire, gave the position of eveiy
battery, its calibre, barrage lines, and observation posts ; the position of all sound-ranging and
flash spotting sections ; the location of every artillery and infantry headquarters and of all battle
stations ; and that of every dug-out, both concrete and otherwise, and of every machine-
gun emplacement. It also revealed to us the rear organisation, that is to say, the divisional sectors ;
ammunition and supply dumps ; railheads ; billets and camps, specifying the accommodation
for men and horses ; the signal communication and electric power installations ; and the selected
places for balloon slieds and landing grounds.
147
148 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept 22nd-28th
policy for the defence of the Hindenburg Line was one of rigid defence, is
clearly shown in the following extracts from this document :
" The Siegfried Line makes full use, along extended stretches,
of the front line of defences afforded by the Bellicourt-St. Quentin
Canal. . . . The strength of these defences, increased as it is by
inundated areas, the very extensive possibilities of mutual flanking
support by the different sectors, and the, generally considered, good
artillery observation render the line very strong. Added to this
is the advantage that the Siegfried Line, having been reconnoitred
without interference from the enemy, and plans having been drawn
up for its occupation by troops of all arms, a systematic withdrawal
from the outpost positions can be effected.
" The Siegfried Line is considered to afford the most favourable
conditions for a stubborn defence by a minimum garrison. It is
therefore adapted to the requirements of obstinate close combat.
" Its position, behind the natural defences offered by the Belli-
court-St. Quentin Canal, affords the enemy free use of many favourable
points of observation close in front of it. The use of these points by
the enemy must be hindered as long as possible. For this reason
outposts will be established before the Siegfried Line with the object
of maintaining contact with the enemy and obstructing his recon-
naissance. These will retire on the Siegfried Line before an enemy
attack. It is the duty of the Command to prevent any decisive
action being fought further forward than the first line of defence of
the Siegfried Line which is prepared for a stubborn defensive. It
must be clearly understood by units of all arms that the battle will
be fought from the first line trenches of the Siegfried Line."
It must, however, be remembered that, since this document was
written, the superiority, under modern conditions, of defence in depth
over a rigid defence had been universally recognised. There is little
doubt that this change in policy, to a certain extent, altered the plans for
occupying the line previous to our attack, and added to the confusion
and disorganisation of the enemy.
The attack of the Fourth Army involved the surmounting of two
widely different types of obstacle. In the southern half of the front,
where the St. Quentin Canal runs through open country, the enemy's
main defence line was sited east of the canal, which provided a naturally
formidable obstacle on its immediate front. The trenches in this part
of the line were not so formidable as in the northern, or tunnel, sector.
Along the whole length of the canal bank, however, concrete machine-gun
emplacements had been constructed to enfilade the wire, which was erected
along the inside slopes of the western bank. Moreover, in order to keep
the water at a sufficient depth, the canal had been dammed at Bellenglise ;
in consequence, the canal bed south of the village was dry for a certain
distance.
In the northern half of the front, where the St. Quentin Canal runs
through the Bellicourt tunnel, the main defences, also of an extremely
formidable nature, were sited on the western side of the canal tunnel,
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Sept. 22ND-2*rHj THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE 149
and consisted of two or three strong lines of trenches, each protected by
several thick belts of wire. Furthermore, the tunnel itself, which was con-
nected by passages with the ground level, provided good cover for reserves.
Besides these main defences, numerous trenches had been constructed
at various points to counteract local weaknesses, or to take advantage of
the lie of the ground and give a good field of fire. The villages of Bellen-
glise, Bellicourt, and Bony had been strongly fortified.
The whole scheme, combining, as it did, the skilful use of the ground
with artificial aid in the shape of wire, dug-outs, and machine-gun em-
placements, and with the judicious disposition of field and machine-guns,
had undoubtedly resulted in the creation of a very strong defensive
position, which well merited the reputation attached to it. A study
of the defence scheme, however, showed that the German
High Command fully realised that there were weak points in the position,
and this was confirmed by the manner in which the enemy was fighting
for every inch of ground in his outer defences. One serious drawback to
the Bellicourt tunnel defences was the fact that the high ground about
Quennemont Farm, Gillemont Farm, and The Knoll, when no longer in
German possession, gave magnificent observation over them, and also
provided the necessary cover for artillery to approach to close quarters
for the purpose of dealing with the belts of wire that protected the defences.
Another weakness was the salient at Bellenglise, which, overlooked as it
was from the high ground both to the south and north-west, was very
vulnerable to the converging fire of artillery. Further, owing to the
configuration of the ground, it was difficult for the enemy, once the outer
defences were lost, to find positions, not under hostile observation,'-
in which to place his artillery or collect his reserves for counter-attack.
Full advantage of these weaknesses was taken in drawing up the plan
of attack and in allotting the objectives.
Behind the main Hindenburg Line there was only one single line of
trenches to arrest our progress. This line, of which the wiring was not
complete, ran from Lesdins to Le Catelet, passing west of Magny-la-Fosse
and Nauroy.2 It is true that there was another line further east, namely
the Masni^res-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line ; this, however, was 5,000 to
6,000 yards away from the main Hindenburg Line, and was too far
distant to play any part in the defence of the canal. ^
Such, then, was the nature of the defences opposed to us. It has fallen
to the lot of few commanders to be provided with such detailed information
as to the nature of the enemy's defences as was furnished by the German
memorandum and maps already referred to.
The orders issued by Sir Henry Rawlinson on September 22nd *
' By constructing underground tunnels, especially a very extensive one between Bellenglise
and Magny-la-Fosse, the Germans had overcome to a considerable extent the difliculty of massing
supports and reserves presented by the lie of the ground. The captured plans, corroborated by
prisoners' statements and photographs, had, however, revealed to us the exact position of these
tunnels and of their exits ; with this knowledge in our possession, they became to the Germans a
source of weakness rather than of strength.
* Usually called the Hindenburg reserve, or Le Catelet-Nauroy, line.
' Opposite the Fourth Army front the northern part of this line was called the Masnieres —
Beaurevoir, and the southern part the Beaure\'oir — Fonsomme Line.
• See page 138.
150 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 22nd-28th
defined the general plan of attack, and were amplified on subsequent
days by a series of instructions dealing with the details
"*' theTacr "" Of the operation.
The preliminary arrangements for the attack were,
generally speaking, identical with those for August 8th, but the IX Corps,
in addition, had to make special preparations for crossing the canal. For
this purpose 3,000 life-belts were obtained and issued to the storming
troops, as were also a few light portable boats and a number of ladders
for scaling the banks of the canal. On the day prior to the attack these
were tested with success on the banks of the Somme.
Much work had to be carried out to improve the forward communica-
tions, which were practically non-existent. Roads, rapidly constructed
in each divisional sector, were definitely allotted to
The communications infantry, artillery, and tanks, and were clearly marked
by signboards throughout. Units with distant objec-
tives were given priority on certain roads between prescribed hours.
Pioneer battalions and road construction companies were told off to
improve certain roads as the attack progressed. Furthermore, the IX
and III Corps made special arrangements for the repair of the bridges
over the canal at Bellenglise and Vendhuile, as soon as those places should
be accessible. Railway construction was also pressed on Avith the utmost
energy, as it would be impossible to maintain our ammunition supply to
the guns unless the railway reached Roisel and Montigny Farm before the
bombardment commenced.
It was decided that, as the enemy would necessarily expect an early
attack on the St. Quentin- Vendhuile front, a strategical surprise of the
nature of that of August 8th was out of the question. A
Secrecy tactical surprise, however, would still be possible, that
is to say the date and hour of our attack might be kept
from the enemj' until the assault was actually launched. As regards this
question, it must be remembered that the conditions obtaining on August 8th
and those on September 29th were radically different. In the former case
the enemy's wire and defences were practically non-existent, and no
wire-cutting or destruction of strong points and machine-gun emplace-
ments was required. Moreover, the Germans early in August still had a
considerable number of divisions in reserve in the western theatre, which
they could send to reinforce the Amiens front if they received warning
of the attack. A strategical surprise was, therefore, all important on
August 8th in order to attain a decisive success at small cost, whilst a
preliminary bombardment would not have materially contributed to the
success of the attack, and might, by destroying all chance of surprise, have
involved its failure. On September 29th, on the other hand, we were
face to face with very strong defences. These included numerous belts
of wire, concrete emplacements, and defended villages, all of which must
be subjected to a very heavy bombardment prior to the assault, if they
were to be captured without prohibitive losses ; on the canal front, south
of Bellicovirt, it was not possible to employ tanks. A strategical surprise,
moreover, was no longer essential ; in fact, such was our superiority in
men and moral, in artillery, tanks, and aeroplanes that it would positively
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Sept. 22nd-28th] THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE 151
be to our advantage if the enemy could be induced to increase the number
of troops holding the line, as his losses would be all the heavier, and the
result of the attack all the more decisive. A tactical surprise, however,
would undoubtedly result in reducing our casualties, and all efforts were
devoted to attaining it. The necessity of maintaining the strictest secrecy
with regard to the projected operations was therefore impressed on all
ranks, and orders were issued that all movement of troops and transport
in an easterly direction, on and after September 23rd, should take place
at night.
The place of honour in the assault on the tunnel defences of the
Hindenburg Line was allotted to the troops of the II American Corps,
_,. . „ „, supported by three Australian divisions. Neither the
The temporary amal- . "^ ^ . T • • ■ i tt » r^ i i
gamation of the Aus- American divisions nor the 11 American Corps had,
traiian and H American howevcr, any American artillery at their disposal, and,
^°^^^ in consequence, all the artillery, both heavy and field,
to support the attack of the 27th and 30th American Divisions, was
supplied by the Australian Corps or from army resources. The corps
signal organisation of the II American Corps had not been completed, and
such personnel as was available had had no experience of the difficulties
of signal communication in battle. Further, neither General Read, the
II American Corps staff, nor the 27th and 30th American Divisions, had as
yet had the experience of organising and mounting an attack of such
magnitude, and on the results of which so much depended.
It was, therefore, decided that, for the operation of breaking the
Hindenburg Line, the 27th and 30th American Divisions should be affiliated
to the Australian Corps and work under the direction of Sir John Monash
and his staff, though in all other matters remaining under General Read's
direct orders. The Americans would thus benefit by the extensive war
experience of the Australian Corps, while maintaining the administrative
unity of the II American Corps. The arrangement was no doubt some-
what complicated, and might have led to difficulties, but for the loyalty
of General Read and his subordinates, and the tact of the Australians.
The II American Corps established its headquarters close to those of the
Australian Corps, and was thus able to keep in close touch with the situa-
tion. On September 24th, in order further to facilitate co-ordination, an
Australian mission was formed and attached to the II American Corps.
The object of this mission was to ensure that all American formations and
units should be thoroughly acquainted with the methods of the Australians,
and understand the orders they received. The personnel was carefvdly
selected from all branches of the staff and from all arms, so that there
should be an Australian officer, or senior non-commissioned officer, with
every American unit down to a company of infantry.
The front on which the Fourth Army launched its attack extended
from Selency to Vendhuile, a distance of twelve miles. On the right, on
f ^ front of 10,000 yards, the IX Corps was to attack from
aSteck^ ° Selency to near Buisson Gaulaine Farm. The main
attack of this corps, against Bellenglise and the canal
north of it, was to be launched by the 46th Division, with the 32nd
Division in support, while the 1st Division, operating between Gricourt
152 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 22nd-28th
and Bellenglise and keeping west of the canal, was to maintain touch with
the 46th Division and press forward towards Thorigny and Le Tronquoy.
South of Gricourt the 6th Division, though not taking an active part
in the main attack, was to try to gain ground eastwards.
In the centre the AustraUan-American Corps prolonged the front to
near Tombois Farm, a distance of some 8,000 yards. On this front, the
30th and 27th Divisions were to assault the tunnel defences around Belli-
court and Bony respectively, with the 5th and 3rd Australian Divisions
in support, and the 2nd Australian Division in reserve.
On the left the III Corps held the remainder of the army front,
some 3,000 yards, with the 12th Division in line and the 18th Division
in reserve. Although not taking part in the main assault of the Hinden-
burg Line, its mission was, nevertheless, very important. It was to secure
the left flank of the Australian-American Corps by capturing the high
ground south-west of Vendhuile, and later, when the Americans had
crossed over the tunnel, by clearing Vendhuile and the area west of the
canal in that vicinity.
To the south of the Fourth Army the First French Army was to
extend the attack as far as Essigny-le- Grand, operating on a front of six
miles. To the north, the V and VI Corps of the Third British Army were
to co-operate by attacking between Vendhuile and Marcoing.
The first objective, or green line, extended from the northern entrance
of the Le Tronquoy tunnel to the northern entrance of the Bellicourt
tunnel, passing east of Lehaucourt, Magny-la- Fosse and
The objectives Nauroy, west of Mont St. Martin, and thence round the
eastern and northern outskirts of Gouy and Le Catelet.
It entailed the storming of the canal and tunnel defences from Bellenglise
to Vendhuile and the forcing of the Hindenburg reserve, or Le Catelet-
Nauroy, Line, which would mean an advance by the IX Corps and the
27th and 30th American Divisions of 4,000 to 5,000 yards.
When this objective was gained, the Americans were to swing north
and south ; to the north, with a view to cutting off the enemy holding
Vendhuile, thus facilitating the task of the III Corps ; to the south, in
order to gain touch with the bridgehead to be established by the IX Corps
at Bellenglise.! This exploitation would also protect the flanks of the
5th and 3rd Australian Divisions, as they moved through the American
divisions towards the second objective.
While the first objective was being consolidated, and while the
American divisions were engaged in exploitation, the IX Corps and the 5th
and 3rd Australian Divisions were to continue the advance to the second
objective, or red line. In the case of the IX Corps, this was to be carried
out by the 32nd Division, which was to " leap-frog " the 46th Division
and secure the tunnel defences at Le Tronquoy and the high groimd round
Levergies. This involved an advance beyond the first objective of from
2,000 to 4,000 yards. At the same time the 1st Division, still operating
west of the canal, was to secure Thorigny and gain touch with the 32nd
Division at Le Tronquoy. The 5th and 3rd Australian Divisions, after
" leap-frogging " the Americans, were to capture the Masnieres-Beaurevoir-
• The extent of this exploitation is shown on Map 10 by the green dotted line.
t^airfr} •«vu rrsrriM
LINE.
\^-^
S*«f* Aa. 7. 10 fau faf 162.
BEIXICOURT and tlu' wire in In.ni .if the HINDENBURC LINE.
o
o
Sept. 22nd-2Sth] THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE 153
Fonsomme Line from east of Joncourt to Guisancourt Farm and to exploit
further east to Wiancourt and Beaurevoir, an advance of from 4,000 to
5,000 yards beyond the first objective. It was expected that, even if our
troops did not reach all the objectives, they would probably gain a
footing in the Masnieres-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line on the first day.
It had been decided that St. Quentin itself was not to be attacked
by the First French Army, and that the French should cross the canal
Th 0 ordination th "°^^ ^"^ south of the town. In order to assist the
^ "flank anniS ^ advance of the XV French Corps, which was on our
immediate right, across the canal immediately north of
St. Quentin, arrangements were made for this corps to have a right of
way through the IX Corps area. It was also arranged that, as soon as
the Le Tronquoy tunnel had been captured by the 32nd and 1st Divisions,
the French were to take over the front held by the 6th Division from
Selency to Gricourt. Then, when the whole of the 1st Division had
passed over the Le Tronquoy tunnel, the French were to be given access
to the Fresnoy-le-Petit-Thorigny-Le Tronquoy road, until such time as
they were able to establish a passage over the canal at Lesdins. After
crossing the tunnel at Le Tronquoy, the XV French Corps was to advance
eastwards and south-eastwards within its boundary, in order to safeguard
the right cf the Fourth Army and turn the enemy's position about
Lesdins.
On the northern flank of the army it was desirable that the 38th
Division on the right of the V Corps should cross the canal and operate
in a north-easterly direction, thus facilitating the passage over the canal
of the other divisions of the V Corps. It was accordingly arranged that
the 38th Division should have the right of way over Vendhuile bridge, as
soon as it had been captured and repaired by the III Corps.
In order to give the necessary volume of fire for the preliminary
bombardment, which was to destroy the defences, cut the wire, and
demoralise the garrison of the Hindenburg Line, 44
The artiUery brigades of field artillery, 21 brigades of heavy artillery,
and 4 long-range siege batteries were placed at the
disposal of the army. These amounted in all to 1,044 field guns and
howitzers, and 593 heavy gims and howitzers.
In the gas bombardment, which opened at 10 p.m. on the 26th and
was maintained intermittently until 6 a.m. on September 27th, 6,336
howitzer and 26,101 18-pdr. " BB " gas shell were fired.
'barTen? This gas bombardment took the form of concentrations
of fire on localities of activity, such as headquarters and
groups of batteries, as experience, gained from studving the enemy's
methods, had shown that a bombardment with Yellow Cross gas was most
efficacious when limited in this manner and not distributed promiscuously
over a large area.
At 6 a.m. on September 27th the artillery began to fire the remainder
of Its programme, which was continued until " zero." This consisted
of vigorous counter-battery and harassing fire, the cutting of lanes in the
enemy's wire, and a sustained bombardment of selected strong points and
defended localities. The bulk of the artillery was disposed around Hargi-
154 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 22nd-28th
court and Lempire, where the configuration of the ground was more adapted
to the grouping of batteries than it was farther north and south ;
there was also a big group at Le Verguier. Owing to atmospheric
conditions, which curtailed photography and observation, it was
impossible to locate the positions of hostile batteries with accuracy,
but, nevertheless, our counter-batteries dealt with them effectively and
were successful in reducing the enemy's fire. The subsequent examination
of his gim positions revealed a satisfactory percentage of direct hits. The
harassing fire was particularly good, and, as the result of it, the enemy's
communications were cut in many places, and in numerous cases he was
unable to send up either rations or reinforcements.
The wire-cutting was carried out principally by 4*5-inch and 6-inch
howitzers using instantaneous fuses ; where it was feasible 6-inch Newton
mortars were used. In some places the wire was entirely swept away ;
in others, lanes were cut through it, or it was severely damaged.
Generally speaking, however, it was due less to the preliminary
bombardment, and more to the demoralisation of the enemy, to
the help of the tanks, and to the effective artillery covering fire, that
our infantry was able to penetrate the wire defences on the day of the
attack.
The destruction of the deep tunnels and dug-outs was beyond the
power of the artillery, and was not attempted, but their entrances and exits
were subjected to heavy and unexpected concentrations, especially on
September 29th. On the same day the telephone exchanges and the
defended localities of Bellenglise, Nauroy, Bellicourt, and Bony were
treated to a particularly heavy sheUing, which reduced them to heaps of
rubble. The sides of the canal were hit at frequent intervals, and ramps
of debris formed, up which the attacking infantry was able to scramble.
The use made of enfilade fire proved remarkably effective.
Provided as he was with substantial cover from shell fire, the enemy's
losses in killed from the bombardment were probably not great, but it
undoubtedly drove the defenders into their deep dug-outs and tunnels,
so demoralising them that a large proportion failed to man their defences
when they were attacked.
The task of supplying over 1,600 gims with the requisite ammunition
was by no means light. It must be realised that it had to be brought
forward and dumped while the preliminary fighting was
The ammunition supply actually in progress, and additional difficulty was caused
by the unavoidably late running of trains on the newly
opened line to Templeux-le-Guerard. Each day as many as fifteen
ammunition trains had to be cleared, their loads of ammunition being
moved forward by lorries, which, as often as not, were delayed by the
congestion on the roads due to the movement of troops and supplies.
When it is stated that from September 26th to October 4th 1,299,467
rounds of artillery ammunition were expended, the magnitude of the task
of supplying the ammunition for an attack of this nature becomes
apparent.
The existence of the canal necessarily limited the zone of activity
of the tanks, and, for this reason, the majority were employed in conjunc-
Sept 22nd-28th] THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE 155
tion with the Americans and Austrahans on the tunnel front, where the
numerous belts of wire, and the strength of the
"^"^ te^^°' "' defences, rendered the support of a large number of
tanks essential.
The Fourth Army was allotted the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Tank Brigades
and the 17th Armoured Car Battalion for the operations. These were
sub-allotted, the 3rd Brigade to the IX Corps, the 4th Brigade to the
American divisions, and the 5th Brigade and the 17th Armoured Car
Battalion to the Australians. Only a portion of the tanks allotted were
to be engaged on the first day of the battle, as experience had showTi the
necessity of keeping a large reserve in hand for subsequent days' fighting.
Consequently, in the IX Corps only the 9th Mark V Tank Battalion of
twenty-four tanks and one company of nine whippet tanks were to be
employed on the first day. Of these, sixteen Mark V tanks were to assist
the 46th Division in securing the first objective, and eight Mark V and the
nine whippet tanks were to support the advance of the 32nd Division
to the second objective. Their employment depended on the 30th
American Division securing the tunnel defences round Bellicourt, as it
had been arranged that all these tanks should cross the tunnel south
of that village, and, moving along the east bank of the canal, should join
their respective divisions in the advance eastward. In the case of the
4th and 5th Tank Brigades supporting the American and Austrahan
divisions, their tasks, although possibly more difficult, were straight-
forward. The 4th Tank Brigade, comprising the 1st, 301st American, and
4th Tank Battalions, all of which were either Mark V or Mark V star,
was to assist the American divisions to gain the first objective.^
The employment of the tanks of the 5th Tank Brigade, except such
tanks as were held in corps reserve, was to be governed by the principle
that each tank unit, in liaison with a definite body of infantry, should
undertake a specific operation. It was, therefore, definitely laid down
by Sir John Monash that on no account were tank units of this brigade,
on the completion of their mission, to be attached to another formation
without reference to the Australian Corps Headquarters. From the
point of view of the Tank Corps, this policy was welcomed as being the
one likely to produce the best results, as it gave the tank brigade and
battalion commanders a chance of husbanding resources, a most important
consideration. The 5th Australian Division was allotted twenty-four
tanks of the 8th Mark V Tank Battalion and eight whippet tanks of the 3rd
Battalion, and the 3rd Australian Division twenty-four tanks of the 16th
Mark V Tank Battalion and eight whippets of the 3rd Battalion. The 13th
Mark V Tank Battalion, comprising twelve tanks, together with twelve
tanks from the 16th Battalion, formed the corps reserve. These were
to move up under orders from the 5th Tank Brigade, and keep in as close
touch as possible with the progress of the battle.
' The original intention was to employ the 1st Tank Battalion with the 30th American
Division against Bellicourt, the 301st American Tank Battalion with the 27th American Division
against Bony, and to retain the 4th Tank Battalion in reserve. For various reasons, however,
it was found necessary to change this distribution considerably, and finally all three battalioD<<
were used on the 29th, thirty-three Mark V tanks supporting the 30th and thirty-four the 27th
American Divisions.
156 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 22nd-28th
The general principles governing the employment of the tanks were
the same as those observed on August 8th. The tanks engaged in the
initial attack on the first objective were to leave their assembly position
just before " zero," join the infantry on the " starting line," and move
forward with them. The noise of the tank engines during assembly was
to be drowned by aeroplanes flying at a low altitude over the battlefield.
As each objective was secured, the tanks were to rally at previously selected
localities, while, in the event of the attack not progressing satisfactorily,
alternative rallying points were chosen further in rear.
The role of the whippet tanks, attached to the " leap-frogging "
divisions for the attack on the second objective, was purely one of ex-
ploitation. They wei-e to penetrate further into the enemy's territory
than could be expected of the infantry, in order to demoralise him and
thus influence the later stages of the battle.
As the roads east of the Hindenburg Line were known to be in a
fairly good condition, it was decided, in the event of the attack making
The special mUsion of Satisfactory progress, to employ the 17th Armoured
the 5th Cavalry Brigade Car Battalion supported by eight whippets of the 3rd
and the annoured cars -pank Battalion to carry out a special mission. Sup-
ported by the whippet tanks, which if necessary could also assist
to tow the cars over the shell area, the armoured cars were to push
forward and demolish the railway line in the vicinity of Bohain and
Busigny, thereby cutting the enemy's main communications. The
whippet tanks were to escort them as far as Serain and Fremont, and then
" stand by " until assistance was required of them. The 5th Cavalry
Brigade was placed at the disposal of the Australian Corps, with a view
to working in conjunction with the armoured cars in the exploitation
beyond the second objective.
With the exception of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, the Cavalry Corps
remained under the orders of General Headquarters. Until the result
of the attack of the Third Army on September 28th
Cavaky Corps* ^^^ known. Sir Douglas Haig could not determine
on what portion of the front the cavalry could best
be employed. On the evening of September 28th, seeing that there
was no immediate prospect of the situation on the Third Army front
being suitable for the employment of cavalry, the Cavalry Corps was
moved into the Fourth Army area. It was, however, only attached
for administration, and, for its tactical employment, was to continue
to act, should the occasion arise, under the orders it had already received
from General Headquarters.
These orders were : —
(a) To advance in the general direction of Le Cateau, securing
the railway junctions at that place and at Busigny.
(b) To operate against the flank and rear of the enemy opposite
our Third and First Armies.
(c) To cut the enemy's communications about Valenciennes.
In accordance with these instructions, the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions
were ordered by Sir Henry Rawlinson to concentrate in the Hervilly-
Sept 2^h] THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE 157
Hamelet-Boucly and the Bihecourt-Vermand-Caulaincourt areas respec-
tively, so as to be ready to carry out their mission should the opportunity
offer.
During the night of September 27th all the divisions taking part in
the battle occupied their assembly areas, and the assaulting troops took
over the line in their respective sectors. The final
^V'tr^o^'s' °' preparations were carried out without a hitch except on
the northern half of the American front. Here, the
failure of the 27th American Division to complete the capture of Quenne-
mont Farm, Gillemont Farm, and The Knoll on September 27th
rendered its final preparations for the attack most difficult. It was
originally intended that the general line Quennemont Farm-Gillemont
Farm should be the infantry " starting line," and the barrage maps had
been worked out on this basis and issued to all concerned. To alter the
barrage at the last moment would ine\'itably lead to confusion, and, even
had it been possible to do so without jeopardising the success of the
operation, the knowledge that parties of American troops, including a
number of American wounded, still occupied portions of trenches in the
vicinity of these farms and of The Knoll made it impossible to bring the
barrage further back. After careful consideration. Sir Henry Rawlinson
decided that the barrage line must remain as originally planned, that is
to say on the east of the line Quennemont Farm, Gillemont Farm, and
The Knoll, and that the troops of the 27th American Division should
form up for the attack as near the barrage line as possible one hour
before " zero," and, assisted by an additional number of tanks, should
fight their way forward to the barrage line by " zero." Five-fifty a.m. on
September 29th was selected as the " zero " hour, and headquarters of
formations were so informed at noon on the 28th.
The early morning was fine but foggy, and was almost a replica of the
morning of August 8th. The svirface of the ground was soft and shppery
owing to the recent rains, but, as there had been a few
The assault days of fine weather previously, it was hard underneath.
The tanks had reached the tank " starting line " during
the night of the 28th. From here, those co-operating with the infantry
in the initial assault moved forward just before " zero," in order to pass
through the infantry on their " starting line " at " zero."
By 5.50 a.m. the infantry was assembled in its positions waiting
for the signal, some in trenches, some in shell holes in No IMan's Land,
others in the shelter of sunken roads. The guns continued relentlessly
battering the enemy's positions, and above the noise of the guns could
be heard the drone of the tank engines moving forward in the darkness
over the slippery ground. Persistent and distinct from the gun fire, and
not unlike the drone of the tank engines, was the rhji:hmic throb of the
aeroplanes patrolling overhead. Occasionally these dropped a bomb on
the enemy's trenches.
At 5.55 a.m. the noise was appalling. The barrage had fallen 200
yards in front of the infantry and was moving steadily forward, in^^sible,
except for the flashes, in the thick morning mist which hung over the battle-
field. The tanks, followed by the leading waves of infantry, rumbled
158 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 29th
forward and became enveloped in the fog, which was by that time
greatly intensified by the smoke of the shells. Shrapnel bursts filled
the air, and machine-gun bullets whistled everywhere overhead. The
attack was launched, and the fate of the battle now rested in the hands
of the subordinate commanders.
On the southern flank of the IX Corps the 1st Division, employing
the 3rd and 1st Brigades, began the difficult task of clearing the enemy
from the ground east and north-east of Pontruet with
^®^ ''"JP^ =^^? ?*'*"'° strong fighting patrols. The mission of the division
was to secure the right flank of the 46th Division in its
advance to the canal, to gain the high ground north of Thorigny, and join
hands with the 32nd Division at the tunnel defences south of Le Tronquoy.
The 1st Loyal North Lancashire and the 1st Black Watch of the 1st
Brigade, the former battalion operating in close liaison with the right of
the 46th Division, cleared the trenches west of the canal astride of the
Bellenglise-Ste. Helene road. The 3rd Brigade on the right sent forward
the 1st Gloucestershire towards the high ground around Sycamore Wood.
When this battalion had progressed about half a mile it encountered strong
resistance from the enemy holding the trenches west of the wood, and, in
accordance with the orders it had received, did not attempt to make a
frontal attack, the wood being subsequently secured after dark from the
north. Meanwhile, the 1st Black Watch", with the 1st Loyal North
Lancashire' in support, had swung round its left west of the canal
and was clearing the trenches in the area as far east as the main St.
Quentin-Cambrai road. The clearing of this maze of trenches was no
easy task, and the fighting was severe, but the 1st Black Watch, and the
1st South Wales Borderers of the 3rd Brigade, were not to be denied, and
early in the afternoon the high ground around Road Wood and the trenches
between it and the canal were captured.
During the remainder of the afternoon, little progress was made by
the troops of the 1st Division beyond the St, Quentin-Cambrai road, on
account of heavy enfilade fire from the south, but connection was estab-
lished with the 6th Division. This division, which had not been able to
advance north of Gricourt, was relieved by the French during the night
of September 29th, and went into corps reserve near Vermand.
The 46th Division advanced to the storming of the canal fine and the
capture of Bellenglise, with the 137th Brigade leading on a three-battalion
The capture of the front. The 139th and 138th Brigades, each on a one-
first objective by the battalion front, were in rear of the 137th, on the right and
46th Division j^f^ respectively, their task being to " leap-frog " the
leading brigade and secure the first army objective (green line). One com-
pany from the leading battalion of each of the supporting brigades was
detailed to " mop up " the area west of the canal. These battalions
were also instructed to keep in close touch with the situation, in order to
ensure that the 137th Brigade, having once crossed the canal, should run
no risk of being outnumbered in the trench systems immediately beyond.
Under cover of the dense mist the 137th Brigade stormed the
trenches west of the canal, killed most of the garrison, and reached
the canal well up to time. The l/6th South Staffordshire on the right
w
z
o
No. 67.
7o face pagf 158.
Wire
I iiiMiii
THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL; ONE OF THE PLACES WHERE THE 46TH DIVISION CROSSED.
No. 68.
ANOTHER PART OF THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL, WHERE A CROSSING WAS
EFFECTED BY THE 46TH DIVISION.
►J
y.
z
o
I
W
m
Sept.2^h] the storming of the HINDENBURG line 159
crossed the canal north-west of Bellenghse, finding Httle water in it.
At first the Germans put up some resistance, but, after a number of our
men had crossed, tliey surrendered freely. This battalion then advanced
through Bellenglise and secured the tunnel entrances in the village, where
some hundreds of prisoners were captured before they had time to offer
any resistance. As a means of giving shelter, and thus avoiding casualties
during a bombardment, these tunnels had served their purpose admirably,
but, as our attacking troops reached them before they were cleared, they
became a veritable trap for those who had taken refuge in them.
The l/5th South Staffordshire and the l/6th North Staffordshire, in the
centre and on the left respectively, found a considerable depth of water
in the canal, and the banks where they crossed were high. Swimming
over first with ropes, the officers were soon joined by the leading waves
of their men, who made use of life-belts, rafts, light portable boats, and in
some cases of bridges which had only been partially destroyed by the enemy.
At Riqueval Farm the bridge was found intact, although prepared for
demolition. Some German pioneers were in the act of lighting the fuses
to the demolition charges, but were prevented from doing so by the timely
arrival of a company of the l/6th North Staffordshire and an engineer
detachment, who rushed the bridge. The bridge was saved, and some
pontoon bridges were rapidly constructed ; these subsequently proved in-
valuable for pushing the supporting troops across the canal. Rapidly over-
coming the resistance of the enemy holding the trenches east of the canal, the
troops of the 137th Brigade penetrated a further 700 yards and captured
a battery of four guns. At 8.20 a.m. the barrage was halted, and
a protective barrage was formed, which remained stationary for the next
three hours.^ The leading battalions of the 139th and 138th Brigades
were already across the canal and close in rear of the 137th Brigade, and,
during this pause, the remainder of these brigades crossed.
When the barrage lifted at 11.20 a.m., the 139th and 138th Brigades
" leap-frogged " the 137th Brigade and advanced against the first objective.
The two companies of the 9th Tank Battalion allotted to these two
brigades had successfully crossed the tunnel south of Bellicourt, and
moved forward, one company with each brigade. By this time the dense
mist, which had greatly assisted the attack of the 46th Division in its
early stages, had thinned considerably, and the visibility was much
improved. This enabled the enemy to bring effective fire to bear on our
troops, and made the tanks an easy mark for hostile field guns. The
leading battalion of the 139th Brigade was immediately subjected to
intense enfilade fire from machine-guns, as well as from a battery of field
guns situated on the high ground west of the canal. This battery also
quickly put out of action the company of tanks which was co-operating
with the 139th Brigade.
Although deprived of the assistance of these tanks, the brigade
pushed steadily forward, keeping close to the barrage. On reaching the
high ground west of Lehaucourt the whole attack was, however, held up by
artillery fire from the front, and by machine-gun and rifle fire from the
right flank. Realising that everything depended on the advancing
^ See Map 18. " Barrage Map." This three hour protective barrage is " Protective B " on
the map.
160 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 29th
troops keeping close to the barrage, Lieut. -Col. William Vann,^ commanding
the l/6th Sherwood Foresters, rushed up to the firing line and, with the
greatest gallantry, led the whole line forward. The fate of the tanks had
meanwhile been avenged by the enterprise of a party of men of the 139th
Brigade, who, having crossed to the western bank of the canal, killed the
detachments of the field guns which had destroyed the tanks. In this
part of the field several attempts were made by the enemy to stem the tide
of our advancing infantry, but in vain.^
On the left the 138th Brigade moved forward steadily, and by
12.30 p.m. was approaching Magny-la-Fosse. Until the mist lifted,
communication with the 30th American Division on the left was difficult.
When the visibility improved, it was seen that there were still Germans in
Nauroy, and the left flank of the 138th Brigade was, therefore, refused.
Similarly, the right flank of the 139th Brigade was in advance of the 1st
Division west of the canal. In consequence there was a slight delay,
when for a short time the infantry lost touch with the barrage ; it
was soon regained, and, assisted by the tanks which co-operated with
the 138th Brigade, the advance of the 46th Division continued. Our
troops had now reached the enemy's artillery positions, where the German
gunners fought gallantly and continued firing their guns up to the last.
Finally Lehaucourt and Magny-la-Fosse were captured, and by 3 p.m.
the whole of the first objective had been secured on the front of the 46th
Division.
Meanwhile, the 32nd Division had moved forward from its assembly
area round Le Verguier, with the 14th and 97th Brigades leading on the
The advance of the right and left respectively, and with the 96th Brigade in
32na Division to the reserve. ^ The leading brigades, with two batteries of
second objective f^^j^j artillery, began to cross the canal at 3 p.m., the
96th Brigade remaining west of the canal. At about 4 p.m. the attacking
brigades " leap-frogged " the 46th Division on the first objective, but the
tanks allotted to the 32nd Division to co-operate in the attack were unfor-
tunately unable to reach their rendezvous in time to take part in the
advance. They were, therefore, concentrated near Magny-la-Fosse ready
for the next day's operations.
Although the advance of the 32nd Division met with determined
resistance, it made good progress. At 6 p.m. the 15th Highland Light
Infantry on the right of the 14th Brigade advanced against Le Tronquoy,
covered by a light artillery barrage. Fighting ensued, but the village
and the high ground and woods round it w^ere captured. On the left of
the 14th Brigade the 1st Dorsetshire was not so fortvmate, the shelling
and machine-gun fire on its front being very severe. Nevertheless, the
battalion reached the second objective on its right, while its left was
refused along Ecume Trench.
" This gallant officer, before the war, was Chaplain to Wellingborough School. See Appendix
E, No. 44.
2 One German officer, who was mounted, made three gallant attempts to rally the men of
the 79th Reserve Division, but, after he and his horse had been killed, the enemy retreated in
disorder.
3 In order to ensure the closest co-operation between the 32nd and 46th Divisions the two
Divisional Commanders established a joint headquarters on September 29th in a dug-out wtU
forward.
Sept 29th] THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE 161
For the same reason the right of the 97th Brigade was held up in the
valley south-west of Levergies, and its left, exposed to heavy
fire from the enemy's machine-guns posted south of Joncourt and on the
southern slopes of Mill Ridge, was temporarily checked north-east of
Magny-la-Fosse. At this time the left of the 32nd Division was
temporarily out of touch with the Australians, of whom some troops of the
32nd Battalion reached the south-western outskirts of Joncourt about 6 p.m.,
but, finding themselves isolated, withdrew to near Etricourt. Machine-
guns of the 82nd Machine Gun Battalion were, meanwhile, moved up the
sunken roads north-east of Magny-la-Fosse, and swept the slopes of Mill
Ridge with harassing fire, to such good effect that the fire of the enemy's
machine-guns was neutralised, and the 97th Brigade was again able to
move forward. The Lehaucourt Ridge was secured to within about
1,000 yards of Joncourt, and a flank was thrown back facing north,
connection being established with the Australians near Etricourt.
By nightfall all three brigades of the 32nd Division were east of the
canal ; the 96th Brigade, which had moved forward during the afternoon,
being in close support of the 14th and 97th Brigades. The artillery was
also well up ; one brigade of field artillery and one brigade of horse
artillery had already crossed the canal and were in action 1,500 yards east
of it, covering the 32nd Division, while two brigades of field artillery
and a brigade of heavy artillery were crossing the canal on their way
to reinforce them. The bridgehead at Bellenglise was therefore firmly
established.
The success attending the operations of the IX Corps was primarily
due to the dash and determination with which the troops of the 46th
The result of the Division pressed forward to their objective, and to the
day's fighting by the excellent leadership and initiative of the subordinate
IX Corps commanders, ^\^len their flanks were exposed, they
exerted pressure where the enemy was weak and gave way, and only
strengthened their flanks just sufficiently to safeguard them.
Not so dramatic, perhaps, but almost equally difficult and important
in its results, was the work of the 1st Division on this day, as the safety
of the right flank of the army depended on the success of its advance,
which the enemy opposed throughout the day with the greatest
determination.
The sector which had been considered in some ways the most formid-
able part of the Hindenburg Line on the army front had been captured at
small cost on the whole of the IX Corps front. The enemy's defences had
been penetrated by a deep wedge to a maximum depth of some 6,000 yards.
This would form an excellent salient from which pressure could be
applied to the north and south with every prospect of success, and the
many months of work which the enemy had spent in constructing these
defences had been rendered useless in a few hours. Over 5,100 prisoners,^
90 guns, and many hvmdreds of machine-guns and trench mortars
' Prisoners were captured from the 2nd, 11th, 75th Reserve, and 79th Reserve Divisions.
Of these the 2nd Division, which was occupying the Bellenglise salient, suffered veiy heavily.
The men on the whole had little stomach for" the fight, their moral having been much lowered
by our bombardment and by the consequent lack of food during the two days previous to our attack.
Y
162 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept 2&th
were captured, the 46th Division alone accounting for 4,200 prisoners
and 70 guns.^ It was a great and well-deserved victory for Sir Walter
Braithwaite and the IX Corps.
The 30th American Division on the right experienced little trouble
in forming up on the " starting line." The 60th Brigade, disposed on a
A trai' front of two regiments, formed up for the assault, with
American Corps ; "the the 59th Brigade in reserve.^ The 117th regiment of
attack of the Ameri- the 59th Brigade, which was to exploit to the south
can Divisions when the first objective had been reached, was in close
support of the right flank of the 60th Brigade. On the left the 27th
American Division, which was to advance an hour before " zero,"
experienced considerable difficulty in forming up on account of the
uncertainty of the situation. It was intended that the 54th Brigade,
which was to carry out the assault, should form up about 1,000 yards
in rear of the barrage line, with the 53rd Brigade in reserve. The i05th
Regiment of the 53rd Brigade, which was to exploit to the north when
the first objective had been reached, was to be in close support of the
left flank of the 54th Brigade. Owing to the difficult situation these
dispositions were not carried out entireh' as arranged.
The attack started well on the front of the 30th American Division.
The infantry, keeping close up to the barrage, moved through the masses
of wire and trenches towards the Bellicourt tunnel,
■"»« ^DWisbS^"''*" ^^^ *^^ intricate nature of the trench systems, the
confusion of wire, and the number of dug-outs were
responsible for a certain loss of cohesion, with the result that, by the time
the tunnel was reached, the barrage had been lost, and a good deal of the
impetus had gone out of the attack. Nevertheless, Bellicourt and the
southern entrance of the tunnel at Riqueval were captured. Beyond this
line it is difficult to say how far the Americans penetrated. As they
passed over and beyond the tunnel, it is certain that numerous groups of
Germans, belonging to the 121st and 185th Divisions, emerging from their
dug-outs and from the tunnel itself, offered a strong resistance to the
advance of the 5th Australian Division following in rear of the Americans.
In the excitement of their first big battle, fought as it was in a dense mist
and thick smoke, combined with the difficulty of locating all the entrances
to the tunnel and dug-outs, the " moppers up " of the 30th American
Division appear to have gone on, instead of dealing with those of the
enemy who had taken shelter during the initial advance.^ Several parties
of Americans penetrated beyond Nauroy and reached the first objective.
WTien the smoke and mist had cleared, and these parties could see where
they were, most of them joined the 5th Australian Division as it fought its
way forward.
' The casualties of the 46th Division on September 29th were only 800.
- An American division is composed of two brigades ; each brigade consists of two
regiments of three battalions each.
3 This was no new story. It had happened to the British and French many times in 1916
and 1917. Amongst several instances may be recalled the similar experiences of the Ulster
Division at Thiepval on July 1st, 1916, and of the 30th and 55th Divisions at Guillemont in August
of the same year, when the leading waves of tlie assault, after their first brilliant initial success,
were cut off by the enemy coming out of his shelters in their rear.
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Sept 29th] THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE 163
From the outset the 27th American Division was beset with
difficulties, which might well have daunted less gallant troops. Assisted
by the tanks, which had been specially detailed to
The 27th American "mop up" the German defences round Quennemont
Farm, Gillemont Farm, and The Knoll, the troops of
this division advanced an hour before " zero " against these centres of
resistance, while the barrage, for reasons given earlier in this chapter,^
came down at " zero " east of these localities and 1,000 yards from the
infantry " starting line." From the start the advance was strongly
opposed by the enemy with the fire of numerous machine-guns, and of a
number of field guns specially sited for dealing with tanks. Raking the
open ground, over which the assaulting troops were forced to advance,
the machine-guns wrought terrible havoc among the waves of advancing
Americans. Of the thirty-nine tanks assisting the advance, twelve
received direct hits, while seven more were " ditched." In one instance,
seven tanks approached to within a hundred yards of Gillemont Farm,
but were put out of action by the enemy as soon as they became visible
through the mist, and only one tank succeeded in crossing the Bellicourt
tunnel on this divisional front.
The gallant Americans gained a footing on The Knoll, but were subse-
quently driven off part of it by a strong counter-attack delivered by the
54th German division.- Some of the troops of the 27th American Division
broke through the tunnel defences of the Hindenburg Line under cover
of the mist and smoke of the barrage,^ the main force of the attack was,
however, expended against Quennemont Farm and Gillemont Farm, which
were still held by the enemy when the 3rd Australian Division arrived on
the scene.*
Moving from its assembly area round Hesbecourt and Ste. Emilie at
7 a.m., the 5th Australian Division advanced across country in artillery
formation, with a view to reaching the original " starting
sth'^AUrSLtSon ^^^^ " of the 30th American Division by 9 a.m., and to
" leap-froggmg " the Americans on the first objective
two hours later. The division was disposed with the 8th Brigade on the
right on a two-battalion front, and the 15th Brigade on the left on a
similar frontage. The 32nd and 29th Battalions led the 8th Brigade
advance, with the 31st in support. The 57th and 59th Battalions
led the 15th Brigade advance, with the 58th in support. The
14th Brigade was held in divisional reserve.
In spite of the thick mist the tanks, followed by the Australian infantry,
crossed the American " starting line " at 9 a.m. without incident, although
there was considerable shelling. On approaching Bellicourt, the tanks
encountered machine-gun fire from the outskirts of the village. Two tanks
■ See page 157.
2 Some troops of the 18th Division moved forward on the left of the 27th American Division
to protect its left (lank and reached The lOioU with the American troops.
3 During the afternoon returning wounded reported that they had reached the Hindenburg
Line, while aircraft reported the presence of ground flares near Gouy.
* The two American divisions were opposed in this attack by parts of four German Divisions,
namely, the 54th, 75th Reserve, 121st, and 185th, all of which were in line between Riqueval
Farm and the northern entrance to the Bellicourt tunnel Of these, the 54th Division was fresh
and put up a very good fight in the Bony area.
164 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 29th
moved forward, and were followed immediately by the 32nd and 29th
Battalions, which entered the village at 9.40 a.m. and proceeded to clear
it of such Germans as still remained. Major Anderson Wark,'^ who
commanded the 32nd Battalion, now found the situation somewhat
critical ; he at once went forward and obtained sufficient information regard-
mg the situation in front to enable him to lead his command forward.
Dm-ing his reconnaissance he fovmd 200 Americans, whose advance had
been checked with heavy loss, and who were in consequence considerably
disorganised. These Major Wark attached to his leading company, and
thus reinforced the 32nd and 29th Battalions, having " mopped up "
Bellicourt, pushed forward towards Nauroy. The mist now lifted,
exposing the infantry and tanks to the view of the enemy holding the
high ground round Nauroy, and the anti-tank guns concealed in the village
quickly put the tanks out of action. In spite of this, the 32nd Battalion
on the right, moving up the western slopes of the high ground, entered
the southern portion of Nauroy; it " mopped up " this ^-illage and cap-
tiu-ed 50 prisoners. The 29th Battalion on the left reached the Le
Catelet-Nauroy Line, but was unable to advance farther on account of
the intensity of the fire which enfiladed their position from the direction
of Cabaret Wood Farm. Shortly after noon the enemy's resistance
strengthened," and it became evident that there were no American troops
in front of the 8th Brigade except small isolated parties. Moreover, by
this time all except two of the twelve tanks supporting the brigade
had been put out of action by direct hits or had been " ditched."
The 8th Brigade Commander, therefore, decided to wait until 8 p.m.,
and then launch an organised attack.
On the left of the 5th Australian Division the 15th Brigade
advanced steadily towards the American " starting line " without incident.
Beyond this line progress was hampered by fire from machine-guns which
had come into action as soon as the Americans had passed. Nevertheless,
at 11 a.m., when the mist began to clear, the 58th Battalion, which had
moved up in support between the 57th and 59th, had reached
the tunnel north of Bellicourt. Here isolated groups of Americans were
encovmtered, but they could give no information regarding the situation
in front. A line was, therefore, formed on the west bank of the tunnel
embankment, with the 57th Battalion on the right and the 58th
in the centre. The 59th on the left had lost touch with the
57th owing to the mist, had SAVung too much to the left, and
thus became mixed up with the 44.th Battalion of the 3rd Australian
Division. The 59th Battalion found great difficulty in reaching the
Hindenburg Line owing to the enfilade and reverse fire which it
experienced from machine-gvms on the high ground round Quennemont
Farm, where the enemy was still holding out ; there were also isolated
posts of the enemy still occupying portions of the Hindenburg Line. Some
hard fighting ensued, but finally the support trenches about 500 yards
west of the tunnel were cleared and held by a mixed garrison, comprising
men of the 59th BattaHon, one platoon of the 44th Battalion, and parties
> For details regarding Major Wark's splendid leadership, see Appendix E, No. 45.
* The line here had been reinforced by at least one battalion of the 21st Division from support
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Sept 2^u] THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE 165
of the 108th Regiment of the 27th American Division. Numerous bombing
counter-attacks down the trenches from the north were repulsed, and
touch with the 58th BattaHon was regained on the tunnel. Reconnais-
sance beyond the tunnel revealed the fact that we had no definite line in
front, except some posts which had been established by the troops of the
30th American Division. As the resistance in front of the 5th Australian
Division had strengthened considerably during the past two hours, it was
decided to continue the attack at 3 p.m. with the 15th Brigade as well as
with the 8th Brigade, under cover of a creeping barrage.
At 3 p.m. the 8th Brigade, assisted by four tanks, all of which
were put out of action almost at once, moved forward. The 32nd Bat-
talion established touch with the troops of the IX Corps on the
northern slopes of Knobkerry Ridge, north of Magny-la-Fosse, about
5.30 p.m. It then continued its advance and succeeded in reaching
Joncourt, but, finding itself isolated, ^vithdrew later to Etricourt,
where it was in touch with the 32nd Division. The 29th Battalion on
the left quickly gained the first objective on its front, although opposition
was encountered from machine-gun posts on the high ground north-east
of Nauroy. This battalion was compelled later to withdraw to the Le
Catelet-Nauroy Line owing to its left flank being enfiladed from the north.
The 31st Battalion, meanwhile, moved forward through Nauroy from
support and advanced between the 32nd and 29th Battalions. It was,
however, checked east of the village by heavy fire from the Sugar Factory
and was unable to advance fai-ther.
On the 15th Brigade front the 57th and 58th Battalions, reinforced
by groups of the 30th American Division, also resumed the advance at
3 p.m. Four Mark V and eight whippet tanks took part in the operation,
but unfortunately, within fifteen minutes of starting, all of the Mark V
tanks and five of the whippets were put out of action. The lightness of
our artillery barrage added to the difficulties of the infantry, as it permitted
the enemy to man his machine-guns in the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line.
Nevertheless, the 57th Battalion on the right managed to capture the
Le Catelet-Nauroy Line on its front, and the 58th Battalion gained a
footing in it further north. This left the enemy still in possession of the
trenches in front of Cabaret Wood Farm, with the result that numerous
bombing encounters took place. Although a portion of these trenches was
cleared by the 57th Battalion, the 58th Battalion on the left was unable
to make any headway on account of the enfilade fire from the north, and at
4.30 p.m. it withdrew, and formed a defensive flank from the Le Catelet-
Nam'oy Line west of Cabaret ^Vood Farm to the tunnel. This line was
prolonged northwards along the tunnel for 200 yards, and then swung
back to the sunken road 500 yards west of the tunnel, where a junction
was effected with the 44th Battalion of the 3rd Australian Division.
Later in the afternoon the 59th Battalion moved forward from the
trench jiist west of the road and relieved the troops of the 44th
Battalion.
Thus, at nightfall the 5th Australian Division, after a very severe
day's fighting, was established on the high ground round Etricourt in
touch with the IX Corps ; it held Navu-oy and the Le Catelet-Nauroy
166 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept 2&rH
Line as far north as Cabaret Wood Farm ; thence it threw back a defensive
flank to the tunnel to join with the 3rd AustraUan Division,
The 3rd Austrahan Division moved off from its assembly area round
Ronssoy at 7 a.m. and, preceded by the tanks, advanced in artillery forma-
tion towards the line Quennemont Farm-Gillcmont
The action of the Farm, which it expected to cross by 9 a.m. The
3rd Australian Division _,., ' j .„., yi • j u- u i j- u
11th and 10th Brigades which were leading, each
advanced on a two-battalion front, followed by the 9th Brigade. As
soon as the leading battahons had crossed the original " starting line " of
the 27th American Division, machine-gun fire was encountered from
Quennemont Farm, Quennet Copse, and Gillemont Farm. At the same
time the enemy's artillery fire was very intense, putting a number of the
tanks out of action.
Although reports from wounded men, and later from the air, were
received that the 27th American Division was through the Hindenburg
Line and had secured its objective, it was obvious that the enemy was
still holding strong localities behind the advanced troops of the American
division, and that there would be considerable fighting before the first
objective could be reached. Definite information regarding the situation
of the troops of the 27th American Division could not be obtained, and
observation w^as impossible owing to the thick mist which obscured every-
thing.
It was essential, however, that the line Quennemont Farm-Gillemont
Farm should be secured, and that the 3rd Australian Division should
push forward and assist the Americans to reorganise and complete their
task. It Avas known that the 30th American Division had captured
Bellicourt, and the 9th Brigade was, therefore, ordered to hold itself in
readiness to move at short notice southwards, with a view to assisting the
easterly advance of the 11th and 10th Brigades by operating against the
flank of the enemy's defences from the direction of Bellicourt. This
move, however, did not take place on the 29th.
Throughout the remainder of the morning heavy fighting took place,
the 54th and 121st German Divisions resisting our advance between
Bellicourt and Le Catelet with determination. Two tanks secured the
small spur immediately south of Quennemont Farm, but were put out of
action shortly afterwards. Other tanks advanced against Quennet
Copse, from which a number of machine-guns were causing our infantry
considerable casualties. The tanks arrived at the copse to find that the
enemy had surrendered, and that our infantry was in possession. Further
north the infantry, working in close conjunction with the tanks, cleared
South Gillemont Trench and gained the western edge of the farm. The
mist was now lifting, visibility was decidedly better, and the shelling from
the north had increased and was at this time very severe. The tanks, as
they moved over the crests of the ridges, formed an excellent target for the
anti-tank guns, and several were put out of action ; their crews, however,
removed the machine-guns from them and joined the infantry.
By noon no material progress had been made. The 44th Battalion
on the right of the 11th Brigade was in touch with the 15th Brigade of the
5th Australian Division in the main trenches of the Hindenburg Line,
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Sept 29thJ THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE 167
but the remainder of the brigade was held up west of Quennemont Farm
and in the trenches east of Quennet Copse. The 10th Austrahan Brigade
continued the hne to the north along South Gillemont Trench, then west
of Gillemont Farm and across the Macquincourt valley to The Knoll,
which was held by our troops. The enemy was beginning to work up the
Macquincourt valley in small parties, and made repeated counter-attacks
against The Knoll and the left flank of the 10th Brigade.
Maj.-Gen. Hobbs ordered the advance to be resumed at 3 p.m.
by the 11th and 10th Brigades and tanks. The 9th Brigade was brought
forward in close support of the 10th Brigade, with the object of protecting
the left flank of the division from any attacks from the north. It was
impossible to employ covering artillery fire for this attack, on account of the
uncei-tainty of the situation with regard to the Americans. Consequently,
when the infantry and tanks began to advance at 3 p.m., they were met by
such a storm of shell and machine-gun fire that it was obvious that to
continue the attack in daylight under these conditions was impossible.
An advance of a few hundred yards, however, was made, and Gillemont
Farm was captured. At about this time the enemy, as the result of continued
counter-attacks, succeeded in gaining a footing on the eastern slopes of
The Knoll, thus threatening the left flank of the 3rd Australian Division
and the right of the III Corps. One battaUon of the 9th Brigade, therefore,
took up a position south-east of Tombois Farm at the head of the
Macquincourt valley to prevent any further penetration.
While the fighting was in progress during the morning, the armoured
cars, with their usual boldness, moved dowTi the Hargicourt-Bony road
to carry out their special mission. On approaching
The armoured cars Bony they found that the enemy was still in occupation.
Four armoured cars and four whippet tanks were put
out of action by anti-tank gun fire. The remainder of the whippets and
armoured cars were, therefore, withdrawn to a position of safety until
the situation should allow them to carry out their allotted task.
The action of the III Corps was entirely dependent on the progress
of the battle on its right. The 12th Division was disposed along the front
of the III Corps, the 35th Brigade on the right and the
opewtior' 37th Brigade on the left, with the object of securing
the left flank of the army. It was not to undertake a
general attack, but, whenever the situation permitted, was to endeavour
to gain ground along the whole of its front and secure Lark Spur. The
main operation on the III Corps front was undertaken by the 18th Division.
This division formed up for the attack with the 54th Brigade in rear of
the left of the 27th American Division near Sart Farm. ^Vhen the latter
division had advanced beyond The Knoll, the 54th Brigade was to swing to
Ihe north and secvire Macquincourt Trench. The 55th Brigade was to
assemble north of Ronssoy, and follow ihe 3rd Australian Division
when it moved forward at 7 a.m. It was then to advance do\vn the
Macquincourt valley and establish a bridgehead across the canal at
Vendhuile. This would in turn allow the 38th Division of the V Corps to
cross the canal and advance northwards against the flank of the enemy's
defences opposite the remainder of the V Corps. One battalion of the 37th
168 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 29th
Brigade of the 12th Division was to form up west of The Knoll on the
left of the 54th Brigade, with the task of securing the high ground 1,000
yards west of Vendhuile.
The III Corps attack was launched at " zero " and at first made good
progress. By 1 p.m. the 54th Brigade had established itself in Macquin-
court Trench overlooking Vendhuile ; the 12th Division had advanced its
line 1000 yards ; on the left, however, the 37th Brigade was unable to push
forward beyond Dados Loop. Up to this time the reports as to the
progress of the 27th American Division had been most favourable, but
information now began to be received which modified the earlier reports.
Moreover, the right flank of the 54th Brigade was in some danger from the
enemy's pressure up the Macquincourt valley.
As the Australians were held up in front of Gillemont Farm, the
proposed advance of the 55th Brigade down the Macquincourt valley was
impossible. Therefore, at 1.25 p.m. one battalion of this brigade was
instructed to operate southwards from The Knoll against the trenches
north of Gillemont Farm ; the situation at this time, however, round The
Knoll and south of it, combined with the intensity of the enemy's artillery
and machine-gun fire, made such an operation impracticable. Subse-
quently, the 55th Brigade strengthened the position round The Knoll by
holding the trenches on its southern slopes, and joined up with the Aus-
tralians on the right and the 54th Brigade on the left, the latter having
thrown back a defensive flank from Macquincourt Trench. The 12th
Division continued the line on the left of the 54th Brigade, at a distance
of about 700 yards from the canal, connecting with the 33rd Division
north of Dados Loop.
Such was still the situation at dusk. On the left no material progress
had been made, and, in consequence, the right divisions of the Third Army
were unable to advance. Moreover, the German artillery
The situation oJ^ the ^^ ^^le high ground about La Terriere was very well
orps a u placed to harass the advance of our left flank, while, so
long as the advance of the Third Army was held up, its own position was
perfectly secure. As the result of the day's fighting, the III Corps had
captured over 250 prisoners and was in possession of Macquincourt Trench
and The Knoll, both of which were of considerable importance, as they
protected the left flank of the Australian- American Corps.
Our total captures on September 29th amounted to over 5,300
prisoners, of whom 128 were officers. These came from 48 battalions of
twenty regiments of nine different divisions. In
"""^ "bSe°* *^^ ^^^ ^-^ Corps, whose attack had been a complete
and far-reaching success, the casualties had been very
light compared with the results achieved. It had every reason to be
proud of the day's work, which was second to none amongst those recorded
in this story. The American divisions, whose task under any conditions
was far from easy, had been compeUed by the events of the previous forty-
eight hours to face a very difficult proposition. Only the most fearless
and self-sacrificing troops would have faced the fire to which they were
subjected from the moment the attack started, and it is to their undying
credit that they achieved what they did and broke the backbone of the
Sept. 29th] THE STORMING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE 169
tunnel defences. The Australian troops engaged surmounted the diffi-
culties which met them from the start with then- usual determination and
individual initiative in the face of unexpected situations, while the 18th
and 12th Divisions showed that the continuous fighting in which they had
taken part since August 8th had in no way damped their ardour,
September 29th was perhaps the most trying day the tanks had
experienced during all the battles in which they took part with the
Fourth Army during the hundred days, but they earned the sincere grati-
tude of the infantry by their never-failing gallantry and self-sacrifice
whenever they were called upon for assistance.
Such high hopes had been held of a sweeping and decisive victory on
September 29th, that the check received at the northern half of the tunnel
defences was for the moment the cause of some disappointment. It was
soon realised, however, that, although we had not achieved all that was
desired and expected, we had, nevertheless, inflicted a crushing defeat on
the enemy. We had forced a wedge into his defences to a depth of some
5,000 to 6,000 yards on a front of about 10,000 yards, which wovild render
his position a very difficult one, and, if a little more pressure was exerted,
the whole of the tunnel defences would shortly be in our possession.
After discussing the situation on the northern half of the front with
Sir John Monash and General Read, Sir Henry Rawlinson decided to
withdraw the II American Corps for a short rest, and to
"'^mbe"30th^*^' ^^^^y °" *^^^ operations with the IX, Australian, and
Xlli Corps on fronts of approximately equal widths, as
soon as the situation on the timnel had been cleared up by the Australian
Corps, and the gap widened.
On the evening of September 29th, therefore, orders were issued to
the following effect : — The IX Corps was to secure the whole of the Le
Tronquoy tunnel defences, with a view to allowing the XV French Corps
to pass through as early as possible, to capture the high groimd on the
line Le Tronquoy-Sequehart-Preselles, and to push forward towards
Joncourt, thereby assisting the advance of the Australian Corps. The
Australian Corps was to endeavour to get into touch with the American
troops who were believed to be in front of our main line, to capture
Estrees and Folemprise Farm, and to secure the remainder of the
Hindenburg Line as far as the northern entrance of the tunnel, and
the Nauroy-Le Catelet Line as far as the southern outskirts of Gouy.
The II American Corps was to withdraw its troops to a position in rear,
as soon as relieved by the Australians. The III Corps was to occupy
Vendhuile, and to give as much artillery assistance as possible to
the Australian Corps. The XIII and Cavalry Corps were to remain in
reserve in the positions they then occupied until the situation developed.
It was hoped to secure all these objectives within a short time, and to
advance our line to within striking distance of the Masnieres-Beatirevoir-
Fonsomme Line, which could then be broken by another organised attack
on a wide front.
CHAPTER IX
THE COMPLETION OF THE CAPTURE OF THE HINDENBURG DEFENCES,
SEPTEMBER 30TH — OCTOBER 2ND, AND THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR
LINE, OCTOBER 3RD — 5TH
Maps 2, 10, 11, and 12
September 30th ; the advance of the IX Corps — The plan of operations of the Australian Corps —
The attack of the 5th Australian Division — The attack of the 3rd Australian Division — The
action of the III Corps — October 1st ; the IX Corps operations ; the 32nd Division attack —
The attack of the Australian Corps continued — The III Corps relieved by the XIII Corps
— October 2nd ; the action of the IX Corps — The relief of the 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions
— The situation on the evening of October 2nd — The orders for the attack on October 3rd —
The objectives and frontages of the attack — October 3rd ; the IX Corps attack ; the action
of the 1st Division — The attacks of the 32nd and 46th Divisions — The action of the XV
French Corps — The Australian Corps ; the attack of the 2nd Australian Division — The XIII
Corps ; the attack of the 50th Division — The result of the day's fighting — The orders for the
continuance of the attack on October 4th — October 4th ; the action of the IX Corps — The
action of the 2nd Australian Division — The XIII Corps attack — The progress of the First
French Army — The plan of attack for the capture of Montbrehain and Beaurevoir —
October 5th ; the IX Corps at Mannequin Hill — The capture of Montbrehain by the 2nd
Australian Division — The XIII Corps ; the capture of Beaurevoir by the 25th Division —
The advance of the 50th Division north of Gouy, and of the 38th Division of the V Corps
— The result of the day's fighting — The relief of the Australian Corps by the II American
Corps on October 6th — The work of the Royal Air Force — A review of the situation on
October 6th— Sir Douglas Haig's orders for the continuance of the offensive.
At 8 a.m. on September 30th the 1st Division, operating west of the
canal, attacked under cover of a creeping barrage. The 3rd Brigade on
September 30th ; the the right advanced against Thorigny and Talana Hill,
advance of the IX whilst the 1st Brigade co-operated by moving along
Corps thg Jq^v groimd, with its left resting on the canal.
Thorigny and Talana Hill were captured during the morning with little
opposition, together with 300 prisoners of the 11th and the 79th Reserve
Divisions. Early in the afternoon the 3rd Brigade linked up with the
14th Brigade of the 32nd Division on the Le Tronquoy tunnel ; the 1st
Brigade, crossing the canal, then relieved the 14th Brigade between Le
Tronquoy and Levergies with two battalions.
At the same time the 32nd Division continued to press forward
with strong patrols of the 14th and 97th Brigades, while the 15th
Lancashire Fusiliers, of the 96th Brigade which was in support, attacked
Joncourt from the south-west. In spite of strong resistance the line was
advanced to close to the southern outskirts of the village, and connection
was established with the 5th Australian Division. During the day the 14th
Brigade completed the "mopping up" of the Le Tronquoy tunnel defences,
and at 7.30 p.m., in conjunction with troops of the 97th Brigade,
attacked Levergies, capturing the village with 400 prisoners.
170
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Sept aoTH] THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR LINE 171
During the night of September 30th preparations were made for the
14th Brigade to attack Sequehart ; for the 96th Brigade to operate against
Joncourt in conjunction with the 5th Australian Division, and to gain
the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line round Chataignies Wood in co-operation
with the 97th Brigade.
Meanwhile the 47th Division of the XV French Corps, which had
relieved our 6th Division at Gricourt, had been ordered to attack towards
the canal south of Le Tronquoy. Little progress was made during the
afternoon of the 30th, but, on the morning of October 1st, the enemy's
resistance weakened, and the canal was reached in the afternoon. The
French then established connection with our 1st Brigade at Le Tronquoy,
thus cutting out the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Division, which was withdrawTi
into reserve.
WTiile the IX Corps was operating around Le Tronquoy and Sequehart,
the Australian Corps was engaged in the difficult task of clearing the
The plan of opera- remainder of the Hindenburg main and reserve lines.
tions of the Australian To add to the difficulties of the situation it was almost
Corps certain that isolated parties of Americans were still
holding out in advance of our line, although their exact position was not
kno^vn. This very much limited the action of our artillery.
The 5th Australian Division was ordered to attack with its right
up the southern slopes of Mill Ridge, in conjunction with the attack of the
32nd Division, and with its left working northwards towards Gouy along
Railway Ridge. The 3rd Australian Division was ordered to attack
simultaneously northwards along the main Hindenburg Line and along
the tunnel towards The Knob.
The 5th Australian Division attacked with the 8th and 14th Brigades,
on the right and left respectively. The 8th Brigade made little head-
way except on the right, where at 4 p.m. the 32nd
5thAus*tS^nDiS'ion Battalion advanced in conjunction with the troops of
the 32nd Division. An appreciable advance was made
south-west of Joncourt, and a footing was established on the southern
slopes of Mill Ridge. On the left the 14th Brigade employed the 53rd
Battalion supported by the 55th, and attacked in co-operation with
the 11th Brigade of the 3rd Australian Division. In order to keep
the battalions of the 14th Brigade free to continue the attack, the
15th Brigade, which was holding that part of the line, was instructed to
take over from the 14th Brigade all ground gained by extending its left
northwards.
The attack started at 6 a.m. and was supported by a barrage.
Machine-gun fire was encountered from the outset from Cabaret Wood
Farm, from the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line, and from the exits from the tunnel
east of Bony. In spite of this, the 53rd Battalion made steady progress,
and by 1 p.m., with the help of a company of the 55th Battalion, had
cleared the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line northwards for a distance of 1,200
yards, and had repulsed several counter-attacks. ^ The 15th Brigade took
^ In this attack Private John Ryan, 55th Battalion, displayed great bravery and initiative,
and his action, when his officers and non-commissioned officers were disabled, saved a critical
situation. See Appendix E, No. 38.
172 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Sept. 30th
over the greater part of the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line captured by the 14th
Brigade, but was unable to clear Cabaret Wood Farm.
The task of the 3rd Austrahan Division was rendered very difficult
by heavy shelling from the north from the enemy's batteries on the
high groimd about La Terriere, and by machine-gun fire from round
Bony. To the 11th Brigade, less one battalion, but
ard^/usSan DiSon Strengthened by two battalions of the 9th Brigade, was
entrusted the clearing of the Hindenburg Line north and
south of Bony from the south. The attack was to be made on a one-
battalion front, each battalion being given a portion of the Hindenburg
Line and the tunnel to " mop up." As each battalion completed its
task, the next battalion was to pass through it and continue the
operation. In order to assist the 11th Brigade as it worked its way up
the Hindenburg Line and the tunnel from the south, the 10th Brigade
was to operate eastwards against the enemy's defences between Bony
and the northern entrance to the tunnel, by means of strong fighting
patrols. The 9th Brigade, which had been moved during the night of
September 29th to the area between Gillemont Farm and Malakoff ^Vood,
was, with its two remaining battalions and one from the 11th Brigade, to
ensure that touch was maintained between the attacks of the 10th and
11th Brigades.
The night of September 29th was dark and cold, and the movement
of the troops, and particularly that of the 9th Brigade, through the mud
and without landmarks, was very trying. Notwithstanding this, the
troops were assembled up to time on the morning of September 30th.
At 6 a.m. the attack of the 3rd Australian Division began simultane-
ously with that of the 5th Australian Division. The 44th Battalion of
the 11th Brigade led the advance behind a creeping barrage which moved
northwards searching the trenches of the main Hindenburg Line. Progress
was steady but slow, as movement except along the trenches was almost
impossible. The Germans fought stubbornly for the possession of each
post and machine-gun position, and hand grenades, Lewis guns, and
especially the bayonet, were all freely employed during this reversion to
trench warfare. By nightfall the 11th Brigade had cleared the trenches
northwards for about 1,000 yards and had gained a footing in the outskirts
of Bony.i
During September 30th the 12th and 18th Divisions of the III Corps
succeeded in driving the enemy across the canal at Vendhuile, and in
clearing the village and the greater part of the area
""'mSpf '^* ^'^^* ^^ *^^ ^^^^^- ^^^^ materially assisted the 10th
Brigade of the 3rd Australian Division, which was thus
able to advance eastwards on October 1st without further fear for its left
flank.
' During these operations the Australian Corps encountered another division from reserve,
the 2nd Guard Di\ision, which had been sent up hurriedly in lorries on the 29th, and its three
regiments divided among the 21st, 183th, and 121st Divisions. From prisoners' statements it
appeared that the 1st Guard Grenadier Regiment had received orders to counter-attack early on
the morning of the 30th, but that our attack had forestalled it. The moral of this division was
by now very bad, the men being dispirited at being brought into the line for the third time during
September, it having been previously engaged against the 18th Division at Trones Wood, and
against the Australians at Mont St. Quentin.
Panoramic photograph So. 8, to face pa^e 172.
Road to Hard/court
Pan->ramic phoioi'apb .Vo. 8. (» /»« ^Jjf I7S.
RosJ to Hardicourt
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Oct. 1ST] THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR LINE 173
On the morning of October 1st the IX Corps held its line thus : the
1st Division from Le Tronquoy to Levergies, with the 1st Brigade in the
October 1st ; the K ^^^^' The 32nd Division held from Levergies to Jon-
Corps operations ; the court, with the 14th, 97th, and 96th Brigades all in line
32nd Division attack f^^^ fig^t to left, and with the 46th Division in support.
The attack on Joncourt was launched at 8 a.m. on October 1st under
cover of a barrage. The 15th Lancashire Fusiliers of the 96th Brigade
entered the village from the south, and the Australians from the west.
There was little resistance, as most of the enemy had retired to the
Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line during the night, and only eight prisoners
were captured.
The attack by the 32nd Division on the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line
and Sequehart was not delivered until 4 p.m. This was a much more
difficult operation, as the enemy's position on the high ground at Sequehart
was one of great natural strength, and the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line
at this point was well wired and strongly held.
The infantry, accompanied by sixteen tanks from the 9th Mark V
Tank Battalion, advanced under cover of a barrage. Sequehart was
captured with great dash by the 5 /6th Royal Scots of the 14th Brigade
with over 200 prisoners of the newly arrived 221st Division. The enemy,
however, at once counter-attacked in strength, after shelling the village
heavily, and drove the 5/6th Royal Scots back to the west of the village.
Further north the 1 /5th Border of the 97th Brigade encircled Chataignies
Wood and entered Preselles, but the frontal and enfilade machine-gun fire,
which was encountered from the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, rendered
it impossible for our men to retain the ground gained, and they were
finally withdrawn to the railway cutting 100 yards west of the wood.
Complete success crowned the attack of the 96th Brigade on the left.
The 2nd Manchester attacked with great gallantry, and was assisted by
four tanks, while five tanks followed in rear to clear the trenches
to the north of the objective. The battalion broke through the Beaurevoir-
Fonsomme Line and, after stiff hand-to-hand fighting, cleared the line
from Swiss Cottage to a point 1,400 yards south of it, capturing 210
prisoners of the 2nd and 241st Divisions.^ In this attack the tanks ren-
dered valuable assistance, although unfortunately three were hit just before
" zero." In one of these tanks the whole crew except the officer became
casualties ; picking up an officer and a man of the attacking battalion
to work the machine-guns, the tank went into action and met with
considerable success. The IX Corps had now gained a footing in the
Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line which would be of great value to it, and of this
the enemy was fully aware. Repeated counter-attacks were made during
the night against the left flank of the 96th Brigade, but the 2nd Manchester
successfully maintained its position, with the assistance of a company of
the 15th Lancashire Fusiliers which had been sent forward to reinforce it.
During the evening of October 1st patrols of the 5th Cavalry Brigade,
which had been transferred from the Australian to the IX Corps, passed
beyond the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line to test the strength of the enemy's
' The wire in front of these trenches was very thick, and the trench itself, although only one
foot deep, contained numerous rifle and machine-gun pits.
174 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct 1st
defence. The village of Ramicourt and the ridge south of it were found
to be strongly held with machine-guns, and the cavalry was withdrawn.
The 5th Australian Division made an organised attack on October 1st
with the object of completing the capture of Mill Ridge, and, if the enemy's
The attack of the resistance showed any signs of weakening, of reaching
Australian Corps the Bea\irevoir-Fonsomme Line east of Joncourt and
continued Estrees. This attack was carried out by the 8th Brigade
on the right, the 14th Brigade, less two battalions, in the centre, and the
15th Brigade on the left.^ It was laimched at 6 a.m. in a thick ground
mist, under cover of a barrage. On the right the 8th Brigade, assisted
by two tanks of the 8th Mark V Tank Battalion, encountered only slight
machine-gun fire, though the enemy's artillery fire was fairly heavy. The
tanks rendered yeoman service, and Mill Ridge was captured by 7 a.m.,
whence patrols were sent out towards Joncourt. This village was entered
from the west, and by 9 a.m. had been cleared with little opposition in
co-operation with the 32nd Division. From here patrols attempted to
reach the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, but were unable to do so. Even-
tually, the 8th Brigade established a line on the north-eastern slopes
of Mill Ridge between Joncourt and Estrees, about 400 yards from the
Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line which the enemy was holding in considerable
strength.
In the centre the 56th and 54th Battalions of the 14th Brigade, on
the right and left respectively, moved forward towards Estrees along the
high grovmd south of Folemprise Farm, and by 7.30 a.m. the leading
infantry had reached the outskirts of the village. Fifteen minutes later
the advance was resumed by the 56th Battalion, which, with the assistance
of eight tanks from the 8th Tank Battalion, cleared Estrees, taking a few
prisoners ^ and some field guns.
The 15th Brigade attacked with the 59th, 57th, and 58th Battalions
from right to left. All the battalions made a good start, and by 7.30 a.m.
Cabaret Wood Farm and Cabaret Copse had been captured, and the line
advanced to the vicinity of Folemprise Farm and Mint Copse. Strong
patrols then went forward, and Folemprise Farm and Mint Copse were
secured without difficulty. The enemy's shelling, however, was severe,
and to avoid casualties our line was withdrawn behind the crest of the
spur running north-west from Folemprise Farm, while only a few posts
were maintained along the Estrees-Gouy road. Later in the afternoon
the line of this road was consolidated, and subsequently handed over to
the 2nd Australian Division.
While this fighting was in progress the 53rd and 55th Battalions of
the 14th Brigade, which were astride of Railway Ridge, finding the enemy's
resistance decidedly weakening, pushed forward and diiring the morning
' The 14th Brigade had taken over part of the front north of Nauroy during the previous
night with two battalions, leaving its 53rd and 55th battalions holding the line on the left of
the 15th Brigade.
* These prisoners belonged to the 119th Division, showing that yet another division had been
thrown into the line. The division had arrived late in the evening of the 29th September, and had
received orders to counter-attack should we succeed in capturing the front line positions. These
instructions had, however, not been carried out, and the men had retired in the face of our attack.
This division had only been relieved on the 20th September after suffering severely during our
attack on September 18th.
Oct 1ST-2ND] THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR LINE 175
occupied practically the whole of the ridge. Communication was then
established by these battalions with the 15th Brigade in the Soult valley,
and with the 3rd Australian Division in the Vauban valley.
On the front of the 3rd Australian Division the struggle had
continued during the night of September 30th, and the pressure was main-
tained persistently on October 1st. Although considerably exhausted
by the trench fighting, the troops of the 3rd Australian Division made
good progress, and by 12 noon Bony, The Knob, the main Hinden-
burg Line, and the tunnel had been captured. The enemy still held
Macquincourt Farm and was not ejected from it until the following night,
when patrols of the 10th Brigade drove him across the canal. The 10th
and 11th Brigades consolidated the ground gained during the afternoon
and pushed forward patrols east of the tunnel and towards Le Catelet
and Gouy.
On the night of September 30th, after the successful attack on
Vendhuile, the 18th Division took over the whole of the III Corps front,
relieving the 12th Division, which was transferred to
"lytoeS CorpI"^ ^^^ First Army by 'bus three days later. On the
night of October 1st the 149th Brigade of the 50th
Division relieved the 18th Division, which, on relief, moved back to a rest
area near Amiens. At 12 noon on October 1st Sir Thomas Morland,
commanding the XIII Corps, took over command of the front held by
the 18th Division from Sir Richard Butler, and the III Corps Headquarters
were transferred to the Fifth Army on October 3rd. Since March, the III
Corps had been holding a sector of the Fovuth Army front without a rest.
During the months of April, ]May, June, and July it was busily engaged
in supervising the construction of defences to cover Amiens. From
August 8th onwards it had taken an important part in a period of almost
continuous fighting, during which the III Corps with five di\nsions had en-
gaged twenty German divisions, taking 13,700 prisoners and 150 guns.
The outstanding feature of this period had undoubtedly been the powers
of endurance of officers and men, and their cheerful response to the
incessant demands made upon them.
During October 2nd the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division spent a trying
and unsatisfactory day. Its role was to keep touch with the left of the
47th French Division, which was passing over the tunnel
action°orthe°ix Co%s ^* ^^ Tronquoy and attacking south-east, and also with
the right of the 32nd Division on the Le Tronquoy-
Sequehart ridge. On the right the French were unable to make any
appreciable progress, while on the left the 32nd Division, after capturing
Sequehart for the second time, had again been forced to withdraw. The
result was that the 1st Brigade, without being actually engaged in the fight,
sustained considerable casualties from shell fire. The excellent information,
however, as to the situation on this flank of the army, which was sent
in by the 1st Loyal North Lancashire and the 1st Cameron Highlanders
during the day. was of the greatest value.
At 6 a.m. on the morning of October 2nd, the 14th Brigade renewed
its efforts to capture Sequehart with the 5 /6th Royal Scots. Once more
the village was secured and 100 prisoners taken, but again a strong
176 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct 2nd
counter-attack by the 221st Division three hours later drove our men back to
their original position on the western edge of the village,^ It was essential
for the enemy to maintain his hold on Sequehart, which commanded all the
ground to the east, south, and west. He appreciated its great tactical
importance, and realised that its capture by us would widen the breach
already made in the Masnieres-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, which was
his last prepared line of defence, and would also enable us to tiirn his
positions north of St. Quentin.
At 8.30 a.m. on the 2nd the 97th Brigade employed one company of
the 10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in an attempt to extend our
hold on the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line north of Preselles,- while simul-
taneously the 96th Brigade launched an attack against Ramicourt. Both
attacks were checked by the enemy's machine-gun fire.
As the result of the determined fighting by the 32nd Division during
the past three days, the IX Corps had added materially to its previous
success and had driven the wedge deeper into the enemy's position.^
On the evening of the 2nd the IX Corps held a front of some 8,000 yards
from Le Tronquoy to Swiss Cottage. This line ran along the high ridge to
Sequehart, along the western outskirts of that village, thence to a
point 1,000 yards north-west of Preselles, from which point to Swiss Cottage
we held the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line. The 1st Division held from
Le Tronquoy to just south of Sequehart, while the 32nd Division held
thence to Swiss Cottage.
During the night of October 1st the 5th Brigade of the 2nd Australian
Division relieved the 5th Australian Division between Joncourt and
The relief of the 3rd Mint Copsc. No operations were undertaken during
and 5th Australian the day on October 2nd, and that night the
Divisions remainder of the 3rd Australian Division was
relieved as far south as Mont St. Martin, by the 151st Brigade, of the
50th Division of the XIII Corps. This left the 2nd Australian Division
holding the Australian Corps front between Joncourt and Mont St. Martin.*
On relief the 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions moved back to rest areas
near Amiens. They had successfully completed a most difficult operation,
after four days of almost continuous fighting, and, like the 1st and 4th
Australian Divisions, they had fought their last fight in the Great War.
The front of the Fourth Army was held on the night of October 2nd
1 According to the German wireless, intercepted that day, the counter-attack was led in person
by the Divisional Commander.
* During this attack the bravery and devotion of a sergeant and eight men of the company
of the 10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were in keeping with the best traditions of their
regiment. This party entered some trenches which it was thought were already held by us, and from
which it was to push southwards and join up with the troops attacking from the west. But the
enemy was holding this portion of the trench in considerable strength, and severe hand-to-hand
fighting ensued. The bodies of the sergeant and his eight men were subsequently found in the
thirty yards of trench which they had cleared. Eleven deserted machine-guns and 16 dead
Germans proved the stubbornness with which the Highlanders had fought.
* With three British divisions the IX Corps had defeated portions of four divisions in the
line and of four divisions from reserve. Of the latter the enemy had hurried up reserve battalions
belonging to both the 84th and 241st Divisions from the La F6re area, as well as the whole of the
221st Division from south of St. Quentin, and the 25th Reserve Division from close support in the
Lesdins area.
* The 54th Battalion of the 5th Division remained in line until the morning of the 3rd
between Mint Copse and Mont St. Martin.
Skfitb Wo. 9, i,/m, ptp 177.
W^i:>^
^.'^fi^^t:ii„(g^.'
BEAUREVOIR and BEAUREX'OIR MILL.
Oct. 2nd] the capture of the BEAUREVOIR line 177
by the IX, Australian, and XIII Corps. The front of the IX
Corps was held by the 1st, 32nd, and 46th Divisions ;^ that of the
Australian Corps by the 2nd Australian Division ; that
eJlli'iiS*^i*octobe° 2nd ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^°^'P^ ^^^ *^^ ^^^^ Division, with the 25th
and 66th Divisions in support. Our line was within
easy striking distance of the Masnieres-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line. The
breach made in the Hindenburg defences on September 29th had now
been considerably widened, and these defences had been captured
from Le Tronquoy to Vendhuile, while to the south our advance had
enabled the First French Army to occupy St. Quentin and reach the line
of the canal. During this time the left of the Third Army had captured
Masnieres, had secured the crossings over the canal between that village
and the outskirts of Cambrai, and was continuing its attacks. The
Canadian Corps also on the right of the First Army was making good
progress north of Cambrai.
It was considered that one more determined attack would give us the
Masnieres-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line on the whole of the Fourth Army
front. This would turn the enemy's defences in front of the right of the
Third Army, thus enabling it to advance the whole of its line, while
to the south it would enable the French to advance east of St. Quentin.
Again, as in the case of the Mont St. Quentin operations and of the
attack against the outer defences of the Hindenburg Line, time was of
great importance. The enemy was still greatly disorganised as the
result of the fighting since September 29th, and, by attacking him again
on October 3rd, he would be prevented from either reorganising his troops
or carrying out an orderly retirement.
Sir Henry Rawlinson had on October 1st decided to attack this line
on October 3rd. He wished to secure the high ground about Mannequin
The orders for the Hill, the villages of Montbrehain and Beaurevoir, Prospect
attack on October 3rd Hill, and the hill north of Gouy and Le Catelet. Orders
(see Map 11) for the necessary readjustment of fronts and the allotting
of objectives had been issued on October 1st to the IX. Australian, and
XIII Corps, and they had been making preparations for the attack. On
October 2nd it was decided that " zero " should be 6.5 a.m. on the 3rd.
On the right the IX Corps, operating in conjunction with the First
French Army, Avas to capture Sequehart and Ramicoui-t, and
The objecHves and &s a sccond objective was given Mannequin Hill and
frontages of the Montbrehain. For this attack, the 32nd and 46th
attack Divisions were employed in the centre and on the left
respectively; the latter division was to maintain touch with the
2nd Australian Division on the road between Joncourt and Wiancourt.
To the 1st Division, on the right of the 32nd Division, was entrusted the
role of maintaining touch with the First French Army. In addition, the
5th Cavalry Brigade was to follow the infantry closely and seize any
opportunity for mounted action which might arise. The Australian Corps,
employing the 2nd Australian Division, was to capture the Masnieres-
Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line north of Swiss Cottage and, if possible,
Beaurevoir and Ponchavix. The XIII Corps allotted the difficult task of
1 The 46th Division relieved the 96th Brigade of the 32nd Division on the night of October 2nd.
A A
178 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct 3rd
clearing Gouy and Le Catelet and of gaining Prospect Hill to the 50th
Division.
\Vhile these operations were in progress, the Third Army was to
co-operate by exploiting east of the canal towards Aubencheul-aux-Bois.
To the south, Marshal Foch ordered the First French Army to press
forward east and south-east from Le Tronquoy and so support the right
flank of the Fourth Army, which for the past two days had been repeatedly
counter-attacked from the south-east, these attacks being chiefly directed
against the 32nd Division at Sequehart.
The IX Corps attack was launched at 6.5 a.m. under cover of a heavy
barrage, and supported by sixteen tanks of the 5th Mark V Tank Battalion.
3 d • th IX ^^ ^^^^ right the 1st Division held the front south
Corps attack ; the of Sequehart with the 1st Brigade in the line and
action of the 1st the 3rd Brigade in close support. Although no definite
Division attack was to be carried out by the division, the 1st
Brigade, in order to keep close touch with the French on the right and
with the 32nd Division on the left, and to assist the 32nd Division
which was attacking Sequehart from the north-west, was compelled
to extend its left northwards. This resulted in the 1st Loyal North
Lancashire becoming involved in the fighting in the south-eastern portion
of Sequehart, where it repulsed an enemy counter-attack with the bayonet
and captured 40 prisoners.
The 32nd and 46th Divisions completed their assembly early in the
morning of October 3rd and began their advance at 6.5 a.m. The 32nd
The attacks of the Division attacked Sequehart from the north-west with
32nd and 46th the 14th Brigade, assisted by four Mark V tanks, and
Divisions i^j^g Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line north of Sequehart with
the 97th Brigade. After hard fighting, the 5 /6th Royal Scots, which had
at its own request again been allotted this task, captured Sequehart and
gained a footing in the trench line north of it, taking 200 prisoners.
The enemy once more made a great effort to recapture Sequehart,
and two counter-attacks were delivered by the 34th and 84th Divisions.
Both counter-attacks were driven off, and all the captured ground was
retained, partly owing to the prompt action of two companies of the
15th Highland Light Infantry, which, led by their battalion commander,
swept through the village and cleared it with the bayonet ; partly to the
action of the 1st Loyal North Lancashire of the 1st Division ; and partly
also to the stubborn manner in which the 5/6th Royal Scots clung to the
village it had three times captured.
The line gained by the 32nd Division was finally established in touch
with the 1st Division at Chardon Vert and with the 46th Division on the
left. At 6 p.m. the enemy put down a heavy barrage on the area
captured, and under cover of it attacked from the east and south-
east, but was again repulsed with heavy loss by rifle and machine-
gun fire.
The 46th Division attacked with the 137th Brigade on the right and
the 139th Brigade on the left. Owing to the fact that the 32nd Division
only held portions of the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, it was decided that
the 46th Division should form up on a track somewhat behind the line
Oct 3rd] THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR LINE 179
held, which could be found in the dark and which allowed a straight
barrage to be put down, a most important factor, as many batteries
had not been able to get into position before dark. The 32nd Division
arranged to have its troops withdra\Mi behind the " starting line " by
" zero." The arduous task of forming up on a dark night on unrecon-
noitred ground was successfully carried out, and at 6.5 a.m., supported by
two companies of ^lark V tanks, the infantry moved forward behind a
good barrage. The 137th Brigade went through to its objective without
a check and reached Mannequin Hill, but the 139th Brigade in advancing
to Ramicourt, after penetrating the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, found
its left flank exposed, owing to touch being lost with the Australians,
who were experiencing very severe opposition in the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme
Line on the left. Two companies, however, were promptly moved forward
to the left flank to link up with the Australians, and formed a protective
flank through Wiancourt, where they captured about 200 prisoners.
The enemy attempted to hold Ramicoiu-t, but was driven out of the
village with the assistance of the tanks, ^ after which his resistance
weakened, and the 139th Brigade, pushing forward rapidly, cleared
Montbrehain and captured 1,000 prisoners and a battery of field guns.^
In Ramicourt and Montbrehain over a hundred French inhabitants were
found and sent back through our lines.
By 10.30 a.m. all the objectives allotted to the 46th Division, including
Mannequin Hill and Montbrehain, had been gained. The division, however,
had suffered heavy casualties, and about 1 p.m. our troops were driven
off Mannequin Hill by a determined counter-attack,^ This withdrawal
caused a considerable gap in our line south of Montbrehain, and the
troops of the 139th Brigade were slowly forced back out of that village
by a second and even stronger counter-attack delivered by portions of
the German 21st, 221st, and 241st Divisions. The 137th and 139th
Brigades of the 46th Division now held a general line along the western
slopes of Mannequin Hill, and east of Ramicourt and Wiancourt. The
138th Brigade, from reserve, was moved up in close support to the Beaure-
voir-Fonsomme Line. At 6 p.m. the enemy, encouraged by his success,
again attacked the 137th Brigade and drove it off the western slopes of
Mannequin Hill. An immediate counter-attack regained the western
slopes of the hill, but the enemy still held the eastern slopes ; the
summit, on account of the severity of the fire, was at this time held by
neither side.*
On the right of the IX Corps the XV French Corps had
' While operating south of Montbrehain a tank was exposed to the fire of 16 machine-guns
holding a strong point. It destroyed all the crews of these guns before it was in its turn disabled
by the enemy's artillery fire.
2 Sergeant William Johnson, l/5th Sherwood Foresters, here materially assisted the advance
of his battalion by capturing two machine-gun posts single-handed. See Appendix E. No. 27.
' It was during this retirement that Lee. -Corp. Coltman, a stretcher-bearer of the 1 /6th North
Staffordshire, so distinguished himself by his courage and devotion to duty See Appendix E,
No. 11.
* The fighting in this operation had been severe, and the -teth Division had suffered considerable
losses, especially in officers, but, in comparison with our casualties, those of the enemy must have
been very great, as the 46th Division alone captured 2,000 prisoners. Since the" morning of
September 29th the 46th Division had captured 6,000 prisoners and over 70 guns at a cost of
2,500 killed, wounded, and missing.
180 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct 3rd
attacked towards Fontaine Uterte at 10 a.m., but had been unable
to gain much ground.
During the night of October 3rd the 126th French
'"'VMnch °Com ^^ Division of the First French Army took over the southern
portion of the IX Corps front as far north as Chardon
Vert, thus reheving the 1st Division. This division was then withdrawn
to the Vraignes area with the exception of the 3rd Brigade, which was
placed temporarily at the disposal of the 46th Division.
On the night of October 2nd the 7th Australian Brigade took over
the front from Folemprise Farm to Mont St. Martin from the 5th Brigade ;
The Australian Corps ; the 6th Brigade, in reserve, was concentrated south of
the attack o£ the 2nd Nauroy. The 5th and 7th Brigades formed up for the
Australian Division attack each with two battalions in line. The leading
battalions were to capture the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, after which the
two supporting battalions of each brigade were to "leap-frog" the leading
battalions and capture the final objectives. The 5th Brigade was
allotted eight tanks of the 13th Mark V Tank Battalion, and eight
whippet tanks of the 3rd BattaHon. Eight tanks of the 8th and 16th Mark V
Tank Battalions assisted the 7th Brigade. The approach march of the
tanks to the assembly positions was long and difficult, owing to the darkness
md the number of trenches and shell holes, and only six of the Mark V
tanks allotted the 5th Brigade arrived. These had to cover a distance of
8,500 yards.
At " zero ' the barrage came down covering the " starting line " and
remained stationary there for six minutes, after which pause it advanced
at the rate of 100 yards every four minutes. The barrage was good, and
the infantry started well up to it ; the tanks, however, were late, though
those that survived the approach march caught up the infantry later.
The 18th and 19th Battalions, on the right and left of the 5th Brigade
front respectively, gained the support trench of the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme
Line between 7.15 a.m. and 7.45 a.m., with the exception of 500 yards of
trench immediately south of the Estrees-Geneve road.^ Here, the two
inner companies of each of these battalions were unable to penetrate the
thick Avire in the face of heavy machine-gun fire, and no tanks had as
yet arrived. These four companies were withdra\vn to the sunken road
east of Estrees, and the troops which were already in the support trench
endeavoured to clear the trenches by working inwards from the north
and south, but without success. The trenches were then subjected to
thirty minutes' bombardment, after which two companies of the 19th
Battalion attacked from the north and captured the trenches, together
with 200 prisoners and 18 machine-guns.
Meanwhile, when the 18th and 19th Battalions had reached the support
trenches of the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line on the flanks, the 17th on the
right and the 20th on the left had passed through them. Only two companies
of the 17th Battalion were able to go forward, as the remaining two
companies had become involved in the struggle for the trenches which had
held up the first attack. The advance of the 17th Battalion was checked
* laeut. .Joseph Maxwell, 18th Battalion, displayed fine leadership in this attack. See
Appendix E. No. 35.
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Oct 3rd] THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR LINE 181
north-east of Wiancourt by machine-gun and artillery fire, but later it
was reinforced by a company of the 19th Battalion and gained touch with
the 46th Division on the right. The 20th Battahon, in passing through
the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, was deflected to the left by the machine-
gun fire from the trenches which had held up the ioui companies of the
18th and 19th Battalions.^ It advanced as far as the road junction near
Beaurevoir Mill, but was forced to withdraw down the western slopes of
the hill. Thus, owing to the advance of the 17th and 20th Battalions
having been diverted outwards, there was a wide gap between them,
which was further accentuated by the enemy's tenacious defence of La
Motte Farm. Shortly before noon, however, after the Germans had been
cleared out of the trenches east of Estrees, the four companies of the 18th
and 19th Battalions advanced, captured La Motte Farm with the aid
of two tanks, and filled the gap with a line of posts. By 2 p.m. the 5th
Brigade held the general line Wiancourt-La Motte Farm with all four
battalions in line, and with the 23rd Battalion of the 6th Brigade in close
support.
On the front of the 7th Brigade the 25th Battalion on the
right advanced about 500 yards and captured some enemy posts -without
difficulty; the 27th Battahon on the left met with some resistance,
but reached the Torrens Canal. Both battalions were now close up to the
Masnieres-Beaurevoir Line, and, with the assistance of two tanks which
had caught up the 25th Battahon, the line was captured. One company
of the 27th Battalion encountered about 100 of the enemy lining a bank
and firing at the troops of the 50th Division advancing on the left, but
Lewis guns were promptly brought to bear on them, and, after 40 of the
enemy had been killed, the remaining 60 surrendered. The whole of the
support trenches ofthe Masnieres-Beaurevoir Line on the 7th Brigade front
had been secured by 8 a.m. ; touch, however, had been temporarily lost
with the XIII Corps north-west of Lormisset Farm.
At 8 a.m. the 26th and 28th Battalions " leap-frogged " the leading
battalions, the 26th Battalion advancing towards Belle\'ue Farm, and
the 28th Battalion working northwards up the Masnieres-Beaurevoir
Line. Belle\'ue Farm was captured, the dug-outs and cellars were cleared,
and two field guns were secured just beyond the farm. With the Germans,
however, still in possession of Beaurevoir Mill hill and the high ground
north of Bellevue Farm, and also debouching from Beaurevoir, the
position of the right of the 26th Battalion was very exposed. It was,
therefore, withdrawn from Bellexoie Farm, and gained touch with the
5th Brigade in the Kukri valley. The 28th Battalion reached the Beau-
revoir-Gouy road with practically no opposition, but north of the road
the opposition stiffened, and at 9.30 a.m. the advance was checked.
Strong fighting patrols then moved north-east and endeavoured to reach
Prospect Hill, but field guns firing from the vicinity of Guisancourt Farm,
combined with machine-gun fire from Prospect Hill and Beaurevoir,
prevented this manoeuvre from being successful. During the afternoon
attempts were made by both the 26th and 28th Battahons to push forward
' This was an interesting case of an exception to the general tendency of troops to be drawn
in the direction from which fire is coming.
182 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct 3rd
with the object of regaining Belle vue Farm and the intervening ground
between it and Guisancourt Farm, but with only limited success, and the
line was established from south-east of Bellevue Farm to the Masnieres-
Beaurevoir Line 500 yards south of Guisancourt Farm, where a junction
was made with the 50th Division on Prospect Hill.
In view of the resistance offered to the advance of the 5th and 7th
Brigades, Maj.-Gen. Rosenthal decided to employ the three battalions of the
6th Brigade which were still in reserve, in order to gain the high ground
north-west of Montbrehain, and Beaurevoir Mill ; the 22nd, 23rd, and
24th Battalions were, therefore, placed at the disposal of the 5th Brigade.
The 21st Battalion, which had already reinforced the 7th Brigade, remained
with it, and, as this brigade had reached most of its objectives, and an
assault on Beaurevoir was not to be attempted that day, the 21st Bat-
talion was not employed and remained in support at Folemprise Farm.
The 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Battalions assembled in the Beaurevoir-Fon-
somme Line north-east of Estrees during the afternoon. At 6.30 p.m.
they advanced, and ten minutes later, when the barrage lifted, passed
through the battalions of the 5th Brigade. By 8.30 p.m. all three
battalions had secured their objective Avithout difficulty and had joined
up with the 46th Division north of Ramicourt.
The 2nd Australian Division during the day's operations had captured
the Masnieres-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line on a front of about 6,000 yards.
The enemy's losses in killed were very heavy, and the prisoners captured
amounted to 28 officers and 1,164 other ranks, belonging to the 21st,
25th, and 119th Divisions, together with 163 machine-guns and 11 field
guns. Eleven Australian battalions, Avhose average fighting strength was
260 rifles, were engaged in the fighting ; their casualties were not more
than 1,000 killed, wounded, and missing.^
On the XIII Corps front the 50th Division had assembled for the
attack with two brigades in line. The 151st Brigade on the right was
The xra Corps ; the disposed with the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and
attack of the 50th the 4th King's Royal Rifle Corps in line, and with the 1st
Division King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in close support.
In addition, the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers of the 150th Brigade was
placed at the disposal of the 151st Brigade, and took up a position west
of Mont St. Martin to ensure touch being kept with the Australian Corps,
The 149th Brigade on the left had two of its battalions holding a defen-
sive flank along the canal, and one in support near The Knob. The
150th Brigade, less one battalion, was held in divisional reserve near
Bony.
The attack was successfully launched at 6.5 a.m. Moving forward
through the mist, the infantry kept close up to the barrage, which advanced
at the rate of 100 yards every four minutes. The 151st Brigade entered
Le Catelet and Gouy before 7 a.m., but touch on the right was temporarily
lost with the Australians who had reached Lormisset Farm. This was
due to the deflection of the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers to the left.
' An unsolicited tribute to the skill and enterprise of the Australians was given by a German
officer captured by the 25th Battalion, who exclaimed, " You Australians are all bluff ; you attack
with practically no men and are on the top of us before we know where we are."
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This Battalion had been allotted the task of capturing Prospect Hill, but
it was caught in flank by machine-gun fire from Gouy, and the well-known
tendency of all troops to be drawn in the direction from which fire is
coming at once showed itself ; the battalion swung round to the left and
became involved in the fighting in Gouy. The Commanding Officer of
the 1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry quickly grasped the situation,
and, showing sound judgment and initiative, immediately moved his
battalion forward with all speed. It succeeded in catching up the barrage,
and by 10 a.m. had secured Prospect Hill and joined up with the Aus-
tralians. The 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the 4th King's Royal
Rifle Corps, meanwhile, pushed through Gouy and Le Catelet, and by
10.30 a.m., after some stubborn fighting, the 54th German Division was
driven out of these villages, except for small parties which still lurked
in the cellars and dug-outs. The objective had now been reached along
the front of the 50th Division, except on the left centre where the situation
was uncertain. Consequently, it was arranged that the artillery fire should
lift off the high ground north of Le Catelet at 11.30 a.m., and that strong
patrols should endeavour to seize it. Failing this, the two battalions of
the 150th Brigade which had not as yet been engaged, were to capture the
high ground during the afternoon. As the employment of these two
battalions would have left the 50th Division without any reserves, one
battalion of the 7th Brigade of the 25th Division was ordered up to the
vicinity of Mont St. Martin. ^
At 12 noon our line on Prospect Hill was firmly established and was
continued along the northern outskirts of Gouy and Le Catelet to Macquin-
court Farm. An hour later a strong counter-attack against Gouy was
delivered by at least five battalions of the 21st Reserve Division, which
had been brought down from further north for the purpose. This attack
was made down the valley from Aubencheul-aux-Bois, and after a stiff
fight the enemy succeeded in penetrating to the centre of Gouy. The
2nd Northumberland Fusiliers of the 150th Brigade was sent forward,
and, forming up south of Gouy, soon drove the enemy out of the village.
By 7 p.m. the 50th Division was firmly established north of Gouy and
Le Catelet. The 150th Brigade then relieved the 151st Brigade on
Prospect Hill and north of Gouy, the latter brigade being withdrawn
into reserve about Bony.
As the result of the fighting on October 3rd, nine different German
divisions had been engaged by the Fourth Army, of which two divisions had
,, „ ,^ been brought up from reserve, and one had been brought
Say's'ShSig do^^''^ f^o"^^ the front of the Third Army. Fighting had
been severe on most parts of the front, and the number
of counter-attacks, five in all, showed that the enemy had received
orders to hold the Masnieres-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line at all costs.
Evidence of a retirement, to be carried out shortly to a line further in
rear, began to accumulate as prisoners were examined. An Alsatian
prisoner, whose information was regarded as reliable, stated that railways
and roads were being mined in the back areas, and that the bridges were
' This order was cancelled later, as Maj.-Gen. Jackson considered he had sufficient troops
available.
184 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct 4th
being prepared for demolition at Le Cateau and Busigny. It seemed
likely, therefore, that the more active resistance of the enemy during the
day was intended to cover the preparations for a withdrawal.
Although we had gained a tactical victory on October 3rd, we had
not compelled the enemy to withdraw in front of the right of the Third
Army as we had hoped to do. This could only be accomplished by the
capture of Beaurevoir, and by extending the salient which we had already
made in the enemy's line. The 2nd Australian Division, however, was
too weak in numbers to renew the attack on the same frontage as on
October 3rd, and it was, therefore, arranged that the XIII Corps should
extend its front southwards to the Torrens Canal immediately north of
La Motte Farm. This front was taken over that night by the 50th Division
with the 7th Brigade, which had moved up from Ronssoy to Quennemont
Farm during the afternoon of October 3rd, the 74th and 75th Brigades
moving respectively up to Mont St. Martin and Ste. Emilie from Moislains
and Nurlu. The 7th Australian Brigade, when relieved, moved back into
reserve near Nauroy.
Orders were issued on the evening of October 3rd for the attack to
be continued on the 4th. The IX Corps was to seize Mannequin Hill and
The orders for the ^^^ high ground north-east of it ; the Australian Corps
continuance of the was to make a small advance on the high ground north-
attack on October 4th ^ygg^ of Montbrehain, capture Geneve, and support the
right of the XIII Corps. The XIII Corps was to make the main attack ;
it was to capture Beaurevoir, to advance its line north of Prospect Hill,
and to seize Guisancourt Farm and the high ground north of Le Catelet
about La Pannerie South. It was arranged that the First French Army
was to co-operate with this attack by an advance towards Fontaine
Uterte.
On the front of the IX Corps no advance was made. On the night
of October 3rd the 139th Brigade had been relieved by the 138th Brigade
and 1/lst Monmouthshire (Pioneers), and, early on the
October 4th; the morning of October 4th, the 137th and 138th Brigades
action of the EC Corps & , j.x i j i> xi. j- x- r nr •
were counter-attacked irom the direction oi Mannequin
Hill ; this forestalled our attack and kept our troops fully employed in
repulsing it. At nightfall the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Division, tem-
porarily attached to the 46th Division, relieved the 137th Brigade,
while the 2nd Australian Division relieved the 138th Brigade, thus
permitting the infantry brigades of the 46th Division to be withdrawn
into reserve.
In the centre of the army front the subsidiary attack by two battalions
of the 6th Brigade of the 2nd Australian Division encountered machine-
gun fire from the outset. For a short time touch with
. J^^ ^*'°° „.*?? the 25th Division was lost, but was regained later by
2nd Australian Division „.^ a . i- rt • j • _x- i> •/
the 7th Australian Brigade moving up a portion of its
support battalion. By 9 a.m. an advance of 1,000 yards had been made
on the left, while on the right the line was moved forward to within 300
yards of the railway.
On the XIII Corps front Sir Thomas Morland's orders were for the
25th Division on the right to capture Beaurevoir by enveloping it from
Oct. *rH] THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOm LINE 185
the north and south, and also to secure Ponchaux and Guisancourt Farm.
The task of the 50th Division on the left was to capture the high grovmd
north of Gouy and Le Catelet, between La Pannerie
The xm Corps attack South and Richmond Quarry'. It was intended that,
if this attack was successful, the V Corps of the Third
Army should push the 38th Division through Gouy to work northwards
behind the Hindcnburg Line towards La Terriere. Very little time was
available for preparations, and consequently the assembly of the troops
for the attack was a matter of some difficulty owing to insufficient
opportimity for reconnaissance, the darkness of the night, and the heavy
rain.
The attack started at 6.10 a.m. under a barrage, in a dense fog which
continued until a late hour in the morning and precluded all observation.
The right of the 7th Brigade of the 25th Division reached the high ground
west of Ponchaux and was in touch with the Australians, but it suffered
heavily from fire from Beaurevoir and Ponchaux and was forced to with-
draw. Although the left of the brigade made some progress towards Guisan-
court Farm, it was checked in front of Beaurevoir. It became clear early
in the afternoon that the 7th Brigade was not strong enough to complete its
task alone, and INIaj.-Gen. Charles began his preparations for renewing
the attack next day with stronger forces.
Meanwhile, the 50th Division had captured La Pannerie South ; its
left, however, was held up by machine-gun fire from Hargival Farm and Rich-
mond Copse, and for some time no progress was made beyond the sunken
road between Le Catelet and Hargival Farm. Later in the afternoon the
enemy's resistance weakened on this flank, and by 6 p.m. the 149th Brigade
had captured Hargival Farm. The 50th Division then established a line
along the northern slopes of Prospect Hill through La Pannerie South to
Hargival Farm, pending the arrival of the 38th Division of the V Corps,
which was already on its way to pass through the 50th Division and
continue the attack northwards.
While the fighting was in progress on the Fourth Army front, the
First French Army resumed its advance south-east of Le Tronquoy.
Attacking at 10 a.m. the XV French Corps entered the
The progress ol the outskirts of Lesdins, but was checked by machine-gxm
fire from Flatiron Wood south of Chardon Vert. The
troops west of the canal found the enemy's resistance weakening, and,
pushing patrols across, captured Morcourt.
The attack on Beaurevoir on October 4th having been unsuccessful,
it was decided to continue the attack on the following day, and to captiure
_„ , . ,, , the village together with the high ground between La
for the capture of Sablonnierc and Guisancoiu't Farm. Simultaneously,
Montbrehain and an attack was to be delivered on Montbrehain by the
Beaurevoir 2nd Australian Division. To enable this operation to be
carried out, the 2nd Australian Division extended its front southwards
during the night of October 4th as far as a point 1,000 yards south-east
of Ramieourt, relieving the 138th Brigade of the 46th Division with the
2nd Australian Pioneer Battalion. The IX Corps was to assist the
Australians with artillery fire, and to protect their southern flank by
B B
186 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct. 5re
securing Mannequin Hill and the high ground south of Montbrehain by
means of strong fighting patrols.
When they advanced on October 5th, the patrols of the IX Corps
made some progress up the slopes of Mannequin Hill, but were unable
October 5th • the K *° secure the summit, with the result that the
Corps at Mannequin enemy holding the high ground south of Montbrehain
Hill subjected our infantry advancing through that
village to enfilade fire.
The 6th Australian Brigade formed up for the attack on Montbrehain
with the 21st Battalion on the right and the 24th Battalion on the left.
The capture of The 23rd and 22nd Battalions were to hold the remainder
Montbrehain by the of the divisional front to the north, and were to keep touch
2nd Australian DivUion ^yj^j^ ^-j^g 25th Division south of Ponchaux. The 2nd Aus-
tralian Pioneer Battalion was to support the 21st and 24th Battalions and
protect their right flank as they advanced. The 18th Battalion of the 5th
Brigade and the 27th Battalion of the 7th Brigade were placed at the
disposal of the 6th Brigade Commander as a reserve against hostile
counter-attacks, and by " zero " these two battalions were concentrated
south and north of Wiancourt respectively.
The attack v/as assisted by twelve tanks of the 16th Mark V Tank
Battalion, four each being allotted to the 21st, 24th, and the 2nd
Australian Pioneer Battalions ; eight brigades of field artillery supplied
the creeping barrage, which covered the advance at the rate of 100 yards
every four minutes.
The assembly was completed under fairly heavy shell fire, a certain
amount of gas shell being employed, and at 6.5 a.m. the advance
began. The 21st and 24th Battalions swept forward, the former followed
by the pioneer battalion, which protected its right flank as the advance
progressed. The tanks were late in arriving at the " starting line," and
consequently the initial stage of the advance was carried out without
their aid, though later, during the fighting in the village itself, they were
of the greatest assistance. Machine-gun fire was encountered during the
advance on Montbrehain until the village was entered. On the north-
western outskirts of the village one strong point in particular, in a quarry
which was held by over 100 men of the 241st Division and 40 machine-
guns, offered a strong resistance, and was only captured by the 24th Bat-
talion after a fierce struggle.^ The 21st Battalion, keeping touch with
the right company of the 24th Battalion, pushed forward through Mont-
brehain assisted by some tanks. It overcame the resistance of many
machine-gun posts and finally established a line of posts clear of, and to
the east of, the village. These posts were, however, withdrawn later on
account of the severity of the enemy's shelling. Meanwhile, touch was
temporarily lost between the companies of the 24th Battalion in the
village, but steady progress was made, and touch was maintained with
the company of the same battalion which was advancing north of the
village.
While this fighting was in progress the 2nd Australian Pioneer Bat-
■ The capture of this quarry was in a large measure due to the courage and leadership of
Lieut. Ingram, 24th Battalion. See Appendix E, No. 25.
Pmorsmti pboiotripb jV.f. 9, Ut fau pj(f 18^
BEAURE\'OIR and BELLE\'UE FARM from the west.
Oct 5th] THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR LINE 187
talion, advancing in support of the right flank of the 21st Battalion, also
met with considerable opposition. The battalion was accompanied by
two tanks, which rendered it much assistance. While engaged in pro-
tecting the right flank of the 21st Battalion, the pioneers were subjected
to heavy fire from Mannequin Hill and Doon Hill. In spite of this,
they established a defensive flank south of Montbrehain through Neville's
Cross, joining up with the IX Corps on the right and with the 21st Battalion
on the left north-east of the village, and held it all day. Considerable
assistance was also rendered to the 24th Battalion by a company of the
pioneers, which had followed it through the village ; realising the
difficulties that the 24th Battalion was encountering, the company
commander promptly filled the gap between its right and centre companies.
The fighting in the village had been severe, and the casualties were con-
siderable ; consequently, the 18th and 27th Battalions were moved up from
reserve, the former reinforcing the 21st, and the latter the 24th Battalion.
By 4 p.m., with their assistance, the whole of Montbrehain was completely
in our hands. Over 600 unwounded prisoners and 150 machine-guns
were captured during the day, and of the former the 2nd Australian
Pioneer Battalion could claim at least 300. These prisoners came from
ten different regiments, thus again indicating the general state of the
enemy's disorganisation along the battle front.
During the night of October 4th the 25th Division had strengthened
its front by moving up the 74th Brigade into the line on the left of the
The xm Corps ; the '^^h Brigade, while the 75th Brigade was concentrated in
capture oi Beaurevoir close support in the vicinity of the Masnieres-Beaurevoir
by the 25th Division Line. During the night Beaurevoir was bombarded
intermittently, but, although the houses were considerably knocked about,
the majority of the cellars were undamaged.
The attack of the 25th Division was launched at 6 a.m. under a
powerful artillery barrage, five minutes before that of the Australians
against Montbrehain. On the right the 21st Manchester, leading the
attack of the 7th Brigade, and supported by four tanks of the 4th
Mark V Tank Battalion, advanced through the southern outskirts of the
village. On the left the 74th Brigade, assisted by four tanks of the 4th
Mark V Tank Battalion, advanced against BcUevue Farm, Guisancourt
Farm, and the northern portion of Beaurevoir, with the 9th Yorkshire,
the 13th Durham Light Infantry, and the 11th Sherwood Foresters in line
from right to left. Although the thick ground mist restricted observation,
the attack started well, and good progress was made on the flanks. Beau-
revoir was entered by the infantry of the 74th Brigade and by two of the
supporting tanks ; the enemy, however, was holding it in considerable
strength, and a counter-attack from the north forced the 74th Brigade back
to their " starting line," with the exception of some men of the 9th
Yorkshire who held on to Bellevue Farm. At 12 noon Maj.-Gen. Charles
decided to wait until dusk before renewing the attack, and, meanwhile,
placed two companies of the l/8th Royal Warwickshire at the disposal
of the 74th Brigade in order to assist it in the capture of Guisancourt Farm.
During the afternoon the 75th Brigade moved forward in order to make
a direct attack on Beaurevoir after dark in coniunction with the 7th
188 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct. 5th
and 74th Brigades, which were to push forward on the flanks towards
Ponehaux and Guisancourt Farm respectively.
At 6.30 p.m. the attack was launched and achieved immediate success.
In the centre the l/5th Gloucestershire and the l/8th Worcestershire of
the 75th Brigade passed through the 9th Yorkshire and the 13th Durham
Light Infantry. The 1 /5th Gloucestershire, not waiting for the barrage to
lift, went right through Beaurevoir, taking the garrison completely by
surprise, and dug itself in well east of the village. The l/8th Wor-
cestershire came under heavy machine-gun fire from the railway cutting
on the west of the village, and its advance was temporarily checked.
A critical situation was saved by the prompt action of the right platoon
commander, who worked round the left flank of the enemy with his
platoon and attacked the defenders of the railway cutting from the rear.
This enabled the battalion to resume its advance, clear the northern
half of Beaurevoir, and establish a line clear of the village on the left of
the l/5th Gloucestershire. On the right the 21st Manchester of the 7th
Brigade captured the cemetery south-east of Beaurevoir, but was unable
to reach Ponehaux ; on the left the enemy still held Guisancoiut Farm.
At 4.10 a.m., however, on the morning of October 6th the farm, together
with 195 prisoners, was finally secured by the 11th Sherwood Foresters
and the two companies of the l/8th Royal Warwickshire, owing to the
initiative of the Commander of the 74th Brigade. This completed the
difficult task which had been allotted to the 25th Division. Beaurevoir,
with the three advanced posts of Beaurevoir Mill, Bellevue Farm, and
Guisancourt Farm, formed a very strong natural position, considerably
strengthened by wire and machine-gun emplacements. Although very
much disorganised, the enemy put up a good fight, prisoners being taken
from four different divisions, the 21st, 21st Reserve, 119th, and 121st.
The performance of the 25th Division was all the more creditable as it
had very short notice in which to make its preparations for the attack.
Perhaps the outstanding feature of the operations was the daylight attack
of the l/5th Gloucestershire and the l/8th Worcestershire, which finally
captured Beaurevoir village.
During the early morning of the 5th the 149th Brigade of the 50th
Division pushed patrols across the canal at Vendhuile and north of that
village. These patrols, working in conjunction with
50th VivU^r north of patrols of the 33rd Division of the V Corps on the left,
Gouy, and of the 38th found Putney evacuated and reached Basket Wood.
Division of the V Corps About midday the 38th Division of the V Corps,
after crossing the tunnel defences of the Hindenburg Line near Bony,
advanced northwards through Gouy and Le Catelet, and passed through
the 50th Division near La Pannerie South. Orders were then issued by
Sir Thomas Morland to the 50th Division to withdraw the 149th and 151st
Brigades into rest, and to conform to the movement of the 38th Division,
which had swung eastwards towards Aubencheul-aux-Bois. This was
done, and by nightfall the 150th Brigade had advanced 500 yards beyond
Vauxhall Quarry and was in touch with the 38th Division south of
Aubencheul-aux-Bois.
The result of the day's fighting had been most satisfactory.
Oct ©TH] THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR LINE 189
Although Mannequin Hill and the high ground north of it were not in our
possession, Montbrehain, Beaurevoir, and Guisancourt Farm had been
captured, while the V Corps was now rapidly extending
^ 's^fi'htLf " ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ attack northwards on the right of the Third
^* ^ ^ Army. During the day prisoners belonging to ten
divisions had been captured, including some from a fairly fresh Saxon
division, the 24th.
During the night of October 5th the 30th American Division moved
forward from reserve and relieved the 2nd Australian Division in the
The reUef of the Montbrehain sector. At 9 a.m. on October 6th the
Australian Corps by the command of the Australian Corps front passed to
n American Corps on Gcn. Read, commanding the II American Corps. Sub-
October 6th sequently all five divisions of the Australian Corps, with
the exception of some of the artillery which remained up in the line with
the II American Corps, were concentrated in areas west of Amiens for a
long period of rest after six eventful months' fighting. The Australian
Corps had begun to come into the line on the Amiens front at the end of
March, 1918, and took a prominent part in finally checking the enemy's
advance on Amiens. Then followed the series of successful minor opera-
tions which it undertook during April, May, June, and July, and which led
up to the attack on August 8th. From August 8th— when the Australian
Corps, together with the Canadian and III Corps, opened the offensive
which had achieved such remarkable success— until October 5th, it had
been almost continually attacking. Its advance had covered a distance of
37 miles, during which 116 towns and villages had been captured. Between
August 8th and October 5th, the Australian Corps had captured 610
officers and 22,244 other ranks from 30 German divisions, and 332 guns.
Time dims many recollections ; but the work of the Australians, their
individual intelligence, good comradeship, and bravery will always remain
a vivid memory to those who had the honour and pleasiire of working with
them.
During these operations the work of the 5th Brigade, Royal Air Force,
had been as brilliant as ever. Much of it was achieved under bad weather
conditions and in face of much stubborn opposition,
The work o! the Royal especially on October 4th and 5th, on which days
""^ unusually strong and aggressive German fighting forma-
tions were sent over the lines. During the week commencing September
29th, in addition to invaluable contact and artillery patrols, more than
1,500 offensive flights were carried out ; 31 enemy aeroplanes were
destroyed and 8 were driven down out of control, while 13 enemy
observation balloons were brought down in flames ; 3,300 bombs were
dropped on hostile transport, billets, dumps, railway centres, and head-
quarters, and upwards of 200,000 machine-gun rounds were fired from the
air. The whole of this programme, which was carried on by day and night,
was achieved with the loss of only 24 British machines.
A review of the The capture by the Fourth, Third, and First
situation on October British Armies of the Hindenburg Defences on which
^"^ the enemy had expended so much skill and labour,
and which he had believed capable of defying any assault, was the
190 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct. 6th
culminating point of the Allied offensive. As stated in Sir Douglas
Haig's Victory Despatch :
" The enemy's defence in the last and strongest of his prepared
positions had been shattered. The whole of the main Hindenburg
Line passed into our possession, and a wide gap was driven through
such rear trench systems as had existed behind them.
" The effect of the victory upon the subsequent course of the
campaign was decisive. The threat to the enemy's communications
was now direct and instant, for nothing but the natural obstacles of
a wooded and well-watered countryside lay between our armies and
Maubeuge.
" Great as were the material losses the enemy had suffered, the
effect of so overwhelming a defeat upon a moral already deteriorated
was of even larger importance."
That the enemy had had no intention of relinquishing the Hindenburg
Line without a desperate struggle is certain. Not only was this proved
by documents subsequently captured, but by the attitude of the enemy
during the bitter fighting between September 29th and October 5th.
Within this period the Germans launched no fewer than thirteen counter-
attacks, delivered principally against the flanks of the Fourth Army and
depriving us for a short period of Sequehart, Montbrehain, Gouy, Le
Catelet, and portions of the Beaurevoir Line. In these counter-attacks
the enemy employed his reserve divisions freely. It was significant,
however, that they had without exception been engaged previously on
several occasions since August 8th.
The strenuous days between September 30th and October 5th had
witnessed a prolonged struggle between the Fourth Army and the Second
and Eighteenth German Armies. Our object had been to widen the gap
made on September 29th ; theirs had been to narrow it, or, at any rate,
to close it by retaining possession of the Beaurevoir Line. Thanks
to the indomitable spirit of the British soldier, the Fourth Army had
gained the day. The right of the Third Army was now able to cross
the canal and increase very considerably the front of attack in the next
phase of the operations.
By October 6th the enemy's situation was becoming desperate. Not
only had he failed to prevent important strategical and tactical successes
being gained by our troops, but he had suffered very heavy losses in men
and material. During the operations, which included the capture of the
Hindenburg and Beaurevoir Lines, the Fourth Army had captured 14,664
prisoners, including 307 officers, and 120 guns. The enemy had employed
twenty different divisions against us, two of which were engaged twice,
whilst we had only employed twelve divisions.
As regards the future, the Fourth Army was still astride the junction
of the 18th German Army of von Hutier and the 2nd German Army of
von der Marwitz, hence reserves belonging to both armies could be brought
against us. These reserves were estimated at fourteen divisions, all of
which had been previously engaged and were in various stages of exhaus-
tion. Moreover, no fresh divisions from reserve had been brought against
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Oct &rH] THE CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR LINE 191
the Fourth Army since September 24th, and it was difficult to see how
the enemy could reinforce this front by fresh divisions while the Allied
forces continued to advance on the whole front from the Argonne to
Flanders.
What then were the enemy's intentions on the front of the Foiu-th
Army ? From the information obtained from air photographs and the
personal reconnaissance of pilots of the 5th Brigade, Royal Air Force, it
was ascertained that the enemy was not carrying out any work on defence
lines, other than the digging of a few rifle pits here and there. All aero-
dromes west of the St. Quentin-Busigny-Cambrai railway had been
evacuated. The large ammunition dumps at Fresnoy-le-Grand and
Brancourt-le-Grand had been emptied, and numerous fires and explosions
had been seen in villages and dumps between the front line and Busigny.
These signs all tended to indicate an early retirement, and confirmation
of this was obtained from the examination of prisoners. Also escaped
British prisoners of war stated that on their way from Landrecies they had
passed transport and guns, including heavies, moving eastwards, and that
civilians were being evacuated from Le Cateau and from the areas as far
back as Landrecies.
There was, however, the general situation to consider. As a result
of their failure to hold the Hindenburg defences against the British troops,
the Germans were compelled to withdraw their forces along the whole
front from Lens to Armenti^res. In the south, in the vicinity of Rheims
they were retreating on a wide front, and in Flanders preparations for an
extensive withdrawal had commenced. All this demanded time, and the
safety of the German armies in France, therefore, depended on the ability
of their troops in the centre to check the advance of the First French
Army and the Foiu-th, Third, and First British Armies for a period long
enough to enable a general withdrawal to be properly organised. A
complete collapse in this part of the line could only mean overwhelming
disaster for all the German Armies, and the enemy, therefore, would have
to strive his utmost to stem our advance with such resources as remained
to him.
Orders were received from General Headquarters on October 5th for
a vigorous attack on a wide front, to be carried out by the Fourth
Sir Douglas Haig's ^^^ Third Armies on October 7th, before a new
orders for the con- defensive position further in rear could be organised
tinuanceoi the offensive by the Germans, while any success gained was to be
exploited by the cavalry.
The date of this attack was shortly afterwards postponed until
October 8th.
CHAPTER X
THE ADVANCE TO LE CATEAU, OCTOBER 6TH TO 16tH
Maps 2, 12, 13, and 14
The nature of the country east of the Beaurevoir Line — The objectives for the attack on October
8th — The role of the cavalry — The allotment of tanks — Artillery action — The disposition of
troops on the Fourth Army front on October 6th — The events of October 6th and 7th —
October 8th ; the attack of the IX Corps — The attack of the II American Corps — The attack
of the XIII Corps — The result of the day's fighting — The orders and objectives for the con-
tinuance of the advance on October 9th — October 9th ; the attack — The action of the cavalry
— The capture of Honnechy — Further objectives ordered — The action of the armoured cars—
The result of the fighting — October 10th ; the advance resumed ; cavalry action — The
infantry advance — The attacks of the 25th and 66th Divisions on St. Benin and Le Cateau —
The events of October 11th — The orders from General Headquarters for the continuance of
the offensive — The preparations for the attack — -The nature of the country ; the Selle — Le
Cateau — The readjustment of the front — The dispositions of the troops — The objectives —
Information regarding the encmj — The detailed arrangements for the attack.
On the Fourth Army front our troops had now reached open country,
where the enemy had no prepared Hnes of defence, and which bore few
The nature of the traces of the devastation of war. It consisted of open
country east of the undulating ground devoid of hedges and free from wire,
Beanrevoir Line ^j^^ ^^g^g ^gjj suited to the employment of cavalry and
tanks. The probable points of resistance, until the Selle was reached, were
the villages, the small scattered woods north of Brancourt-le-Grand and
Bohain, and the line of the railway running north and south, a short
distance west of Bohain and Busigny. The villages were all intact, and
were known to be in most cases still occupied by the civilian population,
which had for over four years been in the power of the enemy.
The Selle, on Avhich Le Cateau is situated, was likely to prove the
most serious obstacle later on. It seemed from the map that it could be
crossed without much difficulty anywhere from its source near Vaux
Andigny as far as St. Benin ; between the latter village and Solesmes, how-
ever, it appeared probable that a crossing could only be effected at the fords
or by bridges. The river was the obvious line behind which the enemy
would make his first determined stand and endeavour to reorganise his
forces. On the southern flank of this position, and south of Vaux Andigny,
there were two woods of considerable size, Riquerval Wood and Andigny
Forest.
On receipt of the orders from General Headquarters on October 5th,
192
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October Gth] THE ADVANCE TO LE CATEAU 193
Sir Henry Rawlinson issued his orders for the attack on October 8th.
Two objectives, known as the first objective and the Une
'ittack^on o^tobeTsth^ °^ exploitation, were allotted to the IX, II American,
a c on c 0 er ^^^ XIII Corps, each of which was to attack on a front
of about 4,000 yards.
As its first objective, the IX Corps on the right was given Mannequin
Hill, Beauregard Farm, and the high ground between Fresnoy-le-Grand
and INIontbrehain. If the First French Army, which was to attack
simultaneously on the right, succeeded in capturing Fontaine-Uterte and
Croix-Fonsomme, the IX Corps was to push on and occupy Mericourt,
while the 5th Cavalry Brigade was to exploit towards Fresnoy-le-Grand
and Bohain. If the First French Army should be unable to take these
villages, the right of the IX Corps was not to advance beyond its first
objective; its left, however, was to keep touch with the II American Corps
and push on to Brancoucourt.
The II American Corps in the centre was allotted Brancourt-le-Grand
and Vaux-le-Pretre as its first objective, after the capture of which, it was
to exploit towards Brancoucourt and Fremont, and secure the woods and
copses between those tAvo places.
The XIII Corps on the left was to seize a line which included Le
Hamage Farm and Les Marliches Farm as its first objective, joining up
with the II American Corps on the right on the Roman road from
Estrees to IMaretz, and on the left with the V Corps of the Third Army,
which was to captvire the village of Villers Outreaux. Its line of exploita-
tion included Serain. " Zero " for the attack was to be at 5.10 a.m. on
the 8th.
If the attack was successful, the cavalry was to be ready to move in
the direction of Le Cateau and secure the railway junctions at that place
and at Busigny. If the opportunity offered, it Avas to
The role o£ the operate against the flank and rear of the enemy opposing
the Third and First British Armies and endeavour to cut
his communications about Valenciennes. In order that no opening might
be lost the cavalry was to keep close touch with the advancing infantry
and tanks. It was left to Sir Charles Kavanagh, commanding the Cavalry
Corps, to decide when to send the cavalry through.
For the operations one company of whippets of the 6th Tank Bat-
talion was allotted to the IX Corps. The II American Corps was allotted
two companies of whippets of the Gth Tank Battalion,
"^^^ ten£'°* °* ^^^ ^^^ ^^^'^ ^^^ ^^^^* ^^^^^ ^ "^^"^ Battalions ; of the
latter one battalion was to assist in the attack on Bran-
court-le-Grand and the other was to remain in corps reserve. With the
XIII Corps were one company of whippets of the 3rd Tank Battalion
and the 1st Mark V Tank Battalion ; of these the latter was to be held in
corps reserve.
The whippets were to follow closely on the heels of the infantry,
and, after the protective barrage lifted off the line of the first objective,
they were to push on independently to the line of exploitation, beyond
which they were not to proceed.
The attack was to be launched under cover of a barrage, which was
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194 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October 6th-7th
to come down at " zero " 200 yards in front of the infantry " starting
line." The first lift was to be made three minutes after " zero," after
which the lifts were to be made at three minute intervals
Artillery action Up to and including the 12th lift ; the barrage was then
to be lifted every four minutes until the line of the first
objective was reached. A protective barrage was to be maintained
for thirty minutes covering the first objective, after which it was to cease ;
the further advance of the infantry and tanks being covered by specially
detailed brigades of field artillery. The selection of targets for the heavy
artillery was left to corps, but, as it was most important that the
action of the cavalry should not be interfered with by the heavy guns,
the II American and XIII Corps were each ordered to detail a special
contact aeroplane, whose sole duty was to warn artillery units by wireless
of the passage of the cavalry through the infantry. As an additional
precaution, the headquarters of the leading cavalry brigade was to fire
a special " golden-rain " signal rocket when the cavalry passed through.
Moreover, orders were issued that the 14-inch guns should lift off Busigny
at five hours after " zero," and that at the same time the 9*2-inch guns
should cease firing, while the fire of the artillery under the command of
corps was to be confined, as soon as the cavalry had passed through, to
targets engaged by direct observation or in answer to calls from the air.
On October 6th the front of the Fourth Army was held as follows : —
From Chardon Vert to Neville's Cross, just south of Montbrehain, by
the IX Corps, with the 6th Division, reinforced by the
troops on the Fourth 139th Brigade of the 46th Division, in line, and with the
Army front on 46th Division, less the 139th Brigade, and the 5th
October 6th Cavalry Brigade in support. From Neville's Cross to
the Torrens Canal by the II American Corps, with the 30th American
Division in line and the 27th in reserve. From the Torrens Canal to
a point about 1,000 yards south of Villcrs Outreaux by the XIII Corps,
with the 25th Division and 50th Division in line, and with the 66th
Division in support. The Cavalry Corps, consisting of the 1st and 3rd
Cavalry Divisions, was in reserve near the St. Quentin Canal.
The two days prior to the attack were occupied in completing the
preparations, and only a few minor operations were carried out. On
October 6th the 50th Division, working in co-operation
The events of October ^yi^j^ ^-j-^g y Corps, captured a portion of the Masnicres-
6th and 7th -p, • t • v. a. ^o • 4. t^ j
Beaurevoir Line between Guisancourt larm and
Aubencheul-aux-Bois, and secured a number of prisoners. On October
7th the 117th Regiment of the 30th American Division made an advance of
about 500 yards ; in this operation the Americans captured 150 prisoners
of the 20th German Division, which was engaged on the Fourth Army
front for the first time. On the same day a strong counter-attack against
the French in the Morcourt area gave the enemy possession of some
ground, which he retained until the following day.
October 8th ; the 0^1 the front of the IX Corps the attack was to be
attack of the IX made by the 6th Division, commanded by IVIaj.-Gen,
^°'P^ Marden, assisted by the 139th Brigade of the 46th
Division which was attached to it. The 16th and 71st Brigades
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October 8th] THE ADVANCE TO LE CATEAU 195
were in line from right to left, with the 139th Brigade keeping touch
with the French on the right, and with the 18th Brigade in close support.
Launched under cover of a heavy barrage and assisted by the whippets,
the attack met with immediate success, and the first objective was quickly
gained. The only serious opposition encountered was experienced by the
16th Brigade from the fire of machine-guns in Mannequin Wood and the
village of Mericourt. The whippets of the 6th Tank Battalion supporting
this attack broke down ; the crews made very gallant efforts to repair
them under fire, but they were all put out of action by hostile artillery.
By midday Mannequin Hill, Doon Hill, and Beauregard Farm had been
cajDtured, but an attempt of the 5th Cavalry Brigade at this period to
break through just south of Brancourt-le-Grand and captiu"e some field guns
at Jonnecourt Farm was frustrated by the enemy's machine-gun fire. The
French on the right were held up by machine-gun fire from Cerise Wood.
After some strenuous bomb fighting in the trenches of the Beaurevoir-
Fonsomme Line east of Sequehart, the 1st West Yorkshire, which was
attached to the 16th Brigade, secured Cerise Wood, where three officers
and 190 other ranks of the 84th German Division surrendered, and shortly
afterwards the village of Mericourt was rushed by the 16th Brigade.
After the capture of Cerise Wood the French resumed their advance, and
by 3.30 p.m. had gained possession of Fontaine-Uterte. At about the
same time the resistance in Mannequin Wood was overcome by the 1st
West Yorkshire, five officers and 193 other ranks being taken prisoner.
By nightfall the IX Corps had reached the line of exploitation on the left,
but had progressed little beyond the first objective on the right flank, as
the French had been unable to keep pace with our advance. Over 1,200
prisoners of the 24th, 34th, 221st, and 241st Divisions and four field guns
were captured during the day by the IX Corps.
The attack of the II American Corps was carried out with great dash
by the 30th American Division with the 59th Brigade, with one battalion
of the 60th Brigade attached, leading. The principal
'^American "corps ° organised resistance came from Brancourt-le-Grand,
which was, however, soon captured with the assistance of
the 301st American Tank Battalion, and by 2.15 p.m. the attacking troops
had reached the line of exploitation. In this satisfactory operation the
Americans captured 30 guns and over 1,500 prisoners of the 20th, 21st,
208th, and Jagcr Divisions, and the Cyclist Brigade.
The XIII Corps employed three divisions, the 66th Division having
come into the line on the evening of October 7th, between the 25th Division
on the right and the 50th Division on the left. On the
""Vra ?orps '^' ^'g^t t^^^ "^th Brigade of the 25th Division was to
attack through Ponchaux, with its centre directed on
the Serain Farms, and was to maintain connection with the II American
Corps ; the 74th and 75th Brigades were in reserve. In the centre the
South African Brigade and the 198th Brigade of the 66th Division were to
carry out the main attack, the objectives of which included the village
of Serain ; the 197th Brigade was held in reserve west of Beaurevoir.
The advance of the left flank of the 66th Division was to be protected by
the 151st Brigade of the 50th Division.
196 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October 8th
As the V Corps had arranged to attack the village of
Villers Outreavix at 1 a.m., four hours and ten minutes before the
Fourth Army main attack was to be launched, the 50th Division was
ordered to attack Villers Farm, a position just south-Avest of Villers
Outreaux, from which the enemy coiild enfilade the Masnieres-Beaurevoir
Line both to the north and south, simultaneously with the V Corps.
The 1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry successfully accomplished this
task, but the enemy's artillery retaliation inflicted hea^'y casualties on
the 198th and South African Brigades while they were forming up for the
main attack. In spite of this, thanks to the steadiness and discipline of
the troops, the assembly was completed punctually and without
confusion.
The attack was delivered with great vigour and met with immediate
success. Some resistance at Ponchaux was quickly overcome, and the
first objective was soon gained. The whippet tanks then pushed on
towards the exploitation line, but most of them were put ovit of action
by shell or anti-tank rifle fire ; an attempt by the 2nd Cavalry Brigade
to break through was also frustrated south-west of Maretz by hostile
machine-gun fire. The infantry, meanwhile, made rapid progress, and
Serain was captured with the assistance of the 1st Tank Battalion. The
exploitation line was reached at 11 a.m., except on the left where the
advance of the 198th Brigade was enfiladed by field and machine-gun
fire from Villers Outreaux, which was not captured by the V Corps until
later. After the captiu-e of this village the left flank of the XIII Corps
also reached the line of exploitation without any difficulty.
Sir Thomas Morland now issued orders for the 25th and 66th Divisions
to establish themselves securely on the exploitation line and to
send forward patrols to Elincourt, Avelu, and Pinon Wood, which
they were to occupy if not strongly held by the enemy. No attempt,
however, was to be made to captvire them if this would entail heavy
fighting ; the 50th Division was at the same time ordered to concentrate
north-east of Gouy in corps reserve.
At nightfall the line held by the XIII Corps ran just clear of the
eastern outskirts of Premont and Serain to the Elincourt-lNIalincourt
road ; over 1,200 prisoners and some guns had been captured during the day.
The attack had been an unqualified success. All objectives on the
whole army front had been secured, and over 4,000 prisoners and 56 guns
had been taken. Though the enemy still retained
^ay'T^hHng''^ sufficient cohesion to prevent the cavalry breaking
through, his disorganisation was pronounced.
Prisoners were captured from seventy-three different battalions
of thirty regiments of fifteen divisions, in addition to artillery
and machine-gun units of two other divisions and companies of the 2nd
Cyclist Brigade. 1 During the afternoon the roads converging on Le
> The divisions encountered were the 2nd Guard, 8th, 20th, 21st, 21st Reserve, 24th, 30th,
34th, 38th, 84th, 119th, 121st, 204th, 208th, 221st (machine-gun units only), 241st (artillery only),
Jager, and 2nd Cyclist Brigade. Of these divisions the enemy had reinforced his line with the
Jager, 204th, 208th, and the 2nd Cyclist Brigade, the 204th having just arrived from Lorraine,
while the 2nd Cj clist Brigade was being employed for the first time, since its arrival from Russia
a few months previously.
October 8TH-9THJ THE ADVANCE TO LE CATEAU 197
Cateau were blocked with transport, and full advantage of this was taken
by our airmen. Between 5.30 p.m. and midnight the German airmen
made a most determined bombing attack against the area east of Beau-
revoir on both sides of the main Estrees-Le Cateau road, in which the 1st
and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were located. The Germans were evidently
very nervous lest our cavalry should break through, and tried this means
of preventing it. A.lthough the bombing was extremely violent while it
lasted our casualties from it were luckily light.
Sir Henrj^ Rawlinson still hoped that, if our victory were followed
up at once, the cavalry might be given the opportunity, denied
to them on the 8th, of completing the rout of
tive3°£or'thrcontou°" the enemy. Orders were accordingly issued for
ance of the advance the offensive to be resumed at 5.20 a.m. on the 9th,
on October 9tii ^^ conjunction with an advance of the Third British
and First French Armies.
The IX Corps was allotted the line of the railway between Fresnoy-
le-Grand and Bohain as its first objective, including the village of Fresnoy-
le-Grand ; Bohain, a town of considerable size and importance, was to
be its second objective. The first objective given to the II American
Corps was the line of the railway between Bohain and Busigny Station,
while the villages of Becquigny and Busigny were its second objective.
Maretz was to be the first objective of the XIII Corps, and its second
objective included the villages of Honnechy and Maurois. The distance
to be covered by the XIII Corps was considerably greater than that to
be covered by the other two corps ; this was due to the long flank which
the IX Corps was compelled to maintain in consequence of the difficulty
experienced by the French in advancing north-east of St. Quentin. The
5th iMark V tank Battalion was allotted to the IX Corps, the 4th and
301st American ^Mark V Tank Battalions and two companies of whippets
to the II American Corps, and the 1st Mark V Tank Battalion and one
company of whippets to the XIII Corps. The role of the cavalry was the
same as for October 8th, and it was to be ready to seize any opportunity
of breaking through.
At 5.20 a.m. on October 9th the attack was resumed along the whole
front. On the right the IX Corps, with the 46th and 6th Divisions in
the line,i had little difficulty in securing Fresnoy-le-
October9th; the Grand and Johnecourt Farm. The enemy retreated
rapidly before oiu- advance, and by 3 p.m.
the line of the railway, which formed the first objective, was secured.
So vigorous was the advance of our troops that the enemy's resistance
broke down, and the 9th Norfolk of the 6th Division captured Bohain
without difficulty towards evening.^ On ovir right the French secvured
Croix-Fonsomme.
The II American Corps, with the 59th Brigade of the 30th
Division leading, experienced only slight opposition from hostile rear-
1 The 46th Division took over the right sector of the IX Corps front from the 6th Division on
the night of the 8th. The 1st Division also moved further forward.
' Four thousand five hundred French inhabitants were liberated in this town, some of whom
had been three days without food.
198 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October 9th
guards, and, advancing rapidly, occupied the villages of Becquigny and
Busigny.^
Equal success attended the advance further north, where the XIII
Corps advanced with the 25th Division on the right and the 66th on the
Jeft. Maretz was captured before 7 a.m. by the 75th Brigade of the
25th Division and the 199th Brigade of the 66th Division, and Elincourt
and Pinon Wood by the 198th Brigade. Having secured jNIaretz, the
advance was continued by the 25th Division on a two-brigade front, the
74th Brigade coming into line on the right of the 75th Brigade, while in
the 66th Division the South African Brigade " leap-frogged " the 198th
and 199th Brigades.
It was not until 9 a.m. that the enemy made any show of resistance ;
the advance of the 25th Division Avas then checked in front of the
railway south-west of Honnechy , and a little later that of the 66th Division
on the outskirts of Gattigny Wood.
Throughout the advance the cavalry had kept in close touch with
the infantry. The 3rd Cavalry Division (the 6th, 7th, and Canadian
Brigades) followed up closely, while the 1st Cavalry
^® cavaky"* ^^^ Division was in reserve, but ready to move forward at
once, as the rapid retirement of the enemy in front of
our advance seemed likely to offer an opportunity for their employment.
At 9.30 a.m. the 3rd Cavalry Division received word that the XIII
Corps advance had been checked by machine-gun fire from the railway
south-west of Honnechy. Thereupon a squadron of the 6th Cavalry
Brigade went forward to Busigny and endeavoured to turn the position
from the south, but this attempt had to be abandoned on account of the
wired enclosures. Meantime the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, moving north
of the main Le Cateau road, found the infantry held up by machine-gun
fire from the western edge of Gattigny Wood and from Clary village. At
11 a.m. the Fort Garry Horse made a very dashing attack on the western
edge of Gattigny Wood, and not only gained a footing in the wood, but
passed through portions of it ; this enabled the infantry to resume their
advance. At the same time Lord Strathcona's Horse secured a small copse
south-east of Clary, and, pushing forward, occupied Mont-aux-Villes Wood
midway between Clary and Bertry. In these operations the Canadian
Cavalry Brigade captured 230 prisoners of the 8th German Division,
two field guns, and 40 machine-guns.
Meantime, the enemy clung tenaciously to the line of the railway south-
west of Honnechy. Shortly before noon, however, more artillery arrived,
and arrangements were made for the railwav and village
'^Ho^Me*^? °* ^^ ^^ attacked by the 25th Division under cover of a
barrage. This attack was arranged by Maj.-Gen.
Charles in co-operation with Maj.-Gen. Harman, commanding the Third
Cavalry Division, who ordered the 6th Cavalry Brigade (3rd Dragoon
Guards, 1st Royal Dragoons, and 10th Hussars) to encircle the village,^
' On reaching the first objective, the 60th Brigade " leap-frogged " the 59th Brigade and
captured the second objective — Becquigny and Busigny.
2 While the 10th Hussars were moving into position for the attack, they were observed by
hostile aircraft and suffered considerable casualties from bombs and machine-gun fire.
October 9th] THE ADVANCE TO LE CATEAU 199
while the Canadian Cavalry Brigade advanced north of Maurois with a
view to seizing the high ground north-east of that village.
The concerted attack against Honnechy began at 2 p.m., and within
forty minutes the village and the ground to the east of it were captured.
Further north the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, after securing 42 prisoners
and 5 machine-guns between Clary and Bertry, pushed forward north of
Maurois.
In consequence of the slight opposition encountered by the troops
during the morning, Sir Henry Rawlinson issued further orders about
noon on the 9th. The IX Corps was ordered to secure
^'^^rieS*''^''' the high ground north and south of Andigny-les-Fermes ;
the II American Corps was to push on to Molain,
St. Souplet, and St. Benin, and seize the crossings over the Selle at these
places ; the XIII Corps was ordered to capture Le Cateau. The cavalry
was to advance as rapidly as possible on Le Cateau, and then carry out the
remainder of the mission allotted to it for October 8th.
The IX and II American Corps did not gain much ground beyond
their original final objective for the 9th.
In compliance with their instructions, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade
moved forward, and by the evening had taken Troisvilles and occupied the
high ground north-west of Le Cateau between Montay and Rambourlieux
Farm. The 6th Cavalry Brigade, however, was unable to get to Le Cateau,
as the advance was checked by strong opposition from the line St. Souplet-
Reumont, which was occupied by parties of the 2nd Cyclist Brigade and
by one of the newly arrived regiments of the 204th Division from Lor-
raine. The 7th Cavalry Brigade then advanced, driving the enemy from
Reumont, and filled the gap between the 6th Cavalry Brigade south-east
of Reumont and the Canadian Cavalry Brigade on the high ground over-
looking Le Cateau. The Third Cavalry Division thus held a line from
south-east of Reumont to Rambourlieux Farm along the high ground
overlooking the Selle just west of Le Cateau, Montay, and Neuvilly, its left
being thrown back along the road running from Neuvilly to Troisvilles.
Late in the evening the infantry of the 66th Division arrived and
relieved the cavalry, which bivouacked close in the rear of the positions
they had captured. In the course of its operations the 3rd Cavalry
Division had captured 450 prisoners, 10 guns, and between 50 and 60
machine-guns, but its experiences showed that the enemy's resistance was
not yet completely broken, as it had not been possible to make any
advance except by vigorous action and hard fighting.
During the operations very effective assistance was given both to the
infantry and cavalry by the armoured cars of the 17th Armoured Car
Battalion. Seven cars were allotted to the 3rd Cavalry
^mou°eS t^^ Division, of which three cars were detailed to the 6th
and four to the 7th Cavalry Brigade ; two cars were
kept in corps reserve. The cars accompanying the 6th Cavalry Brigade
were ordered at 9 a.m. to go forward and report on the situation at Maretz.
One car broke its axle, but the other two proceeded to Maretz, where they
were informed that our infantry and cavalry were checked in front of
Gattigny Wood. The cars proceeded thither at once and engaged a party
200 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October 9th-ioth
of about 30 Germans with machine-guns near the cross roads immedi-
ately south of the wood ; these they scattered, kiUing four of the gunners
and capturing 10 machine-guns. The cars then went towards Honnechy
where, in conjunction with some men of the South African Brigade,
they attacked the enemy in the railway cutting and in the
wood immediately west of the point where the railway crosses the
Roman road. The cars then pushed on to Maurois, where the bridge
over the railway west of the village was blown up after one of the cars had
crossed it. This car engaged parties of the enemy in Maurois and Honnechy,
and, near Honnechy Station, surprised and put to flight a guard on the
bridge, which it was preparing to demolish. Then, after proceeding to
Busigny and killing five out of a party of twenty Germans, who were
going up the road with four trench mortars, it was rejoined by the car
which had been cut off by the destruction of the bridge at Maurois, and
returned to report. ^ Although the four cars with the 7th Cavalry Brigade
did not have such an adventurous career, they gave effective help to the
3rd Dragoon Guards in the attack on Honnechy.
As a result of the day's fighting all the original objectives and, in
addition, a considerable amount of ground opposite the northern flank of
the army had been secured. Fresnoy-le-Grand, Bohain,
^« figig^ *^^ Becquigny, Busigny Wood, Busigny, Proyart Wood,
Escaufort, Reumont, and Troisvilles had all been
occupied, while our outposts were in advance of these places. The enemy
held Riquerval Wood, Vaux-Andigny, and La Haie Menneresse, and, further
north, a line from St. Souplet to St. Benin. Our losses had been small.
The further objectives which Sir Henry Rawlinson had ordered to be
taken during the day had, however, not been secured. The advance was,
therefore, ordered to be resumed at 5.30 a.m. on the 10th in order to gain
these objectives ; in addition, the XIII and II American Corps were to
push strong infantry patrols across the Selle in order to cover the passage
of our troops across that river.
The morning was dull with mist and rain which prevented any obser-
vation of the enemy's movements. At 6 a.m. the 3rd Cavalry Division,
October 10th ; the with the 1st Cavalry Division following behind it, led
advance resumed ; the advance ; heavy hostile shell and machine-gun fire,
cavalry action however, from the line of the Selle between Le Cateau
and Neuvilly, inflicted considerable casualties, and the advance of the
cavalry was checked. Although our artillery opened fire and the armoui'ed
cars moved forward in support, it was found necessary to withdraw the
7th Cavalry Brigade out of observation behind the ridges west of the Selle.
As the result of a reconnaissance, an advance in the direction of Briastre
was also deemed inadvisable, that village and Viesly being both found
to be strongly held by the Germans. The resistance of the enemy had now
obviously become too strong to be overcome by cavalry action, and, after
the arrival of the infantry, the Army Commander ordered the withdrawal
of the whole of the Cavalry Corps.^ This brought the action of the
1 It fired 2,500 rounds from its machine-guns during this run.
^ During these three days' operations the cavalry captured over 500 prisoners, 10 guns, and
60 machine-guns, while their casualties amounted to 7 officers and 77 other ranks killed and 41
officers and 479 other ranks wounded or missing.
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October lOTHj THE ADVANCE TO LE CATEAU 201
cavalry to an end for the time being. Though it had not found the
resistance of the enemy svifficiently broken to permit of far-reaching
operations in the vicinity of Valenciennes, it had given most effective
assistance to the infantry.
Meanwhile, at 5.30 a.m. the infantry advanced close behind the cavalry.
On the right on the IX Corps front, the 46th and 6th Divisions advanced
each with one infantry brigade as advance guard. In
The infantry advance addition to field artillery, each division was also supported
by a mobile brigade of heavy artillery.^ Although
for the first 2,000 yards the troops made rapid headway, the enemy's
resistance increased later, and by 12 noon the advance was definitely checked
in front of the western edge of Riquerval Wood. This wood was watched
by the 46th Division, while the 6th Division on the left gained touch
with the Americans immediately south of Vaux-Andigny.
In the centre the 30th American Division again led the advance of
the II American Corps, with the 120th and 119th Regiments of the 60th
Brigade in line. The Americans captured the western outskirts of Vaux-
Andigny, La Haie Menneresse, and St. Souplet after some fighting.
Serious resistance was encountered, however, by the troops of the
60th Brigade, when they reached the west bank of the Selle, and vigorous
machine-gun fire from the eastern bank of the river brought the advance
to a standstill.
On the left the XIII Corps also made rapid progress until the slopes
running down into the valley of the Selle were reached. At 11 a.m. the
The attacks of the 25th ~^^^ Division, with the 74th and Toth Brigades leading,
and 66th Divisions on reached the high ground north-west of St. Benin, when it
St. Benin and Le came undcr heavy fire from the village, which stands on
Catcau ^ commanding knoll, and from the railway embankment
between St. Benin and Le Cateau. The 25th Division then arranged to
attack St. Benin, and at 2.40 p.m. the village was carried by the 74th
Brigade with great dash, and the enemy was driven across the Selle. No
further progress by the division was, however, possible, partly because the
bridges over the Selle had all been destroyed, but chiefly owing to the
heavy machine-gun fire from the railway on the east bank of the river,
which appeared to be strongly held.
Further north the 66th Division had by noon secured the spur im-
mediately west of Le Catcau, and patrols were sent forward into the
western outskirts of the town, the 198th and 199th Brigades, however, which
were leading, were considerably harassed by artillery fire fi'om the high
ground south-west of Forest. Arrangements were then made between
the 66th and 25th Divisions for a concerted attack on the high ground
immediately east of Le Cateau and the spur south-west of Forest ; but,
as it was found impossible for the 25th Division to complete its arrange-
ment*, in time, the attack was carried out independently by the 66th
Division. The assault was delivered at 5.30 p.m. by the 5th Connaught
Rangers on the right and the ISth King's Liverpool on the left. The former
battalion rushed the town with great gallantry, and a considerable number
* The mobile brigade of heavy artillery consisted of two 60-pounder and two 6-inch howitzer
batteries.
D D
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202 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October iothHth
of men of the 5th Connaught Rangers succeeded in establishing themselves
in the deep railway cutting, which runs in a gentle curve round the
eastern outskirts of the town. The latter battalion reached Montay, but
found the banks of the Selle wired and was unable to cross the stream. As
the 5th Connaught Rangers had both its flanks exposed, it was withdrawn
during the night to the western portion of Le Cateau, and held the line
of the Selle where it passes through the town. During the night St.
Benin was taken over by the II American Corps.
Considerable progress had been made by the Fourth Army on the
10th, and numerous villages had been captured ; ^ with the exception of a
few posts on the western bank the enemy had been driven across the Selle.
The enemy's resistance, however, had been strong enough to prevent ovir
troops from securing all their objectives, and corps were accordingly
instructed to organise attacks with a view to securing those still
uncaptured ; in the case of the IX Corps this meant Andigny-les-Fermes,
and in that of the II American and XIII Corps the high ground east of
the Selle which covered the passages over the river.
On no part of the front was any substantial advance made on the
11th. On the IX Corps front the 46th Division effected a lodgement in
Riquerval Wood, but failed to penetrate it, while the
o^Lberllth ^^^ Division, after advancing about 1,500 yards towards
the Andigny-les-Fermes-Bellevue ridge, could make no
fm'ther progress. Further north the Americans and the XIII Corps were
checked by heavy shell fire, and by rifle and machine-gun fire from the
eastern bank of the Selle ; the 118th American Regiment, however, com-
pleted the capture of Vaux-Andigny and La Haie Menneresse. In Le Cateau
prisoners of the 17th Reserve Division were captured, and it was therefore
clear that the enemy had reinforced this portion of their front with fresh
troops. The result of the day's fighting proved conclusively that the Germans
meant to make a stand behind the Selle ; moreover, their artillery showed
increased activity and seemed to be organised for a stubborn defence.
On the right of the Fourth Army the First French Army had been
unable to advance beyond Seboncourt, while the Third British Army had
reached a line rimning from the high ground overlooking Neuvilly and
Briastre on the Selle, due west to Quievy, and thence northwards to St.
Hilaire-les-Cambrai and St. Aubert, all of which villages were in the
hands of the enemy.
The exact dispositions of the enemy were uncertain, and the dull,
misty weather of the preceding few days had made reconnaissance by
aircraft very difficult. The task of locating the enemy's line had, there-
fore, to be undertaken chiefly by infantry patrols, whose work was rendered
the more arduous by the fact that every movement was under direct
observation from the high ground beyond the Selle. The results of the air
and infantry reconnaissances showed that the enemy was holding trenches
south of Vaux-Andigny and west of Molain, that between Molain and
St. Benin new trenches had been dug east of the river, that from opposite St.
Benin to Le Cateau Station the enemy held the line of the railway
running immediately east of the Selle, and that various parts of the trench
1 Between the Hindenburg Line and the Selle 12,088 French inhabitants had been liberated.
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October iiTH] THE ADVANCE TO LE CATEAU 203
lines had been wired. It was evident that the position was too strong to
be rushed, and that it could only be taken by an organised attack,
adequately supported by artillery.
It was important to organise a general attack without any delay.
On October 11th, therefore, the Commander-in-Chief, after a conference
_ , . with the Army Commanders, issued orders for the
xb6 orders itoiq •
General Headquarters offensive to be resumed on a large scale. The Fourth
for the continuance of Army was to establish itself on the general line
the offensive Wassigny-Le Cateau, and, in co-operation with the
First French Army, was to push forward strong advance guards to the
line of the Sambre and Oise Canal. The Third Army was to establish
itself on the line of the Selle and secure the passages across that river,
while the First Army was to protect the left flank of the Third Army.
The Cavalry Corps was to be again placed under the direct orders of General
Headquarters, and was to be held in readiness to pursue vigorously in
the general direction of Mons, should the enemy carry out a fiirther
retirement.
The IX, II American, and XIII Corps were accordingly ordered to be
ready to carry out a concerted attack on October 14th or loth, and, in the
meanwhile, to push forward as much artillery as the difficulties of ammuni-
tion supply would permit of being employed. Every effort was also to
be made to ascertain the enemy's exact dispositions, and to establish a
suitable " starting line " for the infantry prior to the attack. The date
of the attack was postponed subsequently until October 17th,
on account of the enormous difficulties experienced with regard to the
bringing up of ammunition and supplies. Between the 8th and 11th of
October the Fourth Army had covered an average distance of ten and a
half miles on a front of seven and a half miles, while the XIII Corps had
advanced some thirteen or fourteen miles, and the only main line of
railway for supply ran through St. Quentin, Bohain, and Busigny. This
line, which had to serve both the Fourth Army and the northern corps of
the First French Army, had been considerably damaged by the enemy.
Railway bridges had been demolished and craters blown in the line, and,
what was still more difficult to deal with, a large number of delay action
mines had been scattered along the permanent way. For at least a
month these mines exploded at varying intervals, causing considerable
anxiety to those responsible for supplying the army with food and
ammunition.
The interval between October 11th and 17th was spent in complet-
ing the preparations for the attack. No change in the dispositions of
the IX Corps was found nccessarv ; in the centre the
■^^ P^f X"r *°' 27th American Division relieved the 30th American
Division ; in the XIII Corps the 50th Division,
which had just received strong reinforcements to replace the casualties
suffered in the heavy fighting at Gouy and Le Catelet, relieved the 25th
Division on October 11th. Only a small number of tanks was available
for the operation, as it was found necessary to withdraw the 3rd Tank
Brigade Headquarters and the 3rd and 4th Tank Battalions to refit. The
5th and 1st Mark V Tank Battalions were allotted to the IX and XIII
204 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October hth-ioth
Corps respectively ; the 301st American Mark V Tank Battalion was to
co-operate with the American Corps ; the 6th Whippet Battalion and 10th
and 16th Mark V Tank Battalions were held in army reserve. The whole
of the cavalry was moved fm-ther back, except the 5th Cavalry Brigade,
which was split up, the 12th Lancers being thenceforward attached to the
XIII Corps, and the Royal Scots Greys and 20th Hussars to the IX Corps
and II American Corps respectively. ^
Artillery was brought up as rapidly as the supply of ammunition
permitted, and wire-cutting, counter-battery work, and the bombardment
of important localities were carried on from the 12th onwards. All the
enemy's communications, roads, and approaches were searched by artillery
fire, while 6-inch guns, placed well forward, shelled the crossings over the
Sambre and Oise Canal, the approaches to the canal at Oisy, Catillon,
and Landrecies, and the approaches to others of the more important
villages.
A German map was captured on October 13th, which indicated that
the enemy had intended to construct certain lines of defence, on to which
he was to have retired on October 18th. These positions were called
Hermann Stellung I and II. Hermann Stcllung I was to have consisted
of a line east of the Selle from St. Souplet to Le Catcau ;
Hermann Stellung II was to have been constructed east of the Sambre
and Oise Canal. A continuation of these lines, north of Le Cateau, was
shown on a similar map captured by the Third Army about the same
date.
On October 14th the weather cleared sufficiently for air reconnaissance,
and nearly the whole country as far as Maubeuge was reconnoitred and
photographed. The air photographs revealed the non-existence of either
of the Hermann lines, except for certain lengths of trenches, protected in
places by wire, between Vaux-Andigny and Le Cateau. A number of
rifle pits in pairs on the high ground separating the Selle and the Sambre
and Oise Canal were also shown.
The chief obstacle to the advance of the Fourth Army was the Selle.
The valley of the river is bounded on either side by slopes which rise
steeply to undulating country some 200 feet above the
n^nf,?'"il»°^!n! level of the stream. But, while the gentle and rolling
country ; the Selle , . . i j. <? xu • j • j i?
slopes to the west oi the river are devoid or cover or
obstruction, those to the east are more abrupt in nature, and the country
soon becomes very enclosed owing to the numerous orchards and grass
fields, bounded by thick hedges, which restrict the view and make movement
difficult. The river itself, between St. Souplet and Le Cateau, is under
normal conditions from fifteen to eighteen feet wide and three to four
feet deep, and runs through water meadows extending some 100 to 200
yards on either bank. Where it passes through the western edge of Le
Cateau the banks are bricked up, the span being about twenty feet. A
topographical feature of special importance, as affecting the operations,
was the high spur running in a south-westerly direction from Forest
towards Montay, from which excellent observation could be obtained up
' ^\Tien the II American Corps was withdrawn after the Battle of the Selle, the 20th Hussars
were also attached to the IX Corps.
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October 11TH-16TH] THE ADVANCE TO LE CATEAU 205
the valley of the river and over the plateau east of it, and from which
enfilade fire could be brought to bear on any troops attacking across the
river. ^
Le Cateau itself, through which the Selle runs, was a provincial town
of some 10,500 inhabitants and contained several large factories. The
houses were solidly built, and deep cellars provided
Le Cateau excellent shelter against laombardment. The railway
embankment and cutting, east of the town, commanded
all the exits and formed a natural position of exceptional strength. During
the German occupation, the railway station had been largely used for the
detrainmcnt of troops, and numerous sidings had been constructed covering
an area of some 200 yards wide and 500 yards in length. On the eastern
side the yard was bounded by a bank 30 feet high, and the area was sur-
rounded by goods sheds, factories, and other buildings strongly constructed
and easily adaptable for defence. There was a mound some 30 feet high,
resembling the spoil heap of a coal mine, about fifty yards east of the bank
which bounded the goods yard, from which an exceptional command to
the south was obtainable. This mound was surrounded by trees, and
was thus almost hidden by their foliage from observation from the western
bank of the Selle.
Certain difficulties faced the IX Corps with regard to its arrangements
for the attack on the Bellevue spvir. This spur ran in a north-easterly
The readjustment of direction from Andigny-les-Fermes towards Belle-%'ue
the iront Farm. The configm'ation of the ground made it
(see Maps 13 and 14) inadvisable to attack this spur from the west, and Sir
Walter Braithwaite decided to do so from the north-west. This
necessitated a rearrangement of the boundary between the IX Corps and
the II American Corps, in order to provide depth for the attacking troops
to form up in. On the night of October 14th, therefore, the IX Corps
took over the village of Vaux-Andigny from the II American Corps,
thus extending its front by 1,200 yards.
On the XIII Corps front careful and repeated reconnaissance of the
Selle south of Le Cateau disclosed the fact that, owing to recent heavy
rains, combined with the damming of the stream by the enemy at St.
Crepin, St. Benin, and at the southern exit of Le Cateau, the flooded area
was rapidly extending, and the river itself was increasing considerably in
depth. It was found that at no place on the front of the 50th Division
was a crossing practicable without elaborate bridging operations, which
would have had to be undertaken under close range machine-gun fire
from the opposite bank. Further south, however, in the neighbourhood
of St. Souplet the stream was much narrower, and on the front of the II
American Corps presented no serious obstacle. In order, therefore, to
enable the 50th Division to attack south of Le Cateau, Sir Henry Rawlinson
arranged that the front of the XIII Corps should be extended some 2,000
yards southwards, including on the extreme south a stretch of about
500 yards of river, the crossing of which, though difficult, was not imprac-
ticable.
1 It was on this high ground that the Germans placed the artillery, which caused such heavy
casualties to the artillery of our II Corps, during the Battle of Le Cateau in August, 1914.
206 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARIMY [October iith-igth
The IX Corps, after taking over the extra ground from the Americans,
held a front of 7,000 yards, from a point on the Bohain-Aisonville road just
^ . south of Riquerval Wood to Vaux-Andigny inclusive.
The a^positaons of the ^he forward boundary with the French ran in a north-
easterly direction through the centre of the Andigny
Forest and midway between the hamlets of Blocus d'en Haut and Blocus
d'en Bas, the village of Mennevret being wholly in the French area.
The II American Corps held some 4,000 yards of front from Vaux-
Andigny exclusive to St. Souplet inclusive, while the frontage of the XIII
Corps extended thence for 8,000 yards to Montay. It was only possible,
however, for the XIII Corps to attack along certain portions of this front.
The objectives given to the corps were ambitious and comprised the
capture of the whole of the ground lying between the Selle and the Sambre
and Oise Canal, bounded on the south by the boundary
The objectives with the French, and on the north by the Richemont
river and the Bazuel-Catillon road, along which a
defensive flank facing north-east was to be estabhshed. Le Cateau
itself was included in the objectives.
In all, four objectives were given. The first included Andigny-les-
Fernies arid the whole of the Bellevue spur, the villages of Molain, St.
Martin Rivere, and St. Souplet, and an advance of some 2,000 yards east
of the river between Molain and Le Cateau. The second objective in-
cluded the villages of La Vallee Mulatre and Arbre Guernon, Jonc de Mer
Farm, La Roux Farm, and the toAvn of Le Cateau, that is to say a further
advance of some 1,500-2,000 yards. The third objective entailed an
advance of 2,500-3,000 yards,' and included the villages of Wassigny,
Mazinghien, and Bazuel. Finally, if all went well, the troops were to try
to reach the Sambre and Oise Canal between La Laurette and Catillon.
The southern flank of the army was to be protected by the advance of
the First French Army.
As in the case of previous attacks, it was not expected that the troops
would be able to reach the furthest objective on the first day, but, in view
of the demoralisation of the enemy, it was felt that the resistance might
collapse at any moment, and that it was essential that every effort should
be made to exploit any initial advantage gained to the utmost physical
power of the men.
Our information as regards the enemy, though not as complete as on
some previous occasions immediately prior to an attack, was favourable
^ . , . to a bold and ambitious plan. The fine weather on
Te enS October 14th had been taken full advantage of, and air
reconnaissance had shown that big changes in the
organisation of the rear areas had taken place, which foreshadowed a
further retirement. A score of new aerodromes had sprung up, the
chief groups being those north of Bavai and Maubeuge. A number of
hospitals had been erected at Maubeuge and near the important railway
junction of Aulnoye. Moreover, a number of footbridges had been thrown
over the Sambre and Oise Canal, on which all barge traffic south of Lan-
drecies had ceased.
The enemy's power of resistance was not expected to be great. The
October ISTH-l&TH] THE ADVANCE TO LE CATEAU 207
pause of six days had undoubtedly given him a short breathing space in
which to make some re-organisation in his order of battle. Owing, how-
ever, to the distance which separated the forces and to the presence of the
Selle between the opposing lines, it had been difRcult^^to secure prisoners,
and OUT information, therefore, as to the number of divisions which were
likely to oppose us on the 17th, was incomplete. It was estimated that
we should be confronted by four comparatively fresh divisions and two
exhausted ones. It was known that the Alpine Corps had been sent to
Serbia, owing to the unconditional surrender of Bulgaria and the advance
of the Allies in Macedonia, and that on the whole of the western front the
Germans only had six fresh divisions at their disposal to meet all eventu-
alities. It was probable, therefore, that the Second and Eighteenth
Armies opposed to us would have to rely on their own resources for reserves ;
this meant twelve exhausted divisions of which only one had had any
real rest.
There were two excellent reasons, on the other hand, why the enemy
must make every possible endeavour to check our further advance. He
must if possible prevent us from coming within artillery range of the
railway junction at Aulnoye, the destruction of which by our guns would
effectively sever his main lateral line of communication between Sedan
and Lille. He must also gain time for carrying out the retirement of his
troops in the Lens and Laon areas, in both of which a retreat on a large
scale had now commenced, Laon having been occupied by the French
on October 13th.
It was clearly impossible for the tanks to render any assistance against
the hostile trenches and wire in the early stages of the attack, and the
enemy's positions were, therefore, subjected to a heavy
^nts*to^the^"ttack preliminary bombardment of forty-eight hours, which
commenced at 8 a.m. on October 15th. By dint of
excellent organisation in the rear services and the hard work of all con-
cerned, the artillery and ammunition situation had been much improved,
with the result that, for the forty-eight hours' bombardment and barrage
work, 33 field artillery brigades, and 20 brigades and 13 batteries of heavy
and siege artillery, were in position by October 15th with sufficient
ammunition available. The system of barrages for the attack was similar
to that for previous attacks, the lifts up to the first objective being at
three minute intervals. Here, there was to be a halt of thirty minutes,
after which the barrage was to continue to advance at the same rate up
to the second objective i ; field and heavy artillery were detailed to move
forward and cover the advance when it continued beyond the second
objective. In view of the unsuitability of the northern portion of the
army front for tank action, the IX Corps was allotted the bulk of the tanks,
the "l6th Mark V Tank Battalion and the 6th Battalion of whippets
operating with that corps, while the 301st American and 1st Mark V
Tank Battalions remained with the II American and XIII Corps
respectively. " Zero " was fixed for 5.20 a.m. on the 17th.
By the 16th, on the eve of the Battle of the Selle, all arrangement
had been completed. Energetic patrolling had furnished us with full
> This was rather a faster rate than usual.
208 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October igth
information as regards the state of the enemy's defences, and the result
of the preUminary bombardment had been reported as most effective.
The moral of our troops had never been higher. They had, during the
attacks of October 8th and 9th, seen the enemy in fiill flight and they
knew that there were no more prepared defence lines to be overcome.
Every day brought fresh news of the German retreat both in the Laon and
Lens areas, and optimists were not lacking who prophesied that the war
might end before Christmas.
CHAPTER XI
THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE, OCTOBER 17TH-19TH ; AND THE EVENTS
TO OCTOBER 31ST
Maps 2, 13, 14, and 15
The plan of attack of the IX Corps — The dispositions of the 46th Division — The attack of the
46th Division — The attack of the 6th Division — The dispositions of the 1st Division — The
attack of the 1st Division — The result of the day's fighting by the IX Corps — The dispositions
of the II American Corps — The attack of the" II American Corps — The dispositions of the
XIII Corps — The attack of the 50th Division — Tank action — The plan of attack of the 66th
Division — The South African Brigade attack — The result of the fighting on October 17th —
The army orders for the attack on October 18th — Further orders from General Headquarters
— October 18th ; the attack of the IX Corps — The attack of the II American Corps— The
preparations for the attack of the XIII Corps — The attack of the 50th and 66th Divisions —
The events of October 19th— The result of the Battle of the Selle — The army orders for the
advance to be continued on October 23rd — Artillery and tanks — The readjustment of the
front — The nature of the country — The detailed orders for the attack on October 23rd — The
IX Corps plan — The XIII Corps plan — October 23rd; the attack of the IX Corps — The attack
of the XIII Corps — The 25th Division attack — The 18th Division attack — The action of the
tanks — The result of the day's fighting ; army orders issued for the attack to be continued
on October 24th — October 24th ; ^the IX Corps attack— The XIII Corps attack— The result
of the fighting on the 23rd and 24th — Minor operations from October 25th to 31st — The
progress north and south of the Fourth Army — A summary of the situation on October 31st.
Sir Walter Braithwaite decided to attack with the 46th Division
on the right and the 6th Division on the left, while the 1st Division, which
had moved up from Bellenglise during the night of the
""^ I'^V^.**^'''' °^ 16th, was concentrated just north and west of Bohain.
the IX Corps mi • i . t • ■ i i i • -,• , ,
Ihis last division was held in readiness to pass through
the 6th Division and capture the second and third objectives, including
the villages of Wassigny and La Vallee ]\Iulatre, after the 46th and 6th
Divisions had secured the first objective. The attack of the IX Corps,
owing to the lie of the ground, and to the position of Riquerval Wood in the
south and of the Bellevue spur in the north, was complicated and required
careful preparation, good preliminary staff work, and exceptional leader-
ship from battalion and company commanders.
As it was not considered advisable to make a frontal attack against
Riquerval Wood, it was arranged that one brigade of the 46th Division
should neutralise the enemy on this front, while the other two brigades,
making a flank attack in a south-easterly direction, should clear all the
ground west of the Bellevue spur, including Andigny-les-Fermes, and cut
off the defenders of the wood. It was intended that the advance of the
troops of the IX Corps should continue north of the Andigny Forest and
should join up east of it with the XV French Corps which was attacking
2«« EE
210 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October i 7th
along its southern edge, thus pinching it off. It was, therefore, arranged
that, when the 46th Division had secured the first objective, it should form
a defensive flank facing southwards, immediately south of the Regni-
court-Andigny-les-Fermes road, in order to meet any hostile counter-
attacks which might be delivered through the forest. Subsequently,
should the attack progress favourably, it was to maintain touch with the
French and " mop up " the forest as it advanced.
At the same time the 6th Division, also attacking in a south-easterly
direction from Vaux-Andigny, was to capture the Belle vue spur and the
remainder of the first objective as far as the northern corps boundary,
including the high ground north-west of La Vallee Mulatre.
The dividing line between the 46th and 6th Divisions ran along the
valley from the village of Vaux-Andigny to Andigny-les-Fermes. The
boundary dividing the 6th Division, and later the 1st Division, from the
Americans ran from north of Vaux-Andigny in a slightly north-easterly
direction to the village of Ribeauville.
The 46th Division formed up with the 137th, 139th, and 138th Bri-
gades in line from south to north. The 137th Brigade held a front of
about 2,500 yards, from the junction with the French to
The ^^P°^^'|°^*^°^ ^^^ the northern edge of Riquerval Wood, with one bat-
talion, the remaining two battalions being held in
reserve. Its role was to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the real
attack and to hold him by means of a "Chinese " attack ^ with dummy
tanks and dummy figures. A special rolling barrage, in which the machine-
gun company allotted to the brigade played a leading part, was to come
down at " zero " and move through Riquerval Wood in an easterly direc-
tion.
The 139th and 138th Brigades, detailed for the main attack, held the
line between Riquerval Wood and Vaux-Andigny. In order that these
two brigades might start square with their objectives, which ran almost
east and west just south of the Regnicourt-Andigny-les-Fermes road, it was
arranged that they should form up along the Bohain-Vaux-Andigny road.
As part of this line lay in the 6th Division area, special arrangements had
to be made so that the forming up of the attacking troops of the 46th and
6th Divisions should not clash. The barrage to cover the advance of
these two brigades also required special treatment. It was not possible
to place the artillery which was detailed to cover the advance in positions
from which it could put down a frontal barrage, because this would have
involved occupying battery positions required by the 6th Division and
the 30th American Division. The barrage, therefore, fired from positions
north and north-west of Bohain, was oblique to the line of advance. It
was to move forward at the rate of a hundred yards every three minutes,
and was finally to rest for thirty minutes on the northern edge of the
Andigny Forest, after which it was to cease.
The three tanks of the 16th Tank Battalion which were allotted to
the 46th Division were to co-operate with the infantry, with a view to
dealing first of all with a strong point situated about 1,500 yards east of
■ This •' Chinese " attack succeeded in deceiving the enemy, as ten minutes after " zero "
he put down a heavy barrage on the outpost line of this brigade.
OcroBEBi7TH] THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 211
Guy ot Farm and, subsequently, to working along a line of trenches west of
Regnicourt. Thereafter, leaving one tank to deal with the hostile trenches
in Riquerval Wood, the other two were to assist in " mopping up " Regni-
court and Andigny-les-Fermes.
The attack was launched at 5.20 a.m. in a thick mist which
caused several machine-gun nests to be passed by unmolested by the
leading troops. The 139th Brigade advanced on a one-
'^Ll***™ - '^^ battalion front, with the l/8th Sherwood Foresters
win Division it .ii. /... ,,
leadmg, supported by two companies of the l/5th
Sherwood Foresters. The remaining battalion and a half were held in
brigade reserve. Owing to the dense mist and the oblique nature of the
barrage there was some loss of direction. The leading companies advanced
without difficulty on the right and left, but in the centre the advance was
checked by the fire of some machine-guns in a small clearing north-west
of Regnicourt. A prompt use of reserves, however, by the battalion
commander of the l/8th Sherwood Foresters in a flanking movement from
the north, resulted in the capture of 140 prisoners and 27 machine-guns in
the clearing.
The enemy took up a position in a line of trenches running along
the Regnicourt-Andigny-les-Fermes road, and was not finally dislodged
until our leading troops had been reinforced by the remaining two com-
panies of the l/5th Sherwood Foresters, and until an outflanking move-
ment east of Regnicourt had been carried out with the assistance of a
company of the 11th Essex of the 6th Division.
The enemy's final withdrawal into the forest resulted soon after 10 a.m.
in the capture of the whole of its objective by the 139th Brigade, which
still had the l/6th Sherwood Foresters in reserve. About 11 a.m. the
enemy attempted to launch a counter-attack from south-east of Regnicourt,
but met with no success. The 137th Brigade, after its successful " Chinese"
attack, received orders to push patrols into Riquerval Wood ; these patrols
quickly got in touch with the 139th Brigade, and by 2.30 p.m. Riquerval
Wood was clear of the enemy, and the 137th Brigade was in touch with
the French on its right. By 3.30 p.m. it had reached the western edge of
the Andigny Forest, and its patrols, which were still advancing supported
by a battery, were meeting with little opposition.
Meanwhile, north of the 139th Brigade, the 138th Brigade attacked
with two battalions in line, the l/4th Leicestershire on the right, the l/5th
Lincolnshire on the left, and the l/5th Leicestershire in reserve. The
troops pressed forward rapidly and, in spite of the thick mist, had reached
the Regnicourt-Andigny-les-Fermes road by 6.45 a.m. On the fog lifting
some casualties were suffered from fire from the Bellevue spur, and there
was a temporary check; when this position, however, had been captured by
the 6th Division soon after 9 a.m., the 138th Brigade was able to continue its
attack against the village of Andigny-les-Fermes. The 138th Brigade
captured this village about 11.30 a.m. in conjunction with the 1st Loyal
North Lancashire of the 1st Division, which had moved forward through
the 6th Division on its way to attack the second objective. Attempts
were now made by the 137th Brigade to establish touch with the French
along the Andigny-les-Fermes- ]Mennevret road, a company being detailed
212 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October itth
for the purpose, but, owing to a strong post which was held by the enemy
in the wood, junction with the French on this road was not estabUshed
until 5.30 a.m. on the following day.
By 7.30 p.m. the 46th Division had taken all its objectives, and its
line ran from the Forester's House 1,000 yards west of Mennevret, where
it was in touch with the French, to where it joined up with the 1st Division
about 700 yards east of Andigny-les-Fermes. It held this line with all
three brigades in line, of which the 137th Brigade was still fresh, while
one battalion each of the 139th and 138th Brigades had only been
slightly engaged.
The captures for the day by the 46th Division amoiinted to about
15 officers and 500 other ranks, chiefly belonging to the 5th Reserve Divi-
sion, 2 field guns, and over 100 machine-guns.
Maj.-Gen. Marden arranged to attack with the 18th and 16th Brigades
in line and the 71st Brigade in reserve. The attack was to be
made under an artillery barrage, for which eight brigades
'^l^tteck oMhe of ggi(j artillery were available. The infantry advance
ivjsi n ^^^ ^j^^ ^^ ^^ covered by the fire of eighty machine-
guns of the 2nd Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion and the 6th
Machine Gun Battalion, which received orders to search the reverse
slopes of the spurs in order to prevent enfilade fire up the valleys. Three
tanks of the 16th Mark V Tank Battalion were allotted to each attacking
brigade to assist in the attack on a trench line running north from
Andigny-les-Fermes, in front of which it was thought that there might
be uncut wire.
The assembly of the 18th and 16th Brigades, and the execution of the
attack itself, presented considerable difficulties. The " starting line " of
the division was extremely limited, each brigade having a frontage of
only 700 yards on which to form up, while the total frontage when the
first objective was reached would be about 4,000 yards ; the attack would,
therefore, spread out fan-wise. These difficulties were further enhanced
by both brigades having to debouch from the village of Vaux-Andigny,
which might be shelled with gas prior to or immediately after the com-
mencement of the attack, and by the fact that the " starting line " of the
18th Brigade, which was to attack the Bellevue spur, faced east-south-east,
while its direction of advance was south-east.
The 18th and 16th Brigades moved forward to their preliminary
assembly positions on October 16th and, before " zero," relieved the
71st Brigade, which up to that time had been holding the divisional front.
The assembly of the attacking troops was carried out without a hitch,
in spite of heavy shelling with high explosive and gas which began two
hours before " zero," but luckily fell in rear of the assembly positions.
The 18th Brigade formed up on the line of the railway with its left
at Vaux-Andigny station. The brigade was to attack on a two-battalion
front, with the 11th Essex on the right, the 2nd Durham Light Infantry
on the left, and with the 1st West Yorkshire in reserve in rear of the right
flank. The part of the first objective assigned to the 18th Brigade lay
between the village of Andigny-les-Fermes and a point 500 yards west
of La Vallee Mulatre. At " zero " the two leading battalions advanced,
October 17TH1 THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 213
each with two companies in line and two companies in support. A
certain amount of uncut wire was encountered which caused the infantry
to lose the barrage, and, owing to this and the mist, the troops lost direction ;
the fighting that ensued became very confused. The tanks also lost
direction and, joining the right company of the 11th Essex, proceeded with
it in the direction of Regnicourt, where they took part in the capture of
the village in conjunction with the 139th Brigade of the 46th Division,
after which they proceeded to Andigny-les-Fermes, only to find that the
troops of the ist and 46th Divisions had already captured it. Mean-
while, the remainder of the 11th Essex was assisting to clear the Belle\'ne
spur. Further north the 2nd Durham Light Infantry was checked on the
northern slopes of the spur until reinforced by two companies of the
1st West Yorkshire from reserve, when its advance was continued.
Thus, about 10.30 a.m. troops of the 18th Brigade and of the 1st Division,
which was now arriving on the scene, reached the first objective together.
The 16th Brigade formed up with its right at the railway
station of Vaux-Andigny ; the 1st The Buffs was on the right, the
2nd York and Lancaster on the left, and the 1st Shropshire Light In-
fantry in reserve. This brigade, which started parallel to its objective
and had the railway as a guide, kept direction and by 9.15 a.m. had
reached its objective, except on the extreme right where it did not arrive
until an hour later.
The 6th Division had, therefore, by 10.30 a.m. reached the first
objective along its whole front, and the 1st Division was passing through.
Owing to the fog, the fighting had been confused and in some places severe,
as the enemy, consisting of portions of the 3rd Naval, loth Reserve, and
24th Divisions, resisted with considerable determination. For the
remainder of the day the front of the 6th Division was covered by the 1st
Division, and a counter-attack from the direction of La Vallee Mulatre
was forestalled by the attack of the latter division.
Maj.-Gen. Strickland detailed the 1st and 2nd Brigades, on the
right and left respectively, to carry out the attack on the second and
third objectives, the leading troops of these two
^^ ^srSon"* ""^ brigades " leap - frogging " the 6th Division during
the half-hour pause of the barrage covering the first
objective. The 1st and 2nd Brigades were to attack the second objective
under a barrage and, when they had captured it, were to be covered
by a protective barrage lasting for three hours. During this halt artillery
and machine-guns were to be brought forward to furnish another barrage
for the attack on the third objective.
The dividing line between brigades ran east and west through Angin
Farm to a point on the railway immediately west of La Vallee Mulatre,
whence the railway was to be the boundary as far as the southern out-
skirts of Wassigny. This gave the southern outskirts of La Vallee Mulatre
and the northern portion of the Andigny Forest to the 1st Brigade,
and the greater part of La Vallee Mulatre, the whole of Wassigny, and
the high ground north of it to the 2nd Brigade. On the capture of
Wassigny, however, the 1st Brigade was to take over the village and the
grovmd as far north as the Wassigny-Oisy road from the 2nd Brigade.
214 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October l 7th
Attached to the division for the operations were twelve whippet tanks
of the 6th Tank Battahon and three tanks of the 16th Mark V Tank
BattaHon. To assist in the capture of La Vallee Mulatre, the three tanks
of the 16th Tank Battahon were allotted to the 2nd Brigade, one of these
tanks being detailed to work south of the railway in the 1st Brigade
area. The whippet tanks were to be held in reserve for exploiting to the
Sambre and Oise Canal after the third objective had been taken. The
arrangements for the assembly of the 1st and 2nd Brigades presented
some difficulty, as both brigades had to pass through the troops of the 6th
Division on a line 2,500 to 3,000 yards east of Vaux-Andigny. As the
barrage only paused on this line for half an hour, it was necessar>' that
the two brigades should follow close behind the troops of the 6th Division,
when these advanced at " zero," without waiting for information as to
the success or failure of the 6th Division attack ; in order to do this it
was necessary to assemble in rear of and in touch with them, immediately
west of Vaux-Andigny. But the attacks of the 6th and 46th Divisions
both debouched from the neighbourhood of Vaux-Andigny, the 6th
Division attacking east and south-east, and the 46th Division attacking
south-east ; the tails of these two divisions, therefore, converged west
of Vaux-Andigny. In addition to this, the direction of the American
attack on the left of the 6th Division was considerably north of east,
with the result that the tail of the 59th American Brigade which was to
lead the attack, and the head of the 60th American Brigade which was
to follow close behind it, both required to be in the area west of Vaux-
Andigny. An assembly position in this neighbourhood was, therefore,
required by troops of all four divisions concerned. Thanks to the harmony
which reigned in the IX Corps, and between it and the American Corps,
and to the excellent arrangements made by the 1st and 2nd Brigades,
all difficulties were overcome, and the assembly was successfully completed.
The attacking troops advanced at 5.20 a.m. through the mist, which
considerably hampered their movement. The 1st Brigade advanced
with the 1st Loyal North Lancashire on the right,
"* ist^DiXsron *^^ the 1st Cameron Highlanders on the left, and the 1st
Black Watch in reserve; the 2nd Brigade moved for-
ward with the 1st Northamptonshire on the right, the 2nd King's
Royal Rifle Corps on the left, and the 2nd Royal Sussex in reserve. On
the left the 2nd Brigade was unable to find the tracks through the gardens
and hedges which it had reconnoitred and intended to use in order to avoid
the main road through Vaux-Andigny, so the troops were compelled to
use this road, upon which the enemy concentrated a considerable amount
of artillery fire. The approach march to the " starting line " was con-
tinued in spite of this and of the fact that the 6th Division in its advance
had passed by a number of machine-gun nests unnoticed owing to the
fog. These met the troops of both the 1st and 2nd Brigades with heavy
fire, as soon as they appeared east of Vaux-Andigny, and while still 2,000
yards from their " starting line."
During this approach march the 1st Loyal North Lancashire on the
right, after assisting in the capture of the Bellevue spur, where the fire
from strong machine-gun positions threatened at one time to check the
October 17th] THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 215
entire advance, pushed troops forward into Andigny-les-Fermes in its
efforts to get touch with the 46th Division and assisted the 138th Brigade
to " mop up " this village. On the left of the 1st Loyal North Lancashire,
the 1st Cameron Highlanders was at one time completely checked by
machine-gvm fire near the first objective. The situation here was
retrieved by the successful action of a single platoon, which was dispatched
by the battalion commander to work round by the railway on the left
and outflank the enemy's position; the advance was also materially
assisted by the close support of a section of 18-pounders.
The approach march of the 1st Northamptonshire was successfully
conducted without special incident. The 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps
on the left of the line was heavily shelled in Vaux-Andigny, and, on emerg-
ing from the village, the battalion commander and adjutant found them-
selves alone in the mist with a handful of men, the rest of the battalion
having disappeared. Within a short space of time, however, the whole
battalion found its way to its correct position on the " starting line " and
then proceeded to advance, still on compass bearings, towards the second
objective. When the fog lifted the battalion found itself in its correct
position with the 1st Northamptonshire on its right. The manner in
which the four leading battalions of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, moving by
compass bearing throughout the advance, maintained their cohesion and
direction and reached their " starting line " on the first objective,
practically up to time, constituted a very fine achievement.
Although all four battalions advanced from their " starting line "
towards the second objective approximately according to the time-table,
they lost touch with the barrage. In spite of this, however, they fought
their way forward for about 1,000 yards, which brought the right of the
division on to the objective, the centre east of La Vallee Mvdatre, and the
left to the neighbourhood of the Wassigny-St. Souplet railway, some
little distance short of the objective. La Vallee Mulatre was cap-
txired by the 1st Northamptonshire, but some troops of the 29th German
Division counter-attacked from the wood to the south-east and drove
our men back to the centre of the village.
Thus about midday the 1st Division was approximately on the
line of the second objective from Andigny-les-Fermes northwards, through
the centre of La Vallee Mulatre, to the railway north of the
village, where touch was gained with the Americans. By this time the
barrage programme was over, and any fvui;her progress by the infantry
had to be made with the assistance of such artillery support as could be
arranged by commanders on the spot. The enemy had fought well,
and an advance, in these circumstances, would have been costly. Maj.-
Gen. Strickland, therefore, decided to prepare for an organised attack
on the front of both brigades in the evening.
This attack took place at 5.15 p.m., but the barrage was not as good
as usual, owing to the short notice and to the difficulty of communicating
with the batteries which had all been on the move. On the 1st Brigade
front the 1st Loyal North Lancashire and 1st Cameron Highlanders
reached the edge of the wood south-east of La Vallee Mulatre. A heavy
gas shelling in this area, however, forced the commanders on the spot
216 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October i 7th
to order a withdrawal practically to the " starting line." The 1st
Northamptonshire again cleared La Vallee Mulatre and established itself
well east of it. North of the village a certain amount of progress was
made, ovir troops at one time reaching the vicinity of Ribeauville, the
hostile machine-guns in this neighbourhood prevented us, however, from
maintaining all the ground gained.
The 3rd Brigade in reserve moved during the night to the valley
just west of La Vallee Mulatre, where it arrived at dawn on the 18th,
and commanders reconnoitred forward in view of a probable continuance
of the attack.
As the result of the day's operations the IX Corps had advanced
its line to a depth of 4,500 yards ; it had firmly established itself on the
The result of the crest of the watcr-shed which divided the Selle and
day's fighting by the the Sambrc valleys and was in an excellent position
IX Corps ^Q continue its advance next day. It had engaged
and defeated the 5th Reserve, 29th, and 81st Reserve Divisions, and
portions of the 3rd Naval, 15th Reserve, and 24th Divisions. To accomplish
this, it had employed three divisions, but of these one brigade of each
division was still untouched.
The task of the II American Corps was to cross the headwaters of
the Selle between Molain and St. Souplet and capture the important
hamlet of Arbre Guernon and the villages of Slazing-
The dispositions of the hien and RibcauviUe. From reconnaissance of the ground
encan orps .^ ^^^ clear that the attack on the first objective,
which included Arbre Guernon and Bandival Farm, was hkely to be the
more arduous. The obstacle formed by the stream was made more
formidable by the fact that the enemy held the hamlets of Molain and
St. Martin Rivere and the eastern outskirts of St. Souplet, which lay
astride the river ; while the Le Cateau-Wassigny railway, which was
admirably adapted for defence, barred the way to the high groimd
about Ai-bre Guernon.
Prior to the attack on the 17th the II American Corps had been hold-
ing the line with the 27th Division, but on October 16th, for the piirpose
of the operations, the 30th Division was introduced into the hne between
the 27th American Division and the IX Corps. The dividing hne between
the 27th and 30th Divisions ran in a north-easterly direction, leaving St.
Martin Rivere, Molain, Ribeauville, and Mazinghien in the area of the
30th Division, and Arbre Guernon, Bandival Farm, La Roux Farm, and
Jonc de Mer Farm in that of the 27th Division. The northern boundary
of the corps ran from the northern outskirts of St. Souplet, past La Roiix
Farm, to the southern edge of Bazuel.
The 30th and 27th American Divisions, which were now very weak
in numbers, each attacked on a front of two regiments with two regiments
in support. The 30th American Division advanced
The attack of the n ^j^j^ ^he 117th and 118th Regiments of the 59th
Amencan Corps ^^-^^^^ j^ Hne followed by the 119th and 120th Regi-
ments of the 60th Brigade in support. The 27th American Division
advanced with the 53rd Brigade on the right, the 105th Regiment leading,
and the 54th Brigade on the left, the 108th Regiment leading;
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the 106th and 107th Regiments followed in support, on the right and left
respectively.
Ten tanks of the 301st American Tank Battalion were detailed to
assist the 27th American Division, and twelve tanks the 30th American
Division. The 20th Hussars were also attached to the II American
Corps, one squadron with each division, and the remaining squadron in
corps reserve. The goal of the leading regiments of both divisions was
the second objective, after the capture of which the regiments in rear
were to pass through and secure the third objective.
At 5.20 a.m. the divisions advanced to the attack assisted by the
301st American Tank Battalion, of which twenty tanks reached the
" starting line." They succeeded in crossing the Selle without much diffi-
culty, although some casualties were suffered from machine-gun fire
which came chiefly from the direction of St. Martin Rivere. The enemy's
main line of defence was along the line of the railway, and here severe
fighting took place. The American infantry owing to the strong
opposition could advance but slowly, and the barrage was in consequence
lost. Notwithstanding this, the 30th Division pushed forward with the
greatest determination, gained the first objective, and on the right even
penetrated to the outskirts of Ribeauville.
On the left of the II American Corps front, owing to the mist, touch
between the 27th American Division and the 50th Division was lost
at an early hour. The 105th and 108th Regiments of the 27th American
Division met with determined opposition, and were unable to fight their
way forward past, the railway east of St. Souplet and gain the first
objective until some hours after " zero." After a short pause on the
first objective the 27th American Division continued its advance and
attacked Arbre Guernon, but the 204th German Division made a strong
counter-attack against it and the 50th Division on its left, and the American
troops were forced back almost to the line of the railway.
Not to be denied, however, the 53rd and 54th American Brigades
again pressed forward and re-established their line along the Arbre
Guernon-Le Cateau road, regaining touch with the 50th Division at
4.30 p.m. During the afternoon the 27th American Division, after heavy
fighting, succeeded in driving the enemy out of Arbre Guernon, which
it held in spite of vigorous attempts by the Germans to retake it. One
thousand six hundred prisoners and 12 guns were taken during the
day, and heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy in the severe fight-
ing which took place. The Americans had been opposed by the 3rd Naval
and 204th Divisions, as well as by portions of the 24th and 243rd Divisions.^
Sir Thomas Morland arranged for the attack of the XIII Corps ^
to be made by two divisions, the 50th Division on the right and the 66th
Division on the left, with the 25th Division in reserve.
The topositions^of the j.^^ dividing line between the 50th and 66th Divisions
was the Honnechy-Le Cateau road as far as the southern
exit of Le Cateau, thence north of the railway triangle, which was inclusive
' Of these, the 3rd Naval and 20-lth Divisions were comparatively fresh, and the former had
only been brought into the line since the enemy's retreat to the Selle."
* The attack should be followed in detail on Map 14 in order to realise the di£Qculties.
F F
218 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October 17th
to the 50th Division, thence along the Le Cateau-Pommereuil road,
inclusive to the 66th Division. The 25th Division remained in the Maretz
area, with the 75th Brigade forward at Reumont.
The operation was to be divided into three phases. In the first
phase, the 151st Brigade of the 50th Division, after forming up in depth on
a narrow front, was to cross the Selle immediately north of St. Souplet,
capture the railway embankment immediately opposite its point of crossing,
and then fan out on the first objective along the Arbre Guernon-
Le Cateau road. The right and centre battalions of the brigade, immedi-
ately after crossing the river, were to move north-eastwards on to the
high ground which bounds the river valley on the east ; the left battalion
was to turn due north, roll up the enemy's defences along the railway,
and capture the extensive buildings and goods sheds about Le Cateau
station.
In the second phase, the 149th Brigade was to pass one battalion
over the crossings made by the 151st Brigade and one battalion over
the demolished bridge at St. Benin. These two battalions, after passing
through the right and centre battalions of the 151st Brigade, were to
capture the second objective, namely the ridge inmning parallel to the
first objective and about 2,000 yards further east. The third battalion
of the 149th Brigade, following the right battalion of its brigade, was to
tui'n northwards after crossing the railway and move on the railway
triangle south-east of Le Cateau. In conjunction with the attack of the
149th Brigade, the South African Brigade of the 66th Division was to
cross the river north of the town and establish itself along the railway
as far north as the northern corps boundary, joining up with the 149th
Brig.ide immediately north of the railway triangle.
The third phase was to be carried out by the 150th Brigade of the
50th Division, which was to pass through the 149th Brigade and
captiire Bazuel, while the South African Brigade was to conform by
swinging forward its right, and was to establish itself on the ridge
between Le Cateau and the Richemont River. Special parties of the
198th Brigade of the 66th Division were also detailed during this phase to
" mop up " Le Cateau. Since the V Corps was not attacking simultaneously
with the XIII Corps, careful arrangements were made to obliterate by
smoke the enemy's observation from the high ground north-east of
Montay. The V Corps also agreed to attract the enemy's attention on its
front by vigorous artillery action, including a creeping barrage.
The ground afforded exceptional facilities for artillery and machine-
gun support. In order to strengthen the machine-gun covering fire the
machine-gun battalions of the 50th and 66th Divisions, were reinforced
by the machine-gun battalions of the 18th and 25th Divisions. Twelve
tanks from the 1st Mark V Tank Battahon were allotted to the 50th
Division, but it was no easy matter to get them across the Selle.
The initial front of attack of the 50th Division was restricted to a
width of some 600 yards, and the whole success of
'^loth^D^isfon^* ^^^ P^^^ depended on breaking through the enemy's
line on this frontage.
The 151st Brigade (4th King's Royal Rifle Corps, 1st King's Own
"^
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October 17th] THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 219
Yorkshire Light Infantry, 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers) and the 3rd
Royal Fusiliers and 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers of the 149th Brigade
were formed up north of St. Souplet.i ready to cross the river as soon as
the barrage came down and bridges had been thrown across by the Royal
Engineers. The remaining battalion of the 149th Brigade, the 13th Royal
Highlanders (Scottish Horse), was in St. Benin, ready to cross the river.
The 150th Brigade was in reserve immediately west of the railway
embankment and was to advance, as soon as the second objective was
captured, to the valley separating the first and second objectives, and
there deploy for the attack on Bazuel.
The artillery and machine-gun barrage came down at 5.20 a.m.
Under cover of it the bridging of the river was quickly accomplished by
the Royal Engineers ; within three minutes of " zero," twelve bridges
were placed across the river north of St. Souplet by the 446th Field
Company and a company of the 5th Royal Irish Regiment (Pioneers) ;
while in the same time four bridges were thrown across the Selle at St.
Benin by the 447th Field Company, assisted by two platoons of the
pioneer battalion. This expeditious and satisfactory work avoided any
delay. Moreover, the crossing of the infantry was obscured by the heavy
mist and smoke of the barrage. During the night the enemy had fired
a considerable number of gas shell along the whole length of the Selle
Valley ; there was, however, very little hostile shelling at " zero."
The first battalion to cross the river was the 4th King's Royal Rifle
Corps ; it was closely followed by the 1st King's Own Yorkshire Light
Infantry and the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. The attacking troops
soon encountered strong opposition, both from the line of the railway
and from the slope of the ridge east of the river. At 8.45 a.m. the 4th
King's Royal Rifle Corps, with two companies of the 1st King's Own
Yorkshire Light Infantrj^ had advanced no further than the western
slopes of the spur immediately east of St. Crepin and the railway ; at
the same hour the other two companies of the 1st King's Own Yorkshire
Light Infantry were fighting in the orchards on the top of the ridge due
east of St. Benin. Further north the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
which had turned north to roll up the enemy's line, was meeting with
strong opposition from the station buildings.
About 9.30 a.m., owing to the 151st Brigade being checked short
of the first objective by the resistance of the 204th and 243rd German
Divisions, the battalions of the 149th Brigade, which had been detailed to
capture the second objective, became embroiled in the fight. The 3rd
Royal Fusiliers, moving up in rear of the 4th King's Royal
Rifle Corps, formed a defensive flank facing south, as touch with the
Americans had been temporarily lost, while the 2nd Royal Dublin
Fusiliers advanced to support the 1st King's Own Yorkshire Light
Infantry ; the 13th Royal Highlanders was sent to reinforce the 6th
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. About 11 a.m., when the mist lifted, the situa-
tion of the attacking troops could at last be definitely ascertained. The
4th King's Royal Rifle Corps was just west of the Le Cateau-Arbre Guernon
' On the night of October 16th the 151st and 149th BrigadesThad relieved the 150th Brigade
in the line.
220 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Octobee 17th
road, facing Le Quennelet Farm, with the 3rd Royal Fusiliers on its
right, forming a defensive flank facing south-east across the head of the
valley north of Bandival Farm, on the spur to the east of which were
troops of the 27th American Division, The companies of the 1st King's
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers were
intermingled, and were held in check by the enemy in the orchards on the
Arbre Guernon-Le Cateau road, north of the 4th King's Royal Rifle Corps,
The companies of the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and 13th Royal
Highlanders, also intermingled, were fighting round the station buildings
and meeting with strong opposition.
As the 149th Brigade had thus been unable to advance against the
second objective, the 150th Brigade (2nd Northumberland Fusiliers,
7th Wiltshire, 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers) was brought forward to
carry out this task, its place in reserve being taken by the 75th Brigade
of the 25th Division, which was placed at the disposal of Maj.-Gen.
Jackson. With a view to preparing the way for the continuance of the
attack, the massed heavy artillery of the corps put down an intense bom-
bardment from 3 p,m, to 3.30 p.m. on the northern portion of the station
buildings and on the railway triangle. Our attack, however, was antici-
pated by two strong German counter-attacks which were made against
the junction of the II American Corps and the 50th Division. These
countei'- attacks struck the 3rd Royal Fusiliers, the 4th King's Royal Rifle
Corps, and the 1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. The latter
battalion held its ground, but the two former, having suffered heavy
casualties, were forced back off the top of the ridge down the western
slopes. These counter-attacks also drove back the American 27th
Division.
In consequence of this the 150th Brigade was at 4 p.m. ordered to
regain the lost ground and to make good the first objective. This mission
was entrusted to the 7th Wiltshire and the 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers,
who, rushing forward, carried with them the troops of the 4th King's
Royal Rifle Corps and the 3rd Royal Fusiliers and by 4.30 p.m. had estab-
lished themselves on the first objective. About the same time the enemy
was driven out of the station buildings, but still held the brickworks.
The 50th Division, after this attack, held practically the whole
of the first objective within its divisional boundaries. On the right
touch had been established with the 27th American Division at the farm
buildings about 500 yards north of Bandival Farm, which the Americans
had captvued, while on the left the 66th Division had reached the line of
railway, a short distance north of the main Le Cateau-Bazuel road.^
This division was, however, unable to advance further until the railway
triangle had been captured by the 50th Division.
By this time the infantry of the 50th Division was considerably
disorganised, and, as it was impossible to extricate the battalions of any
one brigade, Maj.-Gen. Jackson divided his line into three sections, each
section being held by a group of three battalions. The right group, consist-
ing of the 3rd Royal Fusiliers, the 7th Wiltshire, and the 4th King's Royal
Rifle Corps, held the line of the Arbre Guernon-Le Cateau road from the
> See page 217. '^ See page 224.
October 17th] THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 221
southern corps boundary to the orchards. The centre group, consisting
of the 1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 2nd Royal Munster
Fusiliers, and the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, held from the orchards in-
clusive to opposite the brickworks. The left group, consisting of the 2nd
Northumberland Fusiliers, the 13th Royal Highlanders (Scottish Horse),
and the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, held from opposite the brick-
works to the divisional boundary north of the station. This line was
firmly established, and at 8 p.m. the brickworks were captured with
100 prisoners. The left group also attacked the railway triangle at
8 p.m., and the fighting continued in this part of the field throughout
the night.
An important part in the operations of the 50th Division was taken
by the tanks. Of the twelve tanks of the 1st Mark V Tank Battalion
originally allotted to the division, only eleven were
Tank action available, and these were distributed between the
151st and 149th Brigades, four tanks accompanying
the right and left attacks; and three the centre. After careful reconnais-
sance it had been ascertained that the only practicable place at which
the tanks could cross the Selle was where the St. Souplet-Arbre Guernon
road crosses the river. Here, where the stream was only eight feet wide
and four feet deep, it was found that a crossing could be effected with
the help of " cribs " ^ ; a route to the crossing-place was taped out on
the night of the 16th, and all the tanks, having arrived beyond the stream
shortly after " zero," proceeded to follow up the infantry. Of the right
group, one tank speedily became bogged in the marshy ground, but the
other three tanks reached the first objective and " mopped up " several
machine-guns. Of the centre group, the crew of one tank was overcome
by gas fumes and was unable to proceed; the other two reached
the first objective and became heavily engaged with hostile artillery and
machine-guns, one tank receiving six direct hits and catching fire. Of
the left group, one tank was unable to cross the river, two were bogged,
while the remaining tank, after over-running two machine-gun posts,
put out of action the detachments of two field guns near the orchards.
It then proceeded to the vicinity of the station, where it disposed of two
trench mortars, after which it returned along the railway to St. Souplet.
The objective of the 66th Division was that part of the long ridge, west
of Bazuel, which lies between the Le Cateau-Pommereuil road and the
Richemont river. The attack presented considerable
^AIh^'dS °* difficulties. Le Cateau, east of the Selle, was in the hands
of the enemy and would have to be cleared ; the
Selle, which was under the enemy's observation, could only be crossed
by bridges. Furthermore, it had been decided that Le Cateau was to
be encircled by the 66th Division from the north and the 50th Division
from the south, the troops of the two divisions meeting at the eastern
exit of the town ; as the troops of the 50th Division had considerably
further to go than those of the 66th Division, the synchronisation of the
attacks of the 66th and 50th Divisions required careful adjustment.
' These were very strong hexagonal franries, constructed by the Tank Corps, which were dropped
into the obstacles and over which the tanks then crossed.
222 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October l 7th
In order to ensure this the South African Brigade was ordered to
start at 7.47 a.m., two hours and twenty-seven minutes after " zero."
Attacking on a front of 900 yards, it was to cross the Selle by eight
bridges, placed by the engineers across the river immediately north of
Le Cateau. At 8.20 a.m., three hours after " zero," at which hour it was
estimated that the attacking brigades of the 66th and 50th Divisions
would have joined hands east of the town, the 198th Brigade was to
begin clearing Le Cateau, starting from the north-east. After the capture
of its objective by the South African Brigade, special instructions were
issued to ensure the clearing up of the line of the railway and the forma-
tion of a defensive flank as far north as Montay. The South African
Brigade in its attack was to advance in a south-easterly direction under
a creeping barrage, with its right flank resting on the Faubourg St. Martin-
Fauboiurg de Landrecies road, and, after gaining touch with the 50th
Division near the Faubourg de Landrecies, was to move forward with
its flank along the Le Cateau-Pommercuil road. The left of the brigade
was to advance due east through Baillon Farm to the level crossing just
east of it, where a strong point was to be established in order to protect
the left flank of the division. After the line of the railway had been
captured and contact obtained with the 50th Division, the advance was
to be continued, pivoting on the level crossing, until the objective of the
division was reached.
It was essential that the attack should be a surprise and that no
indications should be given to the enemy that the bridging of the Selle
north of Le Cateau was contemplated. With a view to diverting the
enemy's attention from this part of the field, feints at bridging opera-
tions were carried out in Le Cateau, in order to make him believe that
a direct advance through the town was intended.
The valley of the Richemont river was to be bombarded with gas
shell on the night of the 16th up to 3 a.m. on the 17th, and at " zero "
an intense bombardment, carried out for fifteen minutes by guns and
howitzers of all calibres, was to be directed on the area lying between Le
Cateau and Baillon Farm, to be followed by a slower rate of fire on the
same area. A similar programme was also to be carried out by the 38th Divi-
sion of the V Corps, immediately north of the Fourth Army. A proportion
of smoke shell was to be used in the bombardment of the north-east and
eastern outskirts of Le Cateau, on the area between the Selle and the railway
north of Baillon Farm, and on the slopes of the spur north-east of Montay.
At 7.29 a.m. a barrage was to be put down 300 yards in front of the
infantry " starting line." This barrage was to remain stationary for fifteen
minutes and was then to advance, at the rate of 100 yards every three
minutes, straight through to a distance of 300 yards in front of the divisional
objective, no halt being made on the railway line. Having paused for
three hours beyond this objective, the barrage was again to advance on
the right flank of the division in order to assist the advance of the 50th
Division to its final objective. Six machine-gun companies were to
supplement the artillery barrage.
By midnight on October 16th, when the final dispositions of the 66th
Division had been completed, the 198th Brigade (6th Lancashire Fusiliers,
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5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers) held the
line on the right, with the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers and two companies
of the 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers ready to " mop up " Le Cateau.
The remaining two companies of the 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
were holding the line north of the South African Brigade, having relieved
portions of that brigade between the Roman road and the northern divi-
sional boundary. The 6th Lancashire Fusiliers were in divisional reserve
in the valley west of Le Cateau : the South African Brigade was in the
centre of the line with all three battalions along the western banks of the
Selle ^ : the 199th Brigade was in divisional reserve north of Reumont.
On the night of the 16th parties of the 9th Gloucestershire (Pioneers)
and the divisional engineers erected eight bridges immediately north of
Le Cateau, completing them by 2 a.m. Opposite these bridges the South
African Brigade was formed up by 5 a.m., with the 4th South African
Battalion on the right, the 2nd South African Battalion on the left, and the
1st South African Battalion in close support. As soon as the bridges were
laid, the South Africans pushed patrols across the stream and established
themselves in rifle pits in the midst of the wire entanglements
which had been erected by the enemy along the east bank of the river.
In this dangerous situation, within fifty yards of the enemy's advanced
posts, the brigade lay for three hours, protected from observation by
the friendly mist, and escaping, by the very hazard of its position, from
the hostile artillery and machine-gun fire, the bulk of which passed harm-
lessly overhead.
At 8.45 a.m. information was received that the 149th Brigade of
the 50th Division had crossed the river, and the welcome order to advance
was given. Rapidly crossing the stream the leading
^rigade'attMk'''' waves joined the advanced posts, penetrated the wire
obstacles, and, pressing forward up the hill, vanished
into the mist. Meanwhile, the second wave, after crossing the river, was
temporarily checked by the obstacles on the further bank. Patrols were
sent forward, but nothing could be seen of the leading waves. A report
was sent back that the attack had failed, and, so substantial was the
evidence, that a discussion was held between the divisional and brigade
commanders as to the advisability of bringing back the barrage to its
initial line in order to start the attack " de novo " with fresh troops.
Fortunately, however, before any such drastic expedient could be decided
on, a message was received that our troops had reached the railway
cutting and were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with the enemy.
After crossing the river the leading waves had encountered several
lines of wire about thirty yards from the stream and parallel to it. On
approaching the railway a still more formidable obstacle was met with
in the shape of fovu" to six belts of wire ; moreover, the railway cutting
was lined with machine-guns and riflemen. With indomitable courage
' Some days prior to the attack, several attempts had been made to bridge the Selle between
Le Cateau and Montay, which was here twenty feet wide and five feet deep, with the surface of
the water five feet below the steep grass-covered banks. These attempts had been frustrated by
machine-gun fire from several German posts immediately west of the Selle, but on the night of
the 15th, the 1st South African Battalion had cleared the whole of the left bank of the river, as far
as Montay, of the enemy.
224 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October i 7th
the South African troops rose to the emergency. At one point, a shallow
trench was found, evidently used by the enemy to communicate from
the railway cutting to an advanced post ; at another, a tortuous path
through the wire for the use of his patrols was discovered ; at another,
a narrow passage was laboriously cut by hand. With dogged determina-
tion small parties of men, covered by Lewis gun fire, fought their way
through and penetrated into the cutting, where very bitter fighting took
place. Gradually, and with great difficulty, reinforcing troops dribbled
up to support the points where penetration had been effected ; slowly
but surely the enemy's resistance was overcome, and by about 9.45 a.m.
a considerable portion of the railway cutting was in our possession.
At 10.20 a.m. the 2nd South African Battalion reached its final
objective on the crest of the ridge. It was unable to stay there owing to
heavy machine-gun fire from both its left flank and right rear, and fell
back on to the railway cutting, where it got in touch with the 4th Battalion
on its right. By 12 noon the South African Brigade had captured the
whole of the railway from a point 500 yards north of the railway triangle
to the northern boundary of the XIII Corps, but it was found impossible
to advance further east until the 50th Division had captiured the railway
triangle.
Meanwhile, at 9 a.m. two companies of the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers
had followed the right battalion of the South African Brigade across the
Selle and had begun to " mop up " Le Cateau. These companies were
shortly afterwards reinforced by the remainder of the battalion, as it
was important to captiu-e all the strong points in the eastern part of the
town as soon as possible, owing to the casualties they were causing to the
South African Brigade. Further south two platoons of the 6th Royal
Dublin Fusiliers also succeeded in crossing the river, and began working
north to meet the remainder of the battalion ; they were joined later by
two companies of the 5th Royal InniskiUing Fusiliers.
The position remained practically unchanged during the day ; at
nightfall the 66th Division was holding the whole town of Le Cateau,
from its southern exit to just north of its eastern exit, with the 198th
Brigade, only two battalions of which had been engaged. ^ North of the
19Sth Brigade the South African Brigade held the line of the railway
as far as the Roman road at Montay, with two companies of the 5th
Royal InniskiUing Fusiliers prolonging the line to the northern corps
boundary. The South African Brigade had fully employed two of its
battalions, while the third battalion had also been engaged. In reserve,
however, were the 199th Brigade and the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers, intact ;
the division was therefore in good condition to continue the battle.
The position attacked by the 66th Division, and especially by the
South African Brigade, requires to be studied on the ground before the
difficulties overcome by the initiative and leadership of the regimental
officers and non-commissioned officers, and by the gallantry of all ranks, can
be fully realised. None but the very best troops could have attempted,
let alone have succeeded in, such an enterprise, and the crossing of the Selle
' The 66th Division had been opposed by the 177th Reserve Division and portions of the
44th Reserve Division.
October 17TH] THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 225
at Le Cateau will always remain, like the struggle in Delville Wood in 1916,
a lasting testimony to the fighting qualities of the South African soldier.
The attack of the 17th had broken the crust of the enemy's defence
on the Hermann Stellung I. The most difficult part of the task set to the
three corps had been carried out with the same skill
fl»i,^!lf,r^!fnL!?w^i^~fh and dash which had been so noticeable in previous
ngnting on October l/tn , , •, ii-iii- • ,,i-o,
attacks, and which had given rise to the belief that
no task was now beyond their power. The passage of the Selle had been
forced, and our troops were firmly established along the western portion
of the ridge separating the Selle and the Sambre Valleys ; no serious
physical obstacle now remained to retard our advance till the Sambre
and Oise Canal was reached.
The Allied success had by no means been confined to the Fourth
Army front. On the right of the IX Corps the First French Army had
attacked in strength with the Oise as its objective. In spite of deter-
mined resistance and several counter-attacks, it had established a line west
of Hauteville, along the western outskirts of Aisonville and Grougis, and
west and north-west of Mennevret, and had captured over 1,200 prisoners.
A severe resistance had been expected, as it was clear that the
situation of the enemy was becoming desperate, and that his hopes of
an armistice depended largely on his troops being able to check our
advance.! But the resistance was even more obstinate than had been
anticipated.
It had been estimated that our advance would be opposed by four
fresh and two exhausted divisions in the line. Our initial attack was
actually opposed by five fresh and three fairly fresh divisions ; four of
the fresh divisions, the 17th Reserve, 44th Reserve, 204th, and 243rd,
held the line north of St. Souplet, while the 5th Reserve Division, also
fresh, opposed the IX Corps in the Andigny-les-Fermes area. In the course
of the morning yet another fresh division, the 29th, recently liberated by
the evacuation of the Laon salient, counter-attacked at La Vallee
Mulatre.
The total of prisoners captured during the 17thamounted to about 4,500,
taken from ten different divisions, of which the IX Corps captured 1,500,
the II American Corps 1,800, and the XIII Corps 1,200. Over 20 guns
were also captured.
' The following captured orders are of interest : —
Issued by an Artillery Sub-Group Commander of the 204th Division, on October 12th : —
" The Higher Command states that the possibiUty of an armistice being brought
about depends on the battle coming to a standstill.
" All ofRcers are to be informed. Other ranks are to be reminded that every gunner,
whether gun number, telephonist, linesman, or observer, must carry out his duty day and
night.
" The English must not cross the Selle on our front. The artillery must prevent
them."
Issued by the Commander of an Artillery close-range group belonging to the 79th Reserve
Division, undated : —
" The Higher Command have ordered that troops are to be made to understand
clearly that the ' Hermann Stellung ' must be held at all costs.
" Reason — if the ' Hermann Stellung ' is held there are good prospects of carrj-ing
on peace negotiations, or, as the case may be, of arranging an armistice with the enemy.
" If, on the other hand, the ' Hermann Stellung ' is not held peace in the near future "is
out of the question."
G O
226 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October 18TU
Sir Henry Rawlinson issued orders on the evening of October 17th
for the attack to be continued next day. The first objective given was
The army orders for practically the same as the second objective of the 17th,
the attack on October while the second objective included Wassigny, Mazing-
18th hien, Bazuel, and the line of the Richemont River.
Having captured this line, divisions were to exploit to the Sambre and
Oise Canal.
Instructions were also received from General Headquarters on
October 17th ordering the Fourth, Third, and First Armies to be ready
to carry out a general attack about October 21st, in
GeS'neJdquStera cO'Operation with the First French Army, with a view
to securing the line of the Sambre and Oise Canal, the
western edge of the Mormal Forest, Ghissignies, Ruesnes, Querenaing, and
up to the Scheldt (Escaut).
The attack ordered by the Army Commander was carried out on Octo-
ber 18th. On the IX Corps front, the 46th Division held the line from its
October 18th ; the junction with the French near the Forester's House
attack of the IX to where it joined up with the 1st Division about
Corps 7Q0 yards east of Andigny-les-Fermes. The 1st
Division covered the remainder of the corps front with the 1st and
2nd Brigades in line, the inter-brigade botmdary being the line of the
railway ; the 3rd Brigade was in reserve in the valley immediately west
of La Vallee Mulatre. The 6th Division was in corps reserve behind
the 1st Division. The 46th Division was to maintain touch between the
left of the French advance and the right of the 1st Division, which was to
carry out the main attack, until Wassigny was captured, when it would be
" squeezed out " and go into reserve. The hour at which the attack was
to be resumed by the IX Corps on the 18th was left to be decided by Sir
Walter Braithwaite with the II American Corps, as the 30th American
Division was to attack in conjunction with the 1st Division. It was
finally decided that the 1st Division should attack at 11.30 a.m.
When the attack was launched the 126th French Division made such
good progress through the Andigny Forest that, together with the 137th
Brigade, which had taken over the whole front of the 46th Division, it com-
pletely cleared the forest during the afternoon. The attack of the 1st Division,
which employed the 1st Brigade on the right and the 3rd Brigade on the
left,i was completely successful, and Wassigny and the line of the road from
Wassigny cemetery to Ribeauville were captured. The 1st Black Watch
was on the right, while the 2nd Welsh, the 1st South Wales Borderers, and
the 1st Gloucestershire continued the line northwards. Shortly after night-
fall the 1st Black Watch, which had captured Wassigny, gained touch with
the 126th French Division at Blocus d'en Bas south-east of Wassigny, thus
" squeezing out " the 46th Division, which then passed into corps reserve.
In the north the 1st Gloucestershire maintained touch with the 30th
American Division during the day, and in the evening pushed into
Ribeauville with the Americans. In spite of the close nature of the
country very useful reconnaissance work was done during the day by two
' The 3rd Brigade passed through the 2nd Brigade, which was holding the Una, before
" zero."
October 18THJ THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 227
squadrons of the Royal Scots Greys, one of which was attached to the
1st and one to the 46th Division.
The opposition offered by the enemy throughout the day was con-
siderably less than on the 17th, although our infantry had no tanks to
assist them. This was due, no doubt, to the heavy losses he had sustained,
and to the disorganisation of his units.^ By the evening of October 18th
the IX Corps had captured the objectives allotted to it in the face of
weakening opposition, and was preparing to exploit its successes on the
following morning.
The attack of the II American Corps was arranged so as to syn-
chronise with the attacks of the corps on its flanks, hence the 60th Brigade
of the 30th Division on the right commenced its attack
The attack of the n ^^ conjunction with the 1st Division at 11.30 a.m.,
American Corps ^j^.^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ Regiments of the 27th
Division attacked at 5.30 a.m. in conjunction with the 50th Division.
The objectives of the 30th Division included the villages of Ribeauville
and Mazinghien, while the Jonc de Mar Farm and the line of the Jonc de
Mer stream were to be taken by the 27th Division.
The fighting in this part of the field was severe throughout the day.
The infantry had no tanks to assist them, and, consequently, slow progress
was made along the whole corps front. The troops of the 119th Regiment
of the 30th American Division captured the village of Ribeauville in touch
with the left of the 1st Division, and Mazinghien was entered by the
American troops later in the evening, its capture being completed during the
night of the 18th and the early morning of the 19th. Considerable opposition
was also offered by the enemy at Jonc de Mer Farm, but this was captured
about 2.45 p.m. by the 27th American Division, and the line was pushed
forward soon afterwards to the Jonc de Mer stream. La Roux Farm,
however, at the junction of the American and XIII Corps, remained in the
hands of the enemy until captured by an enveloping movement from the
north-east, carried out by troops of the 75th Brigade, temporarily attached
to the 50th Division. By nightfall the II American Corps had captured
all its objectives.
The 50th Division had on the evening of October 17th made arrange-
ments for continuing the attack on the 18th ; this was to be carried out
The preparations for ^^ ^wo phases. The first phase had as its objective
the attack o£ the the ridge 2,000 yards east of the Ai'bre Guernon-
xm Corps Lg Cateau road, which had been its second objective on
the 17th. This was to be captm-edby an attack laimched at 5.30 a.m., and
was to be carried out by the three groups into which the 50th Division had
been temporarily divided.- The second phase, timed to begin at 8.30 a.m.,
had as its objective Bazuel and the approximate Une of the Bazuel-
Baillon Farm road, that is the third objective of the 17th. This task was
allotted to the 75th Brigade of the 25th Division, which for this
operation remained vmder the orders of the 50th Division.
' Portions of the ISth Reserve, 22nd Reserve, 24th, 29th, and 221st Divisions opposed the
advance of the IX Corps. Of these the 22nd Reserve, 29th, and 221st Divisions had just arrived
a nd were relieving exhausted divisions.
- See page 220.
228 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October i 8th
The 66th Division was ordered to synchronise its attack with that
of the 50th Division, and to swing forward its right on to the top of the
ridge east of Le Cateau, at the same time clearing the Faubourg de
Landrecies of the enemy. No tanks were available for the operations of
the XIII Corps, but the whole attack was to be covered with barrages
similar to those of the preceding day.
At 5.30 a.m. the attack of the 50th Division was launched and was
most successful from the outset. The first objective, the ridge west of
Bazuel, was captured by the three groups of the division
The attack o! the without much opposition, and touch was established
50th and 66th Divuions ^.^^ ^^^ ^Tth American Division. A party of the 2nd
Royal Dublin Fusiliers, over-running their objective, even penetrated into
Bazuel and captured a few prisoners. Here, a daring individual exploit
by Sergeant Ciu-tis of this battalion put out of action the teams of two
hostile machine-guns, and resulted in the capture of four other machine-
guns with their crews. ^ On the left some difficulty was experienced at the
railway triangle, where fighting had continued throughout the night,
and which was not completely cleared before " zero."
After the capture of the first objective, the 75th Brigade " leap-
frogged " the troops of the 50th Division about 8.45 a.m. and succeeded
in establishing itself on the western slopes of the ridge, at the northern
end of which stands Bazuel. Its right was, however, not in touch with the
left of the 27th American Division, which was held up by a strong point
at La Roux Farm. Seeing this, the commander of the 75th Brigade at
once took steps to attack this post from the north-east, and captured it
by 3 p.m., whereupon the American left s\vung forward into line. About
5 p.m. the 75th Brigade advanced and captured Bazuel, together with a
9-2-inch gun and a complete battery of 4-2-inch howitzers, whose teams
had just arrived to remove the guns. Posts were then established east
and north-east of the village.
Meanwhile, on the left, parties of the left group of the 50th Division,
after clearing up the whole of the railway triangle, fought their way slowly
up the railway and on to the Le Cateau-Pommereuil road. Here they
gained touch with the 198th Brigade of the 66th Division, which had secured
the ridge lying between Le Cateau and the Richemont River.
At the close of the day, therefore, the XIII Corps had gained all its
objectives, and had pushed patrols forward of this line. The battle of
the Selle, which was at an end so far as the XIII Corps was concerned,
had resulted in the capture, by six brigades of this corps, of a carefully
prepared and strongly garrisoned position on a front of 7,000 yards, the
greater part of which was protected by a difficult obstacle.
All objectives allotted for the day having been captured early in
the evening, and the resistance of the enemy having been broken, orders
were issued by Sir Henry Rawlinson, late on October
o^t r*°i9th 'i^^^^, for the troops to advance to the line of exploita-
tion given in the orders for the attack on October 17th.
This line ran from the Arrouaise Farm, east of Wassigny, north-eastwards
to the Sambre and Oise Canal near La Laurette, thence along the canal
' See Appendix E, No. 15.
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October 19th] THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 229
to Catillon, and from there, along the Catillon-Bazuel road and the
Richemont River, to Montay ; on the XIII Corps front this hne had ah-eady
been reached. In view of the severe defeat the enemy had suffered on
the 17th and 18th, it was considered extremely probable that he would
retire across the Sambre and Oise Canal during the night, especially as
the result of the fighting on the front of the First French Army had been
very successful. During the 18th the French had gained a line running
east of Aisonville, Grougis, and Andigny Forest, and had captured over
1,000 prisoners.
The advance on October 19th, on the IX Corps front, was continued
at 5.30 a.m. by the 1st Division, the enemy offering little opposition ;
he had, as was anticipated, withdrawn the greater part of his troops
beyond the Sambre and Oise Canal. By noon the whole of Wassigny was
finally cleared, and our troops entered Rejet de Beaulicu, the Frencla on
our right occupying Tupigny and Hannappes. By nightfall the IX Corps
had reached the line of the Oisy-Rejet de Beaulieu road, overlooking the
canal, and was in touch with the French at Oisy and with the Americans
north of Rejet de Beaulieu. Every attempt, however, to occupy the
western bank of the Sambre and Oise Canal was met with heavy
machine-gun fire from the eastern bank, and hostile artillery fire consider-
ably increased during the day.
The II American Corps advanced at the same time as the IX Corps
and, meeting with little opposition, occupied the high ground north-east of
Mazinghien with the 60th Brigade and two battalions of the 59th Brigade
of the 30th Division, while the 53rd and 54th Brigades of the 27th
Division held the line of the St. Maurice Ravine. Between Bazuel
and Montay the line of the XIII Corps remained unchanged, the enemy
occupying the slopes running down to the right bank of the Richemont
River.
The Battle of the Selle may be said to have terminated on the evening
of October 19th, by which date the enemy had been driven by the First
French Army and the Foinrth Army across the Sambre
BSue'?th? Se ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ between Tupigny and Rejet de
Beaulieu. On the Fourth Army front this represented
an advance of 9,000 yards on a front of over seven miles. This success
had been achieved in the face of strong opposition, and in spite of the lu-gent
appeals of the German High Command to its troops to prevent our
passage of the Selle at all costs. Between the morning of the 17th and the
evening of October 19th, 5,139 prisoners, including 143 officers, and
60 guns were captured. The prisoners represented fourteen different
divisions, eleven of which were fully engaged against the Fourth Army.
Furthermore, our advance had brought the important railway junction
of Aulnoye, which was only fourteen miles from Le Cateau, dangerously
near the limit of our long-range guns. The southern flank of the enemy
was, however, safe for the moment behind the Sambre and Oise Canal,
and the centre of interest was for the time being transferred to the
northern flank of the army.
The Battle of the Selle had scarcely been concluded before a con-
ference was held by the Army Commander at which the outline of the
230 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct 19th 2(>rH
next operation, foreshadowed on October 17th by the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief, 1 was explained to Corps Commanders, and warning
The army orders for Orders were issued as regards objectives and artillery
the advance to be con- action. The forthcoming operation was to be a com-
tinued on October 23rd bined attack carried out by the Fovuth, Third, and First
British Armies, in which the Fourth Army was to establish a defensive
flank facing east to protect the main operations which were to be carried
out by the Third and First Armies, while further south the First French
Army was to co-operate. October 23rd was the date given for the attack.
The task given to the IX Corps by Sir Henry Rawlinson was to ad-
vance to the line of the Sambre and Oise Canal, and capture Catillon, Ors,
and the southern portion of L'Eveque Wood. The XIII Corps, in conjunction
with the V Corps on its left, was at the same time to secure the line of the
main Landrecies-Englefontaine road near the western edge of Mormal
Forest, capturing Pommereuil, the northern part of L'Eveque Wood,
Bousies, Fontaine-au-Bois, and Robersart. The northern boundary of the
XIII Corps would run parallel to, and 500 yards south of, the Roman road
from Montay to Englefontaine. An essential object of the operation was
to secure artillery positions, from which the railway jiinction at Aulnoye
could be kept under the fire of our long-range guns.
Sir Henry Rawlinson laid especial stress on the necessity of the
most energetic measures on the part of the engineers and pioneers in the
repair of bridges, and in the clearance of the roads of obstacles, which the
enemy had created by an extensive system of demolitions and road mines.
These troops accomplished their task with the utmost diligence and zeal,
and our ultimate success was in no small measure due to their continuous
efforts, and to those of the Labour Companies.
Corps Commanders were informed that the forthcoming attack would
not be preceded by a preliminary bombardment, but that vigorous counter-
battery work was to be maintained, while the enemy's
Artillery and tanks communications were to be continually harassed, and
special localities selected by corps were to be bombarded.
Tanks were to be allotted : the 301st American Mark V Tank Battalion,
which was now organised in three sections of five tanks each, to the IX
Corps ; the 10th Mark V Tank Battalion, organised in three companies
of eight tanks each, to the XIII Corps. These two tank battalions were
to be under the orders of the 2nd Tank Brigade.
As the Fourth Army was now covered along a considerable portion of
its front by the Sambre and Oise Canal, it became possible to withdraw
more troops into reserve. Orders were, therefore,
■^^ "ti?J fr^t°* °' issued for the II American Corps, which had been
considerably weakened during the last three days'
fighting, to be withdrawn to rest, its front being taken over by the IX
Corps. 2 On relief, the II American Corps went into reserve near Amiens
' More detailed orders regarding objectives, barrages, etc., were issued on the 21st. Tlie
warning orders issued by Sir Henry Rawlinson at the conference were intended to enable corps and
divisions to go ahead with their preparations. See p. 226.
^ The II American Corps had received practically no reinforcements to make good its
casualties since it joined the Fourth Army at the end of September, and its fighting strength was,
therefore, very reduced.
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October 21STJ THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 231
to rest and refit. Since the end of September it had taken a very prominent
and successful part in the operations of the Fourth Army. Its losses had
been severe,^ but the spirit and keenness of all ranks had been maintained
to the end, and it had thoroughly earned the praise it received from
Sir Douglas Haig and Sir Henry Rawlinson.
By October 21st the necessary reliefs were completed, and the army
front, from Oisy exclusive to Montay, was held by the IX and XIII Corps ;
the former with the 1st and 6th Divisions in line, and the 32nd and
46th Divisions in reserve; the XIII Corps with the 25th and 18th
Divisions in line, and the 50th and 66th Divisions in reserve. In view of
the forthcoming operations certain alterations in boundaries became
necessary. These changes did not affect the boundary between the
Fotirth Army and the First French Army,; but the IX Corps took over about
1,000 yards of front from the XIII Corps, while the V Corps of the Third
Army also extended its front for a similar distance southwards. As the
result of this arrangement the dividing line between the IX and XIII
Corps ran north of Bazuel and then forward in a north-easterly direction
through the centre of L'Eveque Wood to the Forester's House ; thence,
it bent still more eastwards to Landrecies.
The country, over which the advance had taken place since passing
the St. Quentin Canal, was open, rolling down conspicuously devoid of cover,
except for the villages and occasional woods, but, after
The nature of the crossing the Selle, the character of the covmtry entirely
changed. East of the Selle the slopes became more
abrupt, small streams ran in the valleys, and there were large tracts of
woodland. The pasture land between these tracts was cut up into innumer-
able small enclosures bounded by high, thick hedges, which, while consti-
tuting a serious obstacle to an infantry advance, at the same time afforded
it excellent cover from view except at short ranges. Pommereuil,
Bousies, Fontainc-au-Bois, and Robersart were straggling villages, the
houses of which were of a poor type and of no great defensive value.
Bousies alone contained buildings of considerable strength, including
a large factory. L'Eveque Wood, covering an area of some four square
miles, had been cleared of standing timber over three parts of its area,
and the cleared spaces were covered with brambles and imdergro^\'th.
Apart from the difficulty of maintaining touch and direction, the passage
of this wood did not present any serious obstacle, except bv night or
in a fog.
Detailed orders for the forthcoming attack were issued on
October 21st. On the right the IX Corps was to conform to the
The detaUed orders advance of the XIII Corps, and, having captured
for the attack on Catillon and Ors, was to establish a defensive flank
October 23rd facing south-cast, along the line of the railway embank-
(SeeMapi5) ^^^^^ which ran parallel to the Sambre 'and Oise
Canal between Ors and the elbow in the canal 2,000 yards north-east
of that village. To ensure the closest co-operation in the attack
between the left of the Fourth and the right of the Third Army, careful
timings were laid down as to the hoiu- at which the troops of the Fourth
' The losses of the corps amounted to 11,500 since it came into the line in September.
232 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Oct. 21si-22ni}
Armv were to arrive at, and depart from, the various objectives. The
barrage, which was to come down as usual 200 yards in front of the
infantry " starting Hne," was to hft four minutes after " zero " and advance
at the rate of 100 yards every four minutes, except through L'Eveque
Wood, where special arrangements were to be made by the IX and XIII
Corps. As the moon was full on the night of October 22nd, it was con-
sidered that it would be an advantage to launch the attack during the
night instead of at da^vn, as had been the custom hitherto, so that the
unexpectedness of the hour would take the enemy by surprise. " Zero "
for the Fourth Army was, therefore, fixed for 1.20 a.m., and, in order to
synchronise the advance on the flanks of the V and XIII Corps, the
V Corps agreed to start its troops at forty minutes after " zero," by which
time the left of the XIII Corps would be up in line with them.
Sir Walter Braithwaite's plan was to attack with two divisions in line,
the 1st Division on the right, and the 6th Division on the left. The role
of the 1st Division was to gain ground towards the
The DC Corps' plan canal and to drive the enemy across it south of Catillon,
while the 6th Division, conforming to the advance of
the 25th Division, was to form an ever-lengthening defensive flank facing
east, as that division gained ground. The 1st Division was to attack with
the 2nd and 3rd Brigades in line and the 1st Brigade in reserve, and the 6th
Division with the 18th and 71st Brigades in line and the 16th Brigade in
reserve.
To the XIII Corps were allotted five objectives. First, the Pom-
mereuil-Forest road ; second, for the left division only, the Tilleuls
Farm- Vert Baudet road ; third, a line along the north-
The xm Corps' plan eastern edge of L'Eveque Wood and the western edge
of Bousies ; fourth, the spur east of Malgarni and
the ^-illage of Bousies ; fifth, from the spur east of Malgarni in a
north-easterly direction to the junction of roads half a mile south-
east of Fontaine-au-Bois, thence due north to the bend in the
Landrecies-Englefontaine road, and along that road to the northern
corps boimdary.
Sir Thomas Morland arranged to attack with two divisions in line,
the 25th Division on the right and the 18th Division on the left. The
boimdary between the two divisions ran through Garde Mill, along the
north-western edge of L'Eveque Wood, through Tilleuls Farm to Bout
du Monde.
On the 25th Division front the attack on the first objective was to
be carried out by the 7th Brigade, with three battalions deployed in the
front line. Owing to the weakness of the 7th Brigade, whose strength
was imder 700 rifles, one battalion of the 75th Brigade was placed at
its disposal; this battalion was only to be used if absolutely necessary
for the capture of the first objective. Then, when the 18th Division
pushed forward in order to outflank L'Eveque Wood from the north, one
battalion of the 75th Brigade was to advance along the northern edge of
the wood, establishing posts at certain points to protect the right flank of
the 18th Division. The remaining battalion of the 75th Brigade was to
clear the north-eastern portion of the wood and estabUsh itself on the
October 23rd] THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 233
eastern edge of the wood. The 7th Brigade was to clear the western
portion of the wood, using for this purpose, if it was still available, the
battalion of the 75th Brigade which had been placed at its disposal.
The 74th Brigade was in turn to move along the northern edge of
L'Eveque Wood, deploy behind the battalion holding the eastern edge,
and carry forward the attack on to the fourth and fifth objectives.
In the case of the 18th Division, the capture of the first and second
objectives, which included reaching the Tilleuls Farm-Vert Baudet road,
was entrusted to the 53rd Brigade and the 54th Brigade, less the 6th
Northamptonshire, while the 55th Brigade, with the 6th Northampton-
shire attached, was to pass through and secure the third, fourth, and fifth
objectives.
Of the twenty-four tanks of the 10th Tank Battalion at the disposal
of the XIII Corps for the operation, sixteen were allotted to the 18th
Division, which in turn sub-allotted four tanks each to the 53rd and
54th Brigades, and eight to the 55th Brigade. Eight tanks were allotted
to the 25th Division, of Avhich four were to assist in the capture of
Pommereuil. An extra machine-gun battalion was lent to each of the 18th
and 25th Divisions for barrage work, from the divisions in reserve, in
order that a large proportion of the machine-guns of the two attacking
divisions might be kept mobile, ready to move forward with the infantry.
Arrangements were also made for the advance of field artillery brigades
and sections of 6-inch howitzers to support the attack in the later stages,
and three sections of 6-inch guns were held in readiness to move forward
to positions selected on the map, from which they could engage Aulnoye
railway junction as soon as the situation permitted.
On the south, when the IX Corps attacked, the enemy put down a
heavy barrage mixed with gas, but this did not check the advance. On
the right the 1st Division by 8 a.m. had reached the out-
attSt/tS K Corps ^^irts of Catillon and was sending patrols into the
village. More stubborn opposition was experienced
by the 6th Division, and severe fighting took place before the Richemont
River was crossed. No ground was gained without fighting, and, on one
occasion, a party of our troops was surrounded and only hacked its way
out after hand-to-hand fighting. A certain amount of progress was made
through L'Eveque Wood, but the 6th Division was imable to keep abreast
of the 25th Division, which had to form a defensive flank to the south.
Little further advance was made on the IX Corps front that day, and,
although patrols made their way to the banks of the Sambre and Oise
Canal, Catillon and Ors remained in the possession of the enemy.
The troops of the XIII Corps, after a very well organised night march,
reached their assembly positions without a hitch. At 1.20 a.m. the attack
started in bright moonlight. Considerable opposition
"^^CT??oi2 **** ^^^^ experienced from the mills and farms along the
banks of the Richemont River, but this was gradually
overcome, the garrisons being killed or taken prisoner. Unfortunately
several machine-gun posts were passed by unnoticed by the leading troops,
and these gave trouble to the troops detailed for the attack on the more
distant objectives as they moved forward.
H n
234 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October 23rd
On the front of the 25th Division the three battalions of the 7th
Brigade led the attack, with the l/8th Royal Warwickshire of the 75th
Brigade in support. The heavy mist made it difficult to
The 25th Division keep direction, and this caused a certain loss of cohesion
among the attacking troops ; the first objective was, how-
ever, gained without much difficulty. Then began the arduous task of clear-
ing the northern half of L'Eveque Wood,^ but, in spite of the hostile resist-
ance and the thick undergrowth, this was successfully accomplished, except
on the right, where the 6th Division had not been able to keep pace with
the advance of the 25th Division ; a defensive flank was, therefore, estab-
lished through the wood along the line of the Bazuel-Malgarni road.
Meanwhile the right flank of the 18th Division was protected by the l/Sth
Worcestershire, of the 75th Brigade, which had moved along the northern
edge of the wood and captiu-ed Tilleuls Farm and a battery of 4-2-inch
howitzers. The 74th Brigade, which was to attack the foiui:h and fifth
objectives, advanced from its assembly position on the Le Cateau— Busigny
road behind the 75th and 7th Brigades. Its advance was delayed by a
party of the enemy in a sunken road near Garde Mill, which had been
missed by the artillery, and had been passed by the leading troops owing to
there being a gap between the left of the 25th Division and the right of the
18th Division. The enemy was driven from this locality after some
fighting, but so much time had been lost that the leading troops of the
brigade did not reach Pommereuil until 10.30 a.m. The 74th Brigade
then moved along the northern edge of L'Eveque Wood, and endeavoured
to deploy along the eastern outskirts of the wood for the attack on the
fourth and fifth objectives. One battalion, however, the 9th Yorkshire,
became involved in the fighting for the clearing of the wood ; also it was
found that the eastern exits from the wood were raked by the enemy's
fire from the Hermann Stellung II. This fine ran parallel to the road
running south-east from Bousies near the eastern boundary of the wood,
and, although the trenches were not completed, the wire in front of it was
very strong. It soon became obvious that the brigade could not be got
into position before dark, and the attack was accordingly postponed until
the following day.
The 18th Division attacked with the 53rd Brigade on the right and
the 54th Brigade, less one battalion, on the left. The 53rd Brigade
advanced with the 7th Royal West Kent on the right, the
""* ^attec?^'°° '^^^^ '^^^^^ °^ *^^ ^^^*' ^"^ *^^ ^*^ ^°>'^^ Berkshire
in support. The Richemont River was crossed, and a
dashing attack by a company of the 7th Royal West Kent secured Garde
Mill together with 70 prisoners. The 7th Royal W^est Kent reached
the first objective after overcoming all opposition, but the 10th Essex
was held up by machine-gun fire when about 300 yards from the objective.
The 8th Royal Berkshire, which was to " leap-frog " the leading battalions
on the first objective, was checked when crossing the Richemont River
by fire from a machine-gun post that the leading troops had missed, and
the left company was held up for some time. The battalion then went on,
' During the fighting, Private Francis Miles, l/5th Gloucestershire, by his courage and initiative
was responsible for the capture of 16 machine-guns and 50 prisoners See Appendix E, No. 36.
October 23rd] THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 235
but became involved in the check sustained by the 10th Essex, and no
progress could be made until the arrival on the left of the 54th Brigade
with tanks turned the enemy's position and allowed the advance to be
resumed. The 8th Royal Berkshire then secured the second objective,
and established touch with the 25th Division on the right and with the
54th Brigade on the left.
The attack on the 54th Brigade front was led by the 2nd Bedfordshire.
At the outset considerable resistance was encountered, and many prisoners
were captured in the sunken roads north-east of Richemont Mill, which
had been subjected to the enfilade fire of forty machine-guns from a
position east of Le Cateau. The attack was carried on with fine deter-
mination, and White Springs was captiired after stubborn fighting. The
battalion then established itself on a track which it took to be the first
objective, but was in reality 500 yards short of it. Here, the 11th Royal
Fusiliers passed through and, advancing with great dash, captured eleven
guns. One company went right through to the second objective, but,
as both flanks were unsupported, it had to withdraw and come into line
with the remainder of the battalion which had been checked by machine-
gun fire. At 7.30 a.m., however, the 7th The Buffs of the 55th Brigade
came up, and passed through the 11th Royal Fusiliers.
The 55th Brigade, with the 8th East Surrey and the 7th The Buffs
leading, followed up the 54th Brigade so closely that it became in-
volved in the fighting west of the second objective. The 8th East
Surrey then captured Fayt Farm, and the 7th The Buffs Epinette
Farm. As a result of this fighting these battalions were forty minutes
behind schedule time in beginning the attack on the third objective.
Determined resistance was encotmtered at Bousies, where the enemy had
posts and machine-gun nests among the hedges which surrounded and
intersected the village, and the opposition had to be beaten down yard by
yard before the enemy, who lost heavily, was driven out of the village about
8 p.m. As touch with the brigade of the V Corps on the left had been
lost, and on account of the darkness, it was found impossible to continue
the advance on the remaining objectives, and a further attack was postponed
until the following morning. The day had been a very successful one
for the 25th and 18th Divisions, the latter division had made an advance
of 8,000 yards and could claim the capture of 53 guns.
The day on the whole was not a happy one for the tanks. Owing
to the indifferent light in the early stages of the attack a large number
were "ditched" in passing over comparatively insig-
^* *"t^°ks°^ ^^^ nificant obstacles, the drivers being unable to see
clearly what was in front of them. Much valuable
work, however, was done by the tanks of the 10th Tank Battalion in
the heavy fighting in Bousies.
., , ,. At the end of the day the line held by our troops
day's flrhtin? ; army ^^^ from the little hamlet of La Louviere, past Catillon
orders issued for the Halt, along the western outskirts of Ors, through
attack to be continued L'Eveque Wood to within 500 yards of Malgarni, and
thence east and north of Bousies to the south-eastern edge
of Vendegies Wood. As a result of the fighting 849 prisoners, including
236 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October 24th
23 officers, were captured, of the 8th, 17th Reserve, 44th Reserve, 121st,
204th, and 243rd Divisions, and the 2nd CycHst Brigade. Of these Divisions
the 8th and 204th were in the act of reheving the 44th Reserve and 121st
Divisions in the Bousies and Catillon areas respectively. It was resolved
to give the enemy no respite, and both corps were ordered to resume the
attack next morning at 4 a.m. for the purpose of securing the remaining
objectives.
On the right of the IX Corps the 1st Division confined itself to
patrolling the banks of the canal and the outskirts of Catillon. At the
same time the 6th Division gained a footing in Ors and
October 24th ; the IX cleared the southern part of L'Eveque Wood. A few
Corps attack . n ij j u -x
prisoners and some field guns and howitzers were cap-
tured. The 6th Division was still unable to reach its final objective on the
extreme left flank, but it made sufficient progress in L'Eveque Wood to
allow of the 25th Division withdrawing its defensive flank.
The 74th Brigade, to which was attached the l/8th Worcestershire
of the 75th Brigade, carried on the attack of the 25th Division. The
troops formed up in the eastern outskirts of L'Eveque
The xm Corps attack Wood, but, as soon as they emerged into the open, they
were met with heavy fire from the enemy's position
west of Malgarni.i This position was carried in spite of the strong wire,
and Malgarni was captured after severe hand-to-hand fighting in the
orchards and houses. Fontaine-au-Bois was then occupied, and by 12 noon
the 74th Brigade had established itself on the fifth and final objective.
Patrols, which were sent out, found the enemy holding the line of the
Landrecies-Englefontaine road in strength, and all attempts to dislodge
him failed.
The 18th Division met with considerable difficulties. No tanks were
available for the operation, and the 55th and 54th Brigades, which carried
out the attack, were not able to keep up with the barrage on account of
the enclosed and thickly-hedged country through which they had to pass.
Along the whole front the enemy opposed our advance with great tenacity,
and, in the wired defences amidst the hedges and orchards between
Bousies and Robersart, the fighting was exceptionally strenuous and the
advance slow. North-west of Robersart our troops were checked by
five hostile machine-guns posted on the ridge on which stands Renuart
Farm. Lieut. William Hedges of the 6th Northamptonshire promptly
proceeded up the hill under cover, accompanied by a sergeant, and followed
at some considerable distance by a Lewis gun section. Having gone as
far as he could under cover, Lieut. Hedges dashed forward, killed the
first enemy machine-gvmner, and took two others prisoner. He then worked
his way along the crest of the hill and served three other machine-gun
posts in the same fashion. This dashing exploit broke down the enemy's
resistance at this point and enabled our line to go forward.^ Ultimately,
after dogged fighting, our men pushed into Robersart, which was cleared
by the end of the day. A German garrison, which held out in Renuart
Farm, was outflanked by three companies of the 6th Northamptonshire,
while the remaining company engaged the enemy's attention in front.
' Hermann Stellung II. ^ gee Appendix E, No. 24.
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October 25TH-31 ST] THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE 237
Some progress was made east of Robersart and Renuart Farm, but the
final objective on the hne of the main Landrecies-Englefontaine road was
held in force by the enemy.
Thus, after two days' strenuous fighting, ^ the line of the final
objective had been gained on most of the army front. The greater part
The result of the ^^ CatiUon and Ors were still, however, held by the
fighting on the 2Zzi enemy as well as the south-east corner of L'Eveque
and 24th Wood, while the 18th Division held a line just short of
the main Landrecies-Englefontaine road. Eight German Divisions and a
Cyclist Brigade had been defeated, and 27 officers, 1,213 other ranks, and
66 guns had been captured. In addition, the Aulnoye railway junction,
so important to the enemy for movement of transport, troops, and supplies,
was now within range of our 6-inch guns.
After the fighting of the 23rd and 24th there was a lull, dvu-ing which
the troops were rested and reorganised, while preparations were at once
begun for a resumption of the offensive. Infantry
'o°t°b ""ss^th"!^ 31^ action imtil the end of the month was confined chiefly to
active patrolling, but on October 26th the 18th Division,
by throwing forward its left flank, co-operated ^^^th an attack of the V
Corps, which resulted in the capture of Englefontaine and the establish-
ment of our line from Petit Planty to the north-east corner of Engle-
fontaine. On the left of the IX Corps a company of the 1st The Buffs
of the 6th Division attacked and, after a first failure, secured part
of the Happegarbes spur, which it held against the enemy's counter-
attacks until relieved. On October 29th the 1st Division established
itself along the western bank of the Sambre and Oise Canal from Oisy to
the south of Catillon.
North and south of the Fourth Army the experiences of the enemy
had been no more encouraging for him. In Flanders, by the end of Octo-
The progress north and ^er, the enemy had been forced back to the line of the
south of the Fourth Scheldt, and the Third and First Armies had advanced
Army q^^. ij^g ^yell to the north and east of the Le Quesnoy-
Valenciennes railway. To the south the French had made good pro-
gress, had crossed the Serre and Peron rivers, and had reached the
southern bank of the Oise near Guise.
In front of the Fourth Army the enemy was now making a stand on
the line of the Sambre and Oise Canal and along the western edge of
A summary of the Mormal Forest. His troops, however, were depressed
situation on by continuous defeat and exhausted by incessant
October 31st fighting, while the moral of our own men was magnificent.
The general attack was, therefore, only delayed by the Commander-in-
Chief until such time as the preparations should be complete. One
fresh, and five fairly fresh German divisions were transferred to other
parts of the front from in front of the Fourth Army, and the 221st Division,
which had been engaged three times by the Fourth Army, was now dis-
banded. Hence the enemy's reserves on the Fourth Army front were
reduced by seven divisions. At the end of October it was estimated that
> The strong resistance experienced by the XIII Corps in the Bousies area was due to the
fact that the enemy had been reinforced here by the 30th and 58th Divisions.
238 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [October 31st
the Fourth Army was opposed by the equivalent of seven divisions, to-
gether with portions both of the Cychst Brigade and the Jager Division ;
all these divisions, however, were believed to be exhausted and were sup-
ported only by three other equally exhausted divisions. It was believed
that in the back areas the enemy had thirteen divisions at his disposal,
of which the large majority had been recently withdrawn from the fighting
and had suffered heavy casualties. On the whole of the western front,
there was only one German division which had been resting for one month.
Whatever might be his ultimate intentions, it was essential for the
enemy to maintain the line of the Sambre and Oise Canal as long as
possible, and the importance of denying the passage of the canal to our
troops was impressed by him on all ranks of his army.^ At the same
time, aeroplane reconnaissance made it clear that the Germans were
removing aerodromes and destroying railways, and making preparations
for a further retirement. If the passage of the Sambre and Oise Canal
could be forced before their preparations for an orderly retirement could
be completed, they must inevitably suffer disaster.
• The following Army Order, issued by the Crown Prince to the XVIII German Army, which
was captured about October 29th, shows the intentions of the enemy : —
" The defence of the Canal position is of great strategical importance for the Army
Group front. I reckon absolutely on the Army holding its new positions at all costs.
" The reserves at the Army's disposal should be engaged and utilised with a view to
this. It must be clearly understood by all commanding officers that only a stubborn resistance
will induce the enemy to discontinue his attack. Again I order that the canal front be
strongly reinforced with machine-gun imits. I insist upon no further withdrawal being
undertaken without my authority.
" (Sd.) WiLHELM, Crown Prince.
" The above is to be issued down to Regiments.
" (Sd.) BuBKNEB, Chief of Staff."
CHAPTER XII
THE CROSSING OF THE SAMBRE AND OISE CANAL, AND THE EVENTS
LEADING UP TO THE ARMISTICE, NOVEMBER IST TO llTH
Maps 1, 2, 16, and 17
The situation prior to the resumption of the Allied offensive — The orders from General Head-
quarters for a general advance — The preliminary operations by the IX Corps — The general
plan for the attack on November 4th — The nature of the countrj' ; the Sambre and Oise
Canal — The Mormal Forest — The country east of the Sambre and Oise Canal —
The objectives of the attack — The IX Corps plan of attack — The XIII Corps plan
of attack — The action of the artillery — The preparations for bridging the canal — The allot-
ment of tanks — The assembly — November 4th ; the IX Corps ; the attack of the 1st Division ;
the crossing of the canal by the 2nd Brigade — The 1st Brigade crossing — The capture of
CatUlon by the 3rd Brigade — The further advance of the 1st Division — The result of the
fighting by the 1st Division — The attack of the 32nd Division ; the 14th Brigade force a
crossing — Thetemporary check to the 96th Brigade — The capture of the Happegarbes spur —
The further advance of the 32nd Division — The XIII Corps operations — The capture of
Landrecies by the 25th Division — The 50th Division attack through Mormal Forest — The
attack by the 18th Division — The armoured cars — The result of the fighting on November 4th
— The pursuit ; November 5th and 6th ; the events on the IX Corps front — The events on
the XIII Corps front — The pursuit continued on November 7th, 8th, and 9th — The IX Corps —
The XIII Corps — The question of supply — BetheU's Force — The frontier of France reached
on November 10th — The Armistice, 11 a.m., November 11th.
By the end of October the defeat of Germany appeared inevitable.
In a long series of almost continuous battles her armies had been defeated
The situation prior to with heavy losses in men and material, and it was
the resumption oi the becoming increasingly difficult for the German High
Allied offensive Command to withdraw the troops in good order.
Menaced by overwhelming defeat, German soldiers were no longer available
to assist their Allies in other theatres of war ; Turkey and Bulgaria had
surrendered to the Allies, while Austria, bankrupt of leaders, plan, and
organisation, was incapable of carr\'ing on the war.^
Within Germany itself the soaring hopes, aroused by the brilliant
start of the March offensive, had given place to profound depression, as
each week recorded a fresh withdrawal of the German forces. Internal
conditions had grown desperate, and dreams of victory had given place
to a sense of the complete futility of prosecuting a profitless war. The
leaders of the nation were no longer trusted, and social agitators were
given a sympathetic hearing.
Thus, while each military disaster made it difficult for the German
' Bulgaria signed an Armistice on September 29th, Turkey on October 3l8t, and Austria on
November 3rd.
S38
240 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Nov 1st 2nd
leaders to control the army, it was still more difficult to control the forces
within Germany itself. Complete disaster could only be averted if the
defeated armies could be withdrawn behind a line capable of checking
the Allies dming the winter months. Then it might be possible for
Germany to bargain with the Allies, and arrange an armistice, the terms
of which would allow her a voice in the settlement on more or less equal
terms. It was, however, within the power of the Allied forces to shatter
this last hope, if full use was made by Marshal Foch and Sir Douglas
Haig of the enormous moral and strategic advantages which they had
gained. An immediate attack upon the enemy's centre, the vital part of his
line upon which depended the safety of his communications in the north
and south, would anticipate his contemplated and inevitable withdrawal,
and, if successful, would convert that withdrawal into a rout.
With this object orders were issued by Sir Douglas Haig on October
29th for the Fourth. Third, and First Armies to carry out a concerted
The orders from attack in the general direction of Maubeuge and Mons,
General Headquarters while on the right of the Foixrth Army, the First French
for a general advance Army would co-operatc by pushing forward in the direc-
tion of La Capelle.
A preliminary operation to secure Valenciennes was necessary before
the general attack could be made, and this was successfully accomplished
by the Third and First Armies by November 2nd. This victory compelled
the enemy to withdraw on the Le Quesnoy-Valenciennes front, and
rendered the position of his forces in the Tovu'nai salient precarious, as
our progress south of it had now turned the line of the Scheldt.
Preliminary operations were also undertaken by the Fourth Army
in preparation for the general attack. The front of the Fourth Army
The preliminary opera- ^^ ^^^e end of October extended from the Sambre and
tions by the IX Corps Oise Canal, north of Oisy, to its junction with the Third
(see Map 17) Army south of Englefontaine ; of this the IX Corps
held from the southern army boundary to the south-east corner of
L'Eveque Wood, a front of some nine miles, while the XIII Corps held
from L'Eveque Wood, to the junction with the Third Army, a distance of
about six miles.
Before making any attempt to force the passage of the Sambre and
Oise Canal it was necessary to secure complete control of all ground on
its western bank. The chief points of tactical importance still held by the
enemy west of the canal were Catillon, Le Donjon, Ors, and the
Happegarbes spur south-west of Landrecies. Vigorous patrolling was
therefore carried out by the IX Corps on November 1st, and by
November 2nd the village of Ors and the whole western bank, from Ors to
the elbow in the canal fvu1:her north, had been cleared of the enemy.
Further south, the enemy still retained Catillon and the circular strong
point known as Le Donjon.
The most important point, however, held by the enemy on the western
bank was the Happegarbes spur, which commanded the canal as
far south as Catillon and of which the 32nd Division only held a part.^
' The 32nd Division relieved the 6th Division on the left of the IX Corps front on the night
of October 30th.
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November IST-SRDj THE LAST PHASE 241
In order to secure the whole of the spur it was attacked at 6 a.m. on
November 2nd by the 15th Lancashire FusiHers of the 96th Brigade,
assisted by three tanks of the 10th Mark V Tank BattaUon. After heavy
fighting the spur was captured, together with 60 prisoners of the 6th
battahon of the 2nd Cyclist Brigade. ^ Three hours later the position
was counter-attacked by the enemy from the north-east ; this attack was
repulsed, but a second and stronger counter-attack, preceded by a violent
bombardment in which a large quantity of gas shell was used, was carried
out by the 6th Battalion reinforced by the 4th Battalion of Cyclists, and
succeeded in forcing our men off the spur. A second attack by the loth
Lancashire Fusiliers, reinforced by two companies of the 16th Lancashire
Fusiliers, regained possession of the spur on the morning of November
3rd. Two determined counter-attacks were again delivered by the enemy.
The first was successfully beaten off, but a second was delivered by a strong
force, consisting of the two Cyclist battalions reinforced by a regiment
of the 1st Guard Reserve Division. Fighting of the most obstinate and
bitter description took place, and at one time the battalion headquarters
of the 15th Lancashire Fusiliers was almost surrounded. The gallant
resistance of the battalion staff, however, kept the enemy at bay until
night fell, when, owing to the casualties sustained, it was deemed advisable
to withdraw to the " starting line."
It was now clear that, while the capture of the spiu- presented no
great difficvdties to resolute troops, its retention was a matter of considerable
difficulty. Consequently, it was decided to abandon the idea of securing
this ground before the main attack was launched, as it was considered
that in a general advance the enemy would not be in a position to deliver
local counter-attacks in such strength as he did on November 2nd
and 3rd.2
These operations had prepared the way for the general attack which
was to take place, on November 4th. The attack of the British Armies
The general plan for ^^^^ ^^ ^e delivered on a frontage of about thirty miles,
the attack on Novem- from the Sambre and Oise Canal, immediately north of
ber 4th Oisy, to Valenciennes, and was to be extended to the
south of Oisy for another twenty miles by the French. The general fine of
advance of the Fovirth Army, on a frontage of about fifteen miles, was
to be due cast.
The nature of the country over which the advance was to be made
was difficult. On the right there was the obstacle of the Sambre and
The nature of the ^ise Canal which had to be crossed at the outset.
country ; the Sambre This canal runs from La Fere by Mont D'Origny,
and Oise Canal Vadencourt, and Etreux to Landrecies. From La Fere
to Vadencourt it follows the course of the Oise, thence, swinging
to the north near Etreux, it enters the Sambre valley near Oisy. At
Landrecies the canal terminates and the canalised Sambre begins as a
1 Both during this attack, and again on November 3rd and 4th, Sergeant Clarke, 15th
Lancashire Fusiliers, displayed great gallantrj' and fine leadership. See Appendix E, No. 10.
^ It is always a ditHcuIt question to decide whether a small preliminary operation of this
description to capture some important tactical point is wise, or whether it is not better to include
it in the general attack. Experience proves that, with few exceptions, it is better to wait for the
general attack, when such points will be captured without difficulty.
I I
242 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [November 1st-3rd
separate waterway. The canal is of the ordinary type to be met with in
France and Belgium and forms a considerable obstacle, being some seventy
feet wide from bank to bank, and thirty-five to forty feet wide at water-
level except at Lock No. 1, and at the locks at Catillon, Ors, and Landrecies,
where it is seventeen feet wide. It contained at that time an average
depth of six to eight feet of water and was nowhere fordable except at the
bridges, which had been either demolished or prepared for demolition.
In addition to the obstacle offered by the canal itself, the low ground
on both sides of the canal had been inundated by the Germans and much
of it had been transformed into swamp. In some places the water was
only ankle deep, but, north and south of Ors, there were small streams
parallel to the canal swollen to a width of about fifteen feet and a depth of
two to three feet ; similar streams existed south of Catillon. Along
each side of the canal between Oisy and Lock No. 1 there are wide
reservoirs ; at their northern end they are more than twice the width of the
canal, and at that time contained a fair depth of water, but they are
narrower and shallower further south. South of Catillon the enemy had
felled the trees along the western bank of the canal for the double purpose
of improving his field of fire and of forming an abattis.
Fvu-ther north the area west of the Mormal Forest is of a peculiarly
intricate and enclosed natiu-e. The scattered and rambling villages of
Les Etoquies, Happegarbes, Rosimbois, Preux-aux-Bois,
The Mormal Forest and Hecq are surrounded by small orchards and pad-
docks, enclosed by thick, almost impenetrable, hedges,
which restricted the view and greatly increased the difficulties of main-
taining direction.
Mormal Forest itself covers an area of forty square miles, but much
of it had been cut down for timber by the enemy during his occupation,
and there were, therefore, numerous clearings ; in those portions which
were untouched by the axe the undergrowth was very dense and hampered
movement. A number of streams have their source in the forest and
run through narrow channels with steep banks into the Scheldt and
Sambre valleys. In the centre, surrounded by small pastures and
orchards, is the village of Locquignol, on which the numerous roads and
tracks, almost all of which are unmetalled, mostly converge. In addition,
many light railway tracks had been constructed by the enemy in order
to transport the felled timber. The whole forest offered great oppor-
tunities for resolute defence. Owing to its size, density, and good interior
communications it was capable of sheltering considerable forces, whilst
its large expanse made it difficult for artillery to deal with effectively.
The general configuration of the country, east of the Sambre and
Oise Canal and south of Mormal Forest and the Sambre, consists of a series
The country east of ^^ parallel valleys, through which run the tributaries
the Sambre and Oise of the river Sambre, and which are separated by
Canal ridges affording excellent successive positions for rear-
guard action. The whole area was intersected by wire and hedges, and
cavalry or infantry could make only slow progress off the roads, to which
the artillery would be entirely confined for any considerable movements
or changes of position. The landscape bore a striking resemblance to
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November 1st 3rd] THE LAST PHASE 243
that of a dairy-farming county in England. There was little or no
cultivation, the fields being pasture land ; scattered farmsteads were
frequent, and the villages, for the most part tucked away in the valleys,
were of a very much better type than those to be fovmd in the Somme
area before the war wrought its devastation.
In the instructions issued to the IX and XIII Corps Sir Henry Rawlin-
son laid down two main objectives to be secvired. The first, or red
line, extended approximately due north and south
"^^ ""Sack" °^ *''' ^^^^ east of Fcsmy to east of Landrecies, and thence
northwards through the ^lormal Forest about 3,000
yards from its western edge. The attainment of this objective would in
the south carry the attacking troops well beyond the canal, and would
enable the engineers to repair or erect bridges across it without fear of
interference, thus facilitating the forward communications.
The second objective, or line of exploitation, ran east of Cartignies,
Dompierre, and St. Re my Chaussee (see Map 16). This was some
three miles short of the general objective defined by the Commander-
in-Chief, namely the Avesnes-Maubeuge road, and was considered to be
the limit of penetration that could be reached before a halt would be
necessary in order to reorganise and complete the communications.
For the forcing of the Sambre and Oise Canal the IX Corps employed
the 1st and 32nd Divisions on the right and left respectively. Although
the attacks of both divisions were to be simultaneous,
® attack^ ^'*° °' they were to be entirely independent as regards their
detailed execution, each as it advanced arranging for
the protection of its flanks, but establishing connection with the other
immediately on crossing the canal and on the first objective (red line). The
46th Division was concentrated in corps reserve with its head on the line
of the Mazinghien-Bazuel road. Its role, after the attack was lamiched,
was to follow closely behind the 1st Division with a view to relieving that
division either on the first objective, or immediately afterwards ; the
46th and 32nd Divisions would then continue the advance to the second
objective. For the IX Corps attack Sir Walter Braithwaite gave the
1st and 32nd Divisions two preliminary objectives before reaching the
first objective laid down by the army.
(1) The bridgehead or blue-dotted line, which ran on the front of
the 1st Division from the bridge at Petit Cambrc'sis along the road to
Hautreve, thence to the eastern outskirts of Catillon, and, on the front
of the 32nd Division, from Catillon through Petit Versaille to La Folic.
(2) The intermediate or blue line, which ran on the 1st Division
front from the bridge at Petit Cambresis to La Groise, excluding Fcsmy
and including Robelmetre, Grand Galop Farm, and Petit Galop Farm,
and, on the 32nd Division front, from east of Mezieres to Petit Versaille,
including Locquignol Farm.
On the right Maj.-Gen. Strickland, commanding the 1st Division,
which was holding a front of 7,000 yards from Oisy to north of Catillon,
arranged for the 1st and 2nd Brigades to cross the canal south of Catillon
under cover of a heavy barrage. This was to come down at " zero,"
simultaneously with a smoke screen which was to be put down imme-
244 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [November 1st-3rd
diately east of the canal to conceal the infantry crossing.^ Each brigade
was allotted one main crossing ; the 2nd Brigade at the Lock No. 1,
about two miles south of Catillon, the 1st Brigade at the bend in the
canal north-west of Bois I'Abbaye. Once a crossing had been effected, the
1st and 2nd Brigades were to advance behind the creeping barrage and
establish the bridgehead. There was to be a pause on the bridgehead line
of one and a-half hours to allow time for artillery to move forward. The
advance was then to be resumed to the intermediate line, from which,
after fifteen minutes, the infantry on the flanks was to continue to move
forward to the first army objective (red line).
Concurrently with the attack of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, the 3rd
Brigade was to clear Catillon from the south under cover of an enfilade
artillery and machine-gun barrage, after which it was to establish a small
bridgehead east of the canal until such time as touch was definitely estab-
lished with the 32nd Division further cast.
Maj.-Gen. Lambert, commanding the 32nd Division, arranged that
the 14th Brigade should cross the canal just south of Ors, and the 96th
Brigade immediately south of the elbow in the canal north of Ors.
Success depended on obtaining complete superiority of fire over the
enemy holding the eastern bank of the canal, and arrangements were made
for the crossing of the infantry to be covered by a powerful artillery
barrage and smoke screen similar to those employed in the case of the
1st Division. After effecting a crossing the 14th and 96th Brigades
were to reorganise before rencAving the advance to the bridgehead line
under the creeping barrage. ^ No barrage was arranged beyond the bridge-
head line for the further advance to the first army objective (red line),
the arrangements for the necessary artillery support being left to the
brigade commanders concerned.
In view of the topographical features of the country south of the
Sambre, offering as they did splendid opportunities for enfilade and oblique
fire up the valleys which ran at right angles to the enemy's communi-
cations, the IX Corps sited two of its heavy artillery brigades well forward
in the XIII Corps area to enfilade these valleys, which the enemy would
undoubtedly make use of for sheltering troops and guns.
The task of the XIII Corps entailed an attack through the southern
portion of Mormal Forest, the forcing of the canal crossings at Landrecies,
and a total advance of approximately ten miles. Its
^^^ ™uack' ^'*° fii'st objective corresponded with the first objective
laid down by the army, while, between this and the
second objective, an intermediate objective following the Maroilles-
Hachette Farm-Locquignol road was allotted to the divisions.
In view of the depleted strengths of his divisions and of the depth to
which the advance was to be carried, Sir Thomas Morland decided to
employ three divisions for the initial attack, each being on a comparatively
* The barrage was to lift off the eastern bank of the canal at three minutes after " zero,"
and then advance towards the blue-dotted line. Smoke screens for both 1st and 32nd Divisions
Wire made by No. 1 Special Company, R.E., with 4-inch Stokes Mortars.
^ The barrage was to remain on the eastern bank of the canal for five minutes ; it was then
to be lifted 300 yards and remain for thirty minutes, after which pause it was to advance at the
rate of 100 yards every six minutes.
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November 3RD] THE LAST PHASE 245
narrow front, with one division in support. On the right, the 25th Division
was allotted the difficult task of forcing the passage of the canal opposite
Landrecies, capturing that town, and pushing forward to the XIII Corps
intermediate objective, which included the capture of Maroilles. On this
line the 66th Division was to pass through the 25th Division and secure the
final line of exploitation. The 50th Division, in the centre, operating on a
front of 2,500 yards, was responsible for clearing the portion of the Mormal
Forest between the northern boundary of the 25th Division and a line
drawn approximately due west from the bend of the canal 2,000 yards
west of Sassegnics. The division was then to cross the canal and advance,
in conjunction with the 66th Division, to the line of exploitation, or
second objective laid down by the Army Commander.
On the left, the 18th Division, with an initial frontage of 3,000 yards,
which narrowed rapidly as the advance progressed, was to attack
through the Mormal Forest towards Sassegnies, establishing itself on the
canal east and south of that village until its front was covered by the
advance of the 50th Division.
Maj.-Gen. Charles, commanding the 25th Division, arranged to
attack with the 75th Brigade in line, while the 74th and 7th Brigades
were to " leap-frog " the 75th Brigade on the first objective (red line).
Maj.-Gen. Jackson, commanding the 50th Division, ordered an advance on
a two-brigade front, with the 149th and 150th Brigades leading, intending
to pass the 151st Brigade through them when it was considered that the
attack required fresh impetus. Maj.-Gen. Lee, commanding the 18th
Division, attacked on a two-brigade front, with the 54th and 53rd Brigades
leading and the 55th Brigade " leap-frogging "them on the first objective.
As it was expected that the enemy would offer strong resistance at Preux-
aux-Bois, a convergent attack by the 50th and 18th Divisions from the
south and north, wheeling inwards when they had passed the village and
attacking it from both flanks and rear, was arranged by Sir Thomas Morland.
The chief part in this attack was to be taken by the 54th Brigade as the
village lay in the 18th Division's area.
The instructions for the artillery support of the XIII Corps attack
were drawn up after a careful study of air photographs, and the artillery
barrage fire was modified to suit the peculiar conditions.
® artmery" * Owing to the wooded nature of the country many areas
were unsuitable for an 18-pounder barrage ; moreover,
the undergro^\i;h impeded the advance of the infantry and rendered turn-
ing movements necessary. Certain areas or " blocks " were, therefore,
kept under fire for definite periods, which allowed time for the infantry to
work round them ; the fire was then lifted on to other areas which were
treated in the same manner. This fire was combined with a thin creeping
barrage the advance of which was regulated on the usual principles. This
system of " block " barrages continued as far as the first objective, beyond
which the infantry was to be supported by brigades of field artillery and
6-inch howitzers.
It was of paramount importance on this occasion that the attack
should be a complete surprise to the enemy, otherwise the difficulties of
crossing the canal would have been very greatly increased ; artillery
246 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [November 1st-3rd
action, therefore, remained normal, there being neither an increase nor
diminution of artillery fire prior to " zcro.''^ In view of the close nature
of the country, arrangements were made for pushing units of artillery and
trench mortars far forward so that immediate artillery support would
always be available for the infantry.
The provision of means for crossing the canal offered great scope for
ingenuity, industry, and organisation. There was none too much time
to complete the preparations, and the engineers
'b^idgtag"he'°canir ^^ divisions and corps vied with each other in pro-
ducing various patterns of light strong bridges for
the passage of infantry and more substantial ones for guns and
transport.
In the case of the 1st and 32nd Divisions, it was decided that the
bridges for the use of the assaulting troops should be carried up bodily
as bridges, so that no constructional work would be necessary on arrival
at the canal bank. The bridges for the leading troops of the 2nd Brigade
to cross at Lock No, 1 were designed as single span bridges, as light as was
consistent with their being able to support four to six men on them at
one time. They were fitted with a lever and a pair of wheels, so that they
could be launched from the western abutments of the lock without re-
quiring anyone on the far side to receive them. The leading troops of the
1st Brigade used floating bridges carried on German steel floats.^ Four
bridges of this type were made, and, owing to their lightness and shape,
as well as their suitability for sliding over mud, they were perhaps the most
effective pattern of all. The several bays of each bridge were hinged
together in such a way as to give the maximum flexibility in order to avoid
any difficulty when passing them over the near bank of the canal. The
head of each bridge was fitted with a ladder to enable the infantry to scale
the far bank. The latter type of bridge was also used by the 32nd Division,
which, in addition, constructed light footbridges by lashing petrol tins
together.
The 25th Division arranged for infantry bridges to be thrown at
three places at and on both sides of the Landrecies lock. Rafts, con-
sisting of sixteen petrol tins fixed to a timber framework, were accordingly
designed by the engineers of the 25th Division. This raft was primarily
intended for ferrying the leading infantry across the canal, ^ and to each
raft was fixed a paddle and towing lines so that it could be paddled or
towed backwards and forwards across the canal. As soon as the leading
infantry was across, it was intended to form the rafts into light floating
bridges * ; these rafts were carried forward by hand by engineers and
pioneers. For crossing the lock at Landrecies, in the event of the lock
gates being destroyed, the engineers of the 25th Division made two light
trussed footbridges 22 feet long.
> For the attack on November 4th the Fourth Army employed 31 field artillery brigades,
19 brigades of heavy artillery, and 13 long-range siege batteries.
^ These were light, hollow, metal cylinders made for this purpose by the Giermans, and of which
we had captured considerable numbers in their engineer parks.
3 It weighed 95 lbs. and had a buoyancy of 2.30 lbs.
♦ A demonstration was carried out "with six rafts on the Selle near Le Cateau on November
2nd, which was witnessed by all battalions who were likely to carry out the crossing of the canal.
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NovEiiBEE 4TH.] THE LAST PHASE 247
As a last resort, in the event of the various types of bridges used
by the infantry faihng, lifebelts were issued to all troops engaged in the
crossing of the canal, and a number of light portable Berthon boats were
held in readiness.
For the operations the Fourth Army was allotted forty-two Mark V
or Mark V star tanks of the 2nd Tank Brigade, nine armoured cars of the
17th Armoured Car Battalion, and eight supply tanks
"^^ UnS*'^' °' ^°^ carrying forward ammunition and bridging rnaterial.
Of the Mark V and Mark V star tanks, the IX Corps
was given the 10th Tank Battalion consisting of eleven tanks ; of these,
three tanks were allotted to the 1st Division, two to the 32nd Division,
and the remaining six were retained in corps reserve. The tanks operating
with the 1st and 32nd Divisions were to assist in the attack on and the
" mopping up " of Catillon and the Happegarbes spur respectively, subse-
quently assisting the infantry in establishing bridgeheads over the canal.
The 9th and 14th Tank Battalions, consisting of fourteen and seventeen
tanks respectively, were given to the XIII Corps ; of these, the 25th
and 50th Divisions were allotted respectively four and ten tanks of the
9th Tank Battalion, and the 18th Division ten tanks of the lith
Battalion. The role of these tanks was to precede the infantry through
the difficult and intricate orchard country along the western edge of the
Mormal Forest and to force passages through the thick hedges, which
would otherwise have delayed the infantry considerably. These tanks
were not intended to enter the forest, but were ordered to rally when the
infantry had penetrated into it and when the area outside the forest
had been cleared. Certain tanks were, however, given the special task
of " mopping up " Preux-aux-Bois in conjunction with the attack of the
50th and 18th Divisions. The XIII Corps retained in reserve seven tanks
of the 14th Tank Battalion. Of the nine cars of the 17th Armoured Car
Battalion, two were allotted to the 18th Division and two to the 50th
Division to carry out reconnaissances in Mormal Forest. As far as
possible the infantiy was trained in co-operation with the tanks during the
period of preparation, and the various units made elaborate arrangements
with the personnel of the tanks which were to work with them in order to
ensure satisfactory co-operation.
" Zero " for the IX Corps attack was fixed for 5.45 a.m. on November
4th, while that of the XIII Corps was half an hour later so as to conform
with that of the Third Army, The assembly of the
The assembly infantry and tanks was carried out during the night
of the 3rd without a hitch, and a heavy ground mist in
the early morning obscured their movements from the enemy.
At 5.45 a.m. the barrage came down in front of the IX Corps
along the eastern bank of the canal, and the assembled
ETo?STS'atSck infantry of the 1st and 32nd Divisions moved forward
of the 1st Division ; ^^ thc attack.
the crossing of the On the right the 2nd Brigade moved forward with
'"""VjJi" ^"^ *h^ 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps and the 2nd Roval
Sussex on the right and left, followed by the 1st
Northamptonshire in support. South of the reservoirs the 2nd Welsh
248 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY INovember *rH
of the 3rd Brigade held the line of the canal to the junction with the
French north of Oisy.
It had been hoped to have a bridge erected over the lock within five
minutes of " zero," but a small stream west of the canal proved a more
serious obstacle than had been anticipated and caused some delay. A
heavy hostile barrage fell on the western banks of the canal, and withering
machine-gun fire from the lock-house and from the direction of Bois de
I'Abbaye swept all approaches to the lock. So intense was the enemy's
fire that even the stoutest troops hesitated, and it seemed impossible for
any man to get to the lock and yet live. It was a situation that called
for personal gallantry of the highest order ; fortunately this was not lacking.
Major Findlay,^ of the 409th Field Company, quickly steadied and led forward
his sappers and the leading infantry towards the lock. In spite of heavy
casualties, the engineers and infantry responded magnificently to Major
Findlay's example, and a bridge was placed across the lock. Meanwhile
Lt.-Col. Dudley Johnson,^ commanding the 2nd Royal Sussex, had come
forward to see what progress had been made. He found that when any
parties of infantry approached the fire-swept zone they were checked
and thrown into confusion by the intensity of the enemy's fire. Recognising
at once that delay would only increase casualties and demoralise the
troops, Lt.-Col. Johnson quickly collected men to assist the sappers with the
bridges and then personally led the assault forward. Again the enemy's fire
broke up the bridging and attacking parties. The rear waves, which were
now closing up, added to the congestion, and heavy casualties began to be
suffered from the enemy's withering fire. Lt.-Col. Johnson made another
great effort, reorganised his parties, and, under his gallant leadership, the
attacking troops finally crossed the bridge and stormed the lock-house.
The whole of the 2nd Royal Sussex, followed by a large number of the
2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps, was soon across the canal and moving up the
spur south of Bois de I'Abbaye. One company of the latter battalion,
which was to have crossed further south by the existing footbridges over
the reservoirs, found them badly damaged by shell fire and attempted to
cross the reservoir by means of Berthon boats. This was impractic-
able in face of the hostile machine-gun fire, and the company, therefore,
followed the remainder of its battalion over the canal by the lock bridge.
The leading troops of the 2nd Brigade soon reached the line of the road
running south from Bois de I'Abbaye, and, after a pause of twenty minutes
to reorganise, moved forward to the bridgehead line, which they gained by
8 a.m., capturing a large number of prisoners of the 19th Reserve and
29th Divisions.
On the front of the 1st Brigade the 1st Cameron Highlanders and the
1st Loyal North Lancashire moved forward on the right and left respec-
tively, simultaneously with the 23rd Field Companv ;
^« JjosSn^*^^ *h^ 1^^ '^^^^^ Watch followed in support. Practically
no resistance was encountered on the west bank of the
canal, except for one machine-gun, the crew of which was disposed of by
a sergeant of the 23rd Field Company. As soon as the barrage lifted off
the east bank of the canal at three minutes after " zero," four floating
' See Appendix E, N'o. 17. ^ See Appendix E, No. 20.
\o. 96.
'To face page 248.
IHt LOCK-HOUSE FROM THE WEST.
\ u. 97.
ANOrilER I'ARr OI- Mil-: SAMISRi; AM) OISi; CANAI., SOLIH Ol- CAIII.I.O.N, SHOWING
lllE BRUX.KS \\\ WHICH 1 H i: 1ST BRK.ADE, I SI' DUTSION, CROSSED.
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November 4th] THE LAST PHASE 249
bridges were pushed across the canal and were all in position by ten
minutes after " zero." On the right the 1st Cameron Highlanders crossed
without opposition in six minutes,^ and very shortly afterwards both
battalions were across the canal and re-forming before moving forward
towards the bridgehead line. The enemy's retaliatory barrage, which
had been slow in opening, fell west of the canal well behind the leading
battalions, and the bridgehead line was reached with little difficulty by
8 a.m.
For the attack on Catillon the 3rd Brigade employed the 1st
Gloucestershire, which prior to " zero " was assembled in the orchards
south of the village. Though the thick ground mist
'^by'thl^'srVBrig^ade"" "^^^c it difficult to keep direction, good progress was
made. Of the three tanks of the 10th Tank Battalion
with the 3rd Brigade, one broke down before the attack commenced, but
the remaining two rendered valuable assistance. After some opposition
in the outskirts of the village the southern portion was quickly cleared
with the help of one of the tanks. The other tank made for the bridge over
the canal, and in co-operation with the infantry destroyed a machine-gun
cunningly concealed in a house near by.
In the meantime two companies of the 1st South Wales Borderers had
approached Catillon from the west and assisted the 1st Gloucestershire
to " mop up " the village. While this fighting was in progress an excellent
artillery barrage had been maintained along the canal bank, preventing
all escape, and, when it lifted to enable the infantry of the 3rd Brigade to
move forward and secure the bridge crossings, fully 100 of the enemy
crawled from the cellars of Catillon and surrendered. The bridge crossings
were blocked with wire and various obstacles ; these were surmounted,
and soon after 8 a.m. six platoons of the 1st Gloucestershire were across
the canal and were pushing forward to form a bridgehead and get in touch
with the units on either flank.
When the protective barrage, which had been maintained in front
of the bridgehead line, lifted at 9.30 a.m., the 2nd and 1st Brigades moved
forward towards the intermediate objective (blue line),
"^nh^TsTDiSn ^"d on the right the 1st Northamptonshire was brought
up from support for the attack against Fesmy. The
advance met with little opposition, and the intermediate objective north
of Fesmy was secured shortly after midday, though in Fesmy itself the
enemy was still holding out. Owing to the 66th French Division on the
right being unable to move forward as fast as was expected, the flank
of the 2nd Brigade became exposed and was reinforced by the 1 '6th
Welsh (Pioneers). A battalion of the 46th Division was also ordered
up later. 2
At 4 p.m. the 66th French Division attacked with a view to joining
up with the 1st Division at La Justice, while simultaneously the 1st
Northamptonshire advanced and captured Fesmy and Vieville. A patrol
' There was a competition between the two battalions as to which sliould be across the canal
first. The Cameron Highlanders won by the narrow margin of half a minute.
* In order to avoid complicating Map 17, the movements of the 46th Division are not shown
on it.
K K
250 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [November 4th
succeeded in penetrating as far as La Justice, but touch was not actually
gained with the French, who had reached the western outskirts of Bergues-
sur-Sambre. A flank was established from Vieville, south-east of
Fesmy, to the canal, while the 2nd Welsh, which had captured the bridge
at Pt. Cambresis, held the canal and maintained touch between the French
and the 2nd Brigade.
When the barrage moved forward on the 1st Brigade front, the 1st
Cameron Highlanders and the 1st Black Watch, the latter having " leap-
frogged " the 1st Loyal North Lancashire, advanced on the right and left
respectively. At Robelmetre the 1st Cameron Highlanders were held up
temporarily by shell fire, but the left company, avoiding the shelled area,
reached the road south of Grand Galop Farm. The right company of the
1st Black Watch moved through Boyau de Leu and advanced to Grand
Galop and Petit Galop farms, which they captured with 30 prisoners.
The left company of the 1st Black Watch met with little resistance until
Mezicres was reached. Here the enemy attempted to fight, but was soon
overwhelmed, and 50 prisoners were taken.
As the 1st Brigade was not in touch with the 32nd Division on
the left, a company of the 1st Loyal North Lancashire moved forward
to the Mezieres-Catillon road and by 5.15 p.m. had established com-
munication between the 1st Brigade and the 32nd Division at Malassise
Farm.
As the result of the day's fighting the 1st Division had forced the
difficult passage of the Sambre and Oise Canal, penetrating beyond it
The result of the ^^ ^ depth of ovcr 4,000 yards and capturing the villages
fighting by the 1st of CatiUon, Mcziercs, La Groise, and Fesmy. The
Division total casualties of the division were under 500, whereas
49 officers and 1,649 other ranks had been captured belonging to the 19th
Reserve, 29th, and 200th Divisions, together with 20 guns of various
calibres.
At 5.45 a.m., on the 32nd Division front, the 14th Brigade moved
forward with the 5 /6th Royal Scots on the right, the 1st Dorsetshire on
Th tt k f th * ^^^^' ^^^^ with the 15th Highland liight Infantry in
32nd Division ; the reserve. The 96th Brigade on the left advanced
14th Brigade force a with the 2nd Manchester, 16th Lancashire Fusiliers,
crossing ^^^ -j^^^j^ Lancashire Fusiliers in line from right to left,
and with two companies of the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
in reserve. The 97th Brigade, less two companies of 2nd King's Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry, was held in reserve in the vicinity of St.
Souplet.
When the artillery barrage lifted off the canal bank fire minutes after
" zero," the infantry occupied the whole of the western bank of the canal
except south of Ors, where the 5 /6th Royal Scots were checked by machine-
gun fire from Le Donjon. A surprise attempt by the 1st Dorsetshire
to force a crossing over the canal at Ors failed owing to the severity of
the enemy's machine-gun and shell fire. The battalion effected a crossing,
however, by means of a bridge of petrol tins south of Ors by twenty-five
minutes after " zero " ; luckily the enemy, while subjecting all the
suspected points of crossing to an accurate fire, did not locate this bridge
November 4th] THE LAST PHASE 251
owing to the mist until it was too late, with the result that the 1st Dorset-
shire crossed with but little opposition. Taking advantage of this crossing,
two companies of the 5 /6th Royal Scots gained the eastern bank of the
canal, and by 8.15 a.m. they and the 1st Dorsetshire were firmly estab-
lished along the road running parallel to the canal through Rue Verte
and the eastern outskirts of Ors. The enemy defending Le Donjon
was now threatened from the rear and was forced to surrender.
The 96th Brigade was not so successful in its attempt to cross just
south of the elbow in the canal north of Ors. Only through the
heroism of Major Waters and Sapper Archibald ^ of
The temporary check ^j 218th Field Company was it possible to get a bridge
to the 96th Brigade u i 4. "iu u ii j
across. Ihe whole area was swept with shell and
machine-gun fire, and it seemed impossible for anyone to live on the bank
of the canal. All the rest of the party were killed or disabled, yet these
two gallant engineers carried on the work, while bullets splintered the
wood they were holding and struck sparks from the wire binding the
floats. Meanwhile, 2nd Lieut. Kirk ^ of the 2nd Manchester, in a splendid
spirit of self-sacrifice, paddled across the canal on a raft and engaged the
enemy with a Lewis gun. This gallant act cost him his life, but a bridge
was erected, and two platoons of his battalion succeeded in crossing.
Unforttmately, the bridge was almost immediately destroyed by shell
fire, and, though repeated attempts were made to repair it, the undertaking
had to be abandoned, and the remainder of the battalion took shelter
from the enemy's fire behind the western bank of the canal until it received
a message from the 1st Dorsetshire that it was possible to cross at Ors.
Just below the elbow in the canal the Engineers and the 16th Highland
Light Infantry (Pioneers) succeeded in erecting a bridge of small
cork rafts ; before, however, the leading troops of the 16th Lancashire
Fusiliers could cross, the bridge was broken by concentrated artillery and
machine-gun fire. The officer commanding this battalion, Lt.-Col.
Marshall of the Irish Guards, ^ took charge of the situation and organised
parties of volunteers for the repair of the bridge ; the first party were all
soon killed or wounded, nevertheless the bridge was finally erected. Lt.-Col.
Marshall stood on the bank while the work was being carried out, and then
attempted to rush across at the head of his battalion ; he was killed
almost at once. Over 200 casualties had now been sustained in the effort
to cross the canal, and it was clear that any further attempts to cross
on the 96th Brigade front would only result in purposeless loss of life.
The troops of the 14th Brigade east of the canal were, therefore, ordered
to stand fast until the 96th Brigade had succeeded in crossing by the
bridges which had been erected by the 14th Brigade.
While these events were occurring further south the 15th Lancashire
Fusiliers and the two companies of the 2nd King's 0\vn Yorkshire Light
Infantry attacked the Happegarbes spin*, assisted bv two
HappegirbeVsp? t^^^^- ^he infantry and tanks worked through the
village of Happegarbes, clearing up strong points
and machine-gun nests, and then advanced parallel to the railway
' See Appendix E, Nos. 46 and 2. ' See Appendix E, No. 29.
' See Appendix E, No. 84.
252 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [November 4th
embankment, where considerable opposition was encountered. By 7 a.m.
the whole ground west of the Canal was finally cleared as a result of the
excellent co-operation between the two arms.
Shortly after 8.30 a.m. the 96th Brigade began to cross the
canal by the 14th Brigade bridges and cleared the area north-east of
Ors. It was held up at La Motte Farm, but on the
of'lhe'sand Dilbion ^'S^t reached the intermediate objective in conjunction
with the 14th Brigade, which later joined up with the
1st Division north of Mezieres.
During the afternoon the 15th Lancashire Fusiliers, holding
Happegarbes, passed two companies across the canal south of
Landrecies over the two footbridges which had been used by the
25th Division. These two companies at dusk held a position facing
south, with their right on the canal 1,000 yards south-west of Land-
recies and their left in touch with the 25th Division near Pont a
Beaumetz.
Dviring the day's fighting 238 prisoners of the 22nd Reserve, 54th, and
204th Divisions and Cyclist Battalions, 20 guns, and many machine-guns
were captvu-ed by the 32nd Division, and a bridgehead had been firmly
established. Thanks to the untiring energy of the 219th Field Company a
transport bridge at Ors was completed by 1 p.m., and by means of this
bridge a brigade of field artillery crossed the canal and was in action
south of Ors by 4 p.m.
At 6.15 a.m., half an hour after the IX Corps launched its attack,
the XIII Corps began its advance, in conjunction
^''opewtionT''^ with the V Corps operating through the northern portion
of Mormal Forest.
The 75th Brigade of the 25th Division attacked, under a creeping
barrage moving forward at the rate of 100 yards every six minutes,
with the l/5th Gloucestershire and the l/8th Royal Warwickshire in line
The capture oJ Land- on the right and left respectively. The 1 /8th Worcester-
recies by the 25th shire followed in support, while the 108th Field Com-
Division pany and a company of the 11th South Lancashire
(Pioneers) followed close behind the leading infantry carrying 80 rafts down
to the canal, the majority of which reached it safely. At the same time, two
companies of the 21st Manchester from the 7th Brigade " mopped up " the
ground between the 25th and 32nd Divisions in conjunction with the troops
of the 96th Brigade. By 8.15 a.m. the two companies of the 21st Manchester
had cleared up this area and were in touch with the 32nd Division on the
railway. Half an hour later the l/5th Gloucestershire reached the canal
bank south-west of Landrecies and had the good fortune to discover two
footbridges, about 1,000 yards south-west of the town, which the enemy had
not destroyed. The battalion streamed across these bridges at 9.30 a.m.,
closely followed by two companies of the l/8th Worcestershire, and
commenced to encircle Landrecies from the south. The l/8th Royal
Warwickshire on the eft experienced stiff opposition in the vicinity of
Faubourg-Soyeres. The enemy's resistance was, however, finally over-
come largely owing to the gallantry of Lee. -Corp. William Amey,
M'ho rushed the chateau unaided and, after killing two Germans, held up
W
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November 4th] THE LAST PHASE 253
the remainder of the garrison till his comrades arrived. ^ With the capture
of Faubourg-Soyeres the enemy's resistance in this part of the field was
broken, and the l/8th Royal Warwickshire reached the canal. As was
anticipated, the road bridge near the lock in Landrecies was bloA\'n up,
but the left company of the battalion discovered another enemy bridge
intact about 500 yards further north. Shortly afterwards the remainder
of the 1 /8th Royal Warwickshire crossed at the lock gates, Avhich had been
rushed by a small party of the 182nd Tunnelling Company who over-
powered the enemy demolition party while in the act of blowing them up.
At the same time one company of the l/8th Worcestershire crossed the
canal by means of petrol-tin rafts between these two crossings. Thus, by
midday, there were more than half a dozen crossings available for infantry,
and the 106th Field Company then undertook the erection of two pontoon
bridges near the lock, which, in spite of heavy shell fire, were completed
soon after dark.
The failure of such an obstacle as the canal to stop our advance,
doubtless exercised a demoralising influence on the Germans defending
Landrecies. Attacked on three sides, from the south, west, and north,
the resistance of the garrison, consisting chiefly of men of the Cyclist Brigade,
was quickly overcome, and by noon the whole of the village had been cleared.
The capture of Landrecies was an operation beset with many diffi-
culties, but, thanks to good leadership, the bravery of the troops, and the
skill and devotion of the divisional engineers and pioneers, the 75th
Brigade met with the success and good fortune which such a well
planned and boldly executed operation deserved.
About 1 p.m. the 74th Brigade commenced to cross the canal and,
moving through Landrecies, advanced towards Le Preseau with the
11th Sherwood Foresters on the right, the 9th Yorkshire on the left, and
the 13th Durham Light Infantry in support. To cover the right flank of
the 74th Brigade the 75th Brigade established a defensive flank south of
Landrecies to Pont a Beaumetz, where touch was later established with
the 32nd Division. By nightfall the 74th Brigade had established itself
along the line from Saule Bryante through Le Preseau to the canal.
The 50th Division began its advance at 6.15 a.m. with the 149th
Brigade on the right, the 150th on the left, and the 151st
The 50th Division ^^ Support. Eight of the ten tanks of the 9th Tank
attack through Battalion allotted to the division left their assembly
Monnai Forest position half an hour before the infantry began to
advance and co-operated in the attack. 2 Though the enemy's artillery
fire was not very heavy, falling chiefly in the vicinity of Fontaine-au-Bois
and Robersart, the machine-gun fire was severe, the numerous hedgerows
being infested with machine-guns. On account of this and the thickness
of the mist, progress was much sloAvcr than was anticipated. The 149th
Brigade found itself temporarily checked along the Landrecies-
Englefontaine road, but by about 8 a.m. the opposition had been overcome
' See Appendix E, No. 1.
^ The crew of one of these tanks was put out of action by the enemy's gas shell on the way up
to join the infantry, but was replaced by a scratch crew of Dublin Fusiliers which rendered an
excellent account of itself.
254 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Novejibee 4th
with the assistance of the tanks, and the advance was resumed. In this area
the enemy had a very complete system of machine-gun defence, which
constantly checked the advance of the 149th Brigade. The value of the
training carried out by the infantry with the tanks was very marked, and
the final subjugation of this strong machine-gun defence must be ascribed
to a very large extent to their excellent co-operation.
Meeting with less resistance, the 150th Brigade had reached the line of
the Hirondelle Stream by 9 a.m. At this time two companies of the
2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers attacked Preux-aux-Bois from the south in
conjunction with an attack of troops of the 18th Division from the north
and east. Here the fighting continued for a long time, but did not inter-
fere with the advance of the 50th Division.
By 11 a.m. the 149th Brigade had reached the northern portion of
Faubovirg-Soyeres, with their left in INIormal Forest and in touch with the
150th Brigade, which was disposed along the road running north from the
Drill Ground through the forest about 1,000 yards from its western edge.
The enemy's resistance, though still fairly strong in front of the 149th
Brigade, was much weaker opposite the 150th, consequently Maj.-Gen.
Jackson decided to move up the 151st Brigade, then in support near Bousies,
to increase the pressure where the opposition was weakest. While the
151st Brigade, however, was moving forward, the two leading brigades made
good progress, and by 12 noon the whole of the first objective (red line) was
in our hands. All organised resistance appeared to be broken, and the only
opposition encountered was from isolated machine-guns firing at fairly long
range. Half an horn: later the leading battalions of the 151st Brigade " leap-
frogged " the 150th Brigade and continued the advance on the left of the
149th Brigade, which had reached the railway east of Les Etoquies and
was approaching the canal. At dusk the 149th Brigade held the line of
the canal from the bend north of Le Preseau, where it was in touch
with the 25th Division, to near Cense Toury ; the 151st Brigade continued
the line due north through Mormal Forest to Carrefour de I'Hermitage,
where it joined up with the 18th Division.
Simultaneously with the advance of the 50th Division the troops
of the 18th Division moved forward on the extreme left of the XIII Corps.
On the right, the 54th Brigade attacked north of Preux-
^isth^DWisbn''^ aux-Bois with the 6th Northamptonshire, while, south
of this battalion, the 11th Royal Fusiliers stood fast
until the village should be turned from the north by the 2nd Bedfordshire,
who followed in support of the 6th Northamptonshire ; on the left, the
7th Royal West Kent led the advance of the 53rd Brigade against Hecq.
The barrage was all that could be desired, whereas the enemy's
artillery fire, although it came do^vn three minutes after " zero,"
was weak and not effective. Assisted by ten tanks of the
14th Tank Battalion, the 6th Northamptonshire and the 7th
Royal West Kent made good progress in the face of considerable
resistance. By 8 a.m. these two battalions were north-east of Preux-
aux-Bois and east of Hecq, although the Germans held out in both
villages. One tank, detailed to assist in the capture of Hecq, entered
the village from the west, but almost immediately lost touch with the
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November 4th] THE LAST PHASE 255
7th Royal West Kent. It came into contact, however, with some troops
of the 38th Division on the left and helped them by silencing a machine-gun
nest on the outskirts of Englefontaine. Then, returning to Hecq, it re-
joined the 7th Royal West Kent and proceeded to " mop up " strong points,
capturing two machine-guns and two trench mortars in the northern
end of the village. Before completing this task it was put out of action,
but the crew, removing the machine-guns, successfully finished its fight with
one of the strong points from outside the tank. The fighting in Hecq
was severe and continued for several hours after the rest of the line had
advanced. Even more determined was the struggle for the possession
of Preux-aux-Bois. It was attacked from the north by the 2nd Bedford-
shire, assisted by a company of the 11th Royal Fusiliers and a company of
the 6th Northamptonshire. The 50th Division also co-operated by sending
two companies of the 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers to attack the village
from the south. In the strenuous fighting that ensued before its capture
important and valuable assistance was rendered by three tanks. ^
The struggle in and around Preux-aux-Bois and Hecq delayed the
advance of the two " leap-frogging " battalions of the 53rd Brigade which
had been detailed to continue the advance east of those villages to the first
objective (red line). However, two companies of the 8th Royal Berkshire
eventually succeeded in pushing through on the north about noon, followed
by the 10th Essex which moved up into line with them on their right
some time later.
The advance was then resumed without incident until the line of the
Route Duhamel was reached. Here there was a check, but the 55th
Brigade, which had followed in rear of the 10th Essex and 8th Royal
Berkshire, assisted them to push forward to the first objective, which was
gained by 2.30 p.m. The general advance of the 55th Brigade, east of the
first objective, commenced at 3.30 p.m. and proceeded rapidly. Slight
opposition was encountered in the vicinity of Carrefour de I'Hermitage,
but, by 7 p.m., our line was established 300 yards east of the Carrefour
de FHermitage-Locquignol road.
A few armoured cars of the 17th Armoured Car Battalion co-operated
with the 18th and 50th Divisions, and were most useful in the fighting which
took place amongst the hedgerows and in the forest. Their
The armoured cars appearance along the muddy roads of Mormal Forest
caused considerable confusion, with the result that a
number of the enemy abandoned their machine-guns without firing a shot.
Thanks in a large measure to the heroism of subordinate leaders,
both officers and men, the day's operations had been a brilliant success. The
The result of the passage of the Sambre and Oise Canal had been forced
fighting on November on a wide front from south of Catillon to Landrecies
*"* in the face of a determined opposition ; a bridgehead
on a front of at least fifteen miles and to an average depth of three miles
1 At one time oi»e of these tanks, with three of its machine-guns out of action and its 6-pdr.
guns badly jammed by the enemy's fire, found itself surrounded by Germans. These, pushing
up the muzzles of the remaining machine-guns, climbed on to the top of the tank and endeavoured
to tlirow bombs through the apertures, but they were prevented from doing so by the crew using
their revolvers. The enemy was then driven off and the tank continued its task of " mopping
up " the village.
256 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [November 5th
had been established, while Mormal Forest had been penetrated to a depth
of some 6,000 yards. Over 4,000 prisoners and nearly 80 guns had been
captvired. The IX and XIII Corps, which achieved such decisive results
in the last organised attack by the Fourth Army and held the post
of honour at the end of the campaign, received from the Commander-in-
Chief and the Army Commander the praise which their work had
so well deserved.'
Equally unsuccessful was the attempt of the enemy to check the ad-
vance of the Third and First Armies further north and that of the First
French Army to the south. More important, however, than the gain of terri-
tory or the capture of prisoners and material, was the fact that on this vital
portion of his front the enemy's resistance had been broken. The only hope
that had remained to the enemy of preventing his military position from
becoming desperate was to have held on to the line of the Sambre long
enough to enable the German High Command to make preparations for
a planned withdrawal to another line ; numerous captured German docu-
ments clearly showed this.'^ After this defeat, the German forces had no
alternative but to fall back along the whole front, and the Allied pursuit
only required to be pressed home in order to compel the enemy to accept
whatever terms the Allies were prepared to offer.
Accordingly, the IX and XIII Corps were ordered ito resume the
advance towards Avesnes on the morning of November 5th. The heavy
_ t • N - drizzling rain, which was falling when the advance was
ber 5th and'eth ; the resumed, restricted observation, and the rate of advance
events on the EK was slow. For the next few days the rain continued
Corps Front without cessation, and the surface of the roads and tracks
was churned into mud and slush by the continuous traffic, thus increasing
enormously the difficulties of the much tried transport services. During
the night of November 4th the 46th Division moved across the canal,
relieving the 1st and 14th Brigades of the 1st and 32nd Divisions
respectively, astride the main Mezieres-Catillon road, and the advance was
resumed at 6.30 a.m. on November 5th.
On the extreme right the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division still held a
defensive flank round Fesmy, and, when the advance was resumed, occu-
pied La Justice without opposition, gaining touch with the French who
had advanced through Bergues-sur-Sambre. The subsequent advance
of the 46th British Division and the 66th French Division enabled the
2nd Brigade to be " squeezed out," and it rejoined the 1st Division in
reserve in the Wassigny area. On the front of the 32nd Division the enemy
at La Motte Farm had withdra^vn dm-ing the night and allowed the 97th
Brigade, which took over the whole divisional front, to join up with the
right of the XIII Corps south of Landrecies. Under cover of a thin cavalry
screen provided by the 20th Hussars rapid progress was made on the
IX Corps front. The cavalry successfully prevented the enemy's rear-
* Of all the British divisions engaged in the hundred days the 18th and 32nd were the only
two that began and finished the campaign in the Fourth Army.
* One issued by General von Larisch, commanding the LIV Corps on October 19th, 1918, said: —
" The Army Group will accept the decisive battle on the Hermann Stellung (line of Sambre
and Oise Canal). The Hermann Stellung must be held at any price. This is to be notified to all
commanders down to and including Regimental Commanders."
November 5TH-6TH] THE LAST PHASE 257
guards offering any serious resistance and captured a number of guns,
including two 8-inch howitzers in the village of Favril. By nightfall the
46th Division held the high ground 2,000 yards east of Le Sart-en-Thierache
and was astride the La Rivierette just north-west of Prisches. The 32nd
Division held the spur about 2,000 yards east of Favril and was in touch
with the 25th Division south of Maroilles.
On the morning of the 6th, owing to the difficulties of communication
which were much increased by the enemy's systematic destruction of
roads and bridges, it was impossible to renew the advance until 9.30 a.m.
There was practically no fighting throughout the day ; the 20th Hussars
keeping in touch with the retreating enemy, while the advanced guards of
the 46th and 32nd Divisions followed along the roads. Towards evening
the 46th Division entered Cartignies and established an outpost hne
on the Petite Helpe. The 32nd Division cleared Grand Fayt before
noon, but found the Petite Helpe a difficult obstacle. Two companies
of the 10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, however, crossed by a bridge
erected by the 25th Division at INIaroilles and worked southwards. In the
meantime, the main body of the 97th Brigade forced its way across the
river at the lock at Grand Fayt in spite of hostile machine-gun fire, and
by 5 p.m. its leading infantry had passed through Le Foyaux and established
an outpost line astride the ridge some distance further east. The IX
Corps had thus gained the exploitation line, laid down by Sir Henry
Rawhnson in his orders for the attack of November 4th, and was in touch
with the First French Army on the right south of Cartignies, and with the
XIII Corps on the left at the cross roads 1,500 yards east of Marbaix,
By the morning of November 5th two good pontoon bridges, suitable for
carrying field artillery, were in position at Landrecies and Les Etoqviies lock,
and field artillerv brigades were moved across the canal
""'SboS'™ to support the advance of the 25th Division towards
Maroilles and Marbaix. The advance of the XIII
Corps was continued at 6.30 a.m.., and an hoiu- and a-half later the van-
guard of the 25th Division was approaching the Petite Helpe in the face
of slight opposition. By noon Maroilles had been captured, and our troops
were advancing towards Taisnieres-en-Thierache and Noyelles.
Further north the 50th Division had completed the clearance of the
south-eastern portion of Mormal Forest by 10.30. a.m. and had commenced to
cross the canal by a footbridge south of Hachette Farm. The 149th Brigade
was ordered to occupy Haute Noyelles and advance to the high ground at
St. Roch Chapelle, followed by the 150th Brigade which was to move by
Petit Landrecies to Leval. On the left of the army, the 18th Division had
occupied the area west of the canal within the northern army boundary by
noon, and was in touch with the V Corps, which held Berlaimont and was
engaged in crossing the canal north of Leval. Owing to the swampy reaches of
the Sambre and the enemy's opposition on the line of the Grande Helpe, the
progress of the 50th Division towards Leval was slow, and, as the bridge
at Noyelles had been blown up, there was some danger of touch being
lost with the V Corps. To avoid this the 18th Division was instructed to
keep in touch with the V Corps by moving patrols across the canal, and the
12th Lancers were ordered to move to Dompierre, Monceau, and Leval with
L L
258 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Nov 5th-7th
a view to reducing the opposition in front of the 50th Division. Here,
however, the resistance of the Germans, who belonged to the 121st and
241st Divisions, was too strong to be overcome by the cavaky. The enemy
held the ground between Leval and Aulnoye in considerable strength,
and at this point no further progress was made by our troops that day.
Further south, the 25th Division captured Basse Noyelles late in the
afternoon, and at dusk the 50th Division secured a footing on the far bank
of the Grande Helpe near Le Champ du Pare Farm. As soon as its
front was covered by this advance the 18th Division was withdrawn and
moved back to the vicinity of Le Cateau. The 66th Division, which had
concentrated in the vicinity of Landrecies during the day, was warned to
be ready to move to the Maroilles-Taisnieres-en-Thierache area and
relieve the 25th Division.
The night of November 5th passed quietly, and the advance of the
XIII Corps was resumed on the following morning at 7 a.m. The 25th
Division pushed forward with the 74th Brigade on the right and the
7th Brigade on the left. The 50th Division directed the 149th Brigade
on Leval to gain touch with the V Corps which was now fighting in the
northern outskirts of that village, while the 150th Brigade was ordered to
cross the Grande Helpe at Le Champ du Pare Farm, capture Haut Noyelles
from the north, and, swinging eastwards, continue the advance on the
right of the 149th Brigade.
Throughout the morning steady progress was made. All the avail-
able cars of the 17th Armoured Car Battalion co-operated with the XIII
Corps and were of great assistance in dealing with enemy machine-gun
nests on the roads which they patrolled.
By noon the leading infantry of the XIII Corps had reached
the western outskirts of Marbaix and Taisnieres-en-Thierache, and Petit
Landrecies and was advancing towards Leval which was still held by the
enemy. Two hours later Marbaix had fallen, and by evening Dom-
pierre, Monceau, and Leval had been occupied. Thus, by the evening
of the 6th, the XIII Corps had also been able to gain the exploitation line
of November 4th without serious difficulty.
On the afternoon of November 5th it had already become evident
that the enemy was in full retreat, and, consequently, orders were issued by
The pursuit continued Sir Henry Rawlinson for the IX and XIII Corps to
on November 7th, 8th, Continue the pursuit to the La Capelle-Avesnes-Mau-
and 9th beuge road, including the town of Avesnes. The
cavalry was to maintain touch with the enemy's rearguards, but the
infantry was not to advance beyond this road. All tanks and armoured
cars were withdrawn into army reserve in the vicinity of Landrecies for
overhaul.
The 46th and 32nd Divisions resumed the advance at dawn on
November 7th with the 20th Hussars well in advance. By the evening of
the 7th the 46th Division had reached a line just west of
The IX Corps. the La Capelle- Avesnes road, but the 32nd Division
encountered considerable opposition near Avesnes. By
dribbling forward small parties our troops succeeded in approaching
to within a few hundred yards of the town, but every effort
November 7TH-8TH] THE LAST PHASE 259
to enter Avesnes during the night was repulsed by heavy
trench mortar and machine-gun fire. It was, therefore, arranged
for the town to be attacked next morning by the 2nd King's Own York-
shire Light Infantry. At 11 a.m. on November 8th the infantry, covered
by a Hght barrage, rushed the enemy's posts and forced their way into the
town ; by the evening troops of the 32nd Division held Avesnes and
Avesnelles with an outpost line 1,000 yards fui-ther east. During the day
the 46th Division pushed patrols across the main La Capelle-Avesnes
road and by nightfall had established an outpost line 2,000 yards beyond
it, in touch with the French east of La Folie and with the 32nd Division
south-east of Avesnes.
The 25th and 50th Divisions resvuned the advance at 8 a.m. on Novem-
ber 7th. One and a-half hours later the vanguard of the 25th Division
passed through Les Ardennes, with cavalry patrols at
The xm Corps St. Hilairc-suT-Helpe where they encountered some fire
from machine-guns along the Avesnes-Marbaix road ; the
50th Division at this time was approaching St. Aubin. Throughout the
remainder of November 7th considerable fighting took place. The
numerous sunken roads, copses, and hedgerows concealed the enemy's
machine-guns which covered the withdrawal of his rearguards. Slowly
but surely, however, each centre of resistance was located and dealt with
in turn. Particularly severe was the fighting in the 50th Division area
in the village of Dourlers, which was captured by the 6th Royal Innis-
killing Fusiliers supported by the 1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
At nightfall ovu- outpost line was established 1,000 yards east of St. Hilaire-
sur-Helpe, through La Croisette Farm, and along the eastern outskirts of
Dourlers.
During the afternoon of November 7th the 66th Division moved up
to the Marbaix-Taisnieres-en-Thierache area, and at dusk moved forward
again and reheved the 25th Division with the 199th and 198th Brigades,
while on the left the 151st Brigade covered the front of the 50th Division
with all three battalions in line.
When the advance was resumed on the morning of November 8th,
the 66th Division, though somewhat hampered by the intricate nature
of the country north of Avesnes, gradually forced its way to the main
Avesnes-Maubeuge road and emerged into more open coxmtry. Further
north the 50th Division encountered considerable resistance, as the enemy
had selected the line of the Avesnes-Maubeuge road as a rearguard position. ^
The vigour and determination of the attack, however, overcame all resist-
ance, and by 9.30 a.m. the road was in our possession as far south as Les
Trois Paves. A prisoner captured in this locality by the 50th Division gave
the information that his regiment, 500 strong, was assembled in Beugnies
Wood with orders to coimter-attack and regain the Hne of the Avesnes-
Maubeuge road should it be lost. This proved to be correct, as at 11 a.m.
troops of the 9th German division counter-attacked from south-west of the
Beugnies Wood, while hostile artillery searched the ground in the vicinity of
the road. The counter-attack was received with fire from every available
machine-gun, Lewis gun, and rifle, and the hostile infantry was soon
^ This was ascertained from a captured order.
260 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Nov. 8th-9th
dispersed. The German machine-gun detachments, however, continued to
advance, but, after an obstinate fight which lasted for an hour and a-half,
the 151st Brigade held its ground, and the enemy was completely repulsed.
At 2.30 p.m. the 50th Division resumed the advance by moving forward the
149th Brigade through the 151st Brigade, and by 4.30 p.m. Semousies and
Floursies had been captured. At nightfall, an outpost line was established
along the spur running north-east from Bas laeu, where touch was gained
with the 32nd Division, and thence northward through the eastern
outskirts of Semousies, Mont Dourlers, and Floursies.
On the evening of November 8th infantry patrols along the whole
army front reported that touch with the enemy's rearguards had been lost.
Accordingly, at dawn on the 9th, the cavalry — Royal Scots Greys, 20th
Hussars, and 12th Lancers — moved forward and gained touch with them
at Sivry and along the Thure. They were supported by infantry, which
reached Sains-du-Nord, Semeries, Felleries, Solre-le-Chateau, and Solrinnes.
The dominant factor that decided the rate at which the pursuit of
the enemy could be carried out was the question of supply. The main
railway line between St. Quentin and Busigny had been
The question of supply reconstructed, but the periodic explosions of delay
action mines made it necessary frequently to use rail-
heads fiuther back, such as Vermand, Bellicoiirt, and Montigny Farm.
From these railheads supplies and ammunition had to be carried up by
motor transport. The long distances involved, and the gradual breakdown of
the roads as the weather became worse and the traffic grew heavier, threw
an enormous strain on the motor transport. In several cases lorries were
on the road for seventy-two consecutive hours, and it was difficult for the
workshops to cope with the abnormal work of repair rendered necessary
by the constant wear and tear and the bad condition of the roads. In the
forward area, where the roads had been destroyed by mine craters, the
infantry had outstripped the forward limit of lorries, and it became
necessary to use additional horse transport from the ammunition columns ;
it was qviite obvious, therefore, that if the army continued to advance
a complete breakdown in the supply organisation must result before long.
Consequently, on November 9th Sir Henry Rawlinson decided that
the main bodies of corps should be distributed in depth on and west of
the main La Capelle-Avesnes-Maubeuge road, with an
BetheU's Force outpost line east of it. The enemy was in full retreat
and no longer had the heart, or the power, to put up a
strong resistance ; only a comparatively small force was, therefore, necessary
to keep in touch with him. Accordingly a mobile force was organised, chiefly
from the 66th Division, and was placed under the command of Maj.-Gen.
H. K. BetheU.i
' The detailed composition of BetheU's Force was as follows : —
5th Cavalry Brigade. 1 Coy. 100th Battalion Machine Gun Corps.
South African Brigade. 430th, 431st, 432nd Field Companies, R.E.
17th Armoured Car Battalion. 1 Coy. 9th Gloucestershire (Pioneers).
IX Corps Cyclist Battalion. 2 Squadrons, Royal Air Force.
A/331 to B/331 Batteries, R.F.A. 2 Sections, D/331 Battery (4-5-in. howitzers).
1 Anti-Aircraft Section. 1st South African Field Ambulance.
On the 10th November the 199th Brigade was added to the force.
November lOTH-llTH] THE LAST PHASE 261
This force moved forward on the morning of November 10th and found
the enemy in strength around Sivry and Hestrud. In accordance with
The frontier of France Orders received from Army Headquarters, the attack
reached on November was not pressed home, and at night Bethell's Force
loth occupied a Une which ran approximately north and south
through Sivry and Hestrud. Next morning some ground was gained by our
troops before the cessation of hostihties. The enemy held out stubbornly
in the vicinity of Hestrud, but the 20th Hussars were gradually working
their way through Sivry. Just before 11 a.m. the enemy launched a
small counter-attack against our troops who were forcing him back out
of Grandrieu, but its only result was to add six more to the total of Ger-
mans killed during the war.
The troops had been warned about 7 a.m. that hostilities were to
cease at 11 a.m. The firing, however, which had been hea\y all the morn-
ing continued until three minutes to 11 a.m., when it
11 a.m'^N^Tmb Tilth ^^^^ed for a short period and then broke out in a final
crash at 11 a.m.i Then all was silence. Combatants
from both sides emerged from cover and walked about in full view. No
further act of hostility took place, nor was there any attempt at inter-
course on either side. In accordance with the instructions received from
the Commander-in-Chief, our troops stood fast on the line which they
had gained at 11 a.m. At that time the line held by Bethell's Force
ran from Mont Bliart through Martinsart Wood, roimd the eastern edge
of Grandrieu, along the river Thure to the western outskirts of
Cousolre.2
Further north the Third, First, Fifth, and Second Armies had reached
the general line Marpent — east of Mons-Jxirbise-Lessines-Grammont.
The victory of November 4th and following days had finally broken
the enemy's capacity for organised resistance. During the fighting he
had reinforced his line in front of the Fourth Army with seven divisions
from reserve ; but these had been repeatedly engaged since August 8th ;
exhausted by heavy losses and insufficiently rested, they no longer
possessed the fighting qualities necessary to stem the advance of vic-
torious troops. It was the same all along the British front. The German
officers had lost faith and shared with their men the general feeling of
hopelessness, 3 and even of bitter blame towards the German High Com-
mand for uselessly prolonging the war. The moral of the great German
Army had been shattered. In these circumstances the German nation
had no option but to accept the terms of the Alhes.
' The final act of a German machine-gunner, always our most formidable opponent through-
out the war, is worthy of record. At two minutes to 11, a machine-gun, about 200 yards from our
leading troops, fired off a complete belt without a pause. A single machine-gunner was then seen
to stand up beside his weapon, take off his helmet, bow, and turning about walk slowly to the
rear.
- The portion of the front just west of Mont Bliart and Sautain was the most easterly point
reached by British troops at the time of the armistice
' The following extract from a letter by a German company commander was typical o(
many : —
" The men have been in the same clothes, dirty, lousy, and torn for four weeks, are
suffering from bodily filth and a state of depression due to living continuously within range of
the enemy's guns, and in daily expectation of an attack. The troops are hardly in a fit state
to fulfil the task allotted to them in the case of an attack."
262 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY [Nov. hth
So ends the story of the Fourth Army in its last campaign of the
Great War. Between August 8th and November 11th it engaged and
defeated 67 German Divisions, and this was accomphshed by 24 British,
Australian, Canadian, and American Divisions. ^ During this period
79,743 prisoners, including 1,848 officers, and 1,108 guns were captured,
while the losses of the Fomth Army were 122,427 killed, wounded, and
missing. This is probably a unique record, when it is remembered that no
account is taken in these figures of the very large number of Germans who
were killed and wounded.^
■ Twelve British, 5 Australian, 4 Canadian, and 3 American. Tliis does not include the 17th
Division, which held the line for a few days in August, but took no part in any attack while with
the Fourth Army. In addition to the twenty-four infantry divisions, the Cavalry Corps was
engaged on the Fourth Army front, once as a corps of three divisions and once as a corps of two
divisions. See Diagram III and Appendices C and D.
^ Their losses must have been heavy, as the fighting was on occasion very severe, and the
dead actually buried amoimted to a large total.
DIAGRAM
To face page 262.
TH ARMY
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CHAPTER XIII
CONCLUSION
Some tactical questions — The co-operation of all arms— Surprise — Flank attacks — Simul-
taneous attacks — Attack formations and the number of men required — Counter-attacks
— "Zero" — The rate of advance of the barrage — The creeping barrase — Pre-war text-
books— Col. Henderson and the "human" side of war — Initiative and discipline.
Many tactical questions of general interest arose during these opera-
tions, about the most important of which it may be worth recording
the impressions left at the time, before they become less
Some tactical vivid. No attempt has been made to elaborate them,
duestions y^^^ ^j^^y ^^jjj (jo^^tless recall to soldiers many of their
own experiences, and may perhaps assist others in thinking out future
tactical developments.
Nothing perhaps was of greater moment, or affected the issue more,
than the co-operation of the various arms in battle. The necessity for
this co-operation, although as old as war itself, con-
The co-operaHon oJ aU ^inues to grow in importance as each new war adds
fresh inventions. Aeroplanes, tanks, gas, and Stokes
mortars, all made their appearance for the first time in the Great War,
and the result of their co-operation with the other arms, especially that
of the tanks, had an all-important bearing on the result of the Allied
Offensive of 1918. The remarkable number of heavy howitzers and
long-range guns of large calibre that were used by the rival armies was
another new development which materially altered the conditions of field
warfare, but made no change in the principle of co-operation. Nor must
the ever-growing importance of the machine-gun, Lewis gun, and the
automatic rifle be forgotten. In all the reports of attacks and retirements,
both on the German side and our own, the constant reference to the deadly
effect of machine-gun fire became more and more noticeable, and the
co-operation of both machine-gims and tanks with the infantry is likely
to modify many of our ideas on minor tactics, as much as, or even more
perhaps than did the appearance of masses of heavy artillery in the
earlier stages of the war.
The question of surprise has been discussed in Chapter VIII. ^ It is
referred to again here as it is important to emphasise the difference between
a strategical and a tactical surprise, which have been
Surprise sometimes confused. One may gain a strategical but
not a tactical surprise, as was, for instance, the case
on the III Corps front on the morning of August 8th. Here the Germans
' See page 150.
26S
264 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
expected us to attack, in order to recover the ground lost on the 6th, but
had no idea of the scope of the offensive that had been prepared. Or a
tactical but not a strategical surprise may be gained, as on the front of the
IX Corps on September 29th, when, although a general attack was expected,
the date and hour of the attack were unknown to the enemy. Or, again,
it is possible to gain both a strategical and tactical surprise, as was done
on the fronts of the Australian and Canadian Corps on August 8th, when
the offensive was entirely unexpected and found the enemy completely
unprepared both strategically and tactically. As regards the tactical
surprise by the IX Corps on September 29th, the fact that the First and
Third British Armies attacked on September 27th, and that the bombard-
ment by the Fourth Army commenced on the 26th, may have induced the
Germans to think that the Fourth Army bombardment was only a bhnd,
and that no attack was impending on that, perhaps the most strongly
fortified, part of the Hindenburg Line.
A failure to attain a strategical surprise means that the enemy has
adequate time to collect his reserves in rear of the threatened front and to
make all the other necessary arrangements to meet the attack. This war
has shown that an attack in such circumstances will not achieve decisive
results, until the other side has either reached a stage of exhaustion or has
lost its moral, or both. Under these latter conditions, a strategical sur-
prise loses its importance, but a tactical surprise must always remain an
advantage and will undoubtedly save casualties.
The question of whether a preliminary bombardment is advisable or
not depends on what measure of surprise is required, and the question of
whether such a bombardment is necessary or not is dependent on the nature
of the defences which have to be overcome. The nature of the hostile
defences, and especially the amount of wire, was really the deciding
factor as regards this in 1915, 1916, and the early part of 1917, but the
advent of improved tanks in large numbers rendered a surprise possible
against almost any defences.
Some interesting flank attacks were made during the hundred days,
notably those by the 9th Canadian Brigade at Rifle Wood on August 8th, i
by the 18th Division at Trones Wood on August
Flank attacks 27th,2 and by the same division at Fregicourt^ and
Ronssoy * on September 1st and 18th. Flank attacks,
as opposed to purely frontal attacks, date back to the days of Frederick
the Great, who first saw the advantage of such a manceuvre, and possessed
troops sufficiently well drilled and disciplined to be able to carry it out.
But Frederick the Great also knew the answer to this form of attack, when
his opponents tried to turn the tables and attack him in flank. His
answer to it, namely, to strike the manoeuvring columns in flank, ^
holds good to-day, always provided that the manceuvre has been dis-
covered in time, and that sufficient troops are at hand for the purpose.
At Trones Wood, the Germans did counter-attack the outflanking battalions
with some success. At Ronssoy, the attempt of one division to carry out
> See page 34. ^ See page 90. ^ See page 107. * See page 131.
' For a description of Frederick the Great's methods and an excellent account of the battles
of Rosbach and Leuthen, see Home's " Prdcis of Modern Tactics."
CONCLUSION 265
this manoeuvre, when the remaining divisions were making a frontal
attack on a wide front by time-table, was, it is suggested, a tactical mistake.
In the circumstances which obtained on September 18th a straightforward
frontal attack under a heavy barrage, such as was made by the 1st and
74th Divisions and the 1st and 4th Australian Divisions, would probably
have met with more success. To judge of this, the attack must be studied
in detail on the map or on the ground.
The advisability, or otherwise, of launching attacks simultaneoiisly,
when attacking on a wide front, has been a much debated question. Not
doing so tmdoubtedly leads to the exposed flanks of forma-
attacks*"" tions being enfiladed by the fire of the enemy's troops
and gvms that have not yet been engaged, as occurred on
August 9th and 10th, and on several other occasions, and increases the
chances of these attacks failing ; this disadvantage would seem to decide
the question. How often, however, has it been suggested that it is of
the greatest importance to attract the enemy's attention off some point
where the attacker wishes to make certain of success, and to engage the
hostile reserves on other parts of the front before the attack on the most
important objective is launched ? In nine cases out often, the simultaneous
attack Avill avoid compUcations and possible chances of mistakes and will
lead to the best results ; at least experience in the Great War points to
this conclusion.
Throughout the war, military opinion has varied considerably as
regards the best attack formation for infantry and the number of men, per
Attack fonnations Y^rd of front to be attacked, that it is advisable to
and the number of employ. The discussion on this subject, it is safe to
men required prophesy, will not end with the war, and it would be
rash to attempt to lay down even a guide when so much depends on the
ground, the obstacles to be crossed, the machine-gun and artillery support,
and the moral of the opposing forces. It may be said, however, that the
employment of tanks must and will materially alter our ideas on the subject
of both attack formations and the number of troops required. Also that
to attack with too few troops is on occasion as likely to lead to heavy
casualties as attacking with too many, and, in addition, may lead to
failure, either through lack of driving power to overcome the enemy's
resistance completely, or through lack of suflficient strength, when the
objective has been gained, to repulse the enemy's counter-attacks.
Instructions were issued from time to time by General Headquarters
giving a guide as to suitable frontages and formations, these being based
on the latest experiences, but what was suitable then will almost certainly
not apply to the next war in which we may be engaged. It may be of
interest here to give some of the frontages allotted to troops in some
successful attacks carried out during 1915, 1916, 1917, and 1918, with the
chief factors that influenced the situation. (See Table on pp. 266-267.)
It has been an axiom in our army almost from the beginning of the war
that, unless an immediate counter-attack to recover lost ground can be
made with troops on the spot, it is advisable to postpone the counter-
attack until complete preparations can be made for an organised attack,
including artillery and machine-gun support. The advantages of an
M M
266
THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
FORMATIONS, Date,
AND Place.
Frontaoe of Attack.
TROOPS Empioyed.
Depth op OBJBCTrvB.
Artillery and
MACaiNE-GuN Support.
Sept. 25th, 1915, Loos.
1,400 yards. In-
1 division, of which 2
Indefinite.
1 gun to alx)ut 18 yards
15th Division (IV
deflnlte later.
brigades attacked,
4,000 yards to Hill 70,
of front.
Corps).
each on a two-
which was reached.
58 field guns and howit-
battalion front, and
Infantry " starting
zers, about 20 heavy
one brigade was in
line " 200-300 yards
howitzers.
reserve.
from enemy's front
line.
Four days' slow bom-
bardment, and dis-
charge of gas cylm-
ders 40 minutes be-
fore " zero."
July let, 1916, Moatau-
3,500 yards (i.e., 1,750
2 divisions, of which 4
Maximum, 2,400 yards,
1 gun to about 14 yards
bao.
yards per division).
brigades attacked.
average, 2,000 yards.
of front.
13th and 30th Divlsiona.
4,000 yards on final
and 2 were in re-
Infantry " startmg
No creeping barrage.
(XIII Corps).
objective.
serve.
line " 200-300 yards
from enemy's front
Ime.
5 days' bombardment.
July 14th, 1916. Lon-
5,000 yards (i.e., 1.250
4 divisions, of which 6
Maximum, 2,500 yards.
1 gun to about 6 yards
gueval Ridge.
yards per division).
brigades attacked
average, 1,600 yards.
of front.
9th, 3rd, 7th and 2l8t
5,000 yards on first
and 6 were in re-
Infantry " starting
48 hours' slow bombard-
Divisions of XIII and
objective.
serve.
line " origmallyl,500
ment, finishing with
XV Corps.
yards on part of
front : but reduced
during night to 300
yards from enemy's
front trench.
5 minutes' intense
fire. No creephig
barrage.
Sept. 15th, 1916, Flers.
2,700 yards (i.e., 900
3 divisions, of which 6
Maximum, 4,500.
1 gun to about 10 yards
14th, 4l3t, N.Z. Divi-
yards per division).
brigades attacked.
Average, 4,000.
of front.
sions. (XV Corps).
Same on final objec-
and 3 were in re-
3,000 yards actually
Creepmg barrage.
tive.
serve.
captured.
Infantry " starting
line " 300-400 yards
from enemy's front
line.
No preliminary bom-
bardment.
June 7th,1917, Messines.
6,400 yards (i.e., 2,130
3 divisions, of which 6
4,000 yards.
1 gun to about 84 yards
SSth, 16th, 19th Divi-
yards per division).
brigades attacked.
Infantry " starting
of front.
sions. (IX Corps.)
narrowing down to
and 3 "leap-
line " about 200-300
480 field guns and how-
about 2,000 yards on
frogged " the leading
yards from enemy's
itzers.
the corps front on
brigades on the 4th
front line.
246 heavy howitzers.
the final objective.
objective and cap-
tured final objective.
Artillery and machme-
gun creeping barrage
7 days' bombardment.
July 4th, 1918, Hamel.
6,000 yards increasing
10 battalions, of which
Maximum, 2,500 yards.
1 gun to 25 yards of
4th Australian Division.
to 7,300 yards on
6 attacked.
Average, 2,000 yards.
front. Creeping artil-
final objective.
Infantry " starting
line " 300 yards from
enemy's front line.
lery and machine-gun
barrage.
No preliminary bom-
bardment.
Ill machhie-guns for
machine-gun barrage.
326 guns and heavy
howitzers, of which
2/3 were on counter
battery work.
August 8th, 1918.
5,000 yards (i.e., 2,500
2 divisions, each on a
Maximum, 12,000
1 gun to about 14 yards
Battle of Amiens.
yards per division)
front of 1 brigade
yards (3 objectives.
of front.
1st and 2nd Canadian
decreasing down to
which "leap-frogged"
of which all were
Creeping artillery and
DivUions. (Canadian
3,500 OQ final objec-
each other in turn on
captured).
machine-gun barrage.
Corps.)
tive.
the successive ob-
" Starting line " 300
yards from enemy's
192 machine-guns avail-
jectives.
able.
front line.
No prelimmary bom-
bardment.
Sept. 18th, 1918. Outer
7,600 yards (t.e., 3,750
2 divisions, of which 4
Maximum, 5,000 yards.
1 gun to about 20 yards
defences of Hinden-
yards per division)
brigades attacked
(3 objectives, of which
of front.
burg Line.
narrowing down to
and the other 2 were
all were captured).
270 field guns and how-
1st and 4th Australian
6,000 on final objec-
in reserve and were
"Starthig Ime" 300-
itzers and about 100
Divisions. (Australian
tive.
not employed.
400 yards from
heavy howitzers.
Corps.)
enemy's front line.
Creepmg artillery and
machine-gun barrage
256 machme-guns avail-
able.
No preliminary bom-
bardment.
Sept. 29th, 1918.
3,000 yards.
1 division on a brigade
Maximum, 5,000 yards.
1 gun to about 3 yards
Hindenburg Line
front with all 3 bat-
" Starting line " 200-
of front.
(canal defences).
talions in iue, fol-
300 yards from
Creepmg artillery and
46th Division (IX
lowed by two other
enemy's front Ime.
machme-gun barrage
Corps).
brigades which
by 103 field guns and
" leap-frogged " the
leading brigade
when canal was
crossed.
128 machine-guns.
A 10 hours' gas bom-
bardment, followed
by 48 hours' bom-
bardment by high ex-
plosive and slirapnel.
CONCLUSION
267
State of Enemy's
Defences.
State nr Enemy's
Moral.
Deoeee of
8UBPK13E.
Tanks employed. Remaeks.
Very strong. Front,
support, and re-
serve trenches.
Fortifled village of
JLOOB.
Very good.
Expected.
KU.
The 1 5th Division was the centre
of three divisions of the IV
Corps attacking, while the
I Corps attacked simultsjie-
ously on its left.
The supply of ammunition was
■till very limited.
Very strong. Front,
support, and re-
serve trenches, and
fortifled village of
Montauban.
Very good.
Expected.
Nil. The XIII Corps, of two divisions.
was on the right of the British
attack by five corps. The
! French attacked on the right of
' the XIII Corps.
Very strong, but only
front and support
lines.
Temirorarily reduced
by previous fort-
night's fighting,
but etui good.
Expected.
>"U. The XIII and XV Corps carried
out the main attack, with the
j III Corps on their left also
attacking.
1
Fair. A good many
trenches and some
wire.
Good.
Expected
17 This was the first time tacks
Mark I ! were used. The XV Corps was
the centre of three corps
attacking.
Very strong. Numer-
ous lines.
Very good.
Expected.
28 ' The IX Corps of three divisions
Haik IV was the centre of three corps
attacking a salient.
Six mines were fired on the corps
front at " lero."
Poor.
Fair.
Complete surprise.
60
HarkT
An independent operation.
Poor.
Fair.
Complete surprise.
84
Mark V
The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divi-
sions were the left and centre
dlTlaions of the Canadian
Corps, which was the right
corps of the three corps
attacking. The French at-
tacked on the right of the
Canadian Corps.
Fair. Three lines and
fortifled villages
and farms.
Fair. Getting worse.
Probably expected.
9 Mark V tanks and
some dummy
tanks.
The .<ustraUan Corps, attacUsg
with 1st and 4th Divisions, was
the centre of three corps
attacking.
Very strong, with
canal in front.
Poor.
Probably expected.
Ml, till canal had
been crossed.
The 46th Division was the lead-
ing division of the IX Corps
which was the right of three
corps attacking.
268 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
immediate counter-attack have been proved time after time, and examples
of the efficacy of such attacks were very common during the hundred
days. The essence of success is that such a counter-
Counter-attack8 attack should strike the enemy while still disorganised
and exhausted after his assault, probably having lost
many of his leaders, with his artillery fire slackening after firing a rapid
rate of barrage fire, and before all his machine-guns told off for consolida-
tion have arrived. Once this phase is over, the chances of success of a
counter-attack decrease rapidly. The commander on the spot must,
therefore, usually be the best judge of the most favourable hour to counter-
attack, which will depend to a large extent on the position of his available
reserves. The very successful counter-attack of the three brigades (two
Australian and one British) at Villers Bretonneux on April 24thi may
almost be described as an immediate counter-attack because, although
it was not carried out until about twelve hours after the village was
captured, it was made before the Germans had been able to organise
their defence, and, owing to its being made under cover of darkness, it
came as a complete svu-prise and found them unprepared.
The most effective hour at which to attack was also the subject of
much discussion before and after August 8th. The question of surprise
is a most important factor in this problem, and, when
"Zero" the various pros and cons are discussed, it must
always be taken into consideration. To carry out a
surprise attack in daylight in these days of aeroplanes is almost impossible
except in bad weather, and it was found that the choice usually lay between
" dawn " or " night " attacks. The advantage of constantly varying the
hour of attack is obvious, but it may be found that, as in the case of the
Fourth Army during the hvmdred days, other considerations will over-rule
the advantage that might be gained by a greater variation of the
hour. It was generally considered that for large forces night attacks,
unless made in bright moonlight, are best avoided altogether, as their
disadvantages greatly outweigh their advantages, especially as it was
found that tanks in a night attack were of little assistance, even in moon-
light. The almost xmanimous opinion, especially as our experience
increased, was that an hour before sunrise, just as the first streaks of light
were showing in the sky, was the best time, and nearly every attack by
the Fourth Army was made at that hour. Several moonlight attacks
were made, notably one by the III and Australian Corps on August 24th,2
and one by the XIII Corps on October 23rd. ^ Both were successful, but,
although some advantage was imdoubtedly gained from the change from
the usual hour, their success was not so striking as to change the general
opinion that the best time for " zero " was an hour before sunrise.
The dim light an hour before dawn enables the infantry to form up on
its " starting line " without being observed ; at the same time, within
a few minutes of the assault commencing there is light enough for the
infantry to see its way and to shoot. The tanks, to begin with, would
have preferred even a little later, but their skill at manoeuvring in the dark
improved as the operations went on.
' See page 3. * See page 83. ' See page 232 et seq.
CONCLUSION 269
It is possibly not realised with what care the " zero " hour was selected,
and what stress units and formations placed on even five minutes one way
or the other. Officers were detailed to ascertain by personal observation
the exact amount of light that there was at certain hours, and exactly how
much could be seen at different distances at such times. The visibility
varied very much according to the time of year and the weather con-
ditions, and the meteorological adviser had to be consulted as regards this
aspect. The actual hour of " zero " was decided as late as was consistent
with everyone being informed in sufficient time — but not too soon. It
was usually sent out from Army Headquarters at noon on the day pre-
ceding the attack, if the attack was to be early in the morning.
The rate of advance of the barrage, and the advisability of arranging
for halts in its advance, were questions on which opinions differed consider-
ably at first, but experience caiised the consensus of
'^^oMhe^bar^e''^ opinion to harden towards a rapid rate of advance to
begin with, slowing dovm. to a steadier rate once the
attack was fairly laimched. That is to say that for the first 200-300
yards the barrage should be timed to advance at the rate of 100 yards
every two, or three, minutes, while the men were fresh, their nerves highly
strung after a long night's waiting, and while the enemy was still stunned
by the initial shock of ovu* artillery fire. Then the rate of advance should
be reduced to 100 yards every four minutes over good ground ; to be
further reduced to six, or even eight, minutes if there were any obstacles,
or the ground was much cut up. It must be remembered, with regard to
the above remarks, that the going was always good during the hundred
days, when compared to what it was in Flanders in 1917 and in the later
stages of the Somme in 1916.
That creeping barrages, both artillery and machine-gun, have come
to stay there can be little doubt, and the infantry whose moral is suffi-
ciently good to allow of its keeping close under the
^baxrage"^ barrage, even at the cost of some casualties from its
own artillery and machine-guns, will continue to win
battles and suffer the least casualties in the end.
That the principles laid down in our pre-war military text-Dooks
were sound and stood the test of war few will dispute, and any changes
that may be necessary in these books will be those
text-bwriw affecting the method of application of those principles
in the light of modern inventions. All these inventions
are really for one ultimate purpose only, and that is to obtain
superiority of fire over the enemy before oiu: infantry comes to
close quarters with the bayonet, so that our men may enter into this
combat on advantageous terms.
" Success in war," as our Field Service Regulations say, " depends more
on moral than on physical qualities. Skill cannot compensate for want
of coiu-age, energy, and determination ; but even high moral qualities
may not avail without careful preparation and skilful direction. The
fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves
very abstruse ; but the application of them is difficult and cannot be made
the subject of rules. The correct application of principles to circumstances
270 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
is the outcome of sound military knowledge, built up by study and practice
till it has become an instinct."
One more hne might be added to this — Knowledge breeds self-con-
fidence in times of stress and adversity ; than this there is no more valuable
quality in war.
Lord Roberts wrote in April, 1905, in his Memoir of Col. Henderson,
which forms the introduction to " The Science of War," " The influence of
Colonel Henderson such a man must bear good fruit, and the more widely
and the " human " his writings are read, and the more closely his teachings
side of war ^re followed, the more successful will be our would-be
commanders and the better will it be for England when again she is forced
to go to war."
Soldiers, and civilians, who desire to profit by the lessons which stand
out in so many pages of this story should compare them with the deductions
which Col. Henderson drew from his wide study of Military History, and
especially of British Campaigns and of the Civil War in America. The
following quotation well exemplifies his wonderful foresight :
" If I see in the futiire an English General at the head of an Army
far larger than that which drained the life blood of Napoleon's Empire
in the Peninsula, if I see our Colours flying even over a wider area than
in the year which preceded Waterloo, you may think I am over sanguine ;
but to my mind the possibility exists, and with it the probability that
the forces which are employed upon the counter-stroke will be con-
stituted, at least in part, as were the Armies of the American Civil
War. Oiu" men will not all be Regulars. They will come straight
from civil life, and to civil life they will return." ^ His imagination,
far from being over sanguine, was, as events have proved, well within
the mark.
It is in his knowledge and appreciation of the " human " side of war,
as opposed to the mechanical or material side, that lies perhaps the greatest
value of Col. Henderson's writings. His chapters are full of reference
to the qualities, good and bad, of the officers and men who served Welling-
ton, Lee, and Grant, and the effect that such qualities had on the result
of the campaigns in which they were engaged. Discussions on the
characters and characteristics of the various commanders invariably form
part of his account of the campaigns which he describes. As he
says, " In Military History the very highest ideals may be found ; and
here again I would advise students of campaigns to mark the influences
of the characters of great soldiers in difficult operations, and to learn how
determination, perseverance, and the fixed resolve to conquer has enabled
them to triumph over obstacles before which men of weaker fibre would
have turned aside. To keep these points always before our minds, the
influence of moral, and the influence of individual character is the true
way of studying Military History." 2
There is nothing, perhaps, more striking in this narrative of the events
of the hundred days than the value of individual initiative, and the
manner in which the action of one or two men, who instinctively grasped
the situation and the best means of dealing with it, affected the whole
1 " The Science of War," p. 310. ^ Ibid., p. 313.
CONCLUSION 271
course of events. Numerous instances of this have been recorded in
these pages, but many more still remain untold. It is largely a matter
of character. In some men this power of initiative is
^'iscipliiie*"^ bom, in others it has been developed by the surroundings
in which they have lived, and has thus become a habit
which enables them to deal instinctively with difficult situations and com-
mand men. No other Army in Europe during the Great War drew its officers
from more varied conditions than did ours, or from so many careers in which
individuality, resource, and leadership were qualities which were essential to
success. History has shown that this is one of the great characteristics of
the British race. It is this power of leadership, of dealing with the unex-
pected on the spur of the moment, that has made the British Empire
what it is. It is a characteristic that as a nation we can never afford to
lose, or with its loss will fall the edifice of which it is the foundation.
It is an asset that in every walk of life, and especially in the fighting
services, we must continue to cultivate and encoiirage.
A well-organised war machine is a wonderfully powerful weapon,
especially when directed by the hands of capable leaders, but, when plans
miscarry, and days of difficulty and disaster have to be faced, it is the
character and initiative of the individual, and that power over men which
compels them to follow whither the commander leads, that are the
dominating factors in the final struggle. This war has, in a great
measure, been a fight to a finish between a marvellous war organisation
and a free people filled with pride of race. The campaign of 1918 was
the final round of this titanic struggle, in which victory eventually went
to the individual as against the machine.
One lesson more ; the superiority of British discipline, based on
mutual confidence and respect between officers and men, over Prussian
discipline, based on fear of pimishment. We have heard much during the
past five years of the marvellous results of Prussian discipline, and how
no other army could have kept together so long under the trials and
hardships that it was called upon to endure. British disci phne has now
proved that it has no equal in the armies of Europe ; it has stood the hard
test of war and has emerged trivunphant. It has passed through times of
stress and hardship, of retreat and apparent disaster ; times which have
strengthened rather than weakened the bonds that held it together. The
British Army of to-day is imbued with the same spirit and the same ideals
as the old army of 1914. Its faith in those ideals is all the stronger because
they have been tested and not found wanting.
The British officer of the future must be imder no misapprehension
as to how these ideals have been attained in the past ; if he wishes to lead
his men and not to drive them, to receive their willing obedience without
recovu-se to threats of punishment, and to gain their confidence and respect.
He must realise that example is the soul of British discipline, and that it is
more effective than pimishment ; that in order to set that example he
must have both character and knowledge. Character can be cultivated,
it is based on unselfishness, loyalty, and determination ; knowledge can
only be attained by hard work.
In conclusion I venture to dedicate this book to the soldiers from
272 THE STORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY
Great Britain, Ireland, and the Dominions who by their self-sacrifice and
dogged determination in defence, and by their initiative, resource, and
imequalled gallantry in attack, turned days of disaster and alarms into
weeks of success and victory.
History records many glorious pages in the annals of the British
Army, but it is safe to prophesy that never will the name of the British
soldier stand higher than in the last eight months of the greatest war the
world has ever known, when the fate of the British Empire, and all for
which it stands in the world, trembled in the balance.
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APPENDICES
(A). — Comparative Table for the months of March to November, 1918, showing captures,
casualties, and reinforcements of the Fourth Army.
(B). — Table giving the battle casualties suffered, and the prisoners captured by the
Fourth Army in the operations between August 8th and November 11th, 1918, shown
by corps.
(C). — Table showing the losses in prisoners suffered by German divisions and the
number of times these divisions were engaged by the Fourth Army between August 8th
and November 11th, 1918.
(D). — Table showing the rate of absorption of German divisions between August 8th and
November 11th, 1918.
(E).— V.C. Stories.
(F). — The Fourth Army Orders of Battle for August 8th, September 29th, and November
4th, 1918.
(G). Table showing the daily ammunition expenditure by the Fourth Army from August
8th to November 11th, 1918.
(H). Extracts from captured German orders issued during the first half of September,
1918.
(J). Notes on machine-gun organisation and tactics.
(K). The adventures of a whippet tank on August 8th.
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APPENDIX C
Table showing the losses in prisoners suefered by German Divisions, and the
NUMBER OF TIMES THESE DIVISIONS ^VERE ENGAGED BY THE FoURTH ArMY,
BETWEEN August 8th and November 11th, 1918.
This list doee not pretend to be absolutely accurate, owing to the difficulty of obtaining the necessary
information.
Number
1
Number
Division.
of times
engaged.
Officers.
Other
Ranks. ,
Division.
of times
engaged.
Officers.
Other
Ranks.
Alpine Corps
2
28
640
38th Division ...
2
39
1,198
Jager Di\-ision
2
14
657 I
41st
2
47
2,518
1st Guard Res. Div.
1
7
171
i43rd Res. Div. ...
11
1,036
1st Res. Div. ...
3
63
2,091
44th
8
79
2nd Cyclist Bde....
2
19
800 1
54th Div.
36
1,428
2nd Guard Div. ...
4
42
2,784
•54th Res. Div. ...
22
1,052
2nd Division
1
68
1,483
58th Div.
3
474
3rd ^faval Div. ...
1
14
376
75th Res. Div. ...
42
2,187
5th Bav. Div. ...
2
24
846
79th ,
36
2,174
5th Res. Div.
1
—
714
81st „ .. ...
—
20
6th Cav. Div.
1
—
131
82nd
4
354
6th Bav. Div. ...
1
?
?
83rd Division ...
2
282
8th Division
2
15
670
84th
5
612
9th
1
T
?
87th
15
958
11th
1
8
529
107th
1
68
1,609
13th
2
46
3,367
1108th
39
2,386
14th Res. Div. ...
1
26
1,285
» 109th
25
1,522
»14th Bav. Div. ...
2
98
2,846
117th
2
48
2,891
15th Res. Div.
2
16
1,267
U9th
3
70
2,859
17th „
1
26
1,268
12l8t
5
30
1,671
18th Division
1
?
T
185th
2
72
2,017
19th Res. Div.
1
1
61
192nd
2S
1,125
20th Division
1
7
201
197th
17
623
2l8t
3
70
2,429
200th
—
8
21st Res. Div.
1
32
1,517
201st
3
217
22nd
2
—
13
204th
51
1,549
24th Division
2
18
1,478
208th
5
163
25th
2
25
857
221st
3
30
1,252
25th Res. Div.
2
11
495
'225th
2
66
3,527
26th
I
4
155
232nd
2
65
1,525
27th Division
1
45
1,374
1233rd
1
t
t
29th
1
1
38
24l3t
1
34
1,859
30th
2
?
?
243rd
5
33
1,693
34th
1
23
997
Odd Unite
—
38
1,981
Total
—
1,729
76.420
' These divisions were disbanded in August or September.
Total of 67 Divisions, of which 38 were engaged once, 20 twice, 4 three times, 3 four times, and 2 five
times. Some of these di\'i3ions were also engaged on a varying number of occasions by other armies
between August 8th and November 1 1th.
13
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APPENDIX E
V.C. STORIES,
(Given in the words of the original recommendations.)
1. L/Cpl. W. Amey
2. Sapper A, Archibald
3. Lieut. J. C. Barrett
4. Pte. R. M. Beatham
5. T/Capt. A. W. Beauchamp-Proctor
6. L/Cpl. A. Brereton
7. Lieut. J. Briluant . .
8. Cpl. A. H. Buckley
9. Pte. G. Cartwright
10. Sgt. J. Clarke
11. L/Cpl. W. H. Coltman
12. Cpl. F. G. CoppiNS
13. Pte. J. B. Croak
14. Pte. W. M. CuRREY
15. Sgt. H. A. Curtis
16. Pte. T. DiNESON
17. A/Major G. de C. E. Findlay
18. Lieut. A. E. Gaby
19. Cpl. H. J. Good
20. L/Cpl. B. S. Gordon
21. Cpl. A. C. Hall
22. Sgt. T. J. Harris
23. Pte. J. Harvey
24. Lieut. F. W. Hedges
25. 2nd Lieut. G. M. Ingram
26. A/Lt.-Col. D. G. Johnson
27. Sgt. W. H. Johnson
28. Lieut. W. D. Joynt
29. 2nd Lieut. J. Kirk . .
80. L/Cpl. A. Lewis
81. Sgt. A. D. Lowerson
82. Lieut. L. D. McCarthy
38. Pte. R. Mactier
84. A/Lt.-Col. J. N. Marshall
85. Lieut. J. Maxwell . .
86. Pte. F. G. Miles ..
37. Cpl. H. G. B. Miner
88. Pte. J. Ryan
89. Sgt. G. Sexton
40. Sgt. R. Spall
41. Sgt. P. C. Statton . .
42. Lieut. J. E. Tait ..
43. Lieut. E. T. Townee
l/8th Bn. Royal Warwickshire Regt., T.F.
Royal Engineers.
l/5th Bn. Leicestershire Regt., T.F.
8th Bn. Australian Infantry.
Royal Air Force.
8th Bn. Canadian Infantry.
22nd Bn. Canadian Infantry.
64th Bn. Australian Infantry.
33rd Bn. Australian Infantry.
15th Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers.
l/6th Bn. North Staffordshire Regt., T.F.
8th Bn. Canadian Infantry.
13th Bn. Canadian Infantry.
53rd Bn. Australian Infantry.
2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
42nd Bn. Canadian Infantry.
Royal Engineers.
28th Bn. Australian Infantry.
13th Bn. Canadian Infantry.
41st Bn. Australian Infantry.
54th Bn. Australian Infantry.
6th Bn. Royal West Kent Regt.
l/22nd Bn. London Regt., T.F.
The Bedfordshire Regt.
24th Bn. Australian Infantry.
South Wales Borderers.
l/5th Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regt,,
T.F.
8th Bn. Australian Infantry.
10th Bn. Manchester Regt.
6th Bn. Northamptonshire Regt.
21st Bn. Australian Infantry.
16th Bn. Australian Infantry.
23rd Bn. Australian Infantry.
1st Bn. Irish Guards.
18th Bn. Australian Infantry.
l/5th Bn. Gloucestershire Regt., T.F.
58th Bn. Canadian Infantry.
55th Bn. Australian Infantry.
13th Bn. Australian Infantry.
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.
40th Bn. Australian Infantry.
78th Bn. Canadian Infantry.
2nd Australian Machine Gun Bn.
280
APPENDIX E
281
44. A/Lt.-Col. B. W. Vann .
45. Major B. A. Wark . .
46. A/Major A. H. S. Waters
47. L/Cpl. L. C. Weathers .
48. T/Capt. F. M. F. West .
49. Pte. J. P. Woods . .
50. Sgt. R. L. Zengel . .
l/8th Bn. Nottinghamshire
Regt., T.F.
32nd Bn. Australian Infantry.
Royal Engineers.
4.3rd Bn. Australian Infantry.
Royal Air Force.
48th Bn. Australian Infantry.
5th Bn. Canadian Infantry.
and Derbyshire
1. No. 307817 L/Cpl. William Amey, l/8th Battalion, The Royal
Warwickshire Regt., T.F. (Birmingham).
On November 4th, 1918, during the attack on Landrecies, this non-commissioned
officer displayed most conspicuous and outstanding gallantry. The attack commenced
in a fog resulting in many hostile machine-gun nests not being mopped up by the
leading troops. This non-commissioned officer with his section, having lost touch
with his company, attached himself to another company which was held up by heavy
machine-gun fire, and carried out the following deeds of gallantry :—
On his own initiative, he led his section to attack a machine-gun nest in the face
of heavy fire. With great bravery he forced the garrison to retire to a neighbouring
farm, finally causing them to capitulate, and capturing about 50 prisoners and several
machine-guns. Later, single-handed, he attacked a hostile machine-gun post situated
m a farmhouse. Exposed to heavy fire, he advanced unhesitatingly, killed two of
the garrison and drove the remainder into a cellar until assistance arrived. Again
later and unaided, he attacked a Chateau in Faubourg-Soyeres, which was strongly
held, and holding up the line of advance. With determination and disregard for
personal safety he rushed the Chateau, killing two Germans and holding up the
remainder until reinforced. This gallant action was instrumental in the capture of
a further 20 prisoners, and cleared away the last of the opposition in this sector.
Throughout the day, the conduct of L/Cpl. Amey, in the face of much opposition,
and danger, was of the highest type and beyond all praise. The work done by him
not only resulted in clearing up a critical situation, but was instrumental in the saving
of many lives.
2. No. 213078 Spr. Adam Archibald, 218th Field Company, Royal
Engineers (Leith).
For courage of the very highest order and the most exemplary devotion to duty
and disregard of personal safety on November 4th, 1918, near Ors. This sapper was
one of a party building a floating bridge across the canal. He was foremost in the
work under a very heavy artillery barrage and machine-gun fire. The latter was
dkected at him from a few yards' distance while he was working on the cork floats.
Though the fire was such that it seemed impossible that anyone could live under it,
he persevered in his task and his example and efforts were such that the bridge, which
was essential to the success of the operations, was completed very quickly. Just as
his work was finished he collapsed from the effects of gas poisoning. The" heroism of
this sapper was beyond all praise. That anyone should have lived through such close
and accurate fire is little short of miraculous.
Lieut. John Cridlan Barrett, l/5th Battalion, The Leicestershire
Regt., T.F. (Leamington Spa).
For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty on the morning of September
24th, 1918, during the attack on Pontruet. On emerging from the smoke barrage
Lieut. Barrett found himself faced by Forgan's trench which was very strongly hetd
by the enemy, with five machine-guns on his immediate front. Without hesitation,
he coUected all the available men and charged the nearest group of machine-guns.
He was wounded while making the charge, but gained the trench. He himself destroyed
two guns and attacked another gun team with bombs. When his supply of bombs
o o
3.
282 APPENDIX E
gave out he sent for a Lewis gun and got it into action ; in doing this he received two
bullet wounds in the right arm. Seeing that his men were firmly established in the
trench he climbed out into the open and made a reconnaissance, but was unable to
get in touch with the remainder of the battalion which was occupying the village
in rear of his position. On returning to the trench he found that he was becoming ex-
hausted from loss of blood ; he therefore called up his non-commissioned officers,
gave them exact instructions as to where they would find the battalion, and ordered
the party to cut its way out. He refused help and started to crawl back, but was
wounded a fourth time so severely that he was unable to move, and had to be carried
out. It was due to the courage and coolness displayed by this gallant officer, in spite
of his wounds, that any of the party were extricated from a very difficult situation.
4. No. 2742 Pte. Robert Matthew Beatham, 8th Battalion, Australian
Infantry, Australian Imperial Force.
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack north of Rosieres,
east of Amiens. On August 9th, 1918, Pte. Beatham showed such heroism and
courage that he inspired all ofliicers and men in his vicinity in a wonderful manner.
When the advance was held up by heavy machine-gun fire, Pte. Beatham dashed
forward and assisted by one man bombed and fought the crews of four enemy machine-
guns, killing ten of them and capturing ten others. The bravery of the action greatly
facilitated the advance of the whole battalion and prevented casualties. In fighting
the crew of the first gun he was shot through the right leg but continued in the advance.
When the final objective was reached and fierce fighting taking place, he again dashed
forward and bombed the machine-gun that was holding off our men, getting riddled
with bullets and killed in doing so. His heroism and self-sacrifice were not in vain,
and, as his bombs knocked out the enemy machine-gun, our men were enabled to
advance.
5. Temp. Capt. Andrew Weatherby Beauchamp-Proctor, D.S.O.,
M.C., D.S.C., The Royal Air Force, 84th Squadron.
For conspicuous valour and devotion to duty between August 8th, 1918, and
October 8th, 1918, this officer proved himself victor in twenty-six decisive combats,
destroying twelve enemy kite balloons, ten enemy aircraft, and driving down four other
enemy aircraft completely out of control. Between October 1st and October 5th,
1918, he destroyed two enemy scouts, burnt three enemy kite balloons, and drove down
one enemy scout completely out of control. On October 1st, 1918, in a general engage-
ment with about twenty-eight machines, he charged one Fokker biplane near
Fontaine, and a second near Flamicourt ; on October 2nd, he burnt a hostile balloon
near Selvigny ; on October 3rd, he drove down, completely out of control, an enemy
scout near Mont D'Origny, and burnt a hostile balloon ; on October 5th he destroyed
a third hostile balloon near Bohain. On October 8th, 1918, while flying home at a
low altitude, after destroying an enemy two-seater near Maretz, he was painfully
wounded in the arm by machine-gun fire, but, continuing, he landed safely at his
aerodrome, and, after making his report, was admitted to the hospital. In all he has
proved hunself conqueror over fifty-four foes, destroying twenty-two enemy machines,
sixteen enemy kite balloons, and driving down sixteen enemy aircraft completely
out of control. Besides these, his work in attacking enemy troops on the ground,
and in reconnaissance both during the withdrawal following on the battle of St.
Quentin from March 21st, 1918, and during the victorious advance of our Armies
commencing on August 8th, has been almost unsurpassed in its brilliancy and as such
has made an impression on those serving in his squadron, and those around him,
that will not be easily forgotten.
6. No. 830651 Pte. (A/L.-Cpl.) Alexander Brereton, 8th Battalion,
Canadian Infantry (90th Rifles), Manitoba Regt.
For outstanding and conspicuous valour and devotion. On August 9th, 1918,
during the attack on the Amiens defence line, a line of hostile machine-guns opened
APPENDIX E 283
fire suddenly on L/Cpl. Brereton's platoon when it was in a very exposed position
where there was no possibility of taking cover. Realising the necessity for instant
action, he at once rushed one of the machine-gun posts without waiting for orders.
He bayoneted the man operating the gun and shot the first man who attempted to
approach it ; whereupon nine others surrendered to him. The platoon was then
enabled to advance and capture the five remaining posts, where they killed fifteen and
captured thirty of the enemy, and subsequently went on to their final objective.
L/Cpl. Brereton's action was a splendid example of resource and bravery. It undoubtedly
saved the lives of many of his comrades and turned a critical situation into a brilliant
success.
7. Lieut. John Brilliant, M.C, 22nd Battalion (French Canadian),
Quebec Regt,
For most conspicuous gallantry and almost superhuman devotion to duty during
the operations of the 8th and 9th August, 1918, in the attack and twelve miles advance
from the vicinity of Villers Bretonneux to east of Meharicourt. Lieut. Brilliant
was in charge of a company which he led during the two days with absolute fearlessness
and extraordinary abihty and initiative. At about 1 p.m. on August 9th, 1918, one
mile east of Caix, just after that day's attack had begun, his company's left flank
was held up by an enemy machine-gun. Lieut. Brilliant nished and captured the
machine-gun, himself killing two of the enemy crew. Whilst doing this, he was
wounded in the thigh, but refused to be evacuated. A little after 3 p.m. the same
day, his company was held up by heavy machine-gun fire from a machine-gun nest
in the houses in the northern part of Vrely. He reconnoitred the ground personally,
organised a party of two platoons and rushed straight for the machine-gun nest.
Here 150 Germans and 15 machine-guns were captured, Lieut. Brilliant himself
killed five Germans and was wounded a second time, in the shoulder. He had his
wound dressed immediately and again refused to be evacuated. About 6 p.m. the
same day, after his company had reached a line east of Meharicourt, this gallant ofiicer
saw a field gun firing on his men over open sights from the Bois de Maucourt. He
immediately organised and led a rushing party towards the gun. After progressing
about 600 yards, Lieut. Brilliant was seriously wounded in the abdomen. In spite
of this third wound, he continued to advance for some 200 yards more when he
fell unconscious from exhaustion and loss of blood. Lieut. Brilliant's wonderful
example throughout the day fired his men with enthusiasm and fury which largely
contributed towards the battalion's notable achievements.
8. No. 1876 Cpl. Alexander Henry Buckley, 54th BattaUon, Aus-
trahan Infantry, Austrahan Imperial Force.
For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at Peronne during the
operations on September 1st and 2nd, 1918. After passing the first objective, his
half company and part of the company on the flank were held up by an enemy machine-
gun nest. With one man he rushed the post, shooting four of the occupants and
taking twenty-two prisoners. Later, on reaching a moat, another machine-gun nest
commanded the only available footbridge. Whilst this was being engaged from the
flank, this non-commissioned officer endeavoured to cross the bridge and rush the
post, but was killed in the attempt. Throughout the advance he had displayed
great initiative, resource, and courage, being a great inspiration to his men. In order
to avert casualties amongst his comrades and to permit of their advance, he voluntarily
essayed a task which practically meant certain death. He set a fine example of
bravery and of self-sacrificing devotion to duty.
9. No. 726 Pte. George Cartwright, 33rd BattaUon, Austrahan
Infantry, Australian Imperial Force.
For most conspicuous valour and devotion to duty. On the morning of August
31st, 1918, during the attack on Road Wood, south-west of Bouchavesnes, near
284 APPENDIX E
Peronne, Pte. Cartwright displayed exceptional gallantry and supreme disregard
for personal danger in the face of a withering machine-gun fire. Two companies were
held up by a machine-gun firing from the south-western edge of the wood. Without
hesitation this man stood up, and, walking towards the gun, fired his rifle from his
shoulder. He shot the No. 1 gunner, another German manned the gun and he killed
him ; a third attempted to fire the gun, and him he also killed. Pte. Cartwright
then threw a bomb at the post and on its exploding he rushed forward, captured the
gun and nine Germans. Our line then immediately rushed forward loudly cheering
him. This magnificent deed had a most inspiring effect on the whole line ; all strove
to emulate his gallantry. Throughout the operation Pte. Cartwright displayed
wonderful dash, grim determination, and courage of the highest order.
10. No. 37721 Sgt. James Clarke, 15th (Service) Battalion, The
Lancashire Fusiliers (Rochdale).
During the attack at Happegarbes on November 2nd, 1918, this non-commissioned
officer was in command of a platoon. He led his men forward with great determination,
and on being held up by heavy machine-gun fire he rushed forward through a thick
and strongly held hedge, captured in succession four machine-guns, and single-handed
bayoneted the crews in spite of a very heavy and point blank fire from the guns.
Later, he led the remnants of his platoon and captured three more machine-guns and
many prisoners. In the later stages of the attack on the same day, finding the platoon
held up by a nest of enemy machine-guns, he personally led a tank to this point over
very exposed ground, and the opposition was broken down. Continuing the attack
on November 3rd, after capturing many prisoners and gaining his objective, he found
his flank being turned by the enemy. He at once organised a defensive flank, posting
each man so that the enemy was successfully held. On November 4th in the attack
on the Oise-Sambre Canal this non-commissioned officer came under heavy fire from
the opposite bank of the canal. He rushed forward with a Lewis gun and team in
the face of an intense barrage, brought the gun into action, effectively silenced the
enemy's fire, and enabled the rest of his company to advance and gain their objectives.
Throughout the whole of these operations this non-commissioned officer acted with
magnificent bravery and total disregard of personal safety, and by his gallantry and
high sense of duty he set a magnificent example and greatly inspired all ranks.
11. No, 241028 Pte. (L/Cpl.) William Harold Coltman, D.C.M., M.M.,
and Bar, 1 /6th Battalion, The Prince of Wales's (North Staffordshire
Regt.), T.F. (Winshill, Bvirton-on-Trent).
For most conspicuous bravery, initiative, and self-sacrifice in attack. During
the operations at Mannequin Hill north-east of Sequehart, on October 3rd and 4th,
1918, this non-commissioned officer, a stretcher bearer, did most conspicuous acts of
bravery in rescuing and carrying, on his back, on three successive occasions, badly
wounded men who had been left behind when we were compelled to retire after a
heavy enemy counter-attack. Hearing that there were wounded men lying further
to the front who had not been attended to, he went forward alone — and on his own
initiative — into the valley north of the Hill in the face of fierce enfilade fire, found the
wounded, dressed them, and carried each one to his stretcher squad in the rear of our
line, thus saving their lives. In that action alone this very gallant non-commissioned
officer dressed and carried wounded for 48 hours without rest ; his efforts did not
cease until the last wounded man had been attended to.
12. No. 1987 Cpl. Frederick George Coppins, 8th Battalion, Canadian
Infantry (90th Rifles), Manitoba Regt.
For conspicuous and exceptional valour, gallantry, and devotion. On August
9th, 1918, during the attack east of the Amiens defence line on Hatchett Wood,
Cpl. Coppins' platoon came unexpectedly into the zone of fire of numerous machine-
guns in Hatchett Wood. They were unable to advance or retire and, as they were on
APPENDIX E 285
the forward slope, there was no available cover. It was apparent that the platoon
would be annihilated unless the enemy machine-guns were silenced immediately.
Cpl. Coppins at once appreciated the situation. Without hesitation, and on his
own initiative, he called on four men to follow him and leaped forward in the face of a
terrific machine-gun fire. This act alone attracted the enemy's fire, which was con-
centrated on his small party, thus saving the others lying on the ground. Cpl. Coppins
with his comrades rushed straight for the machine-guns. The four men with him were
killed ; Cpl. Coppins was wounded in the ankle. Despite his wound he reached the
hostile machine-guns and called on the crews to surrender. They refused. He then
killed the man operating the first gun and three of the crew — four others immediately
surrendered. This act of outstanding bravery was the means of saving many lives
of the men of his platoon, and enabled the platoon to advance. Despite his wound
he continued with his platoon to the final objective — 5,000 yards distant — and only
left the line when it had been made secure and when ordered to do so by his Com-
manding Officer. The heroism of Cpl. Coppins undoubtedly saved the lives of many
of his comrades and ensured the success of the attack by his platoon.
13. No. 445312 Pte. John Bernaed Croak, 13th Battalion, Canadian
Infantry, Quebec Regt.
On August 8th, 1918, during the attack on the Amiens defence line, Pte. Croak,
after being separated from his section, encountered a machine-gun nest in Ring Copse
which he first bombed unassisted, and then jumped into the post, making prisoners of
the crew and capturing the gun. Shortly afterwards he was severely wounded in
the right arm but refused to desist. In a few minutes his platoon, which he had rejoined
again, encountered a very strong point containing several machine-guns, and were
forced to take cover. Croak, however, seeing an opportunity, dashed forward alone,
and was almost immediately followed by the remainder of the platoon in a brilliant
charge. Croak was the first to arrive at the trench, into which he led the men, capturing
3 machine-guns and bayoneting or capturing the entire garrison. His perseverance
and courage were undoubtedly responsible for taking the strongest point in the whole
day's advance. Pte. Croak was again severely wounded in the knee and died in a
few minutes.
14. No. 1584a Pte. William Matthew Currey, 53rd Battalion, Aus-
tralian Infantry, Australian Imperial Force.
During the attack on Peronne on the morning of September 1st, 1918, Pte. Currey
displayed most conspicuous gallantry and daring. During the early stage of the
advance the battalion was suffering heavy casualties from a 77 mm." field gun that
was firing over sights at a very close range. Pte. Currey without hesitation rushed
forward and, despite a withering machine-gun fire that was directed on him from either
flank, succeeded in capturing the gun single-handed after killing the entire crew.
Later, when continuing the advance, an enemy " strong point " containing 30 men
and two machine-guns was noticed which was holding up the advance of the left flank.
Pte. Currey crept around the flank and engaged the post with a Lewis gun, causing
many casualties. Finally he rushed the post single-handed, killing four, wounding
two, and taking one prisoner, the survivors running away. It was entirely owing to
his gallant conduct that the situation was relieved, and the advance enabled to
continue. After the final stage of the attack it was imperative that one of the com-
panies, that had become isolated, should be withdrawn. This man at once volunteered
to carry the message, although the ground to be crossed was very heavily shelled and
continuously swept by machine-gun fire. He crossed the shell and bullet swept area
three times in the effort to locate the company, and on one occasion his box respirator
was shot through by machine-gun bullets, and he was gassed. Nevertheless, he
remained on duty, and, after finding the isolated company, delivered the message, and
returned with very valuable information from the company commander. Owing
to the gas poisoning from which he was suffering Pte. Currey had shortly afterwards
to be evacuated. Throughout the operations his striking example of coolness, deter-
mination, and utter disregard of danger had a most inspiring effect on his comrades,
and his gallant work contributed largely to our success.
286 APPENDIX E
15. No. 14017 Sgt. Horace Augustus Curtis, 2nd Battalion, The
Royal Dublin Fusiliers (Newlyn, East Cornwall).
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty east of Le Cateau on the morning
of October 18th, 1918. During an attack on an enemy position his platoon came
unexpectedly under the intense hostile fire of many machine-guns. Knowing that
the attack would be a failure unless the enemy guns were silenced, Sgt. Curtis without
hesitation rushed forward through our own barrage and the enemy machine-gun fire.
He reached the enemy position, and killed and wounded the teams of two guns.
Through his extraordinary bravery and prompt action the teams of four other guns
surrendered to him. A train-load of reinforcements was in the immediate vicinity,
from which many of the enemy were detraining. He shot at the driver and succeeded
in capturing over a hundred prisoners by the time his comrades reached him. His
outstanding gallantry and disregard of personal safety inspired all near him to greater
keenness and effort, which resulted in the attack on the whole battalion front being a
complete success.
16. No. 2075467 Pte. Thomas Dineson, 42nd Battalion (Royal High-
landers of Canada), Quebec Regt.
During the action of Parvillers, August 12th, 1918, he was the outstanding
man of his company during ten hours hand-to-hand fighting, which resulted in the
capture of over a mile of strongly garrisoned and stubbornly defended German trenches.
Five times in succession he rushed forward alone, and single-handed put hostile
machine-guns out of action, accounting for twelve of the enemy with bomb and
bayonet. His aggressiveness and resourcefulness inspired his comrades at a very
critical stage of the action.
17. Capt. (A/Major) George de Cardonnell Elmsell Findlay, D.S.O..
M.C., Royal Engineers, 409th (Lowland) Field Company, Royal
Engineers, T.F. (Balloch, N.B.).
For very conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the forcing of the
Sambre-Oise Canal at the lock two miles south of Catillon on November 4th, 1918.
Major Findlay with his company was in charge of the bridging operations at this
crossing and, although wounded, remained at duty until these operations were com-
pleted. He was with the leading bridging and assaulting parties, who came under a
heavy fire while trying to cross the dyke which intervened between the forming up
line and the lock. The casualties were severe and the advance was stopped. Major
Findlay, under a heavy and incessant fire, collected what men he could and repaired
the bridges. During this time the casualties continued to be very heavy, all the
officers of the Royal Engineers Company and 45 per cent, of the other ranks had
become casualties. In spite of being wounded himself. Major Findlay continued
his task, and, after two unsuccessful efforts owing to his men being swept down, he
eventually placed the bridge in position across the lock, and was the first man to cross.
It was his cool and gallant behaviour that ensured him volunteers from different
units at this critical time, when men became casualties almost as soon as they joined
him in the fire swept zone. He remained on duty, though wounded, at this dangerous
spot until 10 p.m. that day, there being no other officer to superintend further work
on the bridges. Without this officer's gallantry and devotion there can be no doubt
that this most important crossing could not have been effected. The value of the
crossing at this point is well known.
18. Lieut. Alfred Edward Gaby, 28th Battalion, Australian Infantry,
Australian Imperial Force.
During the attack east of Villers Bretonneux, near Amiens, on the morning of
August 8th, 1918, this officer led his company with great dash, being well in front.
On reaching the wire in front of the enemy trench, strong opposition was encountered.
APPENDIX E 287
The enemy was holding a strong point in force about 40 yards beyond the wire, and
commanded the gap with four machine-guns and rifles. The advance was at once
checked. Lieut. Gaby found another gap in the wire, and, entirely by himself,
approached the strong point, while machine-guns and rifles were still being fired from
it. Running along the parapet, still alone, and at point blank range, he emptied his
revolver into the garrison, drove the crews from their guns, and compelled the sur-
render of 50 of the enemy with four machine-guns. He then quickly reorganised
his men and led them on to his final objective, which he captured and consolidated.
On the morning of August 11th, 1918, during an attack east of Framerville, near
Amiens, Lieut. Gaby again led his company with great dash on to the objective.
The enemy brought heavy rifle and machine-gun fire to bear upon the line, but in the
face of this heavy fire Lieut. Gaby walked along his line of posts, encouraging his men
to quickly consolidate the line. While engaged on this duty he was killed by an enemy
sniper.
19. No. 445120 Cpl. Herman James Good, 13th Battalion, Canadian
Infantry, Quebec Regt.
On August 8th, 1918, in Hangard Wood, Cpl. Good's company was held up by
heavy machine-gun fire from three machine-guns in a strong point, seriously delaying
the advance near the start of the operation. Cpl. Good, seeing the seriousness of the
situation, dashed forward alone, killing several of the garrison and capturing the
remainder. Later on," while alone, he encountered a battery of 5 "9 guns which were
in action at the time. Collecting three men of his section, he charged the battery
and captured the entire crews of three guns, who continued to fire point blank at them
until the four men were witliin a very short distance of the guns.
20. No. 23 Pte. (L/Cpl.) Bernard Sidney Gordon, 41st Battalion,
Australian Infantry, Australian Imperial Force.
During the operations of August 26th and 27th, 1918, east of Bray, this non-
commissioned officer showed most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in the
face of the enemy. He led his section through heavy enemy shelling to its objective,
which he consolidated. Then, single-handed, he attacked an enemy machine-gun
which was enfilading the company on his right, killed the man on the gun, and captured
the post, which contained an officer (Captain) and ten men. After handing these over
at company headquarters he returned alone to the old system of trenches in which
were many machine-guns, entered a communication trench and proceeded to mop it
up, returning with 16 prisoners in one squad and 14 in another, together with two
machine-guns. Again he returned to the system, this time with a trench mortar gun
and crew, and proceeded to mop up a further portion of the trench, bringing in 22
prisoners, including an officer and three machine-guns. This last capture enabled the
British troops on our left to advance, which they had not been able to do owing to
machine-gun fire from these posts. His total captures were thus 2 officers and 61
other ranks together with 6 machine-guns, and, with the exception of the trench mortar
assistance, it was absolutely an individual effort and done entirely on his own initiative.
21. No. 2631 Cpl. Arthur Charles Hall, 54th Battalion, Australian
Infantry, Australian Imperial Force.
For most conspicuous gallantry, brilliant leadership, and devotion to duty during
the operations at Peronne on September 1st and 2nd, 1918. A machine-gun post
in the enemy front line was holding up the advance ; alone this non-commissioned
officer rushed the position, shot four of the occupants as he advanced, and captured
nine others and two machine-guns. Then crossing the objective with a small party,
he reconnoitred the approaches to the town covering the infiltration of the remainder
of the company. During the mopping up he continuously, in advance of the main
party, located enemy points of resistance and personally led parties to the assault.
In this way he captured many small parties of prisoners and machine-guns. On the
288 APPENDIX E
morning of September 2nd, during a heavy barrage on the newly consolidated position,
a man of his platoon was severely wounded. Seeing that only immediate medical
attention could save him, Cpl. Hall volunteered and carried the man out of the
barrage, handed him to a stretcher bearer, and immediately returned to his post.
This company was heavily engaged throughout the day, only one officer remaining
unwounded. The energy and personal courage of this non-commissioned officer
undoubtedly contributed largely to the success of the operation. Throughout the
operations he showed utter disregard for danger, and under trying conditions behaved
in a most gallant and skilful manner. His daring, coolness, and self-sacrificing devotion
to duty compelled the admiration and confidence of all associated with him.
22. No. 358 Sgt. Thomas James Harris, M.M., 6th Battalion, The
Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regt.) (Lower Hailing, Kent).
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty near Morlancourt on August 9th,
1918. During the attack of the battalion the advance was much impeded by hostile
machine-guns concealed in the crops and shell holes. Sgt. Harris led his section
against one of these, capturing it, and killing seven of the enemy. Later, on two
successive occasions, he attacked, single-handed, enemy machine-guns which were
causing heavy casualties and holding up the advance. He captured the first gun
and killed the team, but was himself killed when attacking the second one. It was
largely due to the great courage and initiative of this non-commissioned officer that
the advance of the battalion was continued without delay and undue casualties.
Throughout the operations he showed a total disregard for his own personal safety
and set a magnificent example to all ranks.
23. No, 681139 Pte. Jack Harvey, l/22nd Battalion (County of London),
The London Regt. (The Queen's) T.F. (CamberweU).
For most conspicuous gallantry and disregard of personal danger on September
2nd, 1918, during the advance north of Peronne. The advance of his company was
held up by intense machine-gun fire ; this man at once rushed forward a distance of
fifty yards alone through our barrage, and, in the face of heavy enemy fire, rushed a
machine-gun post, shooting two of the team and bayoneting another. He then
destroyed the gun and continued to work his way along the enemy trench, and single-
handed rushed an enemy dug-out containing 37 Germans, whom he compelled to
surrender. By these two acts of great gallantry he saved his company heavy casualties
and enabled the whole of the attacking line to advance ; throughout the entire opera-
tion he showed the most magnificent courage and determination, and, by the splendid
example he set to all ranks, materially assisted in the success of the operation.
24. Lieut. Frederick William Hedges, The Bedfordshire Regt.,
attached 6th (Service) Battalion, The Northamptonshire Regt.
(Hounslow).
For conspicuous gallantry and initiative during operations north-east of Bousies
on the afternoon of October 24th, 1918. During the morning this officer, who was
detailed to leap-frog his company to the final objective, handled his company in a
very skilful manner, maintaining direction under the most difficult conditions. His
company was on the right of the brigade front. He advanced a considerable distance
to a point where his further advance was held up by about six machine-gun posts on
the hill opposite the line. Early in the afternoon this officer made up his mind to
clear out these enemy posts. Later, accompanied by one sergeant and followed at
some considerable distance by a Lewis gun section, he proceeded up the hill under
cover of a hedge, and killed the first machine-gunner and took two others prisoner.
He then worked his way along the crest of the hill and dealt with three other machine-
gun posts in a similar manner, taking the feed blocks out of the guns, his total being
six machine-guns and fourteen men. The direct result of this officer's action was
that the whole line which had been held up since the morning was enabled to advance,
thus having a great effect on subsequent operations.
APPENDIX E 289
25. 2nd Lieut. George Morby Ingram, M.M., 24th Battalion
Australian Infantry, Australian Imperial Force. '
During the attack on Montbrehain, east of Peronne, on October 5th 1918 this
officer was in charge of a platoon. About 100 yards from the jumping-off trench
severe enemy machme-gun fire was encountered from a strong post which had escaped
our artillery fire and the advance was thus held up. Lieut. Ingram dashed out, and
under cover of the fire of a Lewis gun, rushed the post at the head of his men This
post contained nine machine-guns and 42 Germans, who fought until our men were
within three yards of them. They were killed, to a man— Lieut. Ingram accounted for
no less than 18 of them. A number of enemy posts were then observed to be firine
on our men from about 150 yards further forward and the company moved forward
to attack them, and severe casualties were sustained. The company commander had
been badly wounded,and the company sergeant-major and several others who attempted
to lead the advance killed. Our barrage had passed on, and no tanks were near.
Lieut. Ingram quickly seized the situation, rallied his men in face of murderous fire
and led them forward with magnificent courage and resolution. He himself rushed
the hrst post, shot six of the enemy, and captured the machine-gun, thus overcoming
a very serious resistance. By this time the company had been reduced from 90 to
about 30 other ranks, but this officer, seeing enemy fire coming from a quarry to his
left front, again led his men forward and rushed the quarry. He jumped into the
quarry amongst enemy wire and his men followed and proceeded to mop up a large
number of the enemy who were in bivouacs there. He then observed an eneniv
machine-gun firing from the ventilator of a cellar through a gap in the wall of a house
about 20 yards away. W ithout hesitation and entirelv alone he scrambled up the edee
of the quarry, ran round the rear of the house, and,"entering from the far side shot
the enemy gunner through the ventilator of the cellar. He fired several more 'shots
into the cellar, then, seeing some enemy jumping out of the window of the house he
burst open the door, rushed to the head of the stairs leading into the cellar, and forced
62 of the enemy to surrender. He now found he was out of touch with the companv
on his left flank so went out alone and made a personal reconnaissance under heavV
fire, and succeeded m gaining touch with the left company, which had lost all its
ofhcers. Having returned to his company he placed a post on his left flank to ensure
Its safety and then reconnoitred and established two posts on his right flank All
this was done in the face of continuous machine-gun and shell fire. Throughout the
whole day he showed the most splendid qualities of courage and leadership and freely
exposed himself again and again with utter contempt of danger. Bv his example he
encouraged his men to keep up such constant fire on the enemy, who were reinforcing
m large numbers that not only did he levy a large toll of casualties on them, but was
responsible for destroying counter-attacks on his front. He personally inflicted 40
casualties on the enemy, exclusive of the large number of prisoners he captured.
Capt. (A/Lt.-Col.) Dudley Graham Johnson, D.S.O.. M.C
The South Wales Borderers, attached 2nd Battalion, The Royal
Sussex Regt.
For very conspicuous gallantry and leadership during the forcing of the Sambre
Canal on November 4th, 1918. The 2nd Infantry Brigade, of which the 2nd Battalion,
IheKoyal Sussex Regiment, formed part, was ordered to cross by the lock, south of
Cati Ion. Ihis was a very strong position and before the bridges could be placed over
the lock a steep bank leading to the lock and waterway about 100 yards this side of
the canal had to be crossed. It was also overlooked by houses on the far side of the
canal The assaulting platoons and parties of the Roval Engineers, carrvinT bridges
moved towards the canal at zero hour, from their hidden assembly area about 250
yards from the lock. On their arrival at the waterway they were thrown into confusion
by a heavy barrage and machine-gun fire, and heavy casualties were caused, the
remnants withdrawing from the barrage. At this moment Lt.-Col. Johnson,
conimanding 2nd Battalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment, came up to see the progress
made. He grasped the situation quickly, hurriedly collected men to man the bridges
26.
p p
290 APPENDIX E
and assist the Royal Engineers, and personallj' led the assault forward. In spite of
his efforts the heavy fire again broke up the assaulting and bridging parties. Owing
to the delay the situation at this moment was becoming serious, as the succeeding waves
were closing up and getting congested. Without any hesitation, Lt.-Col. Johnson
again reorganised the platoons and bridging parties, and again led them at the lock,
this time succeeding in effecting a crossing, after which all went well. During all
this time Lt.-Col. Johnson was under a very heavy fire, which, though it nearly
annihilated the assaulting columns, left him untouched. His conduct was a fine
example of great valour and remarkable coolness and intrepidity, and this, added to his
splendid leadership and the offensive spirit that he had inspired in his battalion, was
entirely responsible for the successful crossing. In addition to securing the success
of the right brigade of the First Division, there can be no doubt that the result of
Lt.-Col. Johnson's action very materially assisted the advance on the left flank of
the division, which might otherwise have been jeopardised.
27. No. 306122 Sgt. William Henry Johnson, l/5th Battalion, The
Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regt.), T.F.
(Worksop).
For most conspicuous gallantry at Ramicourt on October 3rd, 1918. When his
platoon was held up by a nest of enemy machine-guns at very close range, this non-
commissioned officer worked his way forward under very heavy fire, and single-handed
charged the post, bayoneting several gunners and capturing two machine-guns.
During this attack he was severely wounded by a bomb but continued to lead forward
his men. Shortly afterwards the line was again held up by machine-guns, and Sgt.
Johnson rushed forward alone and attacked the post single-handed. With wonderful
courage he bombed the garrison, put the guns out of action, and captured the teams.
He showed throughout the attack most exceptional gallantry and devotion to duty.
28. Lieut. William Donovan Joynt, 8th BattaUon, Austrahan Infantry,
AustraUan Imperial Force.
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack on Herleville
Wood, near Chuignes, near Peronne, on August 23rd, 1918. Early in the advance
Lieut. Joynt's company commander was killed. He immediately took charge of
the company and led them with courage and skill. A great deal of the success of the
operation in this portion of the sector was directly due to his magnificent work. WMien
the advance was commenced the battalion was moving into support to another
battalion. On approaching Herleville Wood the troops of the leading battalion lost
all their officers and became disorganised. Under very heavy fire and having no
leaders they appeared certain to be annihilated. Lieut. Joynt grasped the situation
and rushed forward in the teeth of very heavy machine-gun and artillery fire over
the open. He got the remaining men under control and worked them into a piece of
dead ground until he could re-form them. He manoeuvred his own men forward and
linked them up with the men of the other battalion. He then made a personal recon-
naissance and found that the fire from the wood was holding the whole advance up,
the troops on his flank suffering very heavy casualties. Dashing out in front of his
men he called them on, and by sheer force of example inspired them into a magnificent
frontal bayonet attack on the wood. The audacity of the move over the open
staggered the enemy, and Lieut. Joynt succeeded in penetrating the wood and working
through it. By bis leadership and courage a very critical situation was saved, and on
this officer rests to the greatest extent the success of the brigade's attack. When the
battalion on our left was held up on Plateau Wood and was suffering severe casualties,
Lieut. Joynt, with a small party of volunteers, worked right forward against heavy
opposition, and by means of hand-to-hand fighting forced his way round the rear of
the wood, penetrating it from that side and demoralising the enemy to such an extent
that a very stubborn and victorious defensive was changed into an abject surrender.
He was always in the hardest pressed parts of the line and seemed to bear a charmed
life. He was constantly ready to run any personal risks and to assist flank units.
APPENDIX E 291
He continually showed magnificent leadership and his example to his men had a won-
derful effect on them, causing them to follow him cheerfully in his most daring exploits.
He contmued to do magnificent work until he was badly wounded in the le^ by shell
fire.
29. 2nd Lieut. James Kirk, 10th (attached 2nd) BattaHon, The Man-
chester Regt. (Heaton Moor).
North of Ors on November 4th, 1918, whilst attempting to bridge the Oise Canal,
this officer showed most conspicuous bravery, absolute fearlessness, and supreme devo-
tion to duty. In order to cover the bridging of the canal he took a Lewis gun and four
magazines, and paddled himself across the canal on a raft under a most intense machine-
gun barrage. The bank bristled with machine-guns. He set up his Lewis gun at
10 yards range and fired off the whole of his ammunition. Further ammunition was
paddled across to him on the raft and he continued firing, covering the Royal Engineers
m their task. He was wounded in the arm and the face, but still fired continuously
from a most exposed position until he was shot through the head and fell dead over
his gun. It was his supreme contempt of danger and his magnificent self-sacrifice
which prevented many casualties, and enabled two platoons to cross the bridge before
It was destroyed. He deliberately faced certain death to save the men of his platoon,
and inspired them and all who saw him by the example of his most magnificent devotion.
30. No. 45062 L/Cpl. Albert Lewis, 6th (Service) BattaHon, The
Northamptonshire Regt. (Whitney, Hereford).
On the morning of September 18th, 1918, this non-commissioned officer was in
charge of a section which he had successfully kept together. He was on the right of
the line and the battalion started to advance to attack Ronssoy, where the east and
west barrage opened. The battalion advanced to a point where the enemy machine-
gun fire was so intense that it was practically impossible to get forward. The barrage
went on and the battalion was temporarily held up. This man, working with his
section on the right amongst the ruins, observed two enemy machine-guns opposite
hun enfilading the whole battalion. On his own initiative he crawled forAvard single-
handed, got within bombing range, and successfully bombed the teams manning the
enemy s guns. The enemy left their guns and ran out of their emplacement.
L/Cpl. Lewis thereupon used his rifle with good effect and the whole team surrendered.
He had Avounded six and captured four of the enemy, unwounded. By his courage
and deterniination in putting out of action two enemy machine-guns he undoubtedly
enabled the battalion to advance, and so contributed largely to the success which
followed. Later, on September 21st, 1918, during another attack, this non-
commissioned officer displayed splendid power of command. AVhen his company was
caught in the enemy barrage, he was the first to rush them through it until thcv"came
under heavy fire from enemy machine-guns, whereupon L/Cpl. Lewis immediately
began to place them out in shell holes. While doing this he was killed. Throughout
he showed a splendid disregard of danger, and his leadership at a critical period was
beyond all praise.
31. No. 2358 Sgt. Albert David Lowerson, 21st BattaHon, Australian
Infantry, Austrahan Imperial Force.
At Mont St. Quentin, north of Peronne, on September 1st, 1918, this non-
conimissioned oflftcer displayed courage and tactical skUl of the very highest order
during the attack on this village. Very strong opposition was met with early in the
attack and every foot of ground was stubbornly contested by the enemy located in
very strong positions. This non-commissioned officer's example during "the fiwhtin"
was of the greatest value. He moved about, regardless of the hea%T enemy machine-
gun hre, directing his men, encouraging them to still greater effort, and" finally led
them on to the objective. On reaching the objective, he saw that the left attacking
party had not met with success, and that the attack was held up by an enemy strong
292 APPENDIX E
point heavily manned with 12 machine-guns. Under the heaviest sniping and
machine-gun fire, Sgt. Lowerson ralhed seven men around him into a storming party,
and deployed them to attack the post from both flanks, one party of three being killed
immediately. He himself then rushed the strong post, and, with effective bombing,
inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, and captured the post containing 12 machine-
guns and 30 prisoners. Though severely wounded in the right thigh, he refused to
leave the front line until the prisoners had been dispatched to the rear, and the organisa-
tion and consolidation of the post by our men had been completed. When he saw
that the position was thoroughly secure, he returned to the rear, but refused to leave
the battalion, until forced to evacuate two days later by the seriousness of his wound.
This act was the culminating point of a series of most gallant performances by this
non-commissioned officer during the fighting extending over a week. His leadership
and example had a continual influence on the men serving under him, whilst his prompt
and effective action at a critical juncture allowed the forward movement to be carried
on without delay, thus ensuring the success of the attack.
32. Lieut. Lawrence Dominic McCarthy, 16th Battalion, Australian
Infantry, Australian Imperial Force.
This officer is especially brought to notice for his wonderful gallantry, initiative,
and leadership on the morning of August 23rd, 1918, when an attack was being made
near Madame Wood, west of Vermandovillers (north of Chaulnes). The objectives
of this battalion were attained without serious opposition. The battalion on the left
flank was less fortunate. Here several well-posted machine-gun posts were holding
up the attack and heavy fire was being brought to bear on our left flank. When
Lieut. McCarthy realised the situation he at once engaged the nearest machine-gun
post ; but still the attacking troops failed to get forward. This officer then determined
to attack the nearer post. Leaving his men to continue the fire fight, he, with two
others, dashed across the open and dropped into a disused trench which had been
blocked. One of his two men was killed whilst doing this. He was now right under
the block over which the enemy machine-gun was firing. The presence of head cover
prevented the use of bombs. He therefore tunnelled a hole through the bottom of
the block, through which he inserted his head and one arm. He at once shot dead
the two men firing the gun. He then crawled through the hole he had made, and by
himself charged down the trench. He threw his limited number of Mills bombs
among the German garrison and inflicted some more casualties. He then came in
contact with two German officers, who fired on him with their revolvers. One of these
he shot dead with his revolver, the other he seriously wounded. He then charged
down the trench using his revolver and throwing enemy stick bombs, and captured
three more enemy machine-guns. At this stage, some seven hundred yards from his
starting point, he was joined by the non-commissioned officer whom he had out-
distanced when he crawled through the hole in the trench block mentioned above.
Together they continued to bomb up the trench, until touch was established with the
Lancashire Fusiliers, and in the meanwhile yet another machine-gun had been captured.
A total of five machine-guns and 50 prisoners (37 unwounded and 13 wounded) was
captured, while Lieut. McCarthy during his most amazing and daring feat had, single-
handed, killed 20 of the enemy. Having cleared up a dangerous situation, he proceeded
to establish a garrison in the line. Whilst doing this he saw a number of the enemy
getting away from neighbouring trenches. He at once seized a Lewis gun and inflicted
further casualties on them. The determined and daring conduct of this gallant officer
saved a critical situation, prevented many casualties, and was mainly, if not entirely,
responsible for the final objective being taken.
33. No. 6939 Pte. Robert Mactier, 23rd Battalion, Australian Infantry,
Australian Imperial Force.
On the morning of September 1st, 1918, during the operation entailing the capture
of Mont St. Quentin, this man stands out for the greatest bravery and devotion to
duty. Fifteen minutes before zero two bombing patrols were sent to clear up several
APPENDIX E 293
enemy strong points close to our line, but they met with very stubborn resistance and
no success, and the battalion was unable to move on to its jumping off trench. Mactier,
single-handed and in daylight, then jumped out of the trench from the leading company,
rushed past the block, closed with and killed the machine-gun garrison of eight men
with his revolver and bombs, and threw the enemy machine-gun over the pirapet.
He rushed forward another twenty yards and jumped into another strong point held
by a garrison of six men, who immediately surrendered. Continuing to the next
block through the trench, an enemy gun, which had been enfilading our flank advancing
troops, was swung on to him, but he jumped out of the trench into the open and
disposed of this third post and gun crew by bombing them from the rear. Before he
could get into this trench he was killed by enemy machine-gun at close range. In
the three posts which Mactier rushed 15 of the enemy were found killed and 30 taken
prisoners. It was entirely due to this man's exceptional bravery ?.nd determination
that the battalion was able to move on to its jumping-off trench and carry out the
successful operation of capturing the village of Mont St. Quentin a few hours later.
34. Lieut. (A/Lt.-Col.) James Neville IMarshall, M.C, 1st Battalion,
Irish Guards (attached 16th (Service) Battalion, The Lancashire
Fusiliers).
For most conspicuous gallantry, determination, and leadership in the attack on
the Sambre-Oise Canal near Catillon, on November 4th, 1918. A partly constructed
bridge composed of small cork rafts had been thrown over the canal by the Royal
Engineers and Pioneers, but before the advanced troops of Lt.-Col. Marshall's
battalion could cross, the bridge came under a concentrated fire of artillery and machine-
guns and was broken. On hearing of this Lt.-Col. Marshall at once came up,
took charge of the situation, and organised parties of volunteers for the repair of the
bridge. All the first party of volunteers were quickly killed or wounded, but so great
was the personal example of the commanding officer that other volunteers instantly
took their places. Throughout the repair of the bridge Lt.-Col. Marshall, standing
on the bank, encouraged and assisted the men under a hurricane of heavy fire without
any regard to his own safety. When the bridge was repaired Lt.-Col. Marshall
attempted to rush across at the head of his battalion and was killed while so doing.
The forcing of the line of the canal was of vital importance, and the gallantry displayed
by all ranks at this spot was largely due to the personal example given by Lt.-Col.
Marshall. He had been wounded ten times during the war and fell in the last great
fight in which the Division was engaged.
35. Lieut. Joseph Maxwell, M.C, D.C.M., 18th Battalion, Australian
Infantry, Australian Imperial Force.
On October 3rd, 1918, he took part as a platoon commander in an attack on the
Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line near Estrees, north of St. Quentin. His company com-
mander was severely wounded soon after the jump off, and Lieut. Maxwell at once
took charge of the company. When the enemy wire was reached, they were met
by a hail of machine-gun fire and suffered considerable casualties, including all other
officers of the company. The wire at this point was six belts thick, each belt being
20 to 25 feet wide. Lieut. Maxwell pushed forward single-handed through the wire,
and attacked the most dangerous machine-gun. He killed three of the crew and
captured the remaining four men in the post together with a machine-gun. His com-
pany followed him through the wire and captured the trenches forming their objective.
Later, it was noticed that the company on his left was held up in the wire by a very
strong force on the left flank of the battalion. He at once organised a party and moved
to the left to endeavour to attack the enemy from the rear. Heavy machine-gun fire
met them. Lieut. Maxwell again dashed forward single-handed at the foremost
machine-gun, and with his revolver shot five of its crew, so silencing the gun. Owing
to the work of this party, the left company was then able to work a small force through
the wire and eventually to occupy the objective and mop up the trenches. In the
fighting prior to the mopping up, an English-speaking prisoner who was captured
294 APPENDIX E
stated that the remainder of the enemy were willing to -surrender. Lieut. Maxwell
and two men with this prisoner, walked to a post containing more than 20 Germans,
who, instead of surrendering, seized and disarmed them. Lieut. Maxwell waited his
chance and then with an automatic pistol, which he had concealed in his box respirator,
shot two of the enemy and with the two men escaped. They were pursued by rifle
fire, and one man wounded. However, Lieut. Maxwell organised a small party at
once, attacked, and captured the post. Throughout the day, this young officer set a
most remarkable example of personal bravery, tempered with excellent judgment and
aggressive decision. There is no doubt that, had it not been for his personal dash,
the operation could not have succeeded as quickly as it did. He handled a most
involved situation with very fine leadership.
36. No. 17324 Pte. Francis George Miles, l/5th Battalion, The
Gloucestershire Regt., T.F. (Coleford, Gloucestershire).
For conspicuous gallantry and splendid initiative in attack. On October 23rd,
1918, during the advance against the Bois I'Eveque, his company was held up by a
line of enemy machine-guns in the sunken road near the Moulin J. Jacques. Pte.
Miles alone, and on his own initiative, made his way forward for a distance of 150
yards under exceptionally heavy fire, located one machine-gun, and shot the man
firing the gun. He then rushed the gun and kicked it over, thereby putting it out of
action. He then observed another gun firing from 100 yards further forward. He
again advanced alone, shot the machine-gunner, rushed the gun, and captured the
team of eight. Finally, he stood up and beckoned on his company, who, following
his signals, were enabled to work round the rear of the line, and to capture 16 machine-
guns, one officer, and 50 other ranks. The courage, initiative, and entire disregard
of personal safety shown by this very gallant private soldier enabled his company to
advance at a time when any delay would have seriously jeopardised the whole operation
in which it was engaged.
37. No. 823028 Cpl. Harry Garnett Bedford Miner, 58th Battahon,
Canadian Infantry, 2nd Central Ontario Regt.
For valour during the operations against the German lines on August 8th, 1918.
Cpl. Miner was with his company in the initial attack on the German outpost line.
He received a severe wound in the head and shoulder at the commencement of the
operations but refused to withdraw. He then rushed a German machine-gun post
single-handed, killed the entire crew, and turned the gun, which he had captured, on
the enemj-. Afterwards he, with two others, attacked another German machine-gun
post and succeeded in putting the gun out of action. He then rushed a German bomb-
ing post, which was about twelve strong, single-handed. He bayoneted two of the
garrison and put the remainder to flight. At this post he was mortally wounded, by
German cylindrical stick bombs. He died of wounds the same day, in the Casualty
Clearing Station.
38. No. 1717 Pte. John Ryan, 55th Battalion, AustraUan Infantry,
Australian Imperial Force.
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty, and for saving a very dangerous
situation in particularly gallant circumstances during an attack against the Hindenburg
defences on September 30th, 1918. In the initial assault on the enemy's positions
this soldier went forward with great dash and determination, and was one of the first
men of his company to reach the trench which was their objective. Seeing him rush
in with his bayonet with such exceptional skill and daring, his comrades were inspired
and followed his example. Although the enemy shell and machine-gun fire was
extremely heavy, the enemy trench garrison was soon overcome. In the assault the
attacking troops were weakened by casualties, and, as they were too few to cover the
whole front of attack, a considerable gap was left between the 55th Battalion and the
unit on its left flank. The enemy eoimter-attacked soon after the objective was reached,
APPENDIX E 295
and a few succeeded in infiltrating through the gap and taking up a position of cover in
rear of our men, where they commenced bombing operations. The section of the
trench occupied by Pte. Ryan and his comrades was now under fire from front and
rear, and for a time it seemed that the enemy was certain to force his way through.
The situation was critical and necessitated prompt action by someone in authority.
Pte. Ryan found that there were no officers or non-commissioned officers near, they
had become casualties in the assault. Appreciating the situation at once, he organised
the few men nearest him, and led them out to attack the enemy with bomb and bayonet.
Some of his party fell victims to the enemy's bombs, and he finally dashed into the
enemy position of cover with only three men. The enemy were three times their
number, but by skilful bayonet work, they succeeded in killing the first three Germans
on the enemy's flank. Moving along the embankment, Pte. Ryan alone rushed the
remainder of the enemy with bombs. While thus engaged he fell wounded, but his
dashing bombing assault drove the enemy clear out of our positions. Those who were
not killed or wounded by his bombs fell victims to our Lewis gunners as they retired
across " No Man's Land." A particularly dangerous situation had been saved by
this gallant soldier, w-hose display of determined bravery and initiative was witnessed
by the men of the two attacking battalions, who, inspired and urged by it, fought
skilfully and bravely for two days.
39. No. 6594 Sgt. Gerald Sexton, 13th Battalion, Australian Infantry,
Australian Imperial Force.
In the attack near Le Verguier, north-west of St. Quentin, on September 18th,
1918, Sgt. Sexton displayed the most conspicuous bravery and performed deeds
which, apart from their gallant nature, were in a great measure responsible for the
battalion's success. On the southern edge of the village of Le Verguier the enemy
fought very hard, and serious opposition had to be crushed. During the whole period
of the advance Sgt. Sexton was to the fore dealing with enemy machine-guns by firing
from the hip as he advanced, rushing enemy posts, and performing feats of bravery
and endurance which are better appreciated when one realises that all the time he
fired his Lewis gun from the hip without faltering, or for a moment taking cover.
Immediately the attack began, Sgt. Sexton's Lewis gun section was confronted by an
enemy machine-gun. He called out to his section to follow, rushed the machine-gun,
and killed the crew. He then called out to the rest of the company to follow, but
they had not gone far before they encountered some bombers and riflemen about 70
yards in front of the company. Sexton rushed the trench, firing his gun from the
hip, and killed or took prisoner all the members of the post. Continuing, he entered
a copse and killed or took prisoner another part}- of the enemy. The advance con-
tinued over the ridge at Le Verguier to where Sexton was met by Lieut. Price, who
pointed out a party of the enemy manning a bank and a field gun in action which was
causing casualties and holding up a company. There was also a trench mortar in
action. Sgt. Sexton did not wait, but firing a few short bursts as he advanced, and
calling out to his section to follow, rushed down the bank and killed the gunners on
the field gun. Dashing out on to a flat under fire from two hostile machine-guns
directed on him, he killed 12 more of the enemy. Paying no heed to the machine-gun
fire he returned to the bank and after firing down some dug-outs induced about 30 of the
enemy to surrender. Owing to his action the company on the left of the battalion
was able to continue the advance, where they had been definitely held up and were
suffering from the effects of the field gun. When the advance was continued from the
first to the second objective, the company was again held up b\- two machine-guns
on the right and one on the left. In conjunction with a platoon, Sexton engaged the
machine-gim on the left, firing all the while from the upright position, a fearless figure
which, according to eye-witnesses, inspired everyone. (To have taken cover would
have been more prudent, but Sexton realised that prompt action was essential and
did not wait to lie dowTi.) Silencing this gun he turned his attention to the two
machine-guns on the right and silenced them. He then moved forward into a trench,
killing quite a number of the enemy, and advancing along a sap took a few prisoners.
Further on he was responsible for a few more small posts. When the final objective
was reached he was given a responsible post on the left of his company, whence he
296 APPENDIX E
engaged a machine-gun which was firing across the company front, and thus enabled
his company to dig in. This completed, he went forward down a sunken road and
captiu'ed several more prisoners.
40. No. 475212 Sgt. Robert Spall, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light
Infantry, Eastern Ontario Regt.
On the night of August 12th to 13th, 1918, near Parvillers, during an enemy
counter-attack which cut off the whole of his platoon, this non-commissioned officer
took a Lewis gun and standing on the parapet fired upon the advancing enemy, inflicting
most severe casualties. He then came down the trench directing the men into a sap
seventy-five yards from the enemy. Picking up another Lewis gun he again climbed
the parapet and with his fire held up the enemy. While holding up the enemy at this
position he was killed. This non-commissioned oflicer deliberately gave his life in
order to extricate his platoon from a most difficult situation, and it was owing to his
bravery that the platoon was saved.
41. No. 506 Sgt. Percy Clyde Statton, M.M., 40th BattaUon, Aus-
tralian Infantry, AustraUan Imperial Force.
For most conspicuous gallantry and initiative in action near Proyart on August
12th, 1918. The platoon commanded by Sgt. Statton reached its objective, but
the remainder of the battalion was held up by heavy machine-gun fire. He skilfully
engaged two machine-gun posts with Lewis gun fire, enabling the remainder of his
own battalion to advance. The advance of the battalion on his left had been brought
to a standstill by the heavy enemy machine-gun fire, and the first of our assaulting
detachments to reach the machine-gun posts were put out of action in taking the first
gun. Armed only with a revolver, in broad daylight, Sgt. Statton at once rushed
four enemy machine-gun posts in succession, disposing of two of them and killing five
of the enemy. The remaining two posts retired and were wiped out by Lewis gun fire.
His act had a very inspiring effect on the troops who had been held up ; they cheered
him as he returned. By this daring exploit he enabled the attacking troops to gain
their objective. Later in the evening, under hea\'y machine-gun fire he went out
again and brought in two badly wounded men. Sgt. Statton set a magnificent example
of quick decision and determined gallantry.
42. Lieut. James Edward Tait, M.C, 78th Battalion, Canadian
Infantry, Manitoba Regt.
For bravery in the face of the enemy in the " Llandovery Castle " operations in
front of Amiens, August 8th to August 12th, 1918. On August 8th, in the first phase
of the attack, the advance was checked by a terrific machine-gun fire from Beaucourt
Wood. Lieut. Tait rallied his company and led them forward with consummate
skill and dash under a hail of bullets. One cleverly concealed machine-gun continued
to cause us many casualties. Lieut. Tait, taking a rifle and bayonet from a casualty,
dashed forward alone and killed the German gunner single-handed. Inspired by his
example his men rushed the wood, which yielded 12 machine-guns and 20 prisoners,
besides many slain. His glorious action cleared the way for his battalion to advance.
Again, in the second phase of the battle when the enemy counter-attacked our positions
in Hallu under intense artillery bombardment, he displayed outstanding courage and
leadership and continued to direct and encourage his men after he was hit by a shell,
until his death.
43. Lieut. Edgar Thomas Towner, M.C, 2nd Australian Machine Gun
Battalion, Australian Imperial Force.
On September 1st, 1918, in the attack on Mont St. Quentin, near Peronne, this
officer was in charge of four Vickers guns operating on a front of 1,500 yards. During
the early stages of the advance an enemy machine-gun was causing casualties to our
APPENDIX E 297
advancing infantry. Locating the gun, Lieut. Towner dashed ahead alone and
succeeded in killing the crew with his revolver, capturing the gun, and then, by turning
it against the enemy, inflicted heavy casualties on them. Advancing then past a
copse from which the enemy were firing, he brought his gun into action, placing his
fire behind the enemy and cutting them off. On their attempting to retire before the
advancing infantry, and finding they were prevented by this machine-gun fire, the
party of 25 Germans surrendered. He then reconnoitred alone over open ground
exposed to heavy machine-gun and snipers' fire, and by his energy, foresight, and the
promptitude with which he brought fire to bear on further enemy groups, enabled
the infantry to reach a sunken road. On moving his guns up to the sunken road, he
found himself short of ammunition, so went back across the open under heavy fire
and obtained a German gun and brought it and boxes of ammunition into the sunken
road. Here he mounted and fired the gun in full view of the enemy, causing them to
retire further and enabling infantry on the flank, who were previously held up, to
advance. Enemy machine-gunners having direct observation flicked the earth
round and under his gun, and played a tattoo along the top of the bank. Though
one bullet went into his helmet and inflicted a gaping scalp wound he continued firing.
Subsequently he refused to go out to have his wound attended to, as the situation was
critical and his place was with his men. Later in the day the infantry were obliged
to retire slightly, and one gun crew with the first wave having become casualties, the
gun was left behind. Lieut. Towner seeing this dashed back over the open, carried
the gun back in spite of terrific fire and brought it into action again. He continued
to engage the enemy wherever they appeared, and put an enemy machine-gun out of
action. During the following night he insisted on doing his tour of duty along with
the other oflicers, and his coolness and cheerfulness set an example which had a great
effect on the men. To steady and calm the men of a small detached outpost he
crawled out among the enemy posts to investigate. He remained out about an hour,
though enemy machine-guns fired continuously on the sector and the Germans were
moving about him. He moved one gun up in support of the infantry post and
patrolled the communication saps which ran off this post into the Germanline during
the remainder of the night. Next morning after his guns had assisted in dispersing
a large party of the enemy, he was led away utterly exhausted, 30 hours after being
wounded. The resourcefulness and courage of this officer undoubtedly saved a very
difficult situation and was a very large factor in the success of the attack.
44. Capt. (A/Lt.-Col.) Bernard William Vann, M.C, late l/8th
Battalion, The Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire
Regt.), T.F., attached l/6th Battahon, The Sherwood Foresters
(Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regt.), T.F.
For most conspicuous gallantry, devotion to duty, and fine leadership during the
attack at Bellenglise and Lehaucourt on September 29th, 1918. This officer showed
very great courage and skill in leading his battalion across the Canal du Nord through
a very thick fog, and in spite of heavy fire from field and machine-guns. On reaching
the high ground above Bellenglise, the whole attack was held up by artillery fire from
the front and by very hea^y machine-gun and rifle fire from the right flank. Realising
that everything depended on the advance going forward with the barrage. Col. Vann
rushed up to the firing line and with the greatest gallantry led the whole line forward.
By his prompt action and absolute contempt for danger the whole situation was changed,
the men were encouraged, and the line swept forward. Before the final assault he
completely reorganised the whole line and personally led one company from one
flank to the other in face of the heaviest machine-gun fire. Later, by himself, he rushed
the team of a field gun firing at point blank range. He shot with his revolver one of
the gunners who was on the point of firing and clubbed two others. The success of
the day was in no small degree due to splendid gallantry and fine leadership displayed
by this officer. Col. Vann was killed near Ramicourt on October 3rd, 1918, when
leading his battalion in a further attack. This very gallant officer had been wounded
on six previous occasions. He invariably showed the utmost contempt for danger
and, by his splendid example, largely inspired his men with his o^nti magnificent spirit.
This gallant officer was a clergyman of the Church of England.
Q Q
298 APPENDIX E
45. Major Blair Anderson Wark, D.S.O., 32nd Battalion, Australian
Infantry, Australian Imperial Force.
During the period September 29th to October 1st, 1918, in the operations against
the Hindenburg Line at Bellicourt, and the advance through Nauroy, Etricourt,
Magny-la-Fosse, and Joncourt, Major Wark, in command of the 32nd BattaHon, dis-
played most conspicuous gallantry, and set a fine example of bravery, energy, coolness,
and control under extremely difficult conditions. On September 29th under heavy
artillery and machine-gun fire at very close range from all sides and in a dense fog
Major Wark, finding that the situation was critical, moved quickly forward alone, and
obtained sufficient information regarding the situation in front to be able to lead his
command forward. The American troops, which had formed the first waves of the
attack, were by this time held up and, having suffered heavy losses, were considerably
disorganised, Major Wark quickly organised 200 of them, attached them to his leading
companies and pressed forward. By his prompt action in the early stages of the battle
he restored the situation and enabled the supporting troops to advance. Still moving
fearlessly at the head of his leading companies, and at most times far out in advance
attended only by a runner, he cheered on his men, and_they swept through the Hinden-
burg defences towards Nauroy. Pushing quickly through Nauroy and mopping up
the southern portion of the village, the process yielding 50 prisoners, the battalion
swung towards Etricourt. Still leading his assaulting companies, he observed a
battery of 77 mm. guns firing point blank into his rear companies and causing heavy
casualties. Calling on a few of his men to follow him, he rushed the battery, capturing
the four guns and ten of the crew ; the remainder of the crew fled or were killed. Moving
rapidly forward with only two non-commissioned officers, he surprised and captured
50 Germans near Magny-la-Fosse. Quickly seizing this opportunity, he pushed one
company forward through the village and made good the position. Having captured
his objective for the day, he made personal reconnaissance to see that his flanks were
safe and found his command in a very difficidt and dangerous position, his left flank
being exposed to the extent of 3,000 yards on account of the 31st Battalion not being
able to advance. After a strenuous day's fighting he set about the selection and
reorganisation of a new position, effected a junction with the British troops on the
right and 31st Battalion on the left, and made his line secure. At 6 a.m. on September
30th he again led his command forward to allow of the troops on the right being able
to advance. The men were tired and had suffered heavily, but he personally led them,
and his presence amongst them inspired them to further efforts. On October 1st,
1918, his battalion was ordered to advance at very short notice. He gave his orders
for the attack, and led his troops forward in person. A nest of machine-guns was
encountered, causing heavy casualties to his men. Without hesitation and regardless
of risk, he dashed forward practically into the muzzles of the guns, and, under excep-
tionally heavy fire, he silenced them, killing or capturing the entire crews. Joncourt
and Mill Bidge were then quickly captured and his line consolidated. His men were
practically exhausted after the three days' heavy fighting, but he moved amongst
them from post to post, across country swept by heavy and continuous shell and
machine-gun fire at point blank range, urged them on to further efforts, and the line
was made secure. Throughout he displayed the greatest courage and devotion to
duty, coupled with great tact and skill. His work together with the reports based on
his own personal observation which he forwarded, were invaluable to the brigade.
It is beyond doubt that the success achieved by the brigade during the heavy fighting
on September 29th and 30th, and October 1st, was due to this officer's gallantry, deter-
mination, skill, and great courage.
46. Temp. Capt. (A/Major) Arnold Horace Santo Waters, D.S.O.,
M.C., 218th Field Company, Royal Engineers.
For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty on November 4th, 1918,
near Ors. This officer was in command of the field company whose task it was to
throw a bridge across the Oise-Sambre Canal. As soon as the operations began, the
enemy swept the canal with artillery and machine-gun fire, the latter being at point
blank range, smashing the bridge that was being commenced and inflicting heavy
APPENDIX E 299
casualties on the building party. Major Waters, hearing that all his officers were
killed or wounded, advanced through the heavy enemy artillery barrage, and personally
supervised the completion of the bridge. He was working on the cork float in the
canal under fire from enemy machine-guns on the opposite bank only 30 yards distant,
and the bullets were striking sparks from the wire binding the floats. Timbers that
he was actually handling were struck repeatedly and it appeared impossible that he
could escape being killed. He completed the bridge himself after all his men had
been killed or wounded or had collapsed from gas poisoning. Having finished the
task he returned to our side of the canal and led the first party of infantry over the
bridge. That the attempt was successful was entirely due to his extraordinary bravery
and example.
47. No. 1153 Pte. (L/Cpl.) Lawrence Carthage Weathers, 43rd
Battalion, Australian Infantry, Australian Imperial Force.
On September 2nd, 19IS, during operations north of Peronne, L/Cpl. Weathers
was one of an advanced bombing party operating well forward of our attacking troops.
Just before the attack reached its final objective it was held up by the enemy, who
occupied a trench in great numbers. After an hour's continuous fighting L/Cpl.
Weathers went forward alone in the face of heavy enemy fire and located a large
body of Germans. He immediately attacked them with bombs and killed the senior
officer ; then made his way back to our lines, and, securing a further supply of bombs
and taking three men with him, he went forward and again attacked under very heavy
fire. On reaching the enemy position he jumped up on to the parapet of the trench
and threw bombs amongst the Boches. He then signalled for his comrades to come
up, and the remainder of the enemy, seeing this, surrendered. When counted, the
number of prisoners totalled 180 and tliree machine-guns. The bravery of this non-
commissioned officer cleared a very difficult situation and the fearless way in which
he attacked confused the enemy, and resulted in the successful capture of the final
objective with a minimum number of casualties to our troops.
48. Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) Ferdinand Maurice Felix West, M.C,
The Royal Munster Fusiliers (S.R.) and The Royal Air Force, 8th
Squadron.
For unparalleled pluck and endurance. This officer has flown in France for over
five hundred hours. On August 8th, 1918, he had a bad accident in the fog. In
spite of this he went out on tank contact patrol on August 9th. He scattered by
machine-gun fire enemy infantry, who were surrounding four of our tanks. His
machine was riddled, but he brought it down safely in our front line, when he proceeded
at once to the tank company commander and reported the situation. On August
10th, 1918, he went far over the enemy lines, and fired from a low altitude at enemy
troops in Roye, when he was attacked by seven enemy aircraft. At the outset of the
fight one of his legs was severed by an explosive bullet, and fell into the controls, from
which he lifted it, and, although wounded in the other leg, he manoeuvred his machine
so that his observer was able to get several good bursts in to the enemy machines and
drive them off, and then by sheer grit and determination he brought his machine over
our lines, and safely landed himself and his observer. When he regained consciousness,
he insisted on writing his report. The valour displayed by this officer has throughout
been a magnificent example to his flight, which he has inspired with his devotion,
courage, and power of endurance.
49. No. 3244 Pte. James Park Woods, 48th Battalion, AustraUan
Infantry, Australian Imperial Force.
For conspicuous gallantry and initiative during the operations near Le Verguier,
north-west of St. Qucntin, on September 18th, 1918. Pte. Woods was one of a party
of three men sent out to patrol the right flank of the battalion, which was at that time
in the air. He discovered an enemj' strong point garrisoned by about 25 men with
300 APPENDIX E
four heavy and two light machine-guns. This strong point, which was at the junction
of four fire trenches covering the approaches to BellengHse, was so situated that it
commanded the greater part of our position while, if in our hands, it would give us
observation over the whole of the canal defences. Pte. Woods, appreciating the
great importance and the necessity for its immediate capture, attacked it at once.
He wounded one man with his bayonet, captured another, and drove out the remainder
of the garrison. One of the patrol was now wounded, and Pte. Woods, although
slightly gassed, defended the post with the help of the remaining man. When the
enemy discovered that they were only opposed by two men they attempted to
recapture the strong point. At least thirty men took part in this counter-attack,
advancing down three of the trenches and over the open. Pte. Woods was thus
attacked from both flanks and from the front. He jumped upon the parapet and,
although exposed to heavy fire from machine-guns, rifles, and bombs, opened fire on
the advancing enemy. By this means he inflicted several casualties, and, by his
dogged determination held off the enemy until help arrived, when the attack was
repulsed with hea-vy loss. The capture of the strong point enabled the battalion to
gain touch with the troops on its flank. The initiative, bravery, and grasp of the
situation displayed by Pte. Woods resulted in the capture of a very important position
at comparatively slight cost. He set a splendid example of courage and determination
throughout the whole operation.
50. No. 424252 Sgt. Raphael Louis Zengel, M.M., 5th Battalion,
Canadian Infantry, Saskatchewan Regt.
For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during an attack made
on the enemy's positions east of Warvillers on August 9th, 1918. This non-
commissioned officer with his platoon was protecting the battalion right flank. He
was leading his platoon gallantly forward to the attack, but had not gone far when
he realised that a gap had occurred on his flank, and that an enemy machine-gun was
firing at close range into the advancing line. He immediately grasped the situation,
and, rushing forward about 200 yards ahead of the platoon, tackled the machine-gun
emplacement, killing the officer who was directing the fire of this gun, killing the
machine-gun operator, and wounding another of the crew, the remainder beating a
hurried retreat. By his boldness and quick action, he undoubtedly saved the lives
of many of his comrades. Sgt. Zengel's platoon was now in advance of our general
line, and came under the fire of one of our own tanks. He immediately went towards
the tank, signalling that his party were friends and directed it towards the enemy's
strong points. Later, when the battalion was held up by heavy machine-gun fire,
he took up a most advantageous position on the crest of a mound, where he could
obtain observation of the various enemy machine-gun emplacements and strong-
points, and direct destructive fire on the occupants. While he was doing this an enemy
shell exploded a short distance away from him, rendering him unconscious for a few
minutes. When he recovered, however, he picked up his rifle, and again directed
harassing fire on the enemy. This non-commissioned officer showed the highest
qualities of leadership, and was responsible for the saving of many of his comrades'
lives. His work throughout the attack was excellent, and by his utter disregard
for personal safety, and by the confidence he inspired in all ranks, he greatly assisted
in bringing the attack to a successful issue.
APPENDIX F
The Fourth Army Orders of Battle for August 8th,
September 29th, axd November 4th, 1918.
Explanation of Abbreviations.
A. A. ... ... ... Anti-Aircraft.
A.T. Co. ... ... Army Troops Company.
Aux. ... ... ... Auxiliary.
E. and M. Co. ... Electrical and Mechanical Company.
Howr. ... ... ... Howitzer.
M.T. Co. ... ... Mechanical Transport Company.
Pdr. ... ... ... Poxinder.
(T) Co.... ... ... TunneUing Company.
Composition of Horse, Field, and Gabkison ABTrLi.ERT Brigades.
^ Horse Artillery Brigade, with Cavalry Divisions.
3-13 pdr. Batteries (18-13 pdra.).
Field Artillery Brigade (18 guns a7id 6 howitzers).
3-18 pdr. Batteries (18-18 pdra.).
1-4-5' Howr. Battery (6 howrs.).
S' Howitzer Brigade (24 howitzers).
3-6' Howr. Batteries (18 howrs.).
1-8' Howr. Battery (6 howrs.).
9-2' Howitzer Brigade (24 howitzers).
3-6' Howr. Batteries (18 howrs.).
1-9-2' Howr. Battery (6 howrs.).
Mobile Brigade (12 guns and 12 hountzers).
2-60 pdr. Batteries (12 guns).
2-6' Howr. Batteries (12 howrs.).
Mixed Brigade (12 guns and 24 howitzers).
2-60 pdr. Batteries (12 gun-s).
2-6' Howr. Batteries (12 howrs.).
1-8' Howr. Battery (6 howrs.).
1-9-2' Howr. Battery (6 howrs.).
A. Fourth Army. Gen. Sir H
M.G.G.S.
D.A. and Q.M.G.
G.O.C., R.A. . .
C.E
D.M.S
D.D.S. and T. . .
Chief Signal Officer
Labour Commandant
D.D.O.S.
D.D. Remounts
D.D.V.S.
August 8th.
S. Rawlinson, Bart., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
Maj.-Gen. A. A. Montgomery, C.B.
Maj.-Gen. H. C. Holman, C.JB., C.M.G.. D.S.O.
Maj.-Gen. C. E. D. Budworth, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.
Maj.-Gen. R. U. H. Buckland, C.B., C.M.G.
Maj.-Gen. Sir M. W. O'Keefe, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Brig.-Gen. E. C. F. GUlespie, C.B., C.M.G.
Col. R. G. Earle, D.S.O.
Col. T. Ogilvie, C.M.G.
Col. R. S. Hamilton, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Col. J. W. Yardlev, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Col. W. J. Tatam, C.M.G.
Army Troops.
5th Brigade, R.A.F.^ Brig.-Gen. L. E. O. Charlton, C.M.G., D.S.O.
15//) Corps Wing.^ Lieut.-Col. J. A. Chamier, D.S.O., O.B.E.
8 Squadron (A. W. B.) (working with Tank Corps).
9 Squadron (R.E. 8).
' Army Brigades, R.H.A. attached to the Fourth Army during the period August 8th to November 11th
were composed of 18 pdr. batteries, with the exception of the 16th Brigade which was organised similarly
to the R.H.A. Brigades with Cavalry Divisions.
• The 9th Brigade R.A.F. from General Headquarters assisted the R.A.F. of the Fourth Army during
this operation.
• The other four squadrons of the Corps Wing are shown with the Corps they worked with.
301
302 APPENDIX F
22nd Army Wing. Lieut.-Col. T. A. E. Cairnes, D.S.O.
24, 41, and 84 (S.E. 5), 23 (Dolphin), 80, 201, and 209 (Camel), 48 (Bristol
Fighter) Squadrons.
83 (F.E. 2B), 101 (F.E. 2B), 205 (D.H. 4) Bombing Squadrons.
5th Balloon Wing. Lieut.-Col. W. F. MacNeece, D.S.O.
4th Aircraft Park. 4th Air Ammunition Column. 4th Reserve Lorry Park.
Artillery.
Half 471 Siege Battery, R.G.A. (14' gun on railway mounting).
Half 543 Siege Battery, R.G.A. (12" gun on railway mounting).
A.A. Defence. Lieut.-Col. R. Bruce Hav, D.S.O.
" F," " G," " P," and " Q " A.A. Batteries.
50th (Field Searchlight) Co., R.E.
6, 7, 16, 17, 29, and 30 A.A. Searchlight Sections, R.E.
No. 6 A.A. Company.
5th Field Survey Battalion. Lieut.-Col. F. B. Legh, M.C.
13, 14, 15 and 24 Observation Groups.
" A," " B," " G," " K," and " O " Sound Ranging Sections.
Fourth Army Signal Company.
43, 45, 48, and 53 (Motor) Airline Sections.
" BL " and " BR " Cable Sections.
No. 4 Telegraph Construction Co., R.E.
No. 4 Signal Construction Co., R.E.
213 A.T. Co., R.E.
254 (T.) Co., R.E.
353 E. and M. Co.
No. 3 Water Boring Section.
No. 6 Pontoon Park.
4th Army Troops M.T. Co.
B. Cavalry Corps. Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. T. McM. Kavanagh, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.
B.G.G.S Brig.-Gen. A. F. Home, C.M.G., D.S.O.
D.A. and Q.M.G. . . Brig.-Gen. J. C. G. Longmore, C.M.G., D.S.O.
G.O.C., R.A Brig.-Gen. H. S. Seligman, D.S.O.
C.R.E Lieut.-Col. W. H. Evans, D.S.O.
6 Squadron, R.A.F. (R.E. 8).
3rd Tank Brigade. Brig.-Gen. J. Hardress-Lloyd, D.S.O.
3rdTank Bn.l,,,, .
6th Tank Bn.r^^^'PP^*^-
rCavalrj"^ Corps Signal Squadron.
Corps Signal Troops \ Cavalry Corps Wireless Squadron.
(■" AD " and " GG " Cable Sections.
Cavalry Corps Bridging Park, R.E.
Cavalry Corps Troops M.T. Co.
1st Cavalry Division. Maj.-Gen. R. L. Mullins, C.B.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. R. E. Cecil, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. J. Blakiston-Houston, D.S.O.
1st Cavalry Brigade. 2nd Cavalry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. H. S. Scwell, D.S.O.) (Brig.-Gen. A. Lawson, C.M.G.)
2nd Dragoon Guards. 4th Dragoon Guards.
5th Dragoon Guards. 9th Lancers.
11th Hussars. 18th Hussars.
" I " Battery, R.H.A. " H " Battery, R.H.A.
(6-13 pdr. guns). (6-13 pdr. guns).
let Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron. 2nd Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron.
1st Signal Troop. 2nd Signal Troop.
APPENDIX F
803
9th Cavalry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. D'A. Legard, D.S.O.)
8th Hussars.
15th Hussars.
19th Hussars.
" Y " Battery, R.H.A.
(6-13 pdr. guns).
9th Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron.
9th Signal Troop.
7th Brigade, R.H.A., and Ammunition Column.
1st Field Squadron, R.E.
1st Signal Squadron.
H.Q. 1st Cavalry Divisional R.A.S.C.
1st Cavalry Divisional M.T. Co.
1st Cavalry Divisional Aux. (Horse) Co.
1st, 3rd, and 9th Cavalry Field Ambulances.
1st, 10th, and 39th Mobile Veterinary Sections.
2nd Cavalry Division
G.S.O. 1 . .
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col.
3rd Cavalry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. J. A. Bell-Smyth, C.M.G.)
Maj.-Gen. T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G.
. . Lieut.-Col. M. Graham, D.S.O.
Hon. G. V. A. Monckton-Arundell, D.S.O.
4th Cavalry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. C. H. Rankin, C.M.G.,
D.S.O.)
6th Dragoon Guards.
3rd Hussars.
1/lst Oxfordshire Hussars.
" J " Battery, R.H.A.
(6-13 pdr. guns).
4th Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron.
4th Signal Troop.
4th Hussars.
5th Lancers.
16th Lancers.
" D " Battery, R.H.A.
(6-13 pdr. guns).
3rd Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron.
3rd Signal Troop.
5th Cavalry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. N. W. Haig. C.M.G.)
2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys).
12th Lancers.
20th Hussars.
" E " Battery, R.H.A.
(6-13 pdr. guns).
5th Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron.
5th Signal Troop.
3rd Brigade, R.H.A., and Ammunition Column.
2nd Field Squadron, R.E.
2nd Signal Squadron.
H.Q. 2nd Cavalry Divisional R.A.S.C.
2nd Cavalry Divisional M.T. Co.
2nd Cavalry Divisional Aux. (Horse) Co.
2nd, 4th, and 5th Cavalry Field .\mbulances.
7th, 8th, and 9th Mobile Veterinary Sections.
3rd Cavalry Division. Maj.-Gen. A. E. W. Harman. D.S.O.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. G. P. L. Cosens, D.S.O
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. T. W
Qth Cavalry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. E. Paterson, D.S.O.)
3rd Dragoon Guards.
1st Roj-al Dragoons.
10th Hussars.
" C " Battery, R.H.A.
(6-13 pdr. guns).
6th Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron.
6th Signal Troop.
PragncU, D.S.O.
7th Cavalry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. A. Burt, D.S.O.)
7th Dragoon Guards.
6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons.
17th Lancers.
" K •' Battery, R.H.A.
(6-13 pdr. guns).
7th Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron.
7th Signal Troop.
804i APPENDIX F
Canadian Cavalry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. R. W. Paterson, D.S.O.)
Royal Canadian Dragoons.
Lord Strathcona's Horse.
Fort Garry Horse.
Royal Canadian H.A, Brigade,
(two batteries of 4-13 pdr. guns).
Canadian Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron.
Canadian Signal Troop.
4th Brigade, R.H.A., and Ammunition Column.
3rd Field Squadron, R.E.
3rd Signal Squadron.
H.Q. 3rd Cavalry Divisional R.A.S.C.
3rd Cavalry Divisional M.T. Co.
3rd Cavalry Divisional Aux. (Horse) Co.
6th, 7th, and Canadian Cavalry Field Ambulances.
13th, 14th, and " A " Canadian Mobile Veterinary Sections.
C. Ill Corps. Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.M.G., C.B. (From August 11th to
September 11th, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. J. Godley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.)
B.G.G.S Brig.-Gen. C. G. Fuller, D.S.O.
D.A. and Q.M.G. . . Brig.-Gen. J. F. Doyle, C.M.G., D.S.O.
G.O.C., R.A Brig.-Gen. C. M. Ross-Johnson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.E Brig.-Gen. A. Rolland, D.S.O.
Corps Cavalry and Cyclists.
1/lst Northumberland Hussars.
XXII Corps Cavalry Regt. ) Temnorarilv attached
XXII Corps Cyclist Bn. / ^emporaruy attachea.
Corps Heavy Artillery. Brig.-Gen. A. E. J. Perkins, C.B.
47, 71, and 89 (8" Hovvr.) Brigades, R.G.A.
23 (9-2" Howr.) Brigade, R.G.A.
27, 51, and 76 (Mixed) Brigades, R.G.A.
85 (Mobile) Brigade, R.G.A.
189, 312, and 449 (6" gun) Siege Batteries, R.G.A.
243 (12' Howr.) Siege Battery, R.G.A.
V/III Heavy Trench Mortar Battery, R.G.A.
85 Squadron, R.A.F. (A.W.B.)
10th Tank Bn. (Mark V).
i " C " Corps Signal Co.
Corps Signal Troops I Nos. 6 and 76 (Motor) Airline Sections.
( " LZ," " WE " and " SS " Cable Sections.
No. 2 (2nd Life Guards) Bn., Guards Machine Gun Regt.
No. 1 Siege Co., R.A., R.E.
216 and 574 A.T. Cos., R.E.
180, 253, and 256 (T.) Cos., R.E.
Ill Corps Troops M.T. Co.
12th (Eastern) Division. Maj.-Gen. H. W. Higginson, C.B., D.S.O.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. J. D. Belgrave, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. F. R. Burnside, D.S.O.
S5tli Infantry Brigade. SGth Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. B. Vincent, C.M.G.) (Brig.-Gen. C. S. Owen, C.M.G., D.S.O.)
7th Bn., Norfolk Regt. 9th Bn., Royal Fusiliers.
9th Bn., Essex Regt. 7th Bn., Royal Sussex Regt.
1/lst Bn., Cambridgeshire Regt. 5th Bn., Royal Berkshire Regt.
35th Trench Mortar Battery. 36th Trench Mortar Battery.
APPENDIX F 305
87th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. A. B. Ingledon-Webber, C.M.G., D.S.O.)
6th Bn., The Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regt.).
6th Bn., The Buffs (East Kent Regt.).
6th Bn., The Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regt.).
37th Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. H. M. Thomas, C.M.G., D.S.O.
62nd and 63rd Brigades, R.F.A.
X/12 and Y/12 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
12th Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. A. T. Shakespear, D.S.O., M.C.
69th, 70th, and 87th Field Cos., R.E.
12th Divisional Signal Co.
5th Bn., Northamptonshire Regt. (Pioneers).
No. 12 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
12th Divisional Train.
12th Divisional M.T. Co.
86th, 37th, and 38th Field Ambulances.
28rd Mobile Veterinary Section.
Attached Troops.
25th Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. K. J. Kincaid-Smith, C.M.G., D.S.O.
169th and 232nd Army Brigades, R.F.A.
ISth (Eastern) Division. Maj.-Gen. R. P. Lee, C.B.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. G. Blewitt, D.S.O., M.C.
A.A. & Q.M.G Lieut.-Col. R. H. L. Cutbill, D.S.O.
53rd Infantry Brigade. 5Uh Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. M. G. H. Barker, D.S.O.) (Brig.-Gen. L. W. de V. Sadlier-
Jackson, C.M.G., D.S.O. (From
August 24th, 1918, Brig.-Gen. J. A.
Tyler, C.M.G.)
10th Bn., Essex Regt. 11th Bn., Royal Fusiliers.
8th Bn., Royal Berkshire Regt. 2nd Bn., Bedfordshire Regt.
7th Bn., The Queen's Own (Royal West 6th Bn., Northamptonshire Regt.
Kent Regt.).
53rd Trench Mortar Battery. 54th Trench Mortar Battery.
55th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. E. A. Wood, D.S.O.)
7th Bn., The Queen's (Roval West Surrey Regt.).
7th Bn., The Buffs (East Kent Regt.).
8th Bn., East Surrey Regt.
55th Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Lieut.-Col. T. O. Seagram (acting).
82nd and 83rd Brigades, R.F.A.
X/18 and Y/18 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
18th Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. C. B. O. Symons, D.S.O.
79th, 80th and 82nd Field Cos., R.E.
18th Divisional Signal Co.
8th Bn., Royal Sussex Regt. (Pioneers).
No. 18 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
18th Divisional Train.
18th Divisional M.T. Co.
54th, 55th, and 56th Field Ambulances,
30th Mobile Veterinary Section.
R s
306 APPENDIX F
Attached Troops.
5th Army Brigade, R.H.A.
18th, 86th, and 175th Army Brigades, R.F.A.
4,7th (London) Division (J.). Maj.-Gen. Sir G. F. Gorringe, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
G.S.0. 1 Lieut.-Col. B. L. Montgomery, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. S. H. J. Thunder, D.S.O., M.C.
liOth Infantry Brigade. Hist Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. H. B. P. L. Kennedy, (Brig.-Gen. W. F. Mildren, C.M.G.,
C.M.G., D.S.0.1 D.S.O.)
l/15th Bn., London Regt. l/18th Bn., London Regt.
l/17th Bn., London Regt. l/19th Bn., London Regt.
l/21st Bn., London Regt. l/20th Bn., London Regt.
140th Trench Mortar Battery. 141st Trench Mortar Battery.
142«d Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. R. McDouall, C.M.G., D.S.O.)
l/22nd Bn., London Regt.
l/23rd Bn., London Regt.
l/24th Bn., London Regt.
142nd Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. E. N. Whitley, C.M.G., D.S.O.
235th and 236th Brigades, R.F.A.
X/47 and Y/47 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
47th Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. A. B. Carev, C.M.G., D.S.O.
517th, 518th, and 519th Field Cos., R.E.'
47th Divisional Signal Co.
l/4th Bn., Royal Welsh Fusiliers (Pioneers).
No. 47 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
47th Divisional Train.
47th Divisional M.T. Co.
l/4th, l/5th, and l/6th (London) Field Ambulances.
l/2nd (London) Mobile Veterinary Section.
58<^ (London) Division (T.). Maj.-Gen. F. W. Ramsay. C.M.G., D.S.O.
G.S.0. 1 Lieut.-Col. C. M. Davies, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. A. G. P. McNalty, C.M.G., D.S.O.
173rd Infantry Brigade. 174th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. C. E. Corkran, C.M.G.) (Brig.-Gen. A. Maxwell, D.S.O.)
2/2nd Bn., London Regt. 6th Bn., London Regt.
3rd Bn., London Regt. 7th Bn., London Regt.
2/4th Bn., London Regt. 8th Bn., London Regt.
173rd Trench Mortar Battery. 174th Trench Mortar Battery.
175th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. H. W. Cobham, D.S.O.)
9th Bn., London Regt.
2/1 0th Bn., London Regt.
12th Bn., London Regt.
175th Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. J. McC. Maxwell, C.B., D.S.O.
290th and 291st Brigades, R.F.A.
X/58 and Y/58 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
58th Divisional Ammunition Column.
APPENDIX F 807
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. A. J. Savage.
503rd. 504th, and 511th Field Cos., R.E.
2/lst Wessex Signal Co.
4th Bn. Suffolk Regt. (Pioneers).
No. 58 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
58th Divisional Train.
58th Divisional M.T. Co.
2/lst, 2/2nd, and 2/3rd Home Counties Field Ambulances.
58th (London) Mobile Veterinary Section.
Attached Troops.
50th Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. W. Stirling, D.S.O.
108th Army Brigade, R.F.A.
^7Uh {Yeomanry) Division. Maj.-Gen. E. S. Girdwood, C.B.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. A. C. Temperley, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. R. B. Cousens, D.S.O.
229</i Infantry Brigade. 230th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. R. Hoare, D.S.O. From (Brig.-Gen. A. A. Kennedy, C.M.G.)
September 15th, 1918, Brig.-Gen.
F. C. Thackeray, D.S.O., M.C.)
16th (Royal 1st and Royal North 10th (Royal East and West Kent Yeo.)
Devon Yeo.) Bn., Devon Regt. Bn., The Buffs.
12th (West Somerset Yeo.) Bn., Somer- 15th (Suffolk Yeo.) Bn., Suffolk Regt.
set L.I. 16th (Sussex Yeo.) Bn., Royal Sussex
14th (Fife and Forfar Yeo.) Bn., Royal Regt.
Highlanders.
229th Trench Mortar Battery. 230th Trench Mortar Battery.
231st Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. C. E. Heathcote, C.M.G., D.S.O.)
25th (Montgomery and Welsh Horse Yeo.) Bn., Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
24th (Pembroke and Glamorganshire Yeo.) Bn., Welsh Regt.
10th (Shropshire and Cheshire Yeo.) Bn., King's Shropshire Light Infantry.
231st Trench Mortar Battery.
. Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. L. J. Hext, C.M.G.
44th and 117th Brigades, R.F.A.
X/74 and Y/74 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
74th Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. W. R. Izat, D.S.O.
5th Field Co., Royal Anglesey, R.E.
5th Field Co., Roval Monmouth, R.E.
439th Field Co., R.E.
74th Divisional Signal Co.
1/12 Bn. Loyal North Lancashire Regt. (Pioneers).
No. 74 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
74th Divisional Train.
74th Divisional M.T. Co.
229th, 230th, and 231st Field Ambulances.
59th Mobile Veterinary Section.
33rd {Illinois) American Division. Maj.-Gen. George Bell, Jnr.
Chief of Staff . . . . Col. W. K. Naylor.
The 74th Division did not join the Fourth Army. until September 1st, and remained with it until
September 26th, when it was transferred to another Army.
308 APPENDIX F
65th Infantry Brigade. 66th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. E. L. King.) (Brig.-Gen. P. A. Wolf.)
129th (3rd Illinois) Regt. (1st, 2nd, and 131st (1st Illinois) Regt. (1st, 2nd, and
3rd Ens.). 3rd Bns.).
130th (4th Illinois) Regt. (1st, 2nd, and 132nd (2nd Illinois) Regt. (1st, 2nd, and
3rd Bns.). 3rd Bns.).
123rd (5th lUinois) Machine Gun Bn. 124th (5th Illinois) Machine Gun Bn.
108th Engineer Regt.
108th Field Signal Bn.
122nd Machine Gun Bn.
108th Train Headquarters.
108th Sanitary Train.
129th and 130th Field Ambulance Cos.
D. Canadian Corps. Lieut.-Gen. Sir. A. W. Currie, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
B.G.G.S Brig.-Gen. N. W. Webber, C.M.G., D.S.O.
D.A. and Q.M.G. . . Brig.-Gen. G. J. Farmar, C.B., C.M.G.
G.O.C., R.A Maj.-Gen. E. W. B. Morrison, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
G.O.C., C.E Maj.-Gen. W. B. Lindsay, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Corps Cavalry and Cyclists.
Canadian Light Horse.
Royal North- West Mounted Police.
Canadian Cyclist Bn.
Corps Heavy Artillery. Brig.-Gen. R. H. Massie, C.M.G.
12 and 40 (8" Howr.) Brigades, R.G.A.
98 (9-2" Howr.) Brigade, R.G.A.
79 and 88 (Mixed) Brigades, R.G.A.
29, 41, and 86 (Mobile) Brigades, R.G.A.
3rd Canadian Brigade, R.G.A.
192, 434, and 525 (6" gun) Siege Batteries, R.G.A.
493 (12" Howr.) Siege Battery, R.G.A.
5 Squadron, R.A.F. (R.E.8).
Uh Tank Brigade. Brig.-Gen. E. B. Hankey, D.S.O.
1st Tank Bn. (Mark V star.)
4th Tank Bn. )
5th Tank Bn. } Mark V.
14th Tank Bn. j
1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades.
( Canadian Corps Signal Co.
Corps Signal Troops < Nos. 1 and 2 Canadian (Motor) Airline Sections.
( " CE," " CF," " CG," and " CH " Cable Sections.
No. 4 Siege Co., Royal Anglesey, R.E.
144 A.T. Co., R.E.
182 (T.) Co., R.E.
1st Tramways Co., Canadian Engineers.
1st Canadian Infantry Works Bn.
13th Bn., Canadian Railway Troops.
No. 8 Pontoon Park.
A.A. Searchlight Co., Canadian Engineers.
Canadian Corps Troops M.T. Co.
Canadian Motor Machine Gun M.T. Co.
Canadian Engineers M.T. Co.
1st Canadian Division. Maj.-Gen. A. C. Macdonell, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. J. L. R. Parson, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G, . . Lieut.-Col. J. S. Brown, C.M.G., D.S.O.
APPENDIX F
309
1st Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. W. A. Griesbach, C.M.G.,
D.S.O.)
1st Canadian Bn. (Western Ontario
Regt.).
2nd Canadian Bn. (Eastern Ontario
Regt.).
8rd Canadian Bn. (Toronto Regt.).
4th Canadian Bn. (1st Central Ontario
Regt.).
2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. F. O. W. Loomis, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O.)
5th Canadian Bn. (Saskatchewan
Regt.).
7th Canadian Bn. (British Columbia
Regt.).
8th Canadian Bn. (Manitoba Regt.).
10th Canadian Bn. (Alberta Regt.).
1st Canadian Trench Mortar Battery. 2nd Canadian Trench Mortar Battery.
3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. G. S. Tuxford, C.B., C.M.G.)
13th Canadian Bn. (Royal Highlanders of Canada) (Quebec Regt.).
14th Canadian Bn. (Royal Montreal Regt.) (Quebec Regt.).
15th Canadian Bn. (48th Highlanders of Canada) (1st Central Ontario Regt.).
16th Canadian Bn. (The Canadian Scottish) (Eastern Ontario Regt.).
3rd Canadian Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. H. C. Thacker, C.M.G., D.S.O.
1st and 2nd Brigades, C.F.A.
V/lC Heavy Trench Mortar Battery.
X/lC and Y/lC Trench Mortar Batteries.
1st Canadian Divisional Ammunition Column.
1st Brigade, Canadian Engineers. Col. A. MacPhail, D.S.O.
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns., Canadian Engineers.
1st Pontoon Bridging Transport Unit, Canadian Engineers.
1st Canadian Divisional Signal Co.
No. 1 Bn., Canadian Machine Gun Corps.
1st Canadian Divisional Train.
1st Canadian Divisional M.T. Co.
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Canadian Field Ambulances.
1st Canadian Mobile Veterinary Section.
Attached Troops.
5th Canadian Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. W. Dodds, C.M.G., D.S.O.
77th Army Brigade, R.F.A.
2nd Canadian Division. Maj.-Gen. Sir H. E. Burstall, K.C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. W. R. Bertram, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. P. J. Montague, D.S.O., M.C.
4th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. R. Rennie, C.B., C.M.G.,
M.V.O., D.S.O.)
18th Canadian Bn. (Western Ontario
Regt.).
19th Canadian Bn. (1st Central Ontario
Regt.).
20th Canadian Bn. (1st Central Ontario
Regt.).
21st Canadian Bn. (Eastern Ontario
Regt.).
5th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. T. L. Tremblay, C.M.G.,
D.S.O.)
22nd Canadian Bn. (Canadian Fran-
9ais). (Quebec Regt.).
24th Canadian Bn. (Victoria Rifles
of Canada) (Quebec Regt.).
25th Canadian Bn. (Nova Scotia Rifles)
(Nova Scotia Regt.).
26th Canadian Bn. (New Brunswick
Regt.).
4th Canadian Trench Mortar Battery. 5th Canadian Trench Mortar Battery.
310
APPENDIX F
6th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. A. Ross, D.S.O.)
27th Canadian Bn. (Manitoba Regt.).
28th Canadian Bn. (Saskatchewan Regt.).
29th Canadian Bn. (British Columbia Regt,).
31st Canadian Bn. (Alberta Regt.).
6th Canadian Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery, Brig.-Gen. H. A. Panet, D.S.O.
5th and 6th Brigades, C.F.A.
V/2C Heavy Trench Mortar.
X/2C and Y/2C Trench Mortar Batteries.
2nd Canadian Divisional Ammunition Column.
2nd Brigade, Canadian Engineers. Col. S. H. Osier, D.S.O.
4th, 5th, and 6th Bns., Canadian Engineers.
2nd Pontoon Bridging Transport Unit, Canadian Engineers.
2nd Canadian Divisional Signal Co.
No. 1 Bn. Canadian Machine Gun Corps.
2nd Canadian Divisional Train.
2nd Canadian Divisional M.T. Co.
4th, 5th, and 6th Canadian Field Ambulances.
2nd Canadian Mobile Veterinary Section.
Attached Troops.
150th Army Brigade, R.F.A.
8rd Canadian Division.
G.S.O. 1 . .
A.A. and Q.M.G.
Maj.-Gen. L. J. Lipsett, C.M.G., D.S.O.
. . Lieut.-Col. Hon. C. M. Hore-Ruthven, C.M.G.
. . Lieut.-Col. H. E. Boak, D.S.O.
D.S.O.
7th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. H. M. Dyer, C.M.G., D.S.O.)
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light In-
fantry (Eastern Ontario Regt.).
The Royal Canadian Regt. (Nova
Scotia Regt.).
42nd Canadian Bn, (Royal Highlanders
of Canada).
49th Canadian Bn. (Edmonton Regt.)
(Alberta Regt.).
8lh Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. D. C. Draper, D.S.O.)
1st Canadian Mounted Rifle Bn. (SaS'
katchewan Regt.).
2nd Canadian Mounted Rifle Bn.
Central Ontario Regt.).
Canadian Mounted Rifle Bn.
Central Ontario Regt.).
Canadian Mounted Rifle
(Quebec Regt.).
4th
5th
(1st
(1st
Bn.
7th Canadian Trench Mortar Battery. 8th Canadian Trench Mortar Battery.
9th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. D. M. Ormond, D.S.O.)
43rd Canadian Bn. (Manitoba Regt.).
52nd Canadian Bn. (Manitoba Regt.).
58th Canadian Bn. (2nd Central Ontario Regt.)
116th Canadian Bn. (2nd Central Ontario Regt.).
9th Canadian Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. J. S. Stewart, D.S.O.
9th and 10th Brigades, C.F.A.
V/3C Heavy Trench Mortar Battery.
X/3C and Y/3C Trench Mortar Batteries.
8rd Canadian Divisional Ammunition Column.
3rd Brigade, Canadian Engineers. Col. H. F. Hertzberg, D.S.O., M.C.
7th, 8th, and 9th Bn., Canadian Engineers.
3rd Pontoon Bridging Transport Unit, Canadian Engineers.
APPENDIX F 311
8rd Canadian Divisional Signal Co.
No. 3 Bn., Canadian Machine Gun Corps.
3rd Canadian Divisional Train.
3rd Canadian Divisional M.T. Co.
8th, 9th, and 10th Canadian Field Ambulances.
3rd Canadian Mobile Veterinary Section.
Attached Troops.
104th and 179th Army Brigades, R.F.A.
8th Army Brigade, C.F.A,
4ith Canadian Division. Maj.-Gen. Sir D. Watson, K.C.B., C.M.G.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. E. de B. Panet, C.M.G., D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. K. R. Marshall, D.S.O.
lOth Canadian Infantry Brigade. llth Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. R. J. F. Hayter, C.M.G., (Brig.-Gen. V. W. Odium, C.B.,
D.S.O.) C.M.G., D.S.O.)
44th Canadian Bn. (New Brunswick 54th Canadian Bn. (2nd Central Ontario
Regt.). Regt.).
46th South Saskatchewan Bn. (Sas- 75th Canadian Bn. (1st Central Ontario
katchewan Regt.). Regt.).
47th Canadian Bn. (Western Ontario 87th Canadian Bn. (Canadian Grenadier
Regt.). Guards) (Quebec Regt.).
50th Canadian Bn. (Calgary Regt.) 102nd Canadian Bn.( 2nd Central Ontario
(Alberta Regt.). Regt.).
10th Canadian Trench Mortar Battery. llth Canadian Trench Mortar Battery.
12th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. J. H. McBrien, C.M.G., D.S.O.)
38th Canadian Bn. (Ottawa Regt.) (Eastern Ontario Regt.).
72nd Canadian Bn. (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada) (British Columbia Regt.).
78th Canadian Bn. (Nova Scotia Highlanders) (Nova Scotia Regt.).
85th Canadian Bn. (Winnipeg Grenadiers) (Manitoba Regt.).
12th Canadian Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. W. B. M. King, C.M.G., D.S.O.
3rd and 4th Brigades, C.F.A.
V/4C Heavy Trench Mortar Battery.
X/4C and Y/4C Trench Mortar Batteries.
4th Canadian Divisional Ammunition Column.
4:th Brigade, Canadian Engineers. Col. H. T. Hughes, C.M.G.
10th, llth, and 12th Bns., Canadian Engineers.
4th Pontoon Bridging Transport Unit, Canadian Engineers.
4th Canadian Divisional Signal Co.
No. 4 Bn., Canadian Machine Gun Corps.
4th Canadian Divisional Train.
4th Canadian Divisional M.T. Co.
llth, 12th, and 13th Canadian Field Ambulances.
4th Canadian Mobile Veterinary Section.
32nd Division. Maj.-Gen. T. S. Lambert, C.B., C.M.G.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. A. E. McNamara, C.M.G., D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. J. P. B. Robinson, D.S.O.
lith Infantry Brigade. 96th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. L. P. Evans, V.C, D.S.O.) (Brig.-Gen. A. C. Girdwood, D.S.O.)
5/6th Bn., Royal Scots (T.). 15th Bn., Lancashire Fusiliers.
1st Bn., Dorset Regt. 16th Bn., Lancashire Fusiliers.
15th Bn., Highland Light Infantry. 2nd Bn., Manchester Regt.
14th Trench Mortar Battery. 96th Trench Mortar Battery.
812 APPENDIX F
97th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. J. R. MinshuU-Ford, D.S.O., M.C.)
l/5th Bn., Border Regt.
2nd Bn., The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
10th Bn., Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
97th Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. J. A. Tyler, C.M.G.
161st and 168th Brigades, R.F.A.
X/32 and Y/32 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
82nd Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. G. C. Pollard, C.M.G., D.S.O.
206th, 218th, and 219th Field Cos., R.E.
32nd Divisional Signal Co.
16th Bn., Highland Light Infantry (Pioneers).
No. 32 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
82nd Divisional Train.
82nd Divisional M.T. Co.
90th, 91st, and 92nd Field Ambulances.
42nd Mobile Veterinary Section.
E. AusTRAUAN Corps. Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Monash, K.C.B.
B.G., G.S Brig.-Gen. T. A. Blarney, C.M.G., D.S.O.
D.A. and Q.M.G. . . Brig.-Gen. R. A. Carruthers, C.B., C.M.G.
G.O.C., R.A Brig.-Gen. W. A. Coxen, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.E Brig.-Gen. C. H. Foott, C.M.G.
Corps Cavalry and Cyclists.
13th Regt., Australian Light Horse.
Australian Cyclist Bn.
Corps Heavy Artillery. Brig.-Gen. L. D. Fraser, C.B., C.M.G.
5, 14, and 68 (8" Howr.) Brigades, R.G.A.
8 and 69 (9-2" Howr.) Brigades, R.G.A.
77 and 93 (Mixed) Brigades, R.G.A.
9 and 21 (Mobile) Brigades, R.G.A.
73 Army Brigade, R.G.A. (H.Q. only).
222, 499, and 504 (6" Gun) Siege Batteries, R.G.A.
50 (6' Gun on Naval Mounting) Siege Battery, R.G.A.
494 (12' HowT.) Siege Battery, R.G.A.
V/Australian Heavy Trench Mortar Battery, A.F.A.
3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps (R.E. 8).
Sth Tank Brigade. Brig.-Gen. A. Courage, D.S.O., M.C.
2nd Tank Bn. )
8th Tank Bn. [ Mark V.
13th Tank Bn. I
15th Tank Bn. Mark V star.
17th Armoured Car Bn.
{Australian Corps Signal Co.
Nos. 1 and 2 Australian (Motor) Airline Sections.
Nos. 1 and 2 Australian Cable Sections.
648 Field Co., R.E.
146, 238, and 567 A.T. Cos., R.E.
1st A.T. Co., Australian Engineers.
1st and 2nd (T.) Cos., Australian Engineers.
No. 11 Pontoon Park.
6th Australian (Corps Troops) M.T. Co.
/
APPENDIX F 318
\sl Australian Division. Maj.-Gen. T. W. Glasgow, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. A. M. Ross, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. H. G. Vincy, C.M.G., D.S.O.
\st Australian Infantry Brigade. 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade,
(Brig.-Gen. I. G. Mackay, D.S.O.) (Brig.-Gen. J. Heane, C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O.)
1st Australian Bn. 5th Australian Bn.
2nd Australian Bn. 6th Australian Bn.
3rd Australian Bn. 7th Australian Bn.
4th Australian Bn. 8th Australian Bn.
1st Australian Trench Mortar Battery. 2nd Australian Trench Mortar Battery.
8rd Australian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. H. G. Bennett, C.B., C.M.G.)
9th Australian Bn.
10th Australian Bn.
11th Australian Bn.
12th Australian Bn.
8rd Australian Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. S. M. Anderson, D.S.O.
1st and 2nd Brigades, A.F.A.
X/lA and Y/lA Trench Mortar Batteries, A.F.A.
1st Australian Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. W. A. Henderson, D.S.O.
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Australian Field Cos.
1st Australian Divisional Signal Co.
1st Australian Pioneer Bn.
No. 1 Australian Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
1st Australian Divisional Train.
1st Australian Divisional M.T. Co.
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Australian Field Ambulances.
1st Australian Mobile Veterinary Section.
2nd Australian Division. Maj.-Gen. C. Rosenthal, C.B., C.M.G. , D.S.O.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. C. G. N. Miles, C.M.G., D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. J. M. A. Durrant, C.M.G., D.S.O.
5th Australian Infantry Brigade. 6th Australian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. E. F. Martin. C.M.G., (Brig.-Gen. J. C. Robertson, C.M.G.
D.S.O.) D.S.O.)
I7th Australian Bn. 21st Australian Bn.
18th Australian Bn. 22nd Australian Bn.
19th Australian Bn. 23rd Australian Bn.
20th Australian Bn. 24th Australian Bn.
5th Australian Trench Mortar Battery. 6th Australian Trench Mortar Battery.
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. E. A. Wisdom, C.B., D.S.O.)
25th Australian Bn.
26th Australian Bn.
27th .Australian Bn.
28th Australian Bn.
7th Australian Trench Mortar Battery
s 9
314 APPENDIX F
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. O. F. Phillips, D.S.O.
4th and 5th Brigades, A.F.A.
X/2A and Y/A2 Trench Mortar Batteries, A.F.A.
2nd Australian Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut. -Col. J. M. Corlette, D.S.O.
5th, 6th, and 7th Australian Field Cos.
2nd Australian Divisional Signal Co.
2nd Australian Pioneer Bn.
2nd Australian Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
2nd Australian Divisional Train.
2nd Australian M.T. Co.
5th, 6th, and 7th Australian Field Ambulances.
2nd Australian Mobile Veterinary Section.
Attached Troops.
298th Army Brigade, R.F.A.
8rd Australian Division. Maj.-Gen. J. Gellibrand, C.B., D.S.O.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. C. H. Jess, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. R. E. Jackson, D.S.O.
9th Australian Infantry Brigade. lOth Australian Infantry Brigade.
(Lieut.-Col. J. E. C. Lord, D.S.O., (Brig.-Gen. W. R. McNicoll, C.M.G.,
(acting). D.S.O.)
83rd Australian Bn. 87th Australian Bn.
84th Australian Bn. 88th Australian Bn.
85th Australian Bn. 89th Australian Bn.
86th Australian Bn. 40th Australian Bn.
9th Australian Trench Mortar Battery. 10th Australian Trench Mortar Battery.
llth Australian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. J. H. Cannan, C.B., C.M.G.)
41st Australian Bn.
42nd Australian Bn.
43rd Australian Bn.
44th Australian Bn.
llth Australian Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. H. W. Grimwade, C.B., C.M.G.
7th and 8th Brigades, A.F.A.
X/3A and Y/3A Trench Mortar Batteries, A.F.A.
8rd Australian Divisional Anmiunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. H. Bachtold, D.S.O., M.C.
9th, 10th, and llth Australian Field Cos.
8rd Australian Divisional Signal Co.
3rd Australian Pioneer Bn.
No. 3 Australian Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
3rd Australian Divisional Train.
3rd Australian Divisional M.T. Co.
9th, 10th, and llth Australian Field Ambulances.
3rd Australian Mobile Veterinary Section.
Attached Troops.
16th Army Brigade, R.H.A.
23rd and i89th Army Brigades, R.F.A.
8rd and 12th Army Brigades, A.F.A.
Uh Australian Division. Maj.-Gen. E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan, C.B., D.S.O.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. J. D. Lavarack, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. R. Dowse, D.S.O.
APPENDIX F 315
ith Australian Infantry Brigade. I2th Australian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. E. A. D. Brockman, (Brig.-Gen. R. L. Leane, D.S.O., M.C.)
C.M.G., D.S.O.)
13th Australian Bn. 45th Austrahan Bn.
14th Australian Bn. 46th Australian Bn.
15th Australian Bn. 48th Australian Bn.
16th Australian Bn.
4th Australian Trench Mortar Battery. 12th Australian Trench Mortar Battery.
ISth Australian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. S. C. E. Herring, D.S.O.)
49th Australian Bn.
50th Australian Bn.
51st Australian Bn.
13th Australian Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. W. L. H. Burgess, C.M.G., D.S.O.
10th and 11th Brigades, A.F.A.
X/4A and Y/4A Trench Mortar Batteries, A.F.A.
4th Australian Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut. -Col. R. J. Dyer, D.S.O.
4th, 12th, and 13th Australian Field Cos.
4tli Australian Divisional Signal Co.
4th Australian Pioneer Bn.
No. 4 Australian Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
4th Australian Divisional Train.
4th .\ustralian Divisional M.T. Co.
4th, 12th, and 13th Australian Field Ambulances.
4th Australian Mobile Veterinary Section.
5th Australian Division. Maj.-Gen. Sir J. J. Talbot-Hobbs, K.C.B., V.D.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. .T. Peck, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . tol. ,T. H. Bruche, C.M.G.
Sth Australian Infantry Brigade. lith Australian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. E. Tivey, C.B., D.S.O., (Brig.-Gen. J. C. Stewart, D.S.O.)
V.D.)
29th Australian Bn. 53rd Australian Bn.
30th Australian Bn. .'i4th Australian Bn.
31st Australian Bn. 55th Australian Bn.
32nd Australian Bn. 56th Australian Bn.
Sth Australian Trench Mortar Battery. 1 4th Australian Trench Mortar Battery.
\5th Australian Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. H. E. Elliott, C.B., C.M.G. . D.S.O., D.C.M.)
57th Australian Bn.
58th Australian Bn.
59th Australian Bn.
60th ,\ustralian Bn.
15th Australian Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. A. J. Bessel-Browne, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
13th and 14th Brigades, A.F.A.
X/5A and Y/5A Trench Mortar Batteries, A.F.A.
Sth Australian Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. L. F. S. Mather, D.S.O.
Sth, 14th, and 15th Australian Field Cos.
316 APPENDIX F
5th Australian Divisional Signal Co.
5th Australian Pioneer Bn.
No. 5 Australian Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
5th Australian Divisional Train.
5th Australian Divisional M.T. Co.
8th, 14th, and 15th Australian Field Ambulances.
5th Australian Mobile Veterinarj' Section.
Attached Troops.
14th Army Brigade, R.F.A.
76th Army Brigade, A.F.A.
nth (Northern) Division. Maj.-Gen. P. R. Robertson, C.B., C.M.G.
G.S.O. 1 Col. E. M. Birch, C.M.G., D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. A. E. J. Wilson, D.S.O.
50th Infantry Brigade. 5lst Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. G. Gwvnn-Thomas, (Brig.-Gen. R. M. Dudgeon, D.S.O.,
C.M.G., D.S.O.) M.C.)
10th Bn., West Yorkshire Regt. 7th Bn., Lincolnshire Regt.
7th Bn., East Yorkshire Regt. 7th (Westmoreland and Cumberland
7th Bn., Dorsetshire Regt, Yco.) Bn., Border Regt.
10th Bn., Sherwood Foresters (Not-
tinghamshire and Derbyshire
Regt.)
50th Trench Mortar Battery. 51st Trench Mortar Battery.
52nd Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. W. Allason, D.S.O.)
10th Bn., Lancashire Fusiliers.
9th Bn., West Riding Regt.
12th (Duke of Lancaster's Yeo.) Bn., Manchester Regt.
52nd Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. P. Wheatley, C.M.G., D.S.O.
78th and 79th Brigades, R.F.A.
X/17 and Y/17 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
17th Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. F. A. Ferguson.
77th, 78th, and 93rd Field Cos., R.E.
17th Divisional Signal Co.
7th Bn., York and Lancaster Regt. (Pioneers).
No. 17 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
17th Divisional Train.
17th Divisional M.T. Co.
Slst, 52nd, and 53rd Field Ambulances.
29th Mobile Veterinary Section.
September 29th.
A. Fourth Army. Gen. Sir H. S. Rawlinson, Bart., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
Staff as for August 8th.
Army Troops.
5th Brigade, R.A.F. Brig.-Gen. L. E. O. Charlton, C.M.G., D.S.O.
15th Wing. Lieut.-Col. J. A. Chamier, D.S.O., O.B.E.
8 Squadron (A.W.B ) 1 ^Vorking with Tank Corps.
73 Squadron (Camel) J ° ^
22nd Wing. Lieut.-Col. T. A. E. Cairnes, D.S.O.
24, 84, 85, and 92 (S.E. 5), 23 (Dolphin), 46, 80, and 208 (Camel), 20 (B.F.)
and 205 (D.H. 9) Squadrons.
5th Balloon Wing. Lieut.-Col. F. F. M. Roxby.
4th Aircraft Park. 4th Air Ammunition Column. 4th Reserve Lorry Park.
APPENDIX F 817
Artilkry.
Half 471 Siege Battery, R.G.A. (14" gun on railway mounting).
Half 543 Siege Battery, R.G.A. (12' gun on railway mounting).
Tanks.
2nd Tank Bn. (G.H.Q. Reserve).
A.A. Defence. Lieut.-Col. R. Bruce Hay, D.S.O.
" F," " G," " P," and " Q " A.A. Batteries.
50th (Field Searchlight) Co., R.E.
1, 7, 16, 17, 36, 69, .3 Canadian, and 4 Canadian Searchlight Sections, R.E.
No. 66 A.A. Co.
5th Field Survey Battalion. Lieut.-Col. F. B. Legh, M.C.
2, 13, 14, and 24 Observation Groups.
" A," " B," " G," " K," " O," and " R " Sound Ranging Sections.
Fourth Army Signal Company.
43, 45, 48, and 53 (Motor) Airline Sections.
" BL " and " BR " Cable Sections.
No. 4 Telegraph Construction Co., R.E.
No. 4 Signal Construction Co., R.E.
213 A.T. Co.. R.E.
353 E. and M. Co. (less two advanced sections).
" B " and " Z " Special Cos., R.E.
No. 3 Water Boring Section.
No. 8 Pontoon Park.
4th Army Troops M.T. Co.
B. Cavalry Corps (G.H.Q. Reserve). Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. T. McM. Kavanagh, K.C.B.,
C.V.O., D.S.O.
B.G.G.S Brig.-Gen. A. F. Home, C.M.G., D.S.O.
D.A. and Q.M.G. . . Brig.-Gen. J. C. G. Longmore. C.M.G., D.S.O.
G.O.C., R.A Brig.-Gen. H. S. Seligman, D.S.O.
C.R.E Lieut.-Col. W. H. Evans, D.S.O.
6 Squadron, R.A.F. (R.E. 8).
4,th Guards Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Hon. L. J. P. Butler, C.M.G., D.S.O.
4th Bn., Grenadier Guards.
3rd Bn., Coldstream Guards.
1/lst Bn., Honourable Artiller\- Co.
4th Guards Light Trench Mortar Batterv.
A/68 Batter>', R.F.A.
Household Machine Gun Brigade.
No. 1 (1st Life Guards) Bn., Guards Machine Gun Regt.
No. 3 (Roval Horse Guards) Bn., Guards Machine Gun Regt.
XVIII Corps Cyclist Bn.
f Cavalry Corps Signal Squadron.
Corps Signal Troops < Cavalrv Corps Wireless Squadron.
( " AD •"' and " GG " Cable Sections.
Cavalrj' Corps Bridging Park, R.E.
Cavalry Corps Troops M.T. Co.
Is/ Cavalry Division.
As for August 8th.
3rd Cavalry Division.
As for August 8th.
818
APPENDIX F
C. Ill Corps. Lieul.-Gen.
B.G.G.S
D.A. and Q.M.G.
G.O.C., R.A. . .
C.E
Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.M.G., C.B.
. . Brig.-Gen. C. G. Fuller, D.S.O.
. . Brig.-Gen. A. F. Dovle, C.M.G., D.S.O.
. . Brig.-Gen. C. M. Ross-Johnson, C.B., C.M.G.
. . Brig.-Gen. A. Rolland, D.S.O.
D.S.O.
Corps Cavalry.
1/lst Northumberland Hussars.
Corps Heavy ArtiUerij. Brig.-Gen. A. E. J. Perkins, C.B.
47 (8" Howr.) Brigade, R.G.A.
27 and 76 (Mixed) Brigades, R.G.A.
189 and 545 (6" gun) Siege Batteries, R.G.A.
243 (12" Howr.) Siege Battery, R.G.A.
V/III Heavy Trench Mortar Battery, R.G.A.
R.A.F. (A.W.B.)
C " Corps Signal Co.
Nos. 6 and 76 (Motor) Airline Sections.
LZ " " WE " and " SS " Cable Sections.
283rd A.T. Co.. R.E.
No. 100 Bn.. Machine Gun Corps.
Ill Corps Troops M.T. Co.
\2th (Eastern) Division.
As for August 8th, except that the 25th Divisional Artillery and the 169th and
232nd Army Brigades, R.F.A., were no longer attached.
18th {Eastern) Division.
As for August 8th, except that the 5th Army Brigade, R.H.A., and the 18th,
86th, and 175th Army Brigades, R.F.A., were no longer attached. The
74th Divisional Artillery was, however, under the 18th Division at this time.
35 Squadron,
Corps Signal Troops
P. Braithwaite, K.C.B.
Brig.-Gen. A. R. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G.
Brig.-Gen. J. C. Harding-Newman, C.M.G.
Brig.-Gen. G. Humphreys, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Brig.-Gen. R. A. Gillam, D.S.O.
D.S.O.
D. IX Corps. Lieut.-Gen. Sir W
B.G.G.S
D.A. and Q.M.G.
G.O.C., R.A. . .
C.E
Corps Cyclists.
9th Cj^clist Bn.
Corps Heavy Artilleri/. Brig.-Gen. G. B. Mackenzie, C.M.G
5, 12, and 14 (8" Howr.) Brigades, R.G.A.
69 and 98 (9-2" Howr.) Brigades, R.G.A.
79 and 83 (Mixed) Brigades, R.G.A.
21 (Mobile) Brigade, R.G.A.
498 and 499 (6" gun) Siege Batteries, R.G.A.
50 (6" gun on naval mounting) Siege Battery, R.G.A.
80 (12" Howr.) Siege Battery, R.G.A.
No. 1 (12" Howr.) Siege Battery, R.M.A.
V/IX Heavy Trench Mortar Battery, R.G.A.
9 Squadron, R.A.F. (R.E. 8).
8rd Tank Brigade. Brig.-Gen. J. Hardress-Lloyd, D.S.O.
6th Tank Bn. (Whippets).
5th Tank Bn. (Mark V).
9th Tank Bn. (Mark V).
( " E " Corps Signal Co.
< Nos. 11 and 81 (Motor) Airline Sections.
( " AA," " BT,'" and " SV " Cable Sections
No. 2 (2nd Life Guards) Bn.. Guards Machine Gun Regt.
No. 4 Siege Co., Royal Anglesey, R.E.
Corps Signal Troops
APPENDIX F 819
216, 221, 567, and 574 A.T. Cos., R.E.
180, 253, 254, and 256 (T.) Cos., R.E.
No. 1 Special Co., R.E. (Mortars).
IX Corps Troops M.T. Co.
1st Division. Maj.-Gen. E. P. Strickland, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. E. N. Tandy, C.M.G., D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. H. H. Spender Clay, C.M.G., M.C.
1st Infantry Brigade. 2nd Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. L. L. VVheatley, C.M.G., (Brig.-Gen. G. C. Kelly, D.S.O.)
D.S.O.)
1st Bn., The Black Watch (Royal 2nd Bn., Royal Sussex Regt.
Highlanders). 1st Bn., Northamptonshire Regt.
1st Bn., Loyal North Lancashire Regt. 2nd Bn., King's Royal Rifle Corps.
1st Bn., The Queen's Own Cameron
Highlanders.
1st Trench Mortar Battery. 2nd Trench Mortar Battery.
8rd Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. Sir VV. A. L Kav, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O.)
(From October 6th, 1918, Brig.-Gen. E. G. St. Aubj^n, D.S.O.)
1st Bn., South Wales Borderers.
1st Bn., Gloucestershire Regt.
2nd Bn., The Welsh Rest.
8rd Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. H. F. E. Lewin, C.M.G.
25th and 89th Brigades, R.F.A.
X/1 and Y/1 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
1st Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. C. E. P. Sankey, D.S.O.
28rd, 26th, and 409th Field Cos., R.E.
1st Divisional Signal Co.
l/6th Bn., The Welsh Regt. (Pioneers).
No. 1 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
1st Divisional Train.
1st Divisional M.T. Co.
1st, 2nd, and 141st Field Ambulances.
2nd Mobile Veterinary Section.
Attached Troops.
5th Army Brigade, R.H.A.
298th Army Brigade, R.F.A.
Qth Division. Maj.-Gen. T. O. Marden, C.B., C.M.G.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. T. T. Grove, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. P. Hudson, D.S.O.
imh Infantry Brigade. 18th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. H. A. Walker, C.M.G., (Brig.-Gen. G. S. Craufurd, C.M.G,
D.S.O.) (From October 10th, 1918, CLE., D.S.O., A.D.C.
Brig.-Gen. W. G. Braithwaite,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.)
1st Bn., The Buffs (East Kent 1st Bn., West Yorkshire Regt.
Regt.). 11th Bn., Essex Regt.
1st Bn., King's Shropshire Light In- 2nd Bn., Durham Light Infantry.
fantry.
2nd Bn., York and Lai\caster Regt.
16th Trench Mortar Battery. I8th Trench Mortar Battery.
820 APPENDIX F
71st Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. P. W, Brown, D.S.O.)
9th Bn., Norfolk Regt.
1st Bn., Leicestershire Regt.
2nd Bn., Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regt.).
71st Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. E. F. Delaforce, C.M.G.
2nd and 24th Brigades, R.F.A.
X/6 and Y/6 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
6th Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut. -Col. H. A. L. Hall, M.C.
12th, 459th, and 509th Field Cos., R.E.
6th Divisional Signal Co.
11th Bn., Leicestershire Regt. (Pioneers).
No. 6 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
6th Divisional Train.
6th Divisional M.T. Co.
16th, 17th, and 18th Field Ambulances.
6th Mobile Veterinary Section.
82nd Division.
As for August 8th, except that Brig.-Gen. Sir G. Armytage, Bt., C.M.G. .D.S.O.,
took over command of the 97th Infantry Brigade on October 6th, 1918, and
Lieut.-Col. E. F. G. Dillon, D.S.O., had succeeded Lieut.-Col. A. E. McNamara,
C.M.G., D.S.O., as G.S.O. 1, of the Division.
4,6th (North Midland) Division (T.). Maj.-Gen. G. F. Boyd, C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M.,
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. C. F. Jerram, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. R. Duckworth, D.S.O.
137</i Infantry Brigade. 138</t Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. J. V. Campbell, V.C, (Brig.-Gen. F. G. M. Rowley, C.M.G.,
C.M.G., D.S.O.) D.S.O.)
l/5th Bn., South Staffordshire Regt. l/5th Bn., Lincolnshire Regt.
l/6th Bn., South Staffordshire Regt. l/4th Bn., Leicestershire Regt.
l/6th Bn., North Staffordshire Regt. l/5th Bn., Leicestershire Regt.
137th Trench Mortar Battery. 138th Trench Mortar Battery.
139//i Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. .T. Harington, D.S.O.
l/5th Bn., Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regt.).
l/6th Bn., Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regt.).
l/8th Bn., Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regt.).
139th Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. Sir Hill Child, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.
230th and 231st Brigades, R.F.A.
X/46 and Y/46 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
46th Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. H. T. Morshead, D.S.O.
465th, 466th, and 468th Field Cos., R.E.
46th Divisional Signal Co.
1/lst Bn., Monmouthshire Regt. (Pioneers).
No. 46 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
46th Divisional Train.
46th Divisional M.T. Co.
1/lst, l/2nd, and l/3rd (North Midland) Field Ambulances.
1/lst (North Midland) Mobile Veterinary Section.
APPENDIX F
821
Attached Troops.
16th Army Brigade, R.H.A.
5th Army Brigade, R.F.A.
14th Army Brigade, R.F.A.
23rd Army Brigade, R.F.A.
232nd Army Brigade, R.F.A.
Sir T. L. N. Morland, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
. . Brig.-Gen. I. Stewart, D.S.O.
. . Brig.-Gen. S. W. Robinson, D.S.O.
. . Brig.-Gen. R. A. C. Wellesley, C.B., C.M.G.
. . Brig.-Gen. C. A. Elliott, D.S.O.
E. XIII Corps. Lieut.-Gen.
B.G.G.S
D.A. and Q.M.G.
G.O.C., R.A. . .
C.E
Corps Cyclists.
13th Cyclist Bn.
Corps Heavy Artillery. Brig.-Gen. J. D. Sherer, D.S.O.
( " N " Corps Signal Co.
Corps Signal Troops < Nos. 35 and 95 (Motor) Airline Sections.
I " H " and " VV " Cable Sections.
XIII Corps Troops M.T. Co.
25th Division.
G.S.O. 1
A.A. and Q.M.G
Maj.-Gen. J. R. E. Charles, C.B., D.S.O.
. . Lieut.-Col. D. F. Anderson, D.S.O.
. . Lieut.-Col. Hon. E. P. J. Stourton, D.S.O.
7th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. C. J. Hickie.)
9th Bn., Devonshire Regt.
20th Bn., Manchester Regt.
21st Bn., Manchester Regt.
74ith Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. H. M. Craigie-Halkett,
D.S.O.)
9th Bn., Yorkshire Regt.
11th Bn., Sherwood Foresters (Notting-
hamshire and Derbyshire Regt.).
13th Bn., Durham Light Infantry.
7th Trench Mortar Battery. 74th Trench Mortar Battery.
75th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. M. E. Richardson, D.S.O.)
(From October 1st, 1918, Brig.-Gen. C. W. Frizell, D.S.O., M.C.)
l/8th Bn., Royal Warwickshire Regt.
l/5th Bn., Gloucestershire Regt.
l/8th Bn., Worcestershire Regt.
75th Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. K. J. Kincaid-Smith, C.M.G.
110th and 112th Brigades, R.F.A.
X/25 and Y/25 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
25th Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. R. J. Done, D.S.O.
105th, 106th, and 130th Field Cos., R.E.
25th Divisional Signal Co.
25th Divisional Train.
25th Divisional M.T. Co.
75th, 76th, and 77th Field Ambulances.
37th Mobile Veterinary Section.
D.S.O.
both Division. Maj.-Gen. H.
G.S.O. 1
A.A. and Q.M.G.
C. Jackson, D.S.O.
Lieut.-Col. E. C. Anstey, D.S.O.
Lieut.-Col. A. C. H. Duke, D.S.O.
T T
322 APPENDIX F
14,9th Infantry Brigade. 150th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. P. M. Robinson, C.M.G.) (Brig.-Gen. G. RoUo, D.S.O.)
3rd Bn. Royal Fusiliers. 2nd Bn., Northumberland Fusiliers.
13th Bn. (Scottish Horse), Royal High- 7th Bn., Wiltshire Regt.
landers. 2nd Bn., Royal Munster Fusiliers.
2nd Bn., Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
149th Trench Mortar Battery. 150th Trench Mortar Battery.
15\st Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O.)
6th Bn., Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
1st Bn., King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
4th Bn., King's Royal Rifle Corps.
151st Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. AV. Stirling, D.S.O.
250th and 251st Brigades, R.F.A.
X/50 and Y/50 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
50th Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Lieut. -Col. P. de H. Hall, M.C.
7th, 446th, and 447th Field Cos., R.E.
50th Divisional Signal Co.
5th Bn., Royal Irish Regt. (Pioneers).
No. 50 Bn., Machine Gun Corps.
50th Divisional Train.
50th Divisional M.T. Co.
1/lst, l/3rd, and 2/2nd Northumbrian Field Ambulances.
1/lst Northumbrian Mobile Veterinary Section.
66th Division. Maj.-Gen. H. K. Bethell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
G.S.O. 1 Lieut.-Col. F. P. Nosworthy, D.S.O., M.C.
A.A. and Q.M.G. . . Lieut.-Col. F. J. Lemon, D.S.O.
198th Infantry Brigade. 199th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. A. J. Hunter, D.S.O., M.C.) (Brig.-Gen. G. C. WiUiams, D.S.O.)
6th Bn., Lancashire Fusiliers. 18th Bn., (Lancashire Hussars Yeo.)
5th Bn., Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. The King's (Liverpool Regt.).
6th Bn., Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 9th Bn., Manchester Regt.
5th Bn., The Connaught Rangers.
198th Trench Mortar Battery. 199th Trench Mortar Battery.
South African Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. W. E. C. Tanner, C.M.G., D.S.O.)
1st Bn., South African Infantry.
2nd Bn., South African Infantry.
4th Bn., South African Infantry.
South African Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Artillery. Brig.-Gen. A. Birtwistle, C.M.G., D.S.O.
330th and 331st Brigades, R.F.A.
X/66 and Y/66 Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
66th Divisional Ammunition Column.
Divisional Engineers. Major S. H. Morgan, M.C. (Acting).
430th, 431st, and 432nd Field Cos., R.E.
66th Divisional Signal Co.
9th Bn., Gloucestershire Regt. (Pioneers).
66th Divisional Train.
66th Divisional M.T. Co.
2/2nd and 2/3rd (East Lancashire), and South African Field Ambulances.
1/lst (East Lancashire) Mobile Veterinary Section.
APPENDIX F
323
F. Australian Corps. Lieut.
B.G.G.S
D.A. and Q.M.G.
G.O.C., R.A. . .
C.E
Gen. Sir J. Monash, K.C.B.
. Brig.-Gen. T. A. Blarney, C.M.G., D.S.O.
. Brig.-Gen. R. A. Carnithers, C.B., C.M.G.
. Brig.-Gen. W. A. Coxen, C.M.G., D.S.O.
. Brig.-Gen. C. H. Foott, C.M.G.
Corps Cavalry and Cyclists.
5th Cavalry Brigade (attached). Brig.-Gen. N. W. Haig, C.M.G.
13th Regt., Australian Light Horse.
Australian Cyclist Bn.
Corps Heavy Artillery. Brig.-Gen. L. D. Fraser, C.B., C.M.G.
68, 71, and 89 (8" Howr.) Brigades, R.G.A.
18 and 23 (9.2' Ho^v^.) Brigades, R.G.A.
51 and 93 (Mixed) Brigades, R.G.A.
9, 41, and 85 (Mobile) Brigades, R.G.A.
73 Army Brigade, R.G.A. (H.Q. only).
222, 312, 449, and 504 (6" gun) Siege Batteries, R.G.A.
494 (12" Howr.) Siege Battery, R.G.A.
V/Australian Heavy Trench Mortar Battery, A.F.A.
3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps (also worked with II American Corps).
5tk Tank Brigade. Brig.-Gen. A. Courage, D.S.O., M.C.
3rd Tank Bn. (Whippets).
8th Tank Bn. ) , , , „
13th Tank Bn. f •"^'^'^ ^•
16th Tank Bn. Mark V star.
17th Armoured Car Bn.
( Australian Corps Signal Co.
Corps Signal Troops < Nos. 1 and 2 Australian (Motor) Airline Sections.
I Nos. 1 and 2 Australian Cable Sections.
146 and 238 A.T. Cos., R.E.
1st A.T. Co., Australian Engineers.
1st and 2nd (T.) Cos., Australian Engineers.
No. 2 Advanced Section 353 E. and M. Co.
No. 11 Pontoon Park.
No. 4 Special Co., R.E. (less 1 section).
6th Australian (Corps Troops) M.T. Co.
The 58th Divisional Artillery and the following Array Brigades, R.F.A., were
attached to divisions of the Australian Corps : —
65, 84, 86, 104, 108, and 150.
1st Australian Division.
As for August 8th.
2nd Australian Division.
As for August 8th, except that the 298th Army Brigade, R.F.A., was no longer
attached to the division.
8rd Australian Division.
As for August 8th, except that Brig.-Gen. H. A. Goddard, D.S.O., had taken
over command of the 9th Brigade ; that the 36th Bn. had, owing to lack of
reinforcements, been amalgamated with another battalion in the division ;
the 16th Army Brigade, R.H.A., and the 23rd and 189th Army Brigades,
R.F.A., were no longer attached to the division.
4th Australian Division.
As for August 8th.
5th Australian Division.
As for August 8th, except that the 60th Bn. had, owing to lack of reinforcements,
been amalgamated with another battalion in the division.
324 APPENDIX F
G. II American Corps. Maj.-Gen. G. W. Read.
Chief of Staff . . . . Col. George S. Simonds.
412th Telegraph Bn.
Attached Troops.
3rd Squadron Australian Flying Corps (also worked with Australian Corps),
VII Corps, R.A., H.Q. Brig.-Gen. K. K. Knapp, C.M.G.
VII Corps, H.A., H.q. Brig.-Gen. F. H. Metcalfe, D.S.O.
4.th Tank Brigade. Brig.-Gen. E. B. Hankey, D.S.O.
1st Tank Bn. (Mark V star.)
4th Tank Bn. \,^ , -^r >
301st American Tank Bn./^'"*''*^ ^"^
1st Siege Co., Royal Anglesey, R.E.
144 and 288 A.T. Cos., R.E.
182 (T.) Co., R.E.
No. 1 Advanced Section 353 E. and M. Co.
27th American Division. Maj.-Gen. F. O'Ryan.
Chief of Staff . . . . Lieut.-Col. S. H. Ford.
53rd Infantry Brigade. SUh Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. A. H. Blanding.) (Brig.-Gen. P. D. Pierce.)
105th Regt. (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns.). 107th Regt. (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns.).
106th Regt. (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns.). 108th Regt. (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns.).
105th Machine Gun Bn. 106th Machine Gun Bn.
102nd Engineer Regt.
102nd Field Signal Bn.
104th Machine Gun Bn.
102nd Train Headquarters.
106th and 107th Ambulance Sections.
105th and 106th Field Hospital Sections.
80<^ American Division. Maj.-Gen. E. M. Lewis.
Chief of Staff . . . . Col. John K. Herr.
59th Infantry Brigade. 60th Infantry Brigade.
(Brig.-Gen. L. D. Tyson.) (Brig.-Gen. S. L. Faison.)
117th Regt. (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns.). 119th Regt. (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns.).
118th Regt. (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns.). 120th Regt. (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns.).
114th Machine Gun Bn. 115th Machine Gun Bn.
105th Engineer Regt.
105th Field Signal Bn.
113th Machine Gun Bn.
105th Train Headquarters.
118th and 119th Ambulance Sections.
118th and 119th Field Hospitals.
November 4th.
A. Fourth Army. Gen. Sir H. S. Rawlinson, Bart., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
Staff as for August 8th.
Army Troops.
5th Brigade, R.A.F. Brig.-Gen. L. E. O. Charlton, C.M.G., D.S.O.
15th Wing. Lieut.-Col. J. A. Chamier, D.S.O., O.B.E.
3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, 6 (R.E.8), 8 (A.W.B.) and 73
(Camel) Squadrons (working with Tank Corps).
22nd Wing. Lieut.-Col. T. A. E. Cairnes, D.S.O.
24, 84, 85, and 92 (S.E. 5), 23 (Dolphin), 46, 80, and 208 (Camel), 20
(Bristol Fighter), 211, and 218 Squadrons.
5th Balloon Wing. Lieut.-Col. F. F. M. Roxby.
4th Aircraft Park. 4th Air Ammunition Column. 4th Reserve Lorry Park.
APPENDIX F 325
Artillery.
Half 456 Siege Battery, R.G.A. (9"2" gun on railway mounting).
Half 471 Siege Battery, R.G.A. (14" gun on railway mounting).
Half 543 Siege Battery, R.G.A. (12' gun on railway mounting).
374 Siege Battery, R.G.A. (no guns).
Tanks.
2nd Tank Brigade. (These Headquarters worked with both IX and XIII
Corps).
1 Co. 14th Tank Bn. (Mark V).
17th Armoured Car Bn.
A.A. Defence. Lieut.-Col. R. Bruce Hay, D.S.O.
" F," " G," " P," " Q," and " Z " A.A. Batteries.
50th (Field Searchlight) Co., R.E.
6, 7, 16, 17, 29, 36, and 69 A.A. Searchlight Sections, R.E.
No. 6 A.A. Co., 44th Garrison Bn., Royal Fusiliers.
5th Field Survey Bn. Lieut.-Col. F. B. Legh, M.C.
2, 13, 14, and 24 Observation Groups.
" A," " B," " G," " K," " O," and " R " Sound Ranging Sections.
Fourth Army Signal Co.
43, 45, 48, and 53 (Motor) Airline Sections.
" BL " and " BM " Cable Sections.
No. 4 Telegraph Construction Co., R.E.
No. 4 Signal Construction Co., R.E.
546 and 648 Field Cos., R.E. (less H.Q. and two sections).
213 A.T. Co., R.E.
353 E. and M. Co. (less 2 advanced sections).
No. 3 Water Boring Section.
Nos. 8 and 11 Pontoon Parks.
4th Army Troops M.T. Co.
B. IX Corps. Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. P. Braithwaite, K.C.B.
B.G.G.S Brig.-Gen. A. R. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G.
D.A. and Q.M.G. . . Brig.-Gen. J. C. Harding-Newman, C.M.G.
G.O.C., R.A Brig.-Gen. G. Humphreys, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.E Brig.-Gen. R. A. Gillam, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Corps Cavalry and Cyclists.
5th Cavalry Brigade (less 1 Regt.). Brig.-Gen. N. W. Haig, C.M.G.
9th Cyclist Bn.
Corps Heavy Artillery. Brig.-Gen. G. B. Mackenzie, C.M.G., D.S.O.
12, 14, 68 and 71 (8" Howr.) Brigades, R.G.A.
18, 69, and 98 (9-2" Howr.) Brigades, R.G.A.
61, 79, 83, and 93 (Mixed) Brigades, R.G.A.
9, 21, and 41 (Mobile) Brigades, R.G.A.
222, 498, and 499 (6" gun) Siege Batteries, R.G.A.
50 (6" gun on naval mounting).
80 and 494 (12" Howr.).
No. 1 (12" Howr.) Siege Battery, R.M.A.
V/IX Heavy Trench Mortar Battery, R.G.A
9 Squadron, R.A.F. (R.E. 8).
10th Tank Bn. (Mark V).
E " Corps Signal Co.
Corps Signal Troops \ Nos. 11 and 81 (Motor) Airline Sections.
AA," " BT," and " SV " Cable Sections.
826 APPENDIX F
No. 3 (Royal Horse Guards) Bn., Guards Machine Gun Regt.
648 Field Co. (less 2 sections).
No. 4 Siege Co., R.A., R.E.
146, 221, 238, and 567 A.T. Cos., R.E.
253, 254, and 256 (T.) Cos., R.E.
1st (T.) Co., Australian Engineers.
No. 1 Adv. Section, 353 E. and M. Co.
No. 1 Special Co., R.E. (4" Stokes' Mortars).
IX Corps Troops M.T. Co.
Ist Division.
As for September 29th, except that the 23rd Army Brigade, R.F.A., was attached
to the division.
6th Division.
As for September 29th.
32nd Division.
As for September 29th, except that the 16th Army Brigade, R.H.A., and the
5th and 14th Army BrigadeSj R.F.A., were attached to the division.
iGth {North Midland) Division {T.).
As for September 29th, except that Lieut. -Col. W. Garforth, D.S.O., M.C., had
taken over command of the Royal Engineers, and that there were no Army
Brigades, R.F.A., attached.
C. XIII Corps. Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. L. N. Morland, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
B.G.G.S..
D.A. and Q.M.G.
G.O.C., R.A. .
C.E.
Brig.-Gen. I. Stewart, D.S.O.
Brig.-Gen. S. W. Robinson, D.S.O.
Brig.-Gen. R. A. C. Wellesley, C.B., C.M.G.
Brig.-Gen. C. A. Elliott, D.S.O.
Corps Cavalry and Cyclists.
1/lst Northumberland Hussars.
13th Cyclist Bn.
No. 11 Group of Sharpshooters (Lovat's Scouts).
Corps Heavy Artillery. Brig.-Gen. J. D. Sherer, D.S.O.
47 (8" Howr.) Brigade, R.G.A.
23 (9-2" Howr.) Brigade, R.G.A.
27 and 76 (Mixed) Brigades, R.G.A.
85 (Mobile) Brigade, R.G.A.
73 Army Brigade, R.G.A. (H.Q. only).
189, 312, 449, 504, and 545 (6" gun) Siege Batteries, R.G.A.
243 a2" Howr.) Siege Battery, R.G.A.
V/XIII Heavy Trench Mortar Battery, R.G.A.
35 Squadron, R.A.F. (A.W.B.).
12th Lancers (from 5th Cavalry Brigade) attached.
9th Tank Bn. (Mark V).
14th Tank Bn. (less 1 company), (Mark V).
( " N " Corps Signal Co.
Corps Signal Troops < Nos. 35 and 95 (Motor) Airline Sections.
( " H " and " VV " Cable Sections.
No. 1 Siege Co., Royal Anglesey, R.E.
144, 283, 288, and 574 A.T. Cos., R.E.
180 and 182 (T.) Cos., R.E.
No. 2 Adv. Section, 353 E. and M. Co.
Xm Corps Troops M.T. Co.
APPENDIX F 327
18th (Eastern) Division.
As for September 29th, except that the 74th Divisional Artillery was no longer
under the 18th Division, and the 65th and 84th Army Brigades, R.F.A.,
were attached. Lieut.-Col. K. C. Weldon, D.S.O., and Lieut.-Col. A. P. B.
Irwin, D.S.O., had taken over command of the 54th and 55th Brigades
respectively.
25th Division.
As for September 29th, except that the 25th Bn., Machine Gun Corps, and the
11th Bn. South Lancashire Regt. (Pioneers) had joined the division. The
150th Army Brigade, R.F.A., was attached.
50th Division.
As for September 29th, except that the 86th and 104th Army Brigades, R.F.A-
were attached.
Lieut.-Col. A. K. Grant, D.S.O., had succeeded Lieut.-Col. E. C. Anstey, D.S.O.,
as G.S.O. 1 of the division.
66th Division.
As for September 29th, except that the 100th Bn., Machine Gun Corps, had joined
the division as Machine Gun Bn., and that Lieut.-Col. Q. S. Davies, D.S.O.,
had assumed command of the Royal Engineers.
D. Australian Corps. Lieut. -Gen. Sir J. Monash, K.C.B.
B.G.G.S Brig.-Gen. T. A. Blamey, C.M.G., D.S.O.
D.A. and Q.M.G. . . Brig.-Gen. R. A. Carruthers, C.B., C.M.G.
G.O.C., R.A Brig.-Gen. W. A. Coxen, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.E Brig.-Gen. C. H. Foott, C.M.G.
Corps Cavalry and Cyclists.
13th Regt., Australian Light Horse.
Australian Cyclist Bn.
Corps Heavy Artillery. Brig.-Gen. L. D. Fraser, C.B., C.M.G.
V/Australian Heavy Trench Mortar Battery, A.F.A.
f Australian Corps Signal Co.
Corps Signal Troops I Nos. 1 and 2 Australian (Motor) Airline Sections.
( Nos. 1 and 2 Australian Cable Sections.
3rd, 6th, and 12th Army Brigades, A.F.A.
1st A.T. Co., Australian Engineers.
2nd (T.) Co., Australian Engineers.
6th Australian (Corps Troops) M.T. Co.
1st Australian Division.
As for September 29th.
2nd Australian Division.
As for September 29th.
8rd Australian Division.
As for September 29th, except that the 37th and 42nd Bns. had, owing to lack
of reinforcements, been amalg.amated with other battalions in the division.
Brig.-Gen. C. H. Jess, D.S.O., had assumed command of the 10th Brigade on
October 7th and Lieut.-Col. E. H. Harrison had become G.S.O. 1 of the
division.
Mh Australian Division.
As for September 29th.
5th Australian Division.
As for September 29th, except that the 29th and 54th Bns. had, owing to lack
of reinforcements, been amalgamated with other battalions in the division.
II Americax Corps {Hth and 30th American Divisions).
As for September 29th, except that no British troops were attached, as the corps
was resting in back areas.
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APPENDIX H
Extracts from captured German Orders issued during the
first half of september, 1918
C.G.S. of the Field Army. G.H.Q.
II No. 10144. Secret op. 3/9/18.
An increase has recently taken place in the number of complaints received from home
that men on leave from the front create a very unfavourable impression by making
statements actually bordering on high treason and incitement to disobedience. Instances
such as these drag the honour and respect of the individual as well as of the whole Army
into the mud, and have a disastrous effect upon the moral of the people at home.
No doubt such expressions often emanate from a certain irritation which changes
into an explicable anger at the sight of the superficiality, war- weariness, and despondency
which is unfortunately so widely prevalent at home. In order to counter this, it will
suffice to bring home to the men by careful teaching the consequences of such action,
especially if it is pointed out that, while travelling through the country, the soldier generally
only sees the surface, and that the honest toil and the severe struggle which is going on
at home is not apparent to him. It seems, however, as though some people were con-
sciously adopting a line of conduct hostile to the State. Energetic steps must be taken
to stop this.
I therefore request that : —
(1) All ranks be instructed on this point.
(2) Suspects be deprived of their leave.
(3) Men be informed that the home authorities have been instructed to take
immediate action in such cases, with the result that offenders will be immediately
returned to their unit, where they will be punished and, possibly, posted to a military
prisoner company.
(Sd.) LUDENDORFF.
Order of 1st Reserve Division, dated September 15th, 1918.
" Cases have occurred of men describing recent occurrences on the front in the
gloomiest fashion, and of the local inhabitants obtaining knowledge of this. Such occur-
rences can only be attributed to notoriety-seeking chatterers, entirely devoid of conscience.
Troops are to be instructed most earnestly in the danger which lies in the spreading of false
and exaggerated accounts of events. The passing on of such stories to members of the
population hostile to us borders on high treason. A corresponding punishment wiU be
awarded in every single case, and the extreme penalties allowed by law will be inflicted."
Order of 38th Division, dated September 8th, 1918.
Instructions are given regarding march discipline, saluting, and dress : —
" Every opportunity and all means must be used to restore the old discipline among
the troops.
" I expect this short reminder of our long-established principles to be sufficient to
awaken in all officers and N.C.O.'s an understanding of the value of strict discipline and
that the end in view will always be realised, i.e., keeping the troops well in hand in all
circumstances."
Order of 9Uh Infantry Regiment {38th Division), doled September 15th, 1918.
" I expect the battalion, as Hitherto, to do its duty and discharge its obligations also
during this period of stationary warfare in the responsible position in which it is placed.
" To secure better rationing for the next four days. I have granted every company
200 marks out of the canteen fimds.
APPENDIX H 833
" Every commander and every man is to be most minutely instructed in the importance
of holding the outpost and forward zones as long as possible and of retaking them if lost.
In case of an attack on a large scale, the main line of resistance must be held absolutely
intact.
" Company commanders are personally responsible for carrying out this order.
" For bringing in a prisoner a reward of 100 marks is offered."
Draft of an order from the \\9th Division for inclusion in regimental orders, dated
September I6th, 1918.
" There will be a lecture and conference for all officers and N.C.O.'s at the earliest
possible date, with the object of pointing out how immeasurably important it is that the
troops should now hold their ground more than ever, and that there can be no question
of going back a single step farther.
" We want to show the British, the French, and the Americans that any further
attacks of theirs on the Siegfried Line will be completely broken, and that this line is an
impregnable rampart — with the result that the Entente Powers will condescend to consider
the peace terras which are absolutely necessary to us before we can end this war. In other
words, each step backward now means a lengthening of the war ; a successful stand, on
the other hand, will give us the prospect of an early peace. Every man has got to be clearly
convinced of these facts and company officers must be constantly telling their men this.
I wish all conomanding officers to take similar steps."
Extract from an order of the 1st Reserve Division, dated September 16th, 1918 {the
Division was then in line near Bellenglise), issued down to companies in the
59th Reserve Infantry Regiment.
" At the present moment the enemy has gained the initiative. He must and will
continue his attacks. In cases where he does not aim at far-reaching objectives, he will
attack in order to keep us in a state of uncertainty and to tie down our forces.
" The enemy will not consider that the wire and trenches of the Siegfried Line con-
stitute any extraordinary obstacle to his further advance, as his great successes have
strengthened his consciousness of superiority, while the strength and condition of our
troops cannot be unknown to him.
" An attack on our front, even on a large scale, is, therefore, quite possible and by
no means improbable. If the enemy is actually planning such an attack, his endeavour
can only be to carry it out as soon as possible, before we have settled down in our old
system of trenches and to enable him to get the Siegfried Line behind him. There can be
no doubt that he possesses the means to overcome the difficulties which confront him.
" We must, therefore, count on a hostile attack, and also that it may be deUvered at
any time.
" We must also make up our minds that, in view of our general situation and to prevent
further harm being done to the moral of the troops, the attack, when it comes, must be
completely repulsed.
" It is, therefore, the more necessary that all arms and auxiliary sers'ices should be
employed and utilised to their fullest extent in view of the fact that the infantry needs
all the support imaginable.
" In these circumstances, the defence cannot now be organised, systematically step
by step, so as to secure careful and thorough work, but the organisation must be rather
carried out simultaneously in all spheres, and so rapidly that we are able, at all times, to
meet any attack with confidence.
" To secure this, the utmost exertions are required especially on the part of the com-
manders whose duty it is to make preparations for operations, and energetic measures are
necessary.
" Wherever the defences, in consequence of this fact, are at first only of a temporary
nature, they must, if the enemy leave us sufficient time, continually be improved and
strengthened in accordance with the principles laid down for the defensive battle.
" I expect that full justice will be done to these considerations, and I draw attention
to the fact that, here too, negligence and omissions have more serious results than mistakes
in the choice of material."
(Sd.) Count von Waldersee.
APPENDIX J
Notes on Machine Gun Organisation and Tactics
It is difficult to realise the enormous strides that have been made in the development
of the Machine Gun Corps both as regards numbers and tactics since 1914. We began the
war with only two machine-guns per infantrj' battalion ; moreover, at that time, the
infantry had no Lewis guns or other pattern of automatic small arm. Very early in the
war this paucity of machine-guns was fully realised, and great efforts were made to increase
the supply. Thus, by the early part of 1916, machine-guns were organised in companies
of 16 guns, at the rate of one company to each infantry brigade. The next stage in
development was reached early in 1918 when the Brigade Machine Gun Companies were
organised into battalions of four companies, 16 guns each, with a Lieutenant-Colonel in
command. One battalion was allotted to each division, and senior Machine Gun Corps
officers were attached to General Headquarters, and to the headquarters of armies and
corps, to assist the General Staff in all questions relating to the organisation and tactical
employment of machine-guns. The principal results of these changes may be summarised
as follows : —
(1) The disciplme of the machine-gunners improved rapidly as the result of the
presence of senior officers in the Machine Gun Corps.
(2) The recognition of their corporate unity naturally promoted " Esprit de
Corps."
(3) It became possible to arrange for the co-ordination and collective action of
the machine-guns within the division, and even within corps.
In the battle of the Somme in 1916 there was very little collective action or weight of
fire power from the machine-guns, whereas in 1918, in the operations described, many
instances occurred of the collective use of machine-guns on a large scale, especially at the
capture of the outer defences of the Hindenburg Line, and later in the attack on the main
Hindenburg Line itself. There is no question that the deluge of machine-gun bullets,
which rained down on the enemy positions in 1918, had a large share in the success of
the operations. In addition to this heavy covering fire, machine-guns were also invari-
ably detailed for the close support of the advancing infantry, and there are countless
instances of the good work performed by these forward guns.
In order to explain the method of their employment the action of the machine-guns
supporting the attack of the 4th Australian Division on September 18th is here given in
some detail as being typical of the employment of machine-guns during the hundred days.^
For this operation the 4th Australian Division had at its disposal the 4th and 5th Australian
Machine Gun Battalions, of 64 guns each. These were organised under three categories,
" rear " or " barrage " guns, " support " guns, and " forward " guns.
The 64 " rear " guns were found by the 5th Australian Machine Gun Battalion, whose
task was to supplement the artillery barrage supporting the infantry advance to the first
objective, and subsequently to maintain a protective barrage beyond that objective until
the advance was continued. On completion of their task they remained in their barrage
positions, which are shown in yellow circles on the map, to provide the necessary defence
in depth. The preliminary arrangements for these 64 " barrage " guns entailed very heavy
work in bringing up ammunition, oil, water, and other stores, the selection and preparation
of gun positions, and the arrangements for communications.
« See Map No. 19.
334
APPENDIX J 335
The " support " guns, consisting of two machine-gun companies, 32 guns, were
furnished by the 4th Austrahan Machine Gun Battahon. These guns moved forward ten
minutes after '' zero," followed the infantry as the latter advanced to the first objective,
and from there supplemented the artillery barrage covering the further advance to the
second objective. The guns were brought up in limbered wagons to their assembly
Eositions in rear of the infantry " starting line," be3'ond which they were carried by
and. On arrival at the first objective, the guns were grouped in batteries of four in
positions previously selected on the map from which to cover the advance to the second
objective. On the right, the machine-gunners, moving forward in the mist to these
positions, found some of the trenches on the first objective, which had apparently been
missed by the infantry, still held by the enemy. These were captured without difficulty,
and all the " support " guns were in the positions shown by red circles on the map, and laid
on to their barrage lines, within an hour of arrival.
The " forward " guns, 32 in number, were provided by the remaining two companies
of the 4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion, one company working with each attacking
brigade ; their task was to provide the requisite fire in close support of the infantry as
it advanced. These machine-guns with their ammunition and stores were carried on
limbered wagons up to the infantry " starting line," beyond which pack animals were
used.*
After the first, second, and part of the third objective had been captured, it was
decided to postpone the completion of the task allotted to the division until 11 p.m., and
orders were issued for machine-gun co-operation.^ The " support " guns were ordered up
from their positions on the first objective, marked with red circles on the map, to positions
on the second objective, marked with green circles on the map, from which they were to fire
a barrage at 11 p.m. All the guns were in position and ready to fire by 9 p.m., having
advanced 4,000 yards during the day's fighting.
From the examination of prisoners there is no doubt that the machine-gun barrages
on the 18th had had a great moral and material effect, and had aided the 4th Australian
Division very materially in attaining all its objectives with abnormally few casualties.
The ammunition expenditure of the 4th and 5th Australian Machine Gun Battalions
during the 18th amounted to the enormous total of 354,750 rounds. Of these, 342,000
were expended by indirect, and the remainder by direct fire.
' The pack animals were able to get forward to the third objective, only one being killed and eight
wounded during the advance.
' For the account of the attack of the 4th Australian Division, see pp. 128 et aeq.
APPENDIX K
The Adventures of a Whippet Tank on August 8th
The experiences of a whippet tank of " B " Company of the 6th Tank BattaHon will
give some idea of the work which the tanks performed during the operations. This tank, under
the command of Lieut. Arnold and with a crew of two men, was one of the company of
tanks detailed to accompany the leading troops of the 1st Cavalry Division in the attack
on August 8th. At " zero " it proceeded across country south of the Amiens-Chaulnes
railway together with the other tanks of " B " Company. After proceeding some distance
it found itself ahead of the other whippets and near some Mark V tanks ; these were being
followed by infantry, and were under fire from a German battery situated between Bayon-
villers and Warfusee-Abancourt, the fire from which put out of action two Mark V tanks.
Seeing this, Lieut. Arnold engaged the battery by running diagonally across its front, narrowly
escaping being hit. Having passed out of view of the battery behind a belt of trees he
manoeuvred to attack the battery from the rear, and, when he charged it, the artillerymen
to the number of about 30 abandoned the guns and attempted to escape, but all were
accounted for. The whippet then moved on, accounting for a large number of Germans,
who were in full retreat and appeared quite demoralised, and assisting two cavalry patrols
to advance by killing some Germans who were holding them up on the edge of a cornfield.
Shortly afterwards Lieut. Arnold found another cavalry patrol checked by some Germans
who were firing over the parapet of a railway bridge, so he drove his tank up on to the
railway embankment until he could obtain a clear view of the bridge, when he opened fire
on the enemy, killing some and driving the others away. The whippet, now quite alone,
proceeded eastwards to a small valley between Bayonvillers and Harbonniferes, shown
as containing hutments on the maps issued for the use of the tank commanders. On
entering the valley a large number of Germans were discovered packing their kits prepara-
tory to flight, of these at least 60 were killed. The whippet then pursued the retiring
enemy, engaging them at ranges of from 200-600 yards, but, being alone, was the
target for heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. Up to this time all had gone well, but now the
petrol from some spare tins on the roof, which were perforated by bullets, began to run
into the inside of the tank. The fumes, combined with the intense heat, made it necessary
for the crew to breathe through their box respirators. Nothing daunted, the whippet again
advanced eastward at 2 p.m. and ran into a stream of motor vehicles, horse transport, and
crowds of infantry all retiring in confusion. A lorry was put out of action by shooting
the driver, and heavy casualties were inflicted on the infantry at ranges of from 400-500
yards ; indescribable confusion was caused amongst the mass of horse and motor transport.
The enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire now grew so intense that it was difficult to return
the fire. Finally, the lett-hand revolver port was shot away, and the fumes and heat com-
bined became so bad that Lieut. Arnold ordered the driver to turn about and withdraw ;
unluckily at this moment two concussions were felt, and the tank burst into flames. The
two men reached the door and collapsed ; Lieut. Arnold was almost overcome, but managed
to open the door and drag out his comrades. To add to their difficulties the ground on
which they were lying was running with burning petrol, and they were forced to make a
rush to get further away. In this rush one of the crew was killed by a bullet, and Lieut.
Arnold and the other man were enveloped in flames, which they tried to extinguish by rolling
over on the ground. Meanwhile a number of Germans were approaching from all sides ;
the first arrival wounded Lieut. Arnold in the arm with his bayonet, the second knocking
him senseless with the butt of his rifle. On recovering consciousness he found himself
surrounded by an infuriated mob, who kicked him mercilessly. The subsequent treatment
of this oflicer was equally brutal, as, on refusing to give information to a German officer
during his examination, he was struck in the face, and later received five days' solitary con-
finement in a room with no vnndow.
The story of this gallant exploit, typical of the work of the Tank Corps throughout
the operations, was supplied by Major-Gen. Hugh Elles, the Commander of the Tank
Corps, to whom the Fourth Army owes much, not only for his assistance during the hundred
days, but for the high moral with which he had infused the officers and men of the Tank
Corps.
836
INDEX
Note. — For formations, units, etc., not referred to in the Index, see details in Appendix F.
Abbeville, 13, 139
Ablaincourt, occupied, Aug. 28 : 91
Accroche Wood, sector, 17 ; captured, Aug. 8 : 40
Aohiet, captured, Aug. 22 : 72
Aerodromes, German, new, Oct. 14 : 206 ; evacua-
tion of, Oct. 6 : 191 ; withdrawal of,
Oct. 31 : 238
Aeroplane Patrols {see also Contact Patrols),
services of, 19
Aeroplanes, surprise attack in daylight rendered
difficult by, 268
British, bombing attacks and bomb-dropping
by, 25, 157, 189
Used to drown noise of tanks, 24, 28, 125, 156,
157
British and German, numbers brought down, etc.,
on various dates, see Royal Air Force,
Work of
German, attacks by, on British cavalry, Oct.
8-9 : 197, 198 n.
Ailette river, 72 n.
Air Photographs, issue of, prior to Aug. 8 : 25 «£; n.,
26 ; value of, 16, 123, 204 ; artillery
instructions based on, Nov. 4 : 245
Air Reconnaissance, see R.A.F., Work of, see also
Contact Patrols
Aisonville, 206, 225, 229
Aizecourt-Ie-Haut, 97, 108, 109
Albert I., King of the Belgitins, success of,
Sept. 28-9 : 9, 138 n., 145
Albert, Aug.-Sept. : 13, 16, 21, 22, 67 n., 82, 112,
140 ; captured, Aug. 22 : 73, 74, 76
Defences near, British, 5
German, 15
German withdrawal from (Aug.), 14, 86, 112
Albert-Bapaume road, Aug. 23 : 82
Albertr-Mdaulte road, Aug. 22 : 76
AUaines, Sept. 1-2 : 106, 109, 110
Allason, Brig.-Gen. W., D.S.O., G.O.C. 52nd Inf.
Brig., 316
Allied Armies, see each Army
Allonville, Aug. 8 : 40
America, U.S., Civil War in, lessons of, as drawn by
Henderson, 270
American Forces, see also under Armies, Com-
ponent Parts, aiid in Appendix F
Arrival of, efiect on German moral, 70
Attack on St. Mihiel Salient, Sept. 12, success
of, 137
. Soldiers> characteristics shown by, 6, 10 n., 67,
' 103, 162 <fc 71., 163, 168, 217, 231
Americans, isolated parties in advance of British
line, Sept. 30 : 171
Amey, L/Cpl. W., V.C, 252-3, 280, 281
FOUEia AEMT ^37
Amiens, situation in front of, at end of March, and
in April, 2, 3 n.
British defences constructed April-July : 5, 175
German advance on, March: 2
German defences before, state of, July : 5, 15
Last German attempt on, 2, 4
Rest areas near, 139, 175, 176, 189
Amiens, Battle of, 1, 44 ; plans for, 6, 7, 18 agg. ;
concentration of troops for, 7, 19, 27,
28, 29 ; attack of Aug. 8 : 31 sgg. ;
progress of, Aug. 9-1 1 : 52 agg. ; events
from Aug. 12 : 64 sgg. ; results, 9,
68-70, 121
Amiens, Defences
Inner, 15, 16
Outer, 15, 16, 66, 73
Attacked, Aug. 8-10: 22, 23, 39, 40, 43,
46, 56
Occupied, 45, 57, 61
Amiens-Brie road, Aug. &-26 : 42, 43 n., 54, 61,
67, 79, 87
Amiens -Chaulnes railway, 32 n., 36, 40, 54
Amiens-Roye road, Aug. 1 sgg., 14, 15, 17, 20,
21-2, 33, 39, 44, 53, 66
Ammunition
Daily expenditure by Fourth Army Aug. 8-
Nov. 1 1 : Appendix G, 328
Expenditure of, in attack on Hindenburg Line,
154
Ammunition dumps, German, emptied, Oct. 6 : 191
Ammunition supplies by aeroplane, Aug . 8 :
24 <fc n.
Difficulties concerning, 63, 154, 203, 204, 207
Ancre river, July, Aug., Sept. : 5, 13, 21, 22, 46,
49, 55, 115; German defences on, 15;
German withdrawal behind, 14 ; attack
N. of, 71, 72, 73 ; crossing of, 74, 76 ;
marshes of, 73, 76, 82
Anderson, Brig.-Gen. S. M., D.S.O., G.O.C. 1st Aus.
Divl. ArtiUery, 313
Anderson, Lieut.-Col. D. F., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1,
25th Div., 321
Andigny Forest, Oct. 8-18 : 192, 206, 209, 210, 211,
213, 226, 229
Andigny-les-Fermes, Oct. 9-17 : 199, 202, 205, 206,
209, 210, 212, 213, 215, 225. 226; cap-
ture of, 211
Andigny-les-Fermes-Bellevue Ridge, Oct. 11 : 202
Andigny-les-Ferraes-Menne\Tet road, Oct. 17: 211
Angin Farm, Oct. 17 : 213
Anstey, Lieut.-Col. E. C, D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 50th
Div., 321
Anti-Aircraft Defence, see Appendix F, 302, 317,
325
Anvil Wood, Aug. 31-Sept. 1 : 99, 100, 101, 104,
106
X X
338
INDEX
Appendices, 272 sqq.
Arbre Guemon, Oct. 17 : 206, 216, 217
Arbre Guemon-Le Cateau road, Oct. 17 : 217, 218,
219-20, 227
Archibald, Sapper A., V.C, 251, 280, 281
Arcy Woods, Aug. 23 : 78 ; 15-inch gun found in,
81 n.
Arderlu Wood, Aug. 31 : 102
Argonne, the, operations in, Sept. 26-8 : 137,
145, 191
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
10th Batt., Oct. 2 : 176 <t- n. ; at Maroilles,
Nov. 5 : 257
Armenti^res, 191
Armies
AUied
Attacks of, on other parts of the Front,
Sept. 26-8 : 145
Ruthless offensive policy of, 68 ; attack
ordered on whole front, for Aug. 23 :
72 n. ; general advance of, 73
Success of, in Belgium, 9, 138 n., 145
American (»<■►• also Corps (II) American), 145
Rapid increase of, 9, 68
First, near Verdun, Aug. 23 : 67
Belgian, 9, 137
British
First
Canadian forces associated with, at diSerent
dates, 19, 66, 85
Operations of, Aug.-Nov.
German withdrawal in front of, in con-
templation, Aug. 21 sqq. : 72 ; Drocourt-
Queant Line stormed bj', Sept. 2 : 9,
113; task aUotted to, for Sept. 27:
137 <t- n. ; attack by, Sept. 27-8 :
138, 145 ; divisions transferred to,
Sept. 24, Oct. 3 : 139, 174, and the
capture of the Hindenburg Defences,
189, 190 ; task allotted to, for Oct. 17 :
203 ; advance of, end of Oct., 237 ;
victory of, at Valenciennes, results,
Nov. 2 : 240 ; plan of concerted attack
on Nov. 4 : 240 ; success of, 256
Line reached by, at armistice, Nov. 11 : 261
Second
Operations of, Aug.-Nov.
Canadian troops moved to, 19 ; ground
gained by (Aug. 22), 72 n. ; attack by, in
Flanders, Sept. : 9
Line reached by, at armistice, Nov. 11 :
261
Third
Operations of, Aug.-Nov.
Advance of, on Bapaume, Aug. 22 sqq. :
73 <fc n., 82 ; pressure by, eSects of, 84,
86 ; Bapaume captured by, Aug. 29 :
94; position of, Sept. 4: 114; task
of, for Sept 27: 137, 138 otn., 140;
attack by, Sept. 27 : 145, and the
element of surprise, 261 ; co-operation
of, vrith Fourth Army, Oct. 3 sqq. : 177,
185, 191 ; situation on front of, Oct. 3,
p.m., 184, and the capture of the
Hindenburg Defences, Oct. 8 : 189,
190; attack of, ordered for Oct. 8
191, 193; advance of, Oct. 9-11
197, 202 ; task allotted to, for Oct. 17
203 ; co-operation of, in attack on Oct.
23 : 231-2 ; progress of, 237 ; victory
at Valenciennes, Nov. 2 : 240 ; plan
for general attack, 241 ; general attack,
Nov. 4 : 247, 256
Line reached by, at armistice, Nov. 11 :
261
Armies — cont.
British — cont.
Fourth
Captures, casualties, and reinforcements,
March to Nov. 1918 : Appendix A, 274 ;
captures and casualties, Aug. 8 to Nov.
11, 1918 : Appendix B, 275
Commanders and composition of, see Appen-
dix F, 301 sqq.
Losses, in killed, wounded and missing, 262
Moral of, see Moral, British
Moral effect of, success of, on Aug. 8 : 1
Number of divisions employed by, and
number of German divisions engaged by,
262
Operations of, before and during the Battles
of the Himdred Days, 1 sqq. passim
Sequence of, during JIarch-July : 3 sqq. ;
plans for counter-offensive, July 16 : 7
sqq. ; preparations for the offensive,
mid- July to Aug. 8 : 11 sqq. ; Battle of
Amiens, Aug. 8 sqq., summary of
events, 30 sqq. ; the advance to Peronne,
Aug. 21-30: 71 sqq.; the Battle of
Mont St. Quentin, Aug. 30-Sept. 2,
and subsequent events, 96 sqq. ; the
advance to the Hindenburg Line,
Sept. 5-28: 114 sqq ; orders to, for
Sept. 27 and 29 : 138 ; the storming of
the Hindenburg Line, Sept. 29 : 147 sqq. ;
completion of capture of Hindenburg
Defences, Sept. 30-Oct. 2, and capture
of Beaurevoir hne, Oct. 3-5 : 170 sqq. ;
the advance to Le Cateau, Oct. 6-16 :
192 sqq. ; the Battle of the Selle, Oct.
17-18, and subsequent events to Oct.
31 : 209 sqq. ; the crossing of the Sambre
and Oise Canal, and the events leading
up to the armistice, Nov. 1-11 : 238
sqq. ; line held by, at the armistice,
261 <fc n.
Summarised, 1, 10
Prisoners and guns captured, 262, and see
Appendices A and B, 275, 276
Tactical questions arising during, 263 sqq.
" Zero " hour usual in, 268
Fifth
Position of, at end of March : 2 ; relieved
by Fourth Army, ib.
Divisions and corps joining and trans-
ferred to, Sept. 7, 24 & Oct. 3: 115,
139, 175
Ground gained by, up to Aug. 22 : 72 n.
Line reached by, at armistice, Nov. 11 : 261
French, see also Allied
First, 23
Junction of, with British, 13, 114, 231,-
German thrust at (March-April), 3 <fc n.
Operations of, April-July, and Aug.-
Nov. : at Hangard (April 24-5), 4 ;
placed under Sir Douglas Haig to co-
operate with Fourth Army, 12 ; ex-
tension of scope of, Aug. 5 : 18 ; task
allotted to, for Aug. 8 : 22 ; Franco-
British liaison force, Aug. 8 : 35 ;
attack by, Aug. 8 : 50-1 ; advance of,
Aug. 9 : 51, 53, 57 ; extension of front
to the N., Aug. 17 : 65 ; progress of,
Aug. 1 1-20 : 66 ; Canadian front taken
over by, Aug. 19-27 : 66 ; under Sir
Douglas Haig till Aug. 16 : 66 n. ;
effect of advance of, Aug. 8 : 68 ;
advance of, on Ham, Aug. 22 sqq. :
73 <fc n., 113 ; advance of, in co-opera,
tion with Australian corps, Aug. 27 ;
INDEX
339
Armies — cont.
French — cont.
First — cont.
Junction of — cont.
Operations of — con
89 ; advance of, to Canal du Nord,
Aug. 28 : 91 ; junction effected with,
by 32nd Div., Aug. 28 : 93 ; advance
of, Sept. 6 : 117 ; co-operation of with
attack of Fourth Army planned, 122 ;
objectives, 123-4 ; attacks by, Sept.
24 : 142, 143, 144 ; co-operation of in
attack of, Sept. 29 : 153 ; advance on
Sept. 30 -Oct. 1: 171; objectives,
Oct. 3 : 177 ; task allotted to, by Marshal
Foch, 178; extension of front, 180;
progress of, Oct. 4 : 185 ; objectives
for Oct. 8 sqq. : 193 ; counter-attack
against, Oct. 7 : 194 ; advance of,
Oct. 8 : 195 ; advance of Oct. 9 : 197 ;
Oct. 1 1 : 202 ; operations planned for
Oct. 17 : 203, 206 ; success of, Oct.
17-18 : 225, 229 ; co-operation of
planned for attack about Oct. 21 :
226 ; progress of, end of Oct. : 237 ;
plans for further advance of Nov. 1—6
sqq. : 240, 241 ; advance in pursuit,
256, 257, 259
Group of, of the North and North-East, 66 n.
Third, 7
Joining in the offensive, Aug. 8 : 8 ;
acti\nties of, on Aug. 10-20, and with-
drawal of, 66, 69
Tenth, 66 ; German flight before, on the
Ailette, Aug. 22 : 72 n.
German, in France, general situation of, Oct. 6 :
191; Nov. 11: 10, 261; difficulty of
controlling, 240
Second, Commander of, 7 n., 8 n., 17,
position of, early Aug. : 17 ; Aug. 8 : 8 n. ;
Aug. 9 : 59 n. ; Order of Aug. 25,
extract from, 69 re. ; struggle with,
Sept. 30-Oct. 5: 190; position aa to
reserves, Oct. 17 : 207
Ninth, 8 n.
Eighteenth, Commander, 7 n. ; on Aug. 8 :
8 n. ; struggle with, Sept. 30-Oct. 8 :
190 ; position of, as to reserves, Oct. 17 :
207 ; order issued to, by Crown Prince,
circa Oct. 29, on defence of Sambre
and Oise Canal, 238 re.
Rupprecht Army Group, on Aug. 8 : 8 n.
Armistice, The, 10, 225, 239, 240, 261 ofc n.
Armoured Car Battalion
17th, work of, Aug. 8 : 41, 42 ; 155 ; action
on Sept. 29 : 167 ; allotment of cars
from, and action of, Oct. 9 : 199-200,
and for Nov. 4 : 247 ; co-operation of,
in Mormal Forest and after, 255, 258 ;
in Bethell's Force, 260 re.
Army Printing and Stationery Ser\nces, work of,
prior to Aug. 8 : 25-6
Armytage, Brig.-Gen. Sir G., Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 97th Inf. Brig., 320
Arras, 19, 71, 86
Battle of, April 1917 : 20
Arras front, 66
Arras-Albert railway, limited attack on, Aug. 21 :
71, 72
Arrouaise Farm, Oct. 19 : 228
Artillery, see also Barrage, Gas-shelling, Smoke-
screens, etc.
British, ^rith Fourth Army
Arrangements for Aug. 8 : 7, 20-1, 25 ; for
Sept. 29 : 153-4
Artillery — cont.
British, with Fourth Army — cont.
Bombardment by, before attack on main
Hindenburg Line, Sept. 26-9 : 144 n.
Commanders, and component parts, set
Appendix F
Lack of sufficient, Aug. 11 : 64
Observation for, by R.A.F. Corps Squadrons,
24, see also R.A.F. work
Policy, during advance to Pdronne, 86
Precautions to preserve secrecy, 20
Rdle of, in the operations from Aug. 8 to
Nov. 11 25 passim
Total in July and on Aug. 8 : 12
Total from Sept. 26-29 : 153
Canadian, see under Batteries and under Brigades
French, 28
German, passim
Gas-shelling by, Aug. 8, 22, Sept. 18, Oct. 5:
47, 74, 132 n., 186 et alibi
Guns captured, March-Nov. 1918: Appendix
A, 275
Withdrawals of, Aug. 24-6 : tactics employed.
80 ; Oct. 6 : 191 et alibi
ArviUers, Aug. 9 : 53, 54, 57
Ascension Farm, Sept. 18: 124
Asser\'illers, Aug. 28 : 92
Athies, Sept. 6 : 116
Beauchamp-Proctor's feat at, 117 n.
Atilly, Sept. 11 : 119
Atilly-Maissemy- Jeancourt - Templeux - le - Gu6rard
Epehy line, German artillery covering,
Sept. 8: 117
Attack, see Flank, Frontal, Moonlight, Simultaneous.
and Surprise, see also " Zero "
Combined, by French and British troops, diffi-
culties of, 11 n.
Hour of, 29 n., 268-9
Attack formation for infantry, and number of men
required, 265
Aubencheul-aux-Bois, Oct. 3, 5, 8 : 178, 183, 188,
194
Aubercourt, Aug. 8 : 36 ; captured, 39
Aubigny, 32 re.
Auger Woods, Aug. 10 : 59 ; captured, 62
Aulnoye, Nov. 5 sqq. : 258
Railway junction, Oct. 14, 17. 19. 23-4 : 206.
207, 229, 230, 233, 237
Australian Forces, see Commanders and component
parts under Names, and in Appendix F.
Steady and continuous offensive of, April-July : 1
Australian Light Horse, 13th Regt., Sept. 6-7 : 116
Australian soldiers, quahties shown by, 1, 5-6,
28, 43, 55 cfc re., 63, 65, 77, 80, 82, 93,
101-2, 104, 105, 110, 111, 126, 130, 131,
164, 168-9, 176, 182 <fc n., 189
Austria, armistice signed by, Nov. 3 239 <t n.
Auxi-le-Ch&teau, 19
Avelu, Oct. 8 : 196
Avesnes, Nov. 7-8 : 258, 259
Avesnes-Marbaix road, 259
Avesnes -Maubeuge road, 243, 259
Avesnelles, Nov. 8 : 259
A\Te river, 14, 15, 50
Avre valley, 64
B
Bachtold, Lieut.-Col. H., D.S.O., M.C., C.E. 3rd
Aus. Divl. Engineers, 312
Bacquets Wood, Sept. 2 : 108
Badger Copse, Sept. 17 : 123. 125
BaiUon Farm, Oct. 17-18 : 222, 227
Bandival Farm, Oct. 17 : 216, 220
840
INDEX
Bapaume, 66 ; strategic importance of, 73 n. ;
Battle of, Aug. 22 sqq. : 8, 9, 82, 86 ;
capture of, Aug. 29 : 94 ; advance
beyond, of Third Army, Sept. 4: 113
<fc n.
Barker, Brig.-Gen. M. G. H., D.S.O., G.O.C. 53rd
Inf. Brig., 308
Barleux, 86, 93
Barrage, Block, Nov. 4 : 245
British, Creeping, and rates of, various dates
from Aug. 8 to Nov. 4 : 25 <fc n., 31,
34, 40, 41, 47, 74-75, 79, 80, 81, 82, 86,
90, 104, 119, 123, 124, 140, 144, 157,
170, 172, 174, 180, 182-3, 186, 193-4,
207 c&n., 210, 212, 213, 215, 218, 219,
222, 232, 244 cfc n., 247, 249
Creeping [see also aftofe), preparations advisable
for, 20 ; rate of advance for, discussed,
and advantages of, 269
Machine gun, Sept. 18 sqq. : 125 n., 128 <fc n.
Protective, substituted for creeping barrage,
Aug. 8 : 37, 41, 77 ; Sept. 18 sqq. : 129,
130, 159-60 n. ; Oct. 17 : 213 ; Nov. 4 :
249
Rolling, Special, Oct. 17 : 210
German, Aug. 8, 22, 31, Oct. 3, Nov. 4 : 34, 77,
78, 101, 178, 240, 248, 249
Barrett, Lieut. J. C, V.C, 143 n., 280, 281
Basket Wood, Oct. 5 : 188
Bas Lieu Spur, Nov. 8 : 260
Basse Boulogne, Sept. 18 : 131, 133, 134 <fc n., 135
Basse Noyelles, Nov. 5 : captured, 258
Battalions, see also Armoured Car, Machine Gun,
and Tank under Armoured Car, Machine
Gun Corps, and Tank Battalions,
respectively
American
Engineers, 29
Australian
Cyclist, Sept. 6-8: 116, 118
Infantry
1st, Sept. 18 : 129
2nd (Pioneer), Sept. 18, Oct. 4, 5 : 129, 185,
186-7
3rd (Pioneer), Aug. 22-3, Sept. 18 : 77, 83, 136
4th, Sept. 18 : 129
5th (Pioneer), Aug. 8 : 41
7th, Aug. 8-9 : 40, 55
8th, Aug. 9, 23 : 55 cfc n.
9th, Aug. 23, Sept. 18 : 129, 130 ; hea\'y
casualties, 81
10th, Aug. 10, 23, Sept. 18 : 59, 81 n., 129,
130 ; losses of, at Crepey Wood, 59
nth, Aug. 23, Sept. 18 : 129 ; captures by,
and casualties of, 81 <fc n.
12th, Aug. 23, Sept. 18 : 81, 129
13th, Sept. 18 : 128, 129 ct- n.
14th, Sept. 18: 128 ; night attack by, 130
15th, Sept. 18: 128, 129
16th, Aug. 23, Sept. 28 : 82 n., 128, 129
17th, Aug. 30, 31, Oct. 3 : 98, 99, 100, 180-1
18th, Aug. 29, 30, 31, Oct. 3, 4 : crossing the
Somme and after, 94, 98, 99, 100,
180<fcn., 181, 186, 187
19th, Aug. 30, 31, Oct. 3 : 98 ; at Anvil
Wood, 99, 100, 101 ; attack of, and
captures by, 180, 181
20th, Aug. 30, 31, Oct. 3-4 : 98, 99-100, 102,
180-1, 186, 187
21st, Aug. 31, Sept. 1, Oct. 5 : 100, 105, 106 n.,
182, 186, 187
22nd, Aug. 31, Oct. 4 : 100, 182, 186
23rd, Aug. 31, Sept. 1, Oct. 3, 4 : 100, 103,
104 <fc n., 105, 181, 182, 186; losses
of, 105
Battali ons — cont.
Australian — cont.
Infantry — cont.
24th, Aug. 31, Sept. 1, Oct. 4 : 100, 105, 182,
186 <fc n., 187
25th, Oct. 3 : advance, 181, 186 ; German
tribute to, 182 n.
26th, Sept. 2, Oct. 3 : 109 ; at Bellevue
Farm, 181
27th, Sept. 2, Oct. 3-4 : 109, 181, 186, 187
28th, Aug. 8, Oct. 3 : 40, 181
29th, Sept. 29, 30 : 163, 164, 165
31st, Sept. 29, 30 : 163, 165
32nd, Sept. 29, 30 : 16.3, 164, 165, 171
33rd, Aug. 22, 31 : 78, 102 n.
34th, Aug. 22 : 77
40th, Aug. 24: attack by, on Bray-sur-Somme,
83
41st, Aug. 27, Sept. 1 : 106 ; capture of
prisoners by L/Cpl. Gordon of, at
Fargny Mill, 89 n.
42nd, Sept. 1 : 106
43rd, Sept. 1-2 : 106 <fc n., 110
44th, Sept. 1, 29, 30 : 106, 164, 165, 166, 172
45th, Sept. 18 : 128, 129
46th, Sept. 18 : night attack by, 130
48th, Sept. 18 : 128 cfcn.
49th, Aug. 10 : 60
50th, Aug. 10 : 60
53rd, Sept. 1, 30, Oct. 1-3 : 103, 105 <fc n.,
108, 109, 171, 174<fcn.
64th, Sept. 1, 30, Oct. 1 : 103, 104 <fc n.,
105 <fc n., 108, 109, 174
55th, Sept. 1, 2, Oct. 1 : 105, 108, 109, 171
<fcn., 174 it; n., 175
56th, Sept. 2, Oct. 1 : 108, 109, 174
57th, Aug. 8, Sept. 1, 29-30, Oct. 1 : 41-2,
106, 163, 164, 165, 174
58th, Aug. 8, Sept. 1, 29, Oct. 1 : 42, 108,
109, 163, 164, 165, 174
59th, Sept. 2, 29, Oct. 1 : 108, 163, 164, 165, 174
60th, Sept. 2 : 108
Machine Gun
2nd, Sept. 1 : 106 n.
4th, in attack of Sept. 18 : 334, 335
5th, in attack of Sept. 18 : 334, 335
British
Armoured Car, see wider Armoured Car Corps
Cyclist, IX Corps, 260 n.
Field Survey, work of, prior to Aug. 8 : 25, 26
Infantry, see wilder Names of Regiments
Machine Gun, see under Machine Gun Corps
Canadian
Cyclist, r61e of, Aug. 8 : 33
Infantry
13th, Aug. 8 : 36
1 8th, Aug. 8 : Caucelette Wood captured by, 36
19th, Aug. 8 : 36
21st, Aug. 8 : 36
22nd, Aug. 9 : at Vr61y, 54
27 th, Aug. 9 : 54 n.
28th, Aug. 9 : 54 n.
38th, Aug. 10 : 59
42nd, Aug. 12 : at Parvillers, 64
43rd, Aug. 8 : at Rifle Wood, 34-5 ; hM'son
force formed by, with the French, 35
44th, Aug. 10 : at Fouquescourt, 59
50th, Aug. 10 : 59, 63
52nd, Aug. 8 : 34
54th, Aug. 8 : 38
68th, Aug. 8 : 34 ; Demuin occupied by,
35 dkn.
72nd, Aug. 8, 10 : 38, 59
76th, Aug. 9 : at Le Quesnel, 53
78th, Aug. 8-10 : 39, 60 ; at HaUu, 59
INDEX
341
Battalions — cont.
Canadian — cont.
Infantry — cant.
85th, Aug. 10 : 59
102nd, Aug. 8 : 38
116th, Aug. 8: 34, 35
Machine Gun Corps
2nd, Aug. 8 : 36
4th, Aug. 8 : 38
Mounted Rifle
1st, Aug. 8 : 34
2nd, Aug. 8 : 34
4th, Aug. 8 : 34
5th, Aug. 8 : 34
German
Cyclist, engaged, Nov. 4 : 252
Emperor Francis Joseph's Prussian Guards,
at Trones Wood, Aug. 27 : 90-1
Identified during Sept. I : 108
South African
1st, Oct. 17 : 223 cfc n.
2nd, Oct. 17 : 223, 224
4th, Oct. 17 : 223, 224
Batteries
Artillery (all natures), see Appendix F, 302
Canadian Field Artillery
13th, Aug. 8 : 39
Battle, modern strain of, on human endurance, 63
Battles of the Hundred Days, 1 sqq., passim
Bavai, Oct. 14 : 206
Bayonv-illers, Aug. 8 : 45 ; captured, 42, 43
Bazuel, Oct. 14, 17-18, Nov. 4 : 206, 216, 219, 221,
226, 227, 229, 231, 243 ; captured, 228
Bazuel-Catillon road, Oct. 14 : 206
Bazuel-Malgami road, Oct. 23 : 234
BB. gas, nature of, 144 n.
Shell, bombardment with, of Hindenburg Line,
Sept. 26-7 : 144 <fc n.
Beatham, Pte. R. M., V.C, 55 «., 280, 282
Beauchamp-Proctor, T/Capt. A. W., V.C, D.S.O.,
117 re., 280, 282
Beaucourt, Aug. 8 : captured, 38, 39, 44, 72
Beaucourt Wood, Aug. 8 : 38, 39, 44, 45
Beaufort, Aug. 9 : captured, 54
Beaufort Wood, Aug. 9 : 53
Beauf ort-Warvillers-Vr^ly-Rosi^res -en-San terre line,
Aug. 8 : strongly held by enemy, 45
Beauregard Farm, Oct. 8 : 193, 195
Beaurevoir, Sept. 29, Oct. 3-8 : 177, 181, 184, 185,
188, 189, 195; captured, 187
Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line, Sept. 22-Oct. 8 :
attack on, 171, 173 cfc n., 174, 176-80,
195 ; captured, 190
Beaurevoir-Gouy road, Oct. 3 : 181
Beaurevoir line, Sept. 22-Oct. 6 : 190 ; country
E. of, 192
Beauvois, Sept. 7-10: 117, 119
B^cordel-B^court, Aug. 22-24 : 73 ; captured, 83
B^court Wood, Aug. 24 : 83, 84
Becquigny, Oct. 9 : 197 ; occupied, 198 <fc n., 200
Becquincourt, Aug. 28 : occupied, 92
Bedfordshire Regt.
2nd Batt., Aug. 22 : at Shamrock Hill, 76 ; work
of, Sept. 18 : 133 ; Nov. 4 : 254, 255
Behagnies, Aug. 24 : captured, 86
Belgium {see also Flanders), allied attacks in, Sept.
28-9 : 9, 137, 138 n., 145
Belgrave, Lieut.-Col. J. D., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 12th
(Eastern) Div., 304
BeU, Major-Gen. G., Jnr., G.O.C. 33rd (Illinois)
Amer. Div., 67, 307
Bellenglise, Sept. 29, Oct. 17 : attacks on, 140, 148,
151, 152, 158, 159, 209 ; captured, 161 ;
effect of artillery fire on, 154 ; forti-
fications at, 149
Bellenglise-Magny-la-Fosse tunnel, 149 n., 152, 159
Bellenglise Salient, 149, 161 ra.
Bellevue Farm, Albert, Aug. 22 : 76
Andigny-les-Fermes, Oct. 14 : 205
Beaurevoir, Oct. 3, 5: 181, 182, 187, 188
BeUevue Spur, Oct. 11-17: 205, 206, 209, 210,
211, 212, 213; captured, 214
Bellicourt, Sept. 29 : 147, 150, 164, 166 ; captured,
162; effect on, of artillery fire, 154;
fortifications at, 149, 152
Bellicourt railhead, Nov. 8 : 260
Bellicourt road, Sept. 18 : 134, 135
Bellicourt-St. Quentin Canal, defences before, 148
Bellicourt Turmel and defences, Sept. 11, 21, 29,
Oct. 1 : 121, 138, 148-9, 152 ; attack
on, 152, loScfcn., 159, 162, 163 <fc n.,
164, 165 ; captured, 175
Belloy-en-Santerro, Aug. 28-9 : 92 ; captured, 93
BeU-Smyth, Brig.-Gen. J. A., C.M.G., G.O.C. 3rd
Cav. Brig., 303
Benjamin Post, .Sept. 18 : 134 ; captured, 135
Bennett, Brig.-Gen. H. G., C.B., C.M.G., G.O.C.
3rd Aus. Inf. Brig., 313
Bergues-sur-Sambre, Nov. 4-6 : 250, 256
Berkshire Regt., Royal, see Roysd Berkshire Regt.
Berlaimont, Nov. 5 : 257
Berlin Wood, Aug. 30 : 99
Bemafay Wood, Aug. 26-7 : attack on, 87, 90, 112
Bemes, Sept. 7 : 117
Bemy-en-Sant«rre, Aug. 28 : 91
Berthaucourt, Sept. 11, 18-22 : attack on, and
counter-attacks, 120, 124, 127 <fc n., 135,
136, 140
Berthaucourt-Buisson Gaulaine Farm, line between,
Sept. 21 : 139
Berthon boats, attempted crossing of canal in,
Nov. 4 : 248
Bertram, Lieut.-Col. W. R., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 2nd
Cdn. Div., 309
Bertry, Oct. 9 : 198, 199
Bessel-Browne, Brig.-Gen. A. J., C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., G.O.C. 5th Aus. Divl. Artillery,
315
BetheU, Maj. H. K., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C. 66th
Div., 139, 260 cfc n., 261, 322
Bethell's Force, Nov. 9-10 : composition, com-
mander and operations of, 260 <fc n., 261
Beugnies Wood, Nov. 8 : 259
Biaches, Aug. 29 : 93 <fc n.
Bihdcourt, Sept. 13, 29 : 122, 157
Billon Wood, Aug. 25 : 85 ; captured, 86
Birch, Col. E. M., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 17th
(Northern) Div., 316
Birtwhistle, Brig.-Gen. A., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
06th Divl. Artillery, 322
Black Watch, The, see Royal Highlanders, 42nd
Blakiston-Houston, Lieut.-Col. J., D.S.O., A.A.
& Q.M.G. 1st Cav. Div., 302
Blamey, Brig.-Gen. T. A., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.G.G.S.
Aus. Corps, 312. 323, 327
Blending, Brig.-Gen. A. H., G.O.C. 53rd Amer.
Inf. Brig., 324
Blewitt, Lieut.-Col. G., D.S.O., M.C., G.S.O. 1, ISth
(Eastern) Div., 305
Blocua d'en Bas, Oct. 14, 18 : 206, 226
Boak, Lieut.-Col. H. E., D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G.
3rd Cdn. Div., 310
Bohain, Sept. 29, Oct. 8-9, 11, 17 : 192, 209, 210 ;
secured, 197, 200
Railway at, damaged by enemy, 203
Proposed destruction of, 156
Bohain-AisonviUe road, Oct. 14 : 206
Bohain-Busignv line, Sept. 27 and after, attack in
direction of, 138, 156
Bohain-Vaux-Andigny road, Oct. 17 : 210
342
INDEX
Bois I'Abbaye, Nov. 4 : 244, 248
Bombing attacks, German, Aug. 31, Sept. 18, Oct.
9 : 100, 136, 198 n.
Bony, Sept. 18, 29, 30, Oct. 1 : attack and counter-
attack on, 134 n., 152, 155 n., 163 n.,
167, 172 (fc n., 182, 183, 188; captured,
175; effect of artillery fire on, 154;
fortifications at, 149, 171
Border Kegt.
1/5 Batt., action of, Oct. 1 : 173
Bottom Wood, Aug. 25 : 85
Bouchavesnes, Aug. 28-Sept. 1 : attack on, 91, 100,
102, 107 ; captured, 107 ; attack beyond,
106
Bouchavesnes Kidge, Aug. 28-Sept. 1 : attack on,
100; gained, 106, 107, 111; heavy
German losses near, 108
Bouchavesnes-Rancourt road, Aug. 30 : 93
Bouchoir, Aug. 9 : 53, 57 ; captured, 54
Bouchoir - Rouvroy - en-Santcrre - Meharicourt-Fra-
merville - Mericourt - sur - Somme (ex-
clusive) - Gressaire Wood - Tailles Wood-
Demancourt line reached, Aug. 9, p.m.,
57
Boucly, 157
Bouleaux Wood, Aug. 30 : 95
Bourlon Wood, objective of Third Army, Sept. 27 :
137
Bousies, Oct. 23-4, Nov. 4 : 230, 231, 232, 234, 235,
236, 237 n., 254
Bout du Monde, Oct. 23 : 232
Boyau de Leu, Nov. 4 : 250
Boyd, Maj.-Gen. G. F., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M.,
G.O.C. 46th (North Midland) Div. (T.),
119, 320
Braeton Post, Sept. 19 sqq. : attack on, 136, 137,
140, 141
Braithwaite, Brig.-Gen. W. G., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 16th Inf. Brig., 319
Braithwaite, Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. P., K.C.B., G.O.C.
(IX Corps), 119, 318, 325; plans of,
and operations under, Sept. 19-Nov. 4 ;
136, 142-4, 205, 209-11, 226, 232, 243 ;
victory gained by, Sept. 29 : 162
Brancoucourt, Oct. 8 : 193
Brancourt-le -Grand, Oct. 6, 8 : 191, 192, 193, 195
Bray and Roye, gap between, 8 n.
Bray-sur-Somme, 14; Aug. 9: 25; attack on, 51,
57, 60, 74, 77, 83 ; crossing near, 61
Bray-sur-Somme -Corbie road, 60, 61, 65 n., 67,
73, 77, 78
Bray-sur-Somme Spur, Aug. 22, 25 : 73, 79 ;
captured, 75, 85
Brereton, A/L.-Cpl. A., V.C, 54 n., 280, 282-3
Briastre, 200, 202
Brickworks, The, Peronne, Sept. 1, 2 : 109 ; Le
Cateau, Oct. 17 : captured, 221
Brickyard, The, Morlancourt, Aug. 8 : 46 ; counter-
attack at, 48, 49
Bridge-destruction on the Somme, 96 ; German
instructions on, Aug. 28 : 96 n.
Bridge-repair work for attack of Oct. 23 : 230
Bridges over the Luce, 15
Bridging the Sambre and Oise Canal, prior to
attack on Nov. 4 : 246 tfc n., 247, 248,
250, 251
Brie, Somme crossings at, 86, 113, 115
Brie-Vermand road, 115
Brigade, forming up a, 29 <fc n., and see Diagram II
Brigades
American
53rd, Sept. 29, Oct. 17, 19 : 162, 216, 217, 229
54th, Sept. 29, Oct. 17, 19 : 162, 216, 217, 229
69th Sept. 29, Oct. 8-19 162, 195, 198 <fc n.,
214, 216, 229
Brigades — cont.
American — cont.
60th, Sept. 29, Oct. 8-19 : 162, 195, 198 <fc n.,
201, 214, 216, 227, 229
Australian
1st, Aug. 8-23, Sept. 18: 40 re., 43, 55, 59,
62, 79, 80. 81, 128, 129, 130
2nd, Aug. 8-26, Sept. 18 : 40 n., 55, 59, 78-9,
80, 87, 128, 129, 130 ; at Lihons Hill,
62 ; at Chuignos, 81
3rd, Aug. 8-26. Sept. 18 : 40 n., 59, 81, 87, 128,
129, 130; at Lihons Hill, 62; at
Chuignes, 81
4th, Aug. 8-29, Sept. 18 : 40 n., 43, 128, 129, 193
5th, Aug. 8, 9, 29, 31, Sept.l, 18, Oct. 1-3 : 40,
55, 93-4, 98, 99, 100-3 <fc n., 176, 180,
181, 182, 186; at Mont St. Quentin, 105
6th, Aug. 8-27, 30-1, Sept. 1 sqq., Oct. 2, 3, 6 :
27, 89, 93, 99, 100-1, 103-9, 180, 181,
182, 186; capture by, of Mont St.
Quentin village, 105, 106
7th, Aug. 8-30, Sept. 1, 2, Oct. 2 : 36, 40, 55,
65 w., 93, 98, 99, 109, 110, 180, 181,
182, 184, 186, 187-8
8th, Aug. 8, 27-30, Oct. 1 : 43, 89, 91, 93, 99,
163-5, 171, 174
9th, April 4-5, Aug. 8-31, Sept. 30 : 2, 40,
60, 74-7, 78, 102, 166-7, 172 ; German
comment on, 77 n.
10th, Aug. 8-31, Sept. 30, Oct. 1 : 27, 60, 61,
102, 166-7, 172, 175
11th, Aug. 8-31, Sept. 1-30, Oct. 1 : 40, 89,
90, 102, 106, 110, 166-7, 171, 172, 175
12th, Aug. 8, Sept. 18 : 40, 43, 128, 129, 130
13th, April 24-5, Aug. 8-13, Sept. 18: 32 n.,
40 n., 60, 65 (fc n., 128 ; at Villers
Bretonneux, 3 ; forming part of liaison
14th, Aug. 30-1, Sept. 1, 30, Oct. 1 : 98, 99,
101, 103-6, 108, 109, 163, 171, 172, 173,
174 dh n. ; entry into P6ronne, 104-5
15th, April 24-5, Aug. 8, 30, Sept. 1-29, Oct. 1 :
41-2, 43, 99, 100, 105, 108-9, 163-5,
171, 174 <fc n., 175 ; at Villers Breton-
neux, 3
British, see also under R.A.F., and Tank Corps
Artillery, see Appendix F
Mobile Heavy, composition of, 201 n.
Cavalry
1st, Aug. 8, 11: 44, 45 ; whippet tanks
allotted to, 41-2 ; attached to Aua.
Corps, 61
2nd, Aug. 8, Oct. 8 : 39, 44, 45, 196
3rd, Aug. 8 : 44
6th, Aug. 8, Sept. 23, Oct. 3, Nov. 9 : 156,
177, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198 ; spUt up,
204 ; in Bethell's Force, 260 n.
6th, Aug. 8, Oct. 9 : 44, 45, 109 ; at Hon-
nechy, 198 ; work of armoured cars
with, 199-200
7th, Aug. 8, Oct. 9 : advance of, 44r-5 ;
armoured cars with, 199
9th, Aug. 8, 9 : 39, 44, 45, 54
III Corps, whippet tanks with, Aug. 22 : 74, 75
Infantry
1st, Sept. 27, 29, 30, Oct. 3-23, Nov. 4:
126, 127, 158, 173, 213, 214, 215, 226,
232, 250, 256 ; at Le Tronquoy, 171,
172 ; crossing the Sambre and Oise
Canal, 243-4, 248-9, floating bridges
for, 246
2nd, Sept. 18, 24, 30, Oct. 17-23, Nov. 4-5 :
127, 143, 213-15, 226 <t n., 232, 256 ;
crossing the Sambre and Oise Canal,
243-4 246, 249
INDEX
343
Brigades — cont.
British — cont.
Infantry — cont.
3rd, Sept. 24, 29-30, Oct. 3, 17-18, Nov. 4 :
126, 158, 170, 171, 178, 180, 184, 216,
226 dk n., 232, 244, 247, 248 ; at Gri-
court, 142-3; capture by, of CatiUon, 249
7th, Oct. 3-23, Nov. 6 : 184, 185, 187-8,
195, 232, 233, 234, 24.5, 252
14th, Sept. 2-29, 30, Oct. 1-3, Nov. 4-5:
160, 161, 170, 171, 172, 173, 178, 256;
at Sequehart, 175-6 ; crossing the
Sambre and Oise Canal, 244, 250, 251,
252
16th, Sept. 18, Oct. 8-24; 126, 135, 194,
195, 212, 213, 232, 237
18th, Sept. 17, Oct. 8-23 : 195, 212, 213,
232 ; at Holnon Wood, 1 23
35th, Aug. 8, 22, Sept. 18, 29 : 47, 48, 74,
131, 133, 135, 167
36th, Aug. 8, 9, 22, Sept. 18 : 46, 47 <fc n.,
48, 49, 56, 74, 131, 132
37th, Aug. 8, 9, 22, Sept. 18, 29 : 47. 56, 74,
132
53rd, Aug. 8, 22-7, Sept. 18-29, Nov. 4:
47, 48, 49, 74, 82, 131, 141, 233, 234,
245, 254, 255 ; attack by, on Tara Hill,
82 ; at Trones Wood, 90-1
54th, April 24-5, Aug. 8, 22-8, Sept. 18,
Oct. 23-31, Nov. 1 sgg. : 46, 47, 91, 131,
133, 134, 167-8, 233, 235, 236, 254;
at Villers Bretonneux, 3 ; patrol work
of, 74-6
65th, Aug. 8, 22, 26, Sept. 1, 18, 23-4, Nov. 4 :
47, 74-5, 82, 87, 107, 131, 133, 134, 167-8,
235, 236, 245, 255 ; clearing Albert, 76
71st, Sept. 18-24, Oct. 8, 17, 23 : 126, 127,
135, 142, 194, 212, 232
74th, Oct. 3-10, 23, 24. Nov. 4, 5 : 184, 188,
195, 198, 201, 233, 234, 236, 245, 252,
258 ; Sambre and Oise Canal crossed
bv, 253
75th, Oct. 3 sgq., Nov. 4 : 184, 188, 198, 201,
218, 220, 227, 228, 232, 233, 234, 236,
245 ; at Beaurevoir, 187-8 ; at Lan-
96th, Aug. 23, Sept. 29, Oct. 1, 2, Nov. 2, 4 :
82, 160-1, 170-1, 173, 176, 177 n., 244;
attack at, and crossing by, of the Sambre
and Oise Canal, 250-3
97th, Aug. 22-3, Sept. 30, Oct. 1-3, Nov.
4-6 : 160-1, 170, 171, 173, 176, 177, 178,
250, 256-7 ; attack on Herleville, 78,
79, 82
113th, Aug. 23 : attack by, on Usna HiU, 82
137th, Sept. 29, Oct. 3, 17, 18 : 178, 179, 184,
210,211,212, 226 ; at Bellenglise, 158, 159
138th, Sept. 29, Oct. 3, 4, 17 : 158-60, 174,
179, 185. 210, 211, 212, 214
139th, Sept. 29, Oct. 3, 8, 17 : 158-60, 174,
178, 179, 184, 194-5, 210, 211, 212, 213
140th, Aug. 21 : 73
141st, Aug. 22 : 73, 78
142nd, Aug. 22 : 73, 77, 78
149th, Oct. 1, 5, 17, Nov. 4, 5 : 175, 182, 185,
188, 218, 219<fcn., 220, 221, 223, 245,
257, 258, 260 ; in Mormal Forest, 253,
254
150th, Oct. 3, 17, Nov. 4, 5: 182, 183, 188,
218, 219<fcn., 220, 245, 257, 258; in
Mormal Forest, 253-4
131st, Oct. 2 sqg., Nov. 4, 7 : 176, 182, 183,
188, 195, 243, 244, 245, 259-60 ; cross-
ing the Selle, 218, 219 <fc n., 221; in
Mormal Forest, 253, 254
Brigades — cont.
British — cont.
Infantry — cont.
173rd, Aug. 8, 9, 25, Sept. 18 : 47, 48, 49,
56, 86, 119, 132, 133
174th, Aug. 8, 9 : 47, 48, 49, 56
17.5th, Aug. 8, 9, 22 : 46, 47, 56, 78
197th, Oct. 8 : 195
198th, Oct. 8 aqg., Nov. 7 : 195, 196, 201,
218, 222-3, 224, 228, 259; at Maretz,
198
199th, Oct. 8, 17, Nov. 7, 10 : 201, 223, 224,
259 ; at Maretz, 198 ; added to Bethell's
Force, 260 n.
229th, Sept. 18 : 131
230th, Sept. 18, 21 : 131, 132, 134, 141
231st, Sept. 18: 131, 132, 134, 141
Canadian
Cavalry
Operations of, Aug. 8, 10, Oct. 9 : 38, 44, 58,
198-9
Engineers at Hangard Bridge, Aug. 8 : 35
Field Artillery
5th, Aug. 8 : 36
Infantry
1st, Aug. 8 : 37
2nd, Aug. 8 : 39, 45
3rd, Aug. 8 : 35-6
4th, Aug. 8, 9 : 36, 38-9, 41, 54
5th, Aug. 8, 9 : 37, 39, 54
6th, Aug. 8, 9, Oct. 9 : 39, 54, 198
7th, Aug. 8, 9, Oct. 9 : 33, 34, 3.5, 54, 198
9th, Aug. 8, 9 : 33-4 ; at Hangard and at
Hollan Wood, 35 ; at Bouchoir, 53-4 ;
at Le Quesnoy-en-Santerre, 58
Flank attack by, Aug. 8, at Rifle Wood,
34, 264
10th, Aug. 8, 10 : 38 ; severe fighting by,
58, 59
nth, Aug. 8, 9: 38, 44, 53
12th, Aug. 8, 10 : 38, 39 ; at Chilly, 58, 59
Motor Machine Gun
1st, r61c of, Aug. 8 : 33
2nd, r61e of, Aug. 8 : 33, 36
German
Cyclist, Nov. 4 : at Landrecies, 253
2nd, Oct. 8, 9 : 195, 196 <fc n., 199
4th, Nov. 2 : 241
6th, Nov. 2 : 241
South African, Oct. 8-17, Nov. 9 : operations
of, 195, 196, 198, 200, 218, 222, 223-5 ;
in Bethell's Force, 260 n.
Tank Corps, see under Tank Corps
Brilliant, Lieut. J., V.C, M.C., 54, 280, 283
British Armies, see Armies, British
Military discipline contrasted with Prussian, 271
Soldiers, see aiso Australian, Canadian, and South
African
Dedication to, of the book, 270-1
Endurance and other characteristics of, 2,
60<fcn., 52, 63 69, 82, 91, 92, 110, 111,
112, 132, 136, 141, 146, 161, 168, 172,
173, 175, 176 n., 190, 196, 215, 223,
224, 225, 230, 241, 249 n., 252, 253, 271,
272
Moral of, see Moral, British
Brockman, Brig. -Gen. E. A. D., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 4th Au3. Inf. Brig., 315
Brosse Wood, 129
Brown, Brig. -Gen. P. W., D.S.O., G.O.C. 7l8t
Inf. Brig. 320
Brown, Lieut. -Col. J. S., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.A. &
Q.M.G. 1st Cdn. Div., 308
Bruce Hay, Lieut.-Col. R., D.S.O., O.C. Anti-
Aircraft Defence, 302, 317, 325
844
INDEX
Bniche, Col. J. H., C.M.G., A.A. & Q.M.G. 5th
Aus. Div., 315
Brutinel, Brig.-Gen., G.O.C. Cdn. Machine Gun
Corps, 33
Buckland, Maj.-Gen. R. U. H., C.B., C.M.G., C.E.
Fourth Army, 301
Buckley, Cpl. A. H., V.C, 105 n., 280, 283
Budworth, Maj.-Gen. C. E. D., C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.,
G.O.C. R.A., Fourth Army, 301
Bufis, The, see East Kent Regt.
Buire Wood-Nurlu position, Aug. 30 : 97
Buisson Gaulaine Farm, Sept. 11-29 : 120, 124, 138,
139, 151
Bulgaria, surrender of, 207 ; armistice signed by,
Sept. 29 : 239 ofc n.
Burgess, Brig.-Gen. W. L. H., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 4th Aus. Divl. ArtiUery, 315
Burkner, — , Chief of Stafi XVIII German Army,
238 n.
Bumside, Lieut.-Col. F. R., D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G.
12th (Eastern) Div., 304
Burstall, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. E., K.C.B., C.M.G.,
A.D.C., G.O.C. 2nd Cdn. Div., 35, 309
Burt, Brig.-Gen. A., D.S.O., G.O.C. 7th Cav.
Brig., 303
Buscourt, Aug. 31 : Somme crossed at, 100, 101
Busignv, Sept. 27, 29, Oct. 3-11, Nov. 4 : 138, 184,
191, 192, 194, 197 ; captured, 200
Bridges at, 183-4
Railway, station and junction, 156, 193, 197,
203, 260
Proposed attack on, 156
Busigny Wood, Oct. 9 : 200
Bussu, Sept. 5 : 108, 115 ; captured, 116
Bussu-Haut-Allaines road, Sept. 2 : 110
Butler, Brig.-Gen. Hon. L. J. P., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 4th Guards Brig., 317
Butler, Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. H. K., K.C.M.G., C.B.,
G.O.C. Ill Corps, 12, 46, 65 n., 131, 175,
304, 318
Byng, Gen. Hon. Sir J. H. G., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
M.V.O., G.O.C. Third Army, attack by,
on Albert-Arras front, Aug. 21-2 : 72
C
Cabaret Copse, Oct. 1 : captured, 174
Cabaret Wood Farm, Sept. 29-30, Oct. 1 : 164, 165,
166, 171 ; captured, 174
Cachy, April 24, Aug. 8 : 4, 44
Caimes, Lieut.-Col. T. A. E., D.S.O., O.C. 22nd
Army Wing, R.A.F., 302, 316, 324
Caix, Aug. 8 : 45 ; captured, 39
Cambrai, 71, 145, 177
Cambrai Ofiensive, the, of Nov. 1917 : 20, 21
CampbeU, Brig.-Gen. J. V., V.C, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 137th Inf. Brig., 320
Cambridgeshire Begt.
1/lst Batt., Aug. 8 : 48 ; Sept. 18 : 133
Cameron, Brig.-Gen. A. R., C.B., C.M.G., B.G.G.S.
IX Corps, 318, 325
Cameron Highlanders (The Queen's Own)
1st Batt., Oct. 2 : 175 ; Oct. 17 : 214, 215 ;
crossing the Sambre and Oise Canal,
Nov. 4 : 248, 249 <fc n., 250
Canadian Forces, see under Commanders and com-
ponent parts, see also Appendix F, 301
Canadian Independent Force, under Brutinel, r61e
of, Aug. 8 : 33 ; co-operation of, with
First French Army, Aug. 8 : 39, 50-1 ;
work of, Aug. 9 : 53
Canadian Soldiers, qualities shown by, 36 <fc n., 38,
54 <& n, 59, 64, 85
Canal de I'Escaut, Sept. 27-8 : 138, 145
Canal du Nord, Aug. 22, 24, 28, 31, Sept. 1, 2 :
Germans digging E. of, 84, and with-
drawal to, begun, 112 ; 1st French Army
along, 91 cfc n. ; gap along, 101, 105 ;
attack between and Bouchavesnes, 106 ;
attack on, planned, 108 ; gap in Une
on, 110; operations on: the fight for
the crossing, Sept. 2 sqq. : 110, 111 <fc n.
sqq., success of, Sept. 4: 111, 112,
113n.
Cannan, Brig.-Gen. J. H., C.B.. C.M.G., G.O.C.
nth Aus. Inf. Brig., 314
Cappy, 115 n. ; Aug. 23-6 : attack at, 78, 79, 85,
87 ; pursuit of Germans to, 81 ; German
batteries withdrawn E. of, 88
Captured German Orders cited {see also Appendix
H), 16 n., 20 n., 96 n., 225 n., 238 n.,
256 <fc n., 259 n.
Carey, Lieut.-Col. A. B., C.M.G., D.S.O., C.E.
47th Divl. Engineers (T.), 306
Carey's Force, 2 <fc Ji.
Camoy, Aug. 25-6 : 85, 88 ; captured, 87
Carpela Copse, Sept. 18 : outflanked, 129
Carrefour de I'Hermitage, Nov. 4 : 254, 255
Carrefour de I'Hermitage-Locquignol road, Nov. 4 :
255
Carruthers, Brig.-Gen. R. A., C.B., C.M.G., D.A.
& Q.M.G. Aus. Corps, 312
Cartignies, Nov. 4, 6 : 243, 257
Cartigny, Sept. 4, 6 : 115 ; entered, 116
Cartwright, Pte. G., V.C, 102 n, 280, 283-4
Casualties, saved by tactical surprise, 264
Fourth Army, see Appendices A and B, 275, 276
Cat Post, Sept. 21 : 140 <fc n.
Catillon, Oct. 11 sqq. : operations connected with,
204, 206, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 236,
237
Lock at, Nov. 4 : 242, 244, 248
Catillon-Bazuel road, Oct. 19 : 229
Caucelette Wood ravine, Aug. 8 : captured, 36
Caulaincourt, 157
Cavalry
British, see also under Brigades, and Corps
Bombing attacks on, 197, 198 n.
Terrain favourable for, 11
Cayeux, Aug. 8-9 : 37, 44, 53
Cayeux Wood, Aug. 8 : 44, 45
CecU, Lieut.-Col. R. E., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 1st Cav.
Div., 302
Cemetery N.E. of Anvil Wood, Sept. 1 : 105, 106
Cense Toury, Nov. 4 : 254
Cerise Wood, Oct. 8 : 195
Cerisy-GaiUy, Aug. 8 : 43
Cerisy-Gailly-Warfus^e-Abancourt Valley, Aug. 8 :
hostile batteries in, 22, 32
Ceylon Wood, Aug. 25 : captured, 85
Chair Wood, Sept. 4: HI
Chalk Pit, The (N. of Bray), Aug. 22 : struggle for,
73, 77-78
Chamier, Lieut.-Col. J. A., D.S.O., O.B.E., G.O.C.
15th Corps Wing, R.A.F., 301, 316, 324
Champagne, 19 ; German offensive in, May-July : 4,
failure of, 7
Battle front, 14
Chapel Crossing, Sept. 18 : captured, 134
Chapes Spur, Aug. 24 : captured, 83
Character, individual, influence of, 270
Chardon Vert, Oct. 3, 4, 8 : 180, 185, 194
Charles, Maj.-Gen. J. R. E., C.B., D.S.O., G.O.C.
25th Div., 139, 185, 187, 198, 245, 321
Charlton, Brig.-Gen. L. E. O., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 5th Brig. R.A.F., 301, 316, 324
Chataignies Wood, Sept. 30 : 171, 173
Chateau, The, Selency, Sept. 25 : 144
Cb&teau Wood, Selency, Sept. 25 : secured, 144
INDEX
345
Chaulnes, 18, 23, 51, 57 ; railway centre at, 25 ;
attacks on, Aug. 27-8 : 89, 91
Woods N. of, Aug. 27 : captured, 89
Chevinoourt-Gratibus front, Aug. 10 : German
retreat from, 69
Child, Brig.-Gen. Sir H., Bt., C.M.G.. D.S.O.,
M.V.O., G.O.C. 46th Divl. Artillery (Ti),
320
Chilly, Aug. 10 : Canadian operations at, 58, 69,
61, 62
Chilly-Lihons road, Aug. 10 : 59
" Chinese " attack, Oct. 17 : nature of, 210 <fc n.
Chipilly, 14 ; Aug. 8-9 : 48, 56
Chipilly Spur, 14, 18 ; Aug. 8 : the fighting for,
42, 46, 48, 49, 56, 60
Chuignes, Aiog. 23, 25 : 78, 86
Chuignes-Cappy road, Aug. 23 : attack on, 78
Chuignes Spur, Aug. 23 : gained, 81-2
Woods E. of, Aug. 26 : secured, 87
Chuignolles, Aug. 10, 23 : 51, 58, 78 ; captured,
80, 81
ChuignoUes Wood, Aug. 23 : taken, 80
Civilian moral {see also Moral, German), in Germany,
early Aug. : 17
Civilians turned soldiers, 270
Cizancourt, Aug. 29, Sept. 4: 93, 114
Clarke, Sgt. J., V.C., 241 n., 280, 284
Clary, Oct. 9 : 198, 199
Clery Copse, Aug. 30 : advance to, 95
Clery-sur-Somme, Aug. 25-Sept. 1 : attacks on,
86, 94, 96, 98, 100, 103 ; bridgehead
near seized, 98-9
Valley E. of, Aug. 31 : concentration on, 101
Cobham, Brig.-Gen. H. W., D.S.O., G.O.C. 175th
Inf. Brig., 306
Cologne Farm and heights near, Sept. 11, 18;
attack on, 122, 124, 125 <fc n., 129, 130
Cologne river position, Aug. 30 : attacked, 97
Coltman, L/Cpl. W. H., V.C, D.C.M., M.M., 179 n.,
280, 284
Combles, Aug. 26, 29, 30 : attacked, 86, 94, 95
Communications, difficulty of, Aug. 8 : 32 ; diflS-
culties hindering advance, Nov. 6, 8-9 :
257, 260 ; work to render available for
attack of Oct. 23 : 230
Canadian, Aug. 8 : difficulty of maintaining, 39
German, Oct. 17 : menaced by British advance,
207
Compi6gne, 69 ; Gierman offensive against (June), 4
Concrete emplacements, before Hindenburg Lone,
Sept. 29 : 150
Confederate troops, U.S.A., moral of, 10 n.
Conferences
July 21, at FUx^court, 18 ;
July 23, at Foch's G.H.Q., decision arrived
at, 12
Aug. 4, at Auxi-le-Chateau, 19
Aug. 11, at Villers Bretonneux, of Corps
Commanders of Fourth Army, 63
Oct. 19 : 230
Conforming, 3
Cormaught Rangers
5th Batt., at Le Cateau, Oct. 10 : 201-2
Contact Patrols, 24, 32, 50, 157, 189, 194
Contalmaison, Aug. 25 : captured, 86
Control of the Air, see R.A.F. and its work, passim
Coppins, Cpl. F. G., V.C, Aug. 9 : 54 n., 280,
284-5
Corbie, 14, 122 n.
Corbie-Bray-sur-Somme road, Aug. 9 : 57, 67
Corkran, Brig.-Gen. C. E., C.M.G., G.O.C. 173rd
Inf. Brig., 306
Corlette, Lieut.-Col. J. M., D.S.O., C.E. 2nd Aus.
Divl. Engineers, 314
Comouillers Wood attacked, Sept. 24 : 143 f
FOCBIH ABUT
Corps
American (II American Corps) combined with
Aus. Corps, see Corps, Aus. and Amer.
combined
Placed under Fourth Army, Sept. 22 : 138-9 ;
III Corps relieved by, Sept. 24, p.m.,
142
Operations of, in the advance to Le Cateau,
Oct. 6 sqg. : objectives allotted to, 193,
199; attacks of, 195, 197-8; prisoners
and guns captured by, 195 ; relief by,
of Austrahan Corps, 189; front held by,
Oct. 6 : 194 ; advance of, Oct. 10 :
201, 202 ; front held by, Oct. 14 : 206
Operations of, in the Battle of the Selle,
Oct. 17 sqq : task allotted to, prepara-
tions for, 203, 204, 207 ; dispositions,
Oct. 17: 210; attack, 214, 216-17,
results of day's fighting, 217, total of
prisoners made, 225 ; attack and
objectives of, Oct. 18 : 226, 227 ;
advance of, Oct. 19 : 229
Withdrawn to rest, Oct. 20 : 204 n. ; losses
of, from end of Sept. ; spirit shown by,
230 (fc n., 231 <fc n.
Australian, 19
Achievements from April to July 1918: 1
Attack by, on Hamel and Vaire Wood,
July 4 : 6
Commander of, at Conference of July 21 : 18
Composition of in July: 13
Continuous oSensive of, April-July, value
of, 1
Front held by, Aug. 1 : 13, extension
of, 14
Part played by, in checking German advance
on Amiens, 189
Raids by, May-June 1918 : 5-6
Relief of, by Canadians (.A.ug. 4-8), 32 n., 34
Training of, with tanks, 21 n.
Trenches taken by, on July 4 : 11
Operations of, in Battles from Aug. 8 : frontage
of attack, Aug. 8, and method of advance,
22, 23, 26 ; assembly of, for attack,
27-8 ; offensive policy of, effect of, 27 ;
progress of, 32 ; objectives of, Aug. 8,
and plan of attack, 40, result of day's
fighting, 43 <£r n. ; attack of, S. of Somme,
Aug. 8 : 46, 49 ; task allotted to, Aug.
9 : 54 ; advance of, 54-5 ; Chipilly
Spur, Aug. 9 : 56 ; re-allotment of
front between, and III Corps, Aug. 9,
p.m., 57 ; 131st Amer. Regt. trans-
ferred to, Aug. 9, p.m., 57 ; task
allotted to for Aug. 10 : 57 ; advance
of, on Lihons, 59 ; front held by, night
of Aug. 10 : 60 ; objective of, Aug. 11 :
61 ; operations of during lull, Aug. 12-
15 : 65 ; liaison force between, and the
III Corps, Aug. 12 : 65 n. ; 4th Cdn.
Div.'s front temporarily taken over by,
Aug. 22-7 : 66 : rest periods given to,
Aug. 12-23 : 67 ; frontage held by,
Aug. 22 : 67 ; operations of, S. of the
Somme, Aug. 23 : 78 sqq. ; attack, plan
of, 78 ; phases of, first, 79, second, 81 ;
German batteries forced by, to with-
draw, 88 ; capture by, with III Corps, of
Bray-sur-Somme and Becordel-Becourt,
Aug. 24 : 83 ; front of, S. of Sonmie,
readjustment of, Aug. 24 : 85 ; moon-
Ught attack of Aug. 24 : 83, 268 ;
advance in co-operation with First
French Army, Aug. 27 : 89 ; advance
continued, Aug. 28 : 91 sqq. ; action of,
Y Y
346
INDEX
Corps — cont.
Australian — cont.
Operations of — cont,
S. of the Somme, Aug. 30 sqq. : 95 n.,
96 sqq. ; position on Aug. 29, p.m., 96 :
orders to, for crossing the Somme,
issued Aug. 30, p.m., 97 ; plan of, for
forcing river crossing, Aug. 29 : 98 ;
action during Battle of Mont St.
Quentin, first phase of the action, Aug.
30 : 98 ; second phase, Aug. 31 : 99,
101 ; progre.ss of units, 100, 101 sqq. ;
spirit of the men, 101-2 ; entry into
Wrorme, Aug. 31 : 104, and capture of
Mont St. Quentin, 105 ; situation on
evening of Sept. 1 : 107 tfc n. ; crossing
of corps artillery, Sept. 1, night, 108 ;
further fighting advance, Sept. 1 : 108
sqq. ; spirit of the men. 111 ; result of
the Battle of Mont St. Quentin, 1 1 1 cfc n. ;
orders issued to, Sept. 4, p.m., 113;
front then held by, 114; front as re-
adjusted, Sept. 4^5: 114-15; opera-
tions of, in advance to Hindenburg Line,
Sept. 5 sqq. : 116 sqq. ; fresh readjust-
ment of front, Sept. 11 : 119 ; progress
of units, Sept. 11-12: 120, 122; task
of, Sept. 12-17 : 122-3 ; minor opera-
tions, Sept. 12-17: 122-3; preparations
for attack on Sept. 18 : 123 ; frontage
of attack, 124, 125 ; advance of, Sept.
18 : 126 ; the assembly, objectives, and
first phase of attack, Sept. 19 : 128-9 ;
second phase, 129 ; third phase, 129-30 ;
result of the day's fighting, 130-1 ; all
objectives gained, 135 ; combined with
II Amer. Corps under Gen. Monash,
Sept. 20 : 138-9 (see below) ; plan of
operations of, Sept. : 171-2 ; attack of,
Sept. 30-Oct. 1: 171-2, 174-5; front
of, Oct. 2, p.m., 177 ; objectives and
frontage of attack, Oct. 3 : 177 ; opera-
tion of, Oct. 2-4 : 180 sqq. ; rehef of, by
II Amer. Corps, Oct. 6 : 189 ; summary
of its operations from March to Oct. 6 :
189 ; captures of, Aug. 8 to Oct. 5 : 189
Australian and II American combined, front
assigned to, for Sept 27-9 : 138-9,
155; Sept. 29: further operations of,
in attack on Hindenburg Line, 162—7;
reason for amalgamation, 151 ; II
American Corps withdrawn for rest,
Sept. 30: 169
British
Artillery, Heavy, «ee with each Corps, in
Appendix F
Cavalry
Approach march of, Aug. 7 : 28 ; special
track for, 29
Arrival to reinforce Fourth Army, April
4-5: 2
Composition on Aug. 8 : 12
Concentration of, in Somme vaDey, prior
to Aug. 8 : 28 ; assembly of, for the
attack, 28-9
Engineers of, 29
First informed of plans for attack on Aug. 8 ;
19
R.A.F. squadron working with, Aug. 8 : 24
B61e allotted to, in attEick of Aug. 8 : 7 sqq.,
23-4 ; position of at " zero," Aug. 8,
and advance of, 44 sqq. ; action of, in
main attack, 44-6 ; orders for, Aug. 9 :
51 ; advance of, 52 sqq. ; orders and
objectives given to, for advance on
Corps — cont.
British — cont.
Cavalry — cont.
R61e allotted to — cont.
Aug. 10 : 57 ; ground impossible for.
58 ; ordered to assist Cdn. Corps, Aug,
11: 61; in reserve, Aug. 12: 64;
r61e of on Sept. 29 : 156 ; orders issued
to, for Oct. 8 : 191 ; action of, pre-
cautions as to, 194 ; r61e of, for Oct. 9 :
197 ; action of, Oct. 9 : 198 ; Oct. 10 :
withdrawal, 200 <fc n. ; reverted to orders
of G.H.Q., Oct. 11, objective for Oct.
17 : 203 ; in the pursuit, Nov. 5 sqq. t
256-7, 260
Infantry
II, Casualties at Le Cateau, 1914 : 205 n.
III, Composition of, July : 12
Operations of : Covuiter-attack by, at Villers
Bretormeux, April 24 : valuo of, 3-4 ;
positions held by, after April 24 : 5 ;
training of, with tanks, 21 n. ; front held
by, Aug. 1 : 13, extension of, 14 ;
effect on, of German attack on Aug. 6 :
27 ; assembly of, for attack of Aug. 8 :
27 ; frontage of attack, 22, extension of,
26 ; R.A.F. squadron allotted to,
Aug. 8 : 24 ; tanks allotted to for
Aug. 8 : 23 ; advance of, Aug. 8 :
42 ; attack of, N. of the Somme, 44 ;
plans for, 46, disposition at " zero," 47,
progress of attack on first and later
objectives, first phase, 47-8, second
phase, 48, result of the day's fighting,
and counter-attacks dealt with, 49-50,
189 ; orders for, Aug. 9 : 51 ; operations
of, Aug. 9 : 55 ; successful advance,
56i-7 ; re-allotment of front between
this and the Australian Corps, Aug. 9,
p.m., 57 ; orders to, for Aug. 10, and
operations on that day, 57 ; right
relieved by Australian Corps, 60 ;
hostile counter-attack on, 61 ; Amiens
outer defences occupied by, 61 ; activi-
ties N. of the Somme, Aug. 12-15 :
65 ; temporary change in Commander
of, Aug. 11 : 65 n. ; frontage held by
Aug. 22 : 67 ; attack of, between
Somme and Ancre, Aug. 22 : 73 ; plan
of attack, 73—4 ; orders issued to, for
attack on Aug. 23 : 77 ; why modified
ib. ; Aug. 23 : 82 ; capture of Becourt-
Becordel, Aug. 24 : 83 ; moonlight
attack of, Aug. 24 : 83, 268 ; advance
of in conjunction with Third Army
continued, Aug. 25 i 85 ; exhaustion of,
Aug. 25 : 86-7 ; advance continued,
Aug. 26 sqq. : 87, 90 ; German rein-
forcements opposite to, Aug. 26 : 88 n. ;
objectives for Aug. 28 : 91 ; advance,
Aug. 29-30 : 94, 95 ; German divisions
opposing, Aug. 30 : 96 ; action of,
during Battle of Mont St. Quentin,
Aug. 30-Sept. 2 : 96, 102, 103, 106, 107,
108, 110 ; distance of advance since
Aug. 22: 111, 112; changes on front
of Sept. 2-4 : 108, 114, 115; gains of.
Battle of Mont St. Quentin, Sept. 2:
111 cfc n. ; prisoners captured by, Aug.
31-Sept. 2: 112 n.; operations of, in
advance to Hindenburg Line, Sept.
5-28: 116; Sept. 6-7 : 116,117,118;
Sept. 9-10: at Ep6hy, 118-19, 120;
attack, 120 ; preparations for attack,
Sept. 18 : 123 ; frontage of attack.
INDEX
347
Corps — cont.
British — cont.
Infantry — cont.
Ill, Operations of — cont.
124 ; tanks allotted to, 125 ; progress
of, 125-6 ; heavy machine gun fire
covering, 126 n. ; assembly of, Sept. 17,
p.m., 131 ; terrain of operations, Sept.
18: 132; attack by, Sept. 18: first
phase, 132, second phase, 134, result of
day's fighting, 135 ; attack continued,
Sept. 19-20 : events of, 136-7 ; read-
justment of front, Sept. 20-5 : 138, 139 ;
attacks by, Sept. 21-2 : 140 ; spirit
exhibited during, 141 ; divisions leaving
for another army, 139 ; preparations for
attack on Hindenburg Line, Sept. 22 sqq. :
150 ; attacks by, Sept. 21-2 : 140-2 ;
relief of, Sept. 24, p.m., 142 ; front
as.signed to, 139, 144 ; divisions taken
over from, by XIII Corps , 139-40 ;
operations of, in storming of Hindenburg
Line, and situation of at dusk, Sept.
29 : 167-8 ; orders to, for Sept. 30 :
169 ; action of, at Vendhuile, Sept. 30 :
172 ; relieved by XIII Corps, Sept. 30,
and transferred to Fifth Army Oct. 3 :
summary of its work since March,
175
V, Preliminaries to advance of, Aug. 22-3 :
73, 74 n., 82 ; first objectives of Aug.
24: 83; progress of, Sept. 3-18 : 111,
113 n., 124, 134 ; Canal du Nord crossed
by, Sept. 4, p.m., 113 n. ; attack by,
Sept. 21 : 140 ; plans for, Oct. 4 : 185 ;
operations, Oct. 5 : 188-9 ; objective,
Oct. 8 : 193 ; minor operations by, Oct.
6-7 : 194 ; attack by, Oct. 8 : 196 ;
co-operation with XIII Corps, Oct. 17 :
218 ; front held by, Oct. 21 : 231 ; task
of, Oct. 23 sqq. : 230, 232, 235 ; opera-
tions of Nov. 4 : 252 ; crossing Sambre
and Oise Canal, Nov. 5 : 257 ; at Leval,
Nov. 6 : 258
IX, H.Q. reinforcing Fourth Army, 114, 115
arrival of, Sept. 11 : 119 ct- n. ; minor
operations, Sept. 12-17: 122, 123
frontage of attack for Sept. 18 : 124
tanks allotted to, for Sept. 18 : 125
assembly of, Sept. 18 : 126 ; attack of
first and second phases of, 126-7,
results of the day's fighting, 128, 135
attack continued, Sept. 19-20 : 135-8
Sept. 21-3 : 140 ; operations of. Sept
24 : 142-3 ; pressure maintained. Sept
25-6 : 144 ; tanks allotted to. Sept. 24
142 ; total captures of, 143 n. ; front
assigned to, for Sept. 27-9 : 138, 139
46th Div. transferred to, 139 ; prepara^
tions for crossing St. Quentin Canal, 150
advance of, Sept. 30 : 170-1 ; opera
tions of, Oct. 1 : 173 ; action of, Oct. 2
175-6 ; counter-attacked, 176 dk n.
position on evening Oct. 2 : 176
number of German divisions defeated by,
176 n.; front of, Oct. 2, p.m., 177
objectives and frontage of attack, Oct.
3 : 177 ; the attack with tanks, Oct. 3
178 ; action of, Oct. 4 : 184 ; at Manne-
quin Hill, 185-7 ; objectives for attack
on Oct. 8-9 : 193, 197 <t- n., 199 ; tanks
and whippet tanks allotted to, 193, 197,
207 ; prisoners and gims captured by.
Corps — cont.
British — cont.
Infantry — cont.
IX — cont.
Oct. 8: 195; advance, Oct. 10-11 :
201, 202 ; general attack, Oct. 17 : pre-
paration for, 203 aqq. ; task allotted to,
for Oct. 17 : 203 ; tanks allotted to, for
Oct. 17 : 203, 207 ; cavalry attached to,
204 cfc n. ; frontage extended, Oct. 14 :
20.5, 206 : objectives for Oct. 17 : 205 ;
plan of attack of, Oct. 17-18: 209-11,
214, result of day's fighting, 216 ;
German divisions opposing, total pri-
soners made, Oct. 17 : 225 ; attack of,
Oct. 18 : 226-7 dk n. ; advance of, Oct.
19 : 229 ; II Amer. Corps relieved
by Oct. : 230 ; front held by, Oct.
21 : 231 ; plan of attack on Oct. 23 :
231 ; tanks allotted to, task of, 230 ;
the attack, 233 ; attack of, on Oct. 24 :
236 ; minor operations, Oct. 25 sqq. :
237 ; preliminary operations prior to
attack on Sambre and Oise Canal,
Nov. 1-2 : 240-1 ; heavy artillery of,
siting of, for Nov. 4 : 244 : objectives
for Nov. 4, and plan of attack, 243 ;
tanks allotted to, 247 ; the attack, Nov.
4 : 247 sqq. ; in pursuit, events on front
of, Nov. 5 : 256-7 ; pursuit con-
tinued by, Nov. 7-9 : 258-9
XIII, 224, 227 ; H.Q. placed at disposal of
Fourth Army, Sept. 22 : 138 ; in army
reserve, Sept. 25 : 139 ; divisions taken
over by, Sept. 25 : 139-40 <fc n. ; III
Corps relieved by, Sept. 30-Oct. 2 :
175, 176 : front of, Oct. 2, p.m., 177 ;
objectives and frontage of attack, Oct.
3 : 177-8 ; operations of, Oct. 3 : 181,
182-3 ; attacks of, Oct. 4 - 5 : 184,
185, 187-8 ; tanks and whippets al-
lotted to, 193, 197, 207 ; objectives tor
attacks, Oct. 8 : 193, 197, 198, 199, 200 ;
progress of, 201 ; front held by, Oct. 6 :
194 ; attack of Oct. 8 : 195-6 ; con-
tinued Oct. 9 : 197 ; contEict patrol of,
Oct. 8 : 194 ; prisoners and guns cap-
tured by, Oct. 8 : 196 ; attacks, Oct.
10: 201; advance checked, Oct. 11:
202 ; task allotted to, for Oct. 17 : 203 ;
tanks allotted, 203, 207 ; cavalry
attached to, 204 ; front of, extension
of, 205, 206 ; objectives for Oct.
17 : 206 ; dispositions of, Oct. 17 :
217-18; attacks, 218-225; total of
prisoners made, Oct. 17 : 225 ; pre-
parations for attack on Oct. 18 : 227 ;
the attack, 228, 229 ; success of, 228 ;
front hold by, Oct. 21 : 231 ; plan of
attack, and objectives, for Oct. 23 aqq. :
230, 232 sqq. ; moonlight attack, 232,
268 ; tanks allotted to, for Oct. 23 :
230, ; sub-allotment of, 233 ; the
attack, 233 sqq. ; resistance at Bousies,
235, 237 71. ; the attack continued, Oct,
24 : 236-7 ; line held by end of Oot. :
240 ; objectives, Nov. 4 : 243 ; plan of
attack, 244r-5 : tanks allotted to, 247 ;
attack, Nov. 4 : artillery support, 245 ;
operations, Nov. 4 : 252 sqq. ; in pursuit
Nov. 5-6 ; 256 ; events on front of,
257-8 ; armoured car co-operation, 258 ;
lino gained Nov. 6, p.m., 258 ; pursuit
continued, Nov. 7-9 : 268, 259-60
348
INDEX
Corps — cont.
British — cont.
Infantry — cont.
XXII, and the transfer of the Canadian
Corps, 19
Commander of, in temp, command of
III Corps, Aug. 11: 65 n.
Canadian
.Commander of, at conference, July 21 : 18
Composition and Commander of, Aug. 8 : 12
German divisions opposed to, 17
Operations of, in the Battle of Amiens ; front-
age of attack, Aug. 8 : 21 ; method of
advance, 22, and synchronisation of, 23 ;
tanks allotted to, for Aug. 8 : 23, 33 ;
Cav. Div. and K.A.F. Squadron allotted
to, 24 ; assembly of, for attack, 28 ;
plan of attack and objectives, 32, 33, 35 ;
progress of, 32 n., 33 ; results of clay's
fighting by, 39, 40, 189 ; pause in ad-
vance, 40 ; advance continued, 46, 49 ;
task allotted to, for Aug. 9 : 51 ;
advance on Aug. 9 : 52 sqq. ; orders for
Aug. 10 : 57 ; advance on Aug. 10 :
57-59 ; 32nd British Div. allotted to,
57 ; objective of, for Aug. 11 : 61 ;
action on front of, Aug. 11 : 62 ;
German forces opposing, Aug. 12-15:
64 <fc n. ; reliefs effected, and patrols
pushed out by, 64 ; withdrawn into
reserve, Aug. 17, 20 : 65, 66, 85
Training of, with tanks, 21 n.
Transfer of, to Fourth Army, how camoufl£iged,
19
French
XV, Sept. 30 : 171 ; attack of, Oct. 3 : 179-80 ;
advance and attacks of, Oct. 4, 17 : 185,
209-10, 211
XXXI, frontage held by, Aug. 8 : 22 ;
advance of, 39 ; attack by, 50
XXXVI, reliefs effected by, Aug. 24, night,
85 ; objectives, Sept. 18 : 123, 126 ;
successes of, Sept. 24, 25 : 143, 144
German
Alpine, see under Divisions, German
XI, position of, early Aug., 17
XrV, position of, early Aug., 17
LI, position of, early Aug., 17
H.Q. Staff of, surprised at Proyart, Aug. 8 : 42
LrV, Orders issued to, Oct. 19, on the holding
of the Hermann Stellung, 256 n.
Machine Gun, moral maintained by, 112
Corps Commanders, Gen. Rawlinson's Conference
with, on Aug. 11: 63 .iqq.
Cosens, Lieut.-Col. G. P. L., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 3rd
Cav. Div., 303
Counter-attack, immediate, value of, instances of,
3, 4, 62, 267-8
Value of surprise in, 268
Counter-attacks
British, at
Hallu, Aug. 11 : 62
Mannequin HiU, Oct. 3 : 179
Trones Wood, Aug. 27 : 90, 264
ViUers Bretonneux, April 24 : 4
by 1st Div., Sept. 24 : 143
by 32nd Div., Aug. 11 : 62
German, in
August, 48, 49, 61, 62, 63, 64, 74, 77-8,
83, 84, 90, 94, 99, 100, 102
Sept., 118, 119, 120, 127 d- n., 129, 135, 141,
142, 143 n., 144, 163, 171 cfc n., 175, 190
Oct., 173, 176, 178, 183, 184, 187, 188, 190,
194, 211, 215, 217, 220, 225, 237
Nov., 241, 259-61
Counter-attacks — cont.
German — cont.
Anticipated at Somme crossings, Aug. 30 : 97
Forestalled, various dates, 61-2, 84, 134 n.,
172 n., 213
Lack of means to deliver, Aug. 22 : 72 n.
in Mass formation, 62
Met by bayonet charge, 143 <f: n.
Reserves for, lack of good concealment for,
Sept. 29 : 149 rf: n.
Undelivered, 172 n., 174 n.
Counter-offensive, allied, plans for, 7, and crisis of, 9
Country between Somme and Luce, nature of, 15
Courage, Brig.-Gen. A., D.S.O., M.C., G.O.C. 5th
Aus. Tank Brig., 312, 323
Courcelles, Aug. 22 : captured, 72
Cousens, Lieut.-Col. R. B., D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G.
74th (Yeo.) Div., 307
Cousoh-e, Nov. 11 : 261
Coxen, Brig.-Gen. W. A., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
R.A., Aus. Corps, 312, 323, 327
Craigie-Halkett, Brig.-Gen. H. M., D.S.O., G.O.C.
74th Inf. Brig., 321
Craufurd, Brig.-Gen. G. S., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.,
A.D.C., G.O.C. 18th Inf. Brig., 319
Cr^pey Wood, Aug. 9, 10 : 55, 59, 60, 63
Cribs, for helping tanks to cross obstacles, 221 db n.
Croak, Pte. J. B., V.C, 36 »., 280, 285
Croix-Fonsomme, Oct. 8-9 : 193, 197
Crucifix, The (Brav-sur-Somme), Aug. 22 : 77
Cubitt, Maj.-Gen. t. A., G.O.C. 38th Div., 74 n., 82
Curlu, Aug. 28 : 92
Currey, Pte. W. M., V.C, 104 n., 280, 285
Currie, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. W., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
G.O.C. Cdn. Corps, 12, 32-3, 53, 308
Curtis, Sgt. H. A., V.C, 228, 280, 286
Cutbill, Lieut.-Col. R. H. L., D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G.
18th (Eastern) Div., 305
Dados Loop, Sept. 21-2, 23, 29 : 140, 141, 142, 168
Damery, Aug. 10, 12, 17, 21 : 58, 61, 62, 66 ;
captured, 64
Damery-La Chavatte-Fransart-Chilly-Rainecourt-
Proyart— Etinehem-Amiens outer de-
fences-Demancourt, British Une on,
Aug. 21 : 66
Damery- Partners, 62
Davies, Lieut.-Col. C M., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 58th
(London) Div. (T.), 306
Davies, Lieut.-Col. Q. S., D.S.O., CE. 66th Div.,
327
Dawn attacks, 268
Debeney, General, G.O.C. First French Army,
11 n. ; placed under Haig's orders, and
to co-operate with Fourth Army, 12
Defence in depth, 74, 119, 120
Delaforee, Brig.-Gen. E. F., C.M.G., G.O.C. 6th
Divl. Artillery, 320
Delay Action mines, 203, 260
Delville Wood 1916: 225
1918, Aug. 27: 90, 91
Demuin, 15, 32, 33 ; Aug. 8 : captvired, 35, 39
Deni^eourt, Aug. 28 : occupied, 91
Demancourt, Aug. 9, 10, 27 : 51, 56, 57, 61, 66, 74
Despatches of F.M. Sir D. Haig cited, on German
demoralisation after Nov. 4 : 10 ; on
reasons for extending N. the front of
attack, Aug. 21 : 71-2 ; on importance of
British attack on Sept. 29 : 137 n. ;
on the shattering of the German last
defences, 190
INDEX
349
Deus Trench, 101
Dillon, Lieut.-Col. E. F. G., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1,
32nd Div., 320
Dinesen, Pte. T., V.C, 64, 280, 286
Discipline, British and Prussian, contrasted,
271
Division, length of front allotted to, at various
dates, 6 S re.
Divisions forming part of Fourth Army, see also
Appendix F and Diagram III
Records of successes, Aug. 8 to Nov. 11 :
262 <fc n.
American, with Fourth Army, from Aug. 8 to
Nov. 1 1 ; number of, 262 <fc n.
27th, Operations of, Sept. 22-9, Oct. 6-19 :
138, 139, 14i-5, 151, 152, 155 n., 156,
162, 163 cfc n., 165, 166, 167, 168, 194,
203, 216, 217, 220, 227, 228, 229
30th, Operations of, Sept. 22-9, Oct. 5-19 :
138, 139, 144, 151, 152, 155 S n., 160,
162, 166, 189, 194, 195, 197, 201, 203,
210,216, 217, 226, 227, 229
33rd (Illinois), Operations of, July 4, Aug.
8 sqr]., 20-23 : 12, 47, 55, 56, 66 ;
temporary attachment of, to Australians,
and first action of, at Hamel, 6, 67 ;
appreciation of, 67
Australian, with Fourth Array, Aug. 8-Nov. 11:
number of, 262 cfc n.
Ist, Operations of, April 24 sqq., July, Aug.
8-11, 22-6, Sept. 4-25, Oct. 1 : 5, 13,
32 71., 40 <fc «., 54, 55, 59, 60-3, 67, 81,
82, 86, 87, 88, 111, 114, 119, 120, 121,
122, 124, 125<fcn., 128, 129, 130-1, 132,
140, 176, 265 ; with Second Army,
12 <fc n. ; capture by, of Lihons, 62-3 ;
heavily counter-attacked, 63 ; attack
by, 78, 79 re., 81 ; relief of, by American
troops, 139 <fc re.
2nd, Operations of, July, Aug. &-31, Sept. 1—4,
Oct. 1-5 : 12, 27, 28, 36, 40, 41, 54, 56,
60, 63, 65, 67, 87, 88-9, 91-3, 103, 104,
106, 108, 109, 111, 114 <fc n., 138, 152,
174, 176, 177, 185; at Framer%'ille,
55 ; at the Somme crossings, 92-3 ;
in Battle of Mont St. Quentin, 99, 103 ;
in reserve, 152 ; in attack on Beaurevoir
Une, 180-2, 184; capture by, of Mont-
brehain, 186 ; relieved, 189
3rd, Operations of, July, Aug. 8-31, Sept.
1-3, Oct. 1, 2 : 13, 27, 28, 40, 41, 60, 67,
73. 74, 78, 83, 87, 89, 92, 94-5, 98, 100,
101, 103, 106, 107, 110, HI, 114, 115,
118, 119, 138, 152, 155, 165, 166, 167,
176, 265 ; liaison force relieved by, 65 n. ;
at Proyart, 65 ; advance to P^ronue,
77 ; Ceylon Wood captured by, 88 ;
Vaux Wood secured by, 89 ; at Battle
of Mont St. Quentin, 100-3 ; in capture
of Hindenburg defences, 152, 166, 171,
172, 175; relieved, 176
4th, Operations of, April 24, July 4, 31, Aug. 1,
8 sqq., Sept. 9-21 : 13, 14, 27, 28, 32 n.,
40 <fc re., 41, 42, 43, 67, 114, 119-20,
122, 123, 124, 125. 127-9, 131, 176;
at Hamel, 67 ; relieved by 3rd Div.,
60 ; liaison force formed to relieve,
65 n. ; raids by, 82 re. ; casualties to,
from German gas, 85 ; night attack by,
130; relieved, 138, 139
6th, Operations of, April 24, July, Aug. 8-30,
Sept. 10-30, Oct. 1 : 13, 27, 28, 40, 41,
42, 43, 44, 45, 50, 55, 65, 67, 78, 88, 89
91-3, dSsqq., 104, 108, 109, 114, 115,
116 119. 138, 152 155, 162, 163, 164.
Divisions — cortt.
Australian — cont.
5th, Operations of — cont.
165, 166 ; capture by, of Vauvillers, 54
attack by, on P6ronne, 98, 99, 101, 103
104, 111; hea\'y artillery supporting,
104 ; attack on Hindenburg Line de
fences, 152, 163-6, 170-4 ; relief of,
176<fc».
British, numbers engaged in Fourth Army
operations, Aug. 8-Nov. 11, and number
of German divisions engaged by them,
262 dk re. ; for the latter see Appendices
C and D, 277, 278-9
Cavalry
1st, Operations of, Aug. 8-10, Sept. 29, Oct.
8-10 : 12, 24, 39, 44, 45, 53, 57, 58 <t n.,
156-7, 194, 197, 198, 200
2nd, Operations of, Aug. 8-10 : 12, 44, 45,
53, 58 cfc re.
3rd, Operations of, Aug. 8-10, Sept. 29,
Oct. 8, 9, 10 : 12, 23-4, 33, 38, 44, 45,
46, 58, 156-7, 194, 197, 198, 199.
200
Infantry
1st, Operations of, Sept. 11-30, Oct. 1-3, 8, 16
sqq., 21, 29, Nov. 4, 5 : 119 <fc n., 122,
124, 126, 128, 130, 135, 138, 139, 144,
151, 152, 153, 161, 170-1, 175-8, 180,
184, 197 n., 209-13, 214, 215, 220, 227,
229, 231, 232, 236-7, 243, 247, 249, 250,
256, 265 ; at Fresnoy-le-Petit, 127 ;
at Gricourt, 142; on Sept. 29: 158;
crossing the Sambre and Oise Canal,
246 sqq.
6th, Operations of, Sept. 4, 11, 13-19, 24-
30, Oct. 6, 9, 10, 16-18, 21-3, 26, 30 :
114, 116 n., 119 n., 122, 124, 126, 127,
135, 136 <fc re., 138-9, 152, 158, 194,
197 <fc re., 201-2, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213,
214, 226, 231-4, 236, 237 ; transferred
to IX Corps, 119 <fc n. ; at Maissemy,
122 ; at the Quadrilateral, 135, 136 <fc n.,
142, 144 ; relieved by the French, 171 ;
relieved by 32nd Div., 240 re.
8th, April 24 : at Villers Bretonneux, 3
12th (Eastern), Operations of, Aug. 8, 9, 10,
12, 13, 22-9, Sept. 4, 5, 17, ia-21, 29,
30, Oct. 3 : 12 <fc re., 46, 47, 48, 49, 61,
67, 73, 74-5, 83, 85, 88, 90, 94, 114,
115, 116 cfc re., 118 <b re., 124, 131-6,
137, 139, 140-2, 152, 167, 168, 169; at
Morlancourt, 56-7 ; Amiens out«r de-
fences occupied by, 61 ; on Hill 105, 65 ;
at the Filiform Tree, 84 ; at Camoy,
87 ; at Hardecourt, 92 ; relieved by
47th Div., 95 re. ; spirit of, 112; at
Vendhuile, 172 ; relieved, and trans-
ferred to First Army, 175
17th (Northern), in the line, Aug. 8, 12-16 :
13, 67, 202 n. ; casualties from gas-
shelling, 67 re.
18th (Eastern), Operations of, April 24,
July, Aug. 6, 7, 8 sqq., 22 sqq.,
Sept. 1-4, 18-21, 29, 30, Oct. 1, 23-6,
Nov. 4-5 : 3, 12 <fc re., 27, 46-9, 74, 75.
76, 82, 84, 94, 95, 102, 107, 10*-9,
110-11, 114, 124, 125, 131, 133-5, 136,
137-42, 152, 163 re., 167, 169, 218, 231
232, 233, 245, 247, 254-6 n., 257, 258 ; at
Villers Bretonneux, 3, 5 ; attack on,
27 ; 47th Div. relieved by, 67 n. ;
attack by, on Tara Hill, 79 ; success of,
82 ; at "Chapes Spur, 83 ; at Fricourt,
85 ; at Montauban, 87 ; capture by,
350
INDEX
Divisions — cont.
British — cont.
Infantry — cont.
18th (Eastern), Operations of — cont.
of Trones Wood, 90 dk n., 91 <fc n., 172 n.,
264 ; at Fr^gicourt, 107, 264 ; spirit of,
112; relief of, 115; at Konssoy, 131,
134 <fc M. ; relief of, by American troops,
139 ; taken over by XIII Coqjs, 139,
140 <fc n. ; at Vendhuile, 172 <fc n. ;
relieved, 175
Flank attacks by, Aug. 8, Sept. 1, 18, Oct.
23, 24, Nov. 4 : 90, 107, 131, 236-7,
254-5, 264
21st, Sept. 18 : 134
25th, Operations of, Oct. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8-10,
17-18, 21-4, Nov. 4, 5, 7: 138, 139,
140 d; n., 177, 183-7, 194, 196, 217,
218, 220, 227, 231, 232, 233, 234^6,
254, 257-8; at Beaurevoir, 187-8; at
Honnechy, 198-9 ; attack on St. Benin
and Le Cateau, 201-2 ; relieved, 203 ;
at the crossing of the Sambre and Oise
Canal, 245-7 ; capture by, of Landrecies,
252-3 ; relieved, 259
32nd, Operations of, Aug. 10-12, 22-31,
Sept. 1 sgq., 29, Oct. 1-3, 30, Nov. 1-7 :
13, 57, 58, 61, 62, 67, 78, 79 dh n., 80,
81, 82, 85, 88, 91, 93, 99, 114-16, 118-19
(fc n., 138, 151, 152, 153, 155, 158, 160-1,
165, 170-4, 175, 177 <b n., 231, 240 <fc n.,
243-4, 250 sqq., 256, 257, 258-9 ; allotted
to Cdn. Corps, 57, 58 ; relieved by 3rd
Cdn. Div., 62 ; gas casualties, 85 ;
advance in conjiuiction with First
French Army, 89 ; taken over by IX
Corps, 119 <fc n. : relieved, 122 <fc n. ;
results of fighting, 176 ; at Sequehart,
178-9 ; crossing the Sambre and Oise
Canal, 246, 247, 252
33rd, Sept. 29, Oct. 5 : 168 ; advance of,
188
38th, Operations of, Aug. 22 sqq., Sept. 1 sqq.,
Oct. 4-5, 17, Nov. 4 : 74 n., 82, 85, 86,
87, 91, 94, 103, 107, 108, 110, 153, 167,
185, 188, 222, 255
46th (North Midland) (T.), Operations of,
Sept. 19-24, Oct. 1-3, 6, 8-9, 10-11,
17, 18, 23, Nov. 4-7 : 138, 151, 152, 158,
159, 160, 162 cfc n., 173, 177 cfc n., 178,
179 dh n., 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 194,
197 d; n., 213, 226, 227, 231, 243, 249
<fc n. ; posted to IX Corps, 119 d& n.,
139 ; 4th Aus. Div. reheved by, 138,
139 ; at Bellenglise, 158 ; co-operation
with 32nd Div., 160; at Pontruet,
142, 143 ; at Kiquerval Wood, 201, 202 ;
in the Battle of the SeUe, 209-12, 214-15 ;
in pursuit, 256-9
47th (London) (T.), Operations o April,
Aug. 8, 10, 22, 24, 30-1, Sept. 1-7:
5, 12, 47, 67 <fc n., 73, 74-5, 76-7 <& n.,
83, 84, 95 & n., 102, 106, 107 <fc nn.,
108, 110 cfc n.. Ill, 112, 114, 116;
German Order captured by, 20 n. ;
relieved by 18th Div., 67 n. ; in the
Happy Valley, 77-8 ; reUeved, 78 ;
attack by, 83 ; at Rancourt, 107 j at Mois-
lains, 110; withdrawn and allotted to
Fifth Army, 115
48th, March 1917 : 93 n.
50th, Operations of, Oct. 1-5, 6, 8, 11, 17,
18, 21, Nov. 4, 5sqq.: 138, 139, 175,
176, 177, 178, 181, 184, 185, 188, 194,
195, 196, 203, 205, 217, 220, 224;
Divisions — cont.
British — cont.
Infantry — cont.
50th, Operations of — cont.
taken over by XIII Corps, 139, 140 <fc n. ;
at Gouy, 182-3 ; at Prospect Hill,
183 ; at the Selle crossing, 218, 221-3 ;
attack of, phases of, 227, 228, 231, 245,
247, 255 <fc n., 257 sqq. ; attack through
Mormal Forest, 253-4 ; in pursuit,
258, 259-60
68th (London) (T.), Operations of, April 24,
and after, Aug. 8-31, Sept. 1-24 : 5, 12,
46-9, 56, 67, 74, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 94, 95,
102, 106-7, 118 cfc n., 119, 124, 131-5,
136, 140; at Villers Bretonneux, 3 ; at
Malard Wood, 49, 55 ; Amiens outer
defences occupied by, 61 ; relieved
67 n. ; 47th Div. relieved by, 78 ; at
Hardecourt, 92 ; relieved, 108 ; spirit
of, 112; at Peizi^res, 132-4; at Dados
Loop, 141, 142 ; transferred to First
Army, 139
63rd, Aug. 8 : 13
66th, Operations of, Oct. 2-21, Nov. 4, 7-8:
138, 139-40 <fc n., 177, 194, 195, 196,
198, 228, 231, 245, 258, 259, 260 ;
taken over by XIII Corps, 139 ; 3rd
Cav. Div. relieved by, 199 ; attack
on Le Cateau, 201-2 ; in the Battle of
the Selle, 217-18, 220-3 sqq.
74th (Yeomanry), Operations of, Sept. 2-22:
108, 110, HI, 114, 118 <fc n., 119, 120,
124, 131-6, 138, 139, 140 <fc n., 141,
265
Canadian, in Fourth Army, Aug. 8-Nov. 1 1 :
number of, 262 <& n.
1st, Operations of, Aug. 8-23 : 13, 32, 33,
34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 52-4, 56, 58, 62, 67 ;
withdrawn and transferred to First
Army, 66
2nd, Operations of, Aug. 8-17 : 13, 32, 33, 35,
36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44-5, 52, 53, 58 ; 4th
Cdn. Div. relieved by, 62 ; withdrawn
and transferred to First Army, 66
3rd, Operations of, Aug. 8-17: 13, 32 sqq.,
35 <& n., 38, 50, 52, 53, 54, 58, 64 ; 32nd
Div. relieved by, 62 ; withdrawn and
transferred to First Army, 66
4th, Operations of, Aug. 8-24 : 13, 19, 33,
35, 37 sqq., 44, 45, 67, 85 ; at Le Quesnel,
52, 53, 58 ; relieved by 2nd Cdn. Div.,
62 ; withdrawn and transferred to First
Army, 66, 85
French
Moroccan, April 24 : at Hangard, 4 n.
34th, Sept. 15, 19 : 123, 135, 136 n.
42nd, Aug. 8 : 34, 35
47th, Sept. 30, Oct. 1, 2 : 171, 175
66th, Nov. 4 : 249, 256
126th, Oct. 18 : 3 ; relief by, of let Div.,
180 ; at Andigny Forest, 226
German
Engaged and defeated by Fourth Army,
Aug. 8 to Nov. 11 : 262
Losses in prisoners suffered by, and number
of times these divisions were engaged by
Fourth Army, Aug. 8-Nov. 11 : Appendix
C, 277
Rate of absorption of, between Aug. 8 and
Nov. 11 : Appendix D, 278-9
Alpine Corps, engaged, Aug., Sept., Oct. : 64,
67, 112, 118 <fc n., 119, 121 n., 133, 135,
136, 142 n. ; sent to Serbia (Oct. 17), 207
1st Guard, engaged, Aug.-Nov. : 53 n., 241
INDEX
851
Divisions — cont.
German — cont,
1st, engaged, Sept. : 53 n., 121 n., 122 n.,
129
2nd Guard, eng£iged, Aug., Sept., Oct. : 88 n.,
HI n., 112, 121 n., 135, 142 n., 145 n.,
172 n., 196 n. ; at Trones Wood, 90; at
Mont St Quentin, 98
Order of, issued, Aug. : 69 n.
2nd, engaged, Sept., Oct., Nov. : 145 n., 173,
243
3rd Naval, engaged, Oct. : 213, 216, 217 cfc n.
5th (Bavarian), engaged, Aug., Sept., Oct. :
63, 115, 121 n., 132 n., 212, 216
5th (Reserve), engaged, Oct. : 212, 225
6th (Cavalry) dismounted, engaged, Sept. :
116 n., 118 «.
8th, engaged, Sept., Oct. : 145 n., 196 n., 198,
236
9th, counter-attack by, Nov. : 259
11th, engaged, Sept. : 143 n., 145 n., 170
Jager, engaged, Oct. : 195, 196 n.
13th (Westphalian), position of, beginning of
Aug. : 16, 17 ; engaged, Aug. : 43 n.
14th (Bavarian), position of, early Aug.: 17;
engaged, Aug., Sept. : 35 n., 51 n.,
HI n., 112cfcn.
15th, engaged, Oct. : 213, 216, 227 n.
17th, engaged, Oct. : 202, 225, 236
19th, engaged, Nov. : 248, 250
20th, engaged, Oct. : 194, 195, 196 n.
21st, engaged, Sept., Oct. : 111«., 122 n., 145 n.,
172 n., 179, 182, 183, 188, 195, 196 n.
22nd, engaged, Oct., Nov. : 227 n., 252
24th (Saxon), engaged, Oct. : 189, 195, 196 n.,
213, 216, 217, 227 n.
25th, engaged, Sept.: 112, 121 n., 123, 128,
145 n., 182
27th (Wurttemberg), position of, early Aug. :
16, 17 ; engaged, Aug. : 46, 49
29th, engaged, Oct., Nov. : 215, 216, 225, 227 n.,
248, 250
30th, engaged, Oct. : 196 n., 237 n.
34th, engaged, Oct. : 178, 195, 196 n.
38th, engaged, Aug., Sept., Oct. : 63, 111 n.,
121 n., 196 n.
4lBt (East Prussian), position of, at beginning
of Aug. : 16, 17 ; engaged, Aug., Sept. :
37 n., 43 71., 112 n.
43rd, position of, early Aug. : 16, 17 ; engaged,
Aug. : 43 «., 48 ; disbanded, 43 n.
44th, engaged, Oct. : 224 «., 225, 236
64th, position of, end of July: 16; engaged,
Sept., Oct., Nov. : 144, 145 n., 183, 252
Order of, captured, cited, on reticence of
British prisoners, 20 n.
68th, engaged, Oct. : 237 n.
75th, engaged, Sept. : 145 n.
77th, engaged, Oct. : 224 n.
79th, engaged, Aug., Sept. : 62, 121 n., 123,
127 n., 128, 145 n., 170
Orders of, captured, on defence of Hermann
Stellung, 225 n.
81st, engaged, Oct. : 216
82nd, engaged, Aug., Sept. : 53 n., 57, 128
83rd, engaged, Aug., Sept. : 112
84th, engaged, Aug., Sept., Oct. i 143 n.,
176 n., 178, 195, 196 n.
87th, engaged, Aug. : 88 n., 112
107th, engaged, Aug. : 57
108th, engaged, Aug. : 43 n., 48 ; disbanded,
43 n.
109th, position at beginning of Aug. : 16, 17 ;
engaged, Aug. : 37 n.
117th, engaged, Aug., Sept. : 37 n., 112 n.
Divisions — cont.
German — cont.
H9th. engaged, Aug., Sept., Oct. : 57, 59 n.,
62, 115, 121 n., 122 n., 129, 145 n.,
174 <fc n., 182, 188, 196 n.
12l8t, engaged, Aug., Sept., Oct., Nov. : 64,
134 n., 145 n., 172 n., 188, 196 n., 236,
258
185th, engaged, Sept. : 111 n., 145 n., 172 n.
192nd, engaged, Aug. : 35 n.
197th (Jager), engaged, Sept. : 127 cfc n., 128
200th, engaged, Nov. : 250
204th, engaged, Oct., Nov. : 196 n., 199, 217
<fc »., 219, 225, 236, 252
Orders of, captured, Oct. 12 : 225 n.
208th, engaged, Oct. : 195, 196 n.
221st, engaged, Sept., Oct. : 145 n., 173, 176
cfc n., 179, 195, 196 n., 227 n. ; disbanded,
237
225th (Prussian), position at beginning of
Aug. : 17 ; engaged, Aug., Sept. : 35 n.,
112 n.
232nd, engaged, Aug., Sept. : 88 n., 112,
142 »., 144
233rd, position of, end of July: 16; engaged,
Aug., Sept. : 112
241st, engaged, Oct., Nov. : 173, 176 n., 179,
186, 195, 196 n., 258
243rd, engaged, Aug., Oct. : 57, 217, 219, 225,
236
Divisional Artillery, Engineers, etc., see vnth each
division, in Appendix F
Dixmude, 145
Dodds, Brig. -Gen. W., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C. 5th
Cdn. Divl. Artillery, 309
Doingt, Sept. 2, 5: 108; captured, 116
Doleful Post, Sept. 21 : 141
Domart, bridge at, 15, 34
Dompierre, Aug. 27-8, Nov. 4-6 : 89, 92, 243, 257 ;
captured, 258
Done, Lieut.-Col. J. R., D.S.O., C.E. 25th Divl.
Engineers, 321
Doon Hill, Oct. 5, 8 : 187 ; captured, 195
Dorsetshire Regt.
1st Batt. action, Nov. 4 : 250, 251
Doullens, 13, 29
Dourlers, Nov. 7 : 259
Dowse, Lieut.-Col. R., D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G. 4th
Aus. Div., 314
Doyle, Brig.-Gen. J. F., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.A. &
Q.M.G. in Corps, 304, 318
Dragoon Guards
3rd, Oct. 9 : 198
5th, Aug. 8 : 45
Dragoons, 1st (Royal), see Royal Dragoons
2nd (Royal Scots Greys), see Royal Scots Greys
Draper, Brig.-Gen. D. C, D.S.O., G.O.C. 8lh
Cdn. Inf. Brig., 310
Driencourt, Sept. 5 : 116
Drill Ground, The (N. of Landrecies), Nov. 4 :
254
Drocourt-Qu^ant Line stormed, Sept. 2 : 9, 113
Dublin Fusiliers, Royal, see Royal Dublin Fusiliers
Duckworth, Lieut.-Col. R., D.S.O., AA. & Q.M.G.
46th (North Midland) Div. (T.), 320
Dudgeon, Brig.-Gen. R. M., D.S.O., M.C., G.O.C.
51st Inf. Brig., 316
Duke, Lieut.-Col. A. C. H., D.S.O., A.A. &. Q.M.G.
50th Div., 321
Dirnamy figures, in " Chinese " attack, Oct. 17 : 210
Dummy tanks, Sept. 18, Oct. 17 : 125 ofc n., 210
Duncan Post, Sept. 19-22 : 137, 140, 141-2
Durham Light Infantry
2nd Batt., Oct. 17 : 212, 213
13th Batt., Oct. 5 : 187, 188 ; Nov. 4 : 253
852
INDEX
Durrant, Lieut.-Col. J. M.A., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
A.A. & Q.M.G. 2nd Aus. Div., 313
Dyer, Brig.-Gen. H. M., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
7th Cdn. Inf. Brig., 310
Dyer, Lieut.-Col. R. J., D.S.O., C.E. Divl. Engineers,
4th Aus. Div., 315
Earle, Col. R. G., D.S.O., Chief Signal Officer,
Fourth Army, 301
East Kent Regt. (The Buffs)
1st Batt., Oct. 24 sqq. : 213, 237
7th Batt., Aug. 22, Sept. 1, Oct. 23 : 76, 107, 235
East Surrey Regt.
8th Batt., Aug. 22, Sept. 1, Oct. 23 : 76, 107, 235
Eolusier, Aug. 23 : Somme crossing at, 79
Bcume Trench, Sept. 29 : 160
Egg Post, Sept. 21-2 sqq. : 141, 142
Egypt, divisions from, 140 A nn.
Elincourt, Oct. 8, 9 : 196, 198
Elineourt-Malincourt road, Oct. 8 : 196
EUiott, Brig.-Gen. C. A., D.S.O., C.E. XIII Corps,
321 326
Elliott, Brig.-Gen. H. E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
D.C.M., G.O.C. loth Aus. Inf. Brig., 315
Elsa Trench, Aug. 31-Sept. 1 : 101, 105
Enfilade fire, artillery and machine gun, Aug. sqq. :
56, 79, 99, 100, 134, 136 n., 154, 164, 173,
186, 196, 205, 212
Engineers, see American, Canadian, Cavalry Corps,
and Royal Engineers, see also Appendix
F, 301
Englefontaine, Oct. 23-26, Nov. 2-4 : 230, 237, 240,
253, 255
Ep6hy, fighting at, Sept. 7 sqq. : 117, 118 <fc n., 119,
120, 121, 124, 125, 131, 133, 134, 136
Ep6hy-Peizi6res heights, Sept. 11, 18: attacked,
120, 123
Epenancourt, Aug. 28 : 91
Epine de Malassise ridge, Aug. 30 : attacked, 97
Epinette Farm, Oct. 23 : captured, 235
Escaufort, 200
Escaut, see Scheldt, see also Canal de I'Escaut
Essex Regt.
9th Batt., Aug. 8 : 48 ; Sept. 18 : 133
10th Batt., Aug. 8, Oct. 23, Nov. 4 : 48, 49, 234,
255
11th Batt., Sept. 14-Oct. 17: 211, 213; at
Hohion Wood, 122-3
Essigny-le-Grand, 152
Estrees, Aug. 28, Sept. 30, Oct. 3 : 92, 169, 174,
180, 181, 182, 193
Eatr^ee-Gen^ve road, Oct. 3 : 180
Estr^es-Gouy road, 174
Estr^es-Le Cateau road, 197
Staples, 13
Eterpigny, Aug. 29 : 93, 98
Etineham, and Etinehnm Spur, 14, 15 ; attack on,
Aug. 9-10, 12, 22 : 51, 56, 58, 60, 65,
66, 77
Etreuz, 241
Etricourt, Sept. 29 : 161, 165
Evans, Brig.-Gen. L. P., V.C, D.S.O., G.O.C. 14th
Cdn. Inf. Brig., 311
Evans, Lieut.-Col. W. H., D.S.O., C.R.E., Cavalry
Corps, 302, 317
Falvy, Aug. 22 : 84
Fargny Mill, Aug. 27 : captured, 89
Fargnv Wood, Aug 27 : 90
Farmar, Brig.-Gen. G. J., C.B., C.M.G., D.A. it
Q.M.G. Cdn. Corps, 308
Faubourg de Bretagne, P^ronne, Sept. 1 : 105
Faubourg de Landrecies, Le Cateau, Oct. 17-18 :
228
Faubourg St. Martin-Faubourg de Landrecies road,
Oct. 17 : 222
Faubourg-Soydres, Landrecies, Nov. 4 : 252, 253,
254
Favreuil, Aug. 25 : captured, 86
Fa\Til, Nov. 5 : 257
Fay, Aug. 28 : captured, 92
Fayet, 139
Fayolle, General, commanding Group of French
Armies of the N. & N.E., 66 n.
Fayt Farm, Oct. 23 : taken, 235
Felleries, Nov. 8 : 260
Ferguson, Lieut.-Col. F. A., C.E. 17th (Northern)
Divl. Engineers, 316
Fervaque Farm, Sept. 18 : 129
Fesmy, Nov. 4-6 : 243, 256 ; captured, 249, 250
Feuillacourt, Aug. 31, Sept. 1 : 99, 100, 105
Feuillferes, Aug. 29 : occupied, 93
Field Artillery, see Appendix F, 301
Field Companies —
23rd, crossing Sambre and Oise Canal, Nov. 4 :
248
106th, bridge- work at Sambre and Oise Canal,
Nov. 4 : 253
108th, and the crossing of the Sambre and Oise
Canal, Nov. 4 : 252
219th, bridging by, Nov. 4 : 252
409th, Nov. 4 : 248
446th, Oct. 17 : bridging by, of the Selle, 219
447th, bridging by, of the SeUe, Oct. 17 : 219
Field Service Regulations, cited, on Success in War,
269
Field Survey BattaUon, Sound-ranging Section and
Flash - spotting Observation-posts of,
31 <fc n.
Filiform Tree, the, fighting at, Aug. 22, 24 : 75,
83, 84
Findlay, A/Major G. de C. E., V.C, D.S.O., M.C.,
248, 280, 286
Fire, reverse, German, Sept. 29 : 164
Fire-direction by observation baUoona, Aug. 8 : 50
Fisher's Keep, Sept. 18 : 133 cfc n.
Flacques Wood, Sept. 2 : 108
Flamicourt, Sept. 3, 4: cleared. 111
Marshes, of, Sept. 2 : crossing attempted, 109
Flanders, Sept.-Oct. : allied progress in, 9, 10, 137,
138 n., 145, 191, 237
" going " in, 1917 : 269
Flank attacks and outflanking movements
British, instances of, on
Aug. 8, at Rifle Wood, 34 <fc n., 264
Aug. 23, at Garenne Wood, 81
Aug. 27, at Trones Wood, 90, 264
Sept. 1, at Fr^gicourt, 107, 264
Sept. 18, at Ronssoy, 131, 264-5
Oct. 17, at Regnicourt, 211
Oct. 24, at Renuart Farm, 236
Frederick the Great's methods in delivering and
replying to, 264 ds n.
by One division, while others attack frontally,
discussed, 264—5
Flanking fire of machine guns of 18th Div. at
Montauban, Aug. 26 : 87
Flanks of a breach, holding firm by, 3—4
Flash-spotting Observation-posts, work of, prior
to Aug. 8 : 31 <fc n.
Flatiron Wood, Oct. 4 : 185
Flaucourt, Aug. 29-30 : 99 ; captured, 93
Flaucourt-Feuilleres, terrain near, Aug. 29 : 93
Flixecourt, H.Q. Fourth Army, 18, 28
INDEX
353
Fiorina Trench, Aug. 31, Sept. 1 : 100, 101, 103,
104
Floursies, 260
Fluqui^res, 117
Foch, General (made Marshal, 5 tfc n. ), and the plan of
attack of the Fourth Army, 5, 7, 11 n.,
12, 18, 19, 240 ; arrangement with,
for front of Cdn. Corps to be taken over
by First French Army, Aug. 17-22 :
66
and Sir D. Haig, convergent attacks delivered by,
Sept. 26-9 : 9 ; attack on Hindenburg
Line decided on, Sept. 22 : 137 ; sup-
port given by, to Fourth Army, Oct. 3 i
178
Folemprise Farm, Sept. 30, Oct. 2 : 169, 180, 182 ;
captured, 174
Folies, Aug. 9 : captured, 53
Fontaine-aux-Bois, Oct. 23-4, Nov. 4 : 230, 231,
232, 253 ; captured, 236
Fontaine-les-Cappv, Aug. 26-7 : 87, 88, 89
Fontaine Uterte, Oct. 3, 4, 8 : 180, 184 ; gained,
195
Footbridges, German, over Sambre and Oise Canal,
206
Foott, Brig.-Gen. C. H., C.M.G., C.E. Aus. Corps,
312, 323. 327
Ford, Lieut. -Col. S. H., Chief of StaS, 27th Amer.
Div., 324
Foreign Legion, The, at Villers Bretonneux, April
24: in.
Forest, Oct. 10-11 : 201, 204
Forester's House, the, in
Andigny Forest, Oct. 17, 18 : 212, 226
L'Eveque Wood, Oct. 21 : 231
Fort Garry Horse, Oct. 9 : attack by, 198
Foucaucourt, 16; Aug. 8, 23, 27: 42, 79, 88;
captured, 89
Fouquescourt, Aug. 10-11 : 58, 59, 61, 62
Framerville, Aug. 8-9 : 42, 45, 55, 57
France, frontier of, reached by Fourth Army,
Nov. 10 : 261
Francilly-Selency, Sept. 18 sqq. : 126, 135, 138, 142
Franco-American attack towards Mezi^res, date
fixed for, 138 n.
Franco-British liaison force, Aug. 8 : 35
Fransart, 66
Fraser, Brig.-Gen. L. D., C.B., C.M.G., G.O.C.
Heavy ArtiUery, Aus. Corps, 312, 323,
327
Freckles Wood, Aug. 31 : 101
Frederick the Great, methods of, in employing and
meeting flank attacks, 264 <fc n. ; spirit
of, as influencing the moral of his forces,
10 n.
Fregicourt, Aug. 30, Sept. 1 : 96 sqq., 107, 108, 264
Freideburg, — von, order issued by, Aug. 27 :
69 n.
French Armies, see each, under Army, French
Front, shortening of, Aug. 1 1-20 : 66
High Command, Third French Army withdrawn
by, 66
Inhabitants of Bohain, plight of, Oct. 9 : 197 n.
Liberated between the Hindenburg Line and
the Selle, 202 n.
Offensive on the Mame, July 18 : 5, 17 <f: n.,
68 n., 70
Fresnoy-en-Chauss6e, Aug. 8 : 38-9, 44, 51
Fresnoy-le-Grand, Oct. 6, 8, 9 : 191, 193, 197 ;
occupied, 200
Fresnoy-le-Grand-Bohain railway, 197
Fresnoy-le-Petit, tactical importance of, Sept. H :
120; objective on Sept. 18 sqq. : 123,
125, 127, 135, 13G, 139. 142 ; captured,
143
FOrSTH ABUT
Freanoy-le-Petitr-Berthancourt-Le Verguier-Grand
Priel Woods-Hargicourt^Ronssoy— Basse
Boulogne-Epehy-Peizi6re8, high ground
near German first line of defence, 120
Fresnoy-le-Petit-Thorigny-Le Tronquoy road, Sept.
29: 1.53
Fricourt, Aug. 25 : captured, 85
Frise, 16 : Aug. 27-8 : 89 ; captured, 92
FrizeU, Brig.-Gen. C. W., D.S.O., M.C., G.O.C.
75th Inf. Brig., 321
Froissy Beacon, Aug. 23 : captured, 81
Frontage, length considered suitable to allot to a
division at various dates, 6 its n.
Frontages allotted to troops in successful attacks,
1915-18, with chief factors influencing
the situation, 265-268 ; Tables, 266-7
Frontal attack, 265
FuUer, Brig.-Gen. C. G., D.S.O., B.G.G.S. Ill
Corps, 304, 318
Fuses, instantaneous, used for
Road shelling, Aug. 25 : 86 <fc n.
Wire-cutting, Sept. : 154
Gaby, Lieut. A. E., V.C, 40, 280, 286-7
Gailly, Aug. 8 : captured, 43
Garde Mill, Oct. 23 : 232, 234
Garenne Wood, Aug. 23 : 81
Garforth, Lieut.-Col. W., D.S.O., M.C., C.E. 46th
Divl. Engineers (T.). 326
Gas, BB., British use of, 144. 153
Yellow Cross or Mustard, German use of. 3 cfc n.,
26, 144 n., 153
Gas-shelling
British
Sept. 26-7 : 144 <fc n., 153 ; Oct. 5, 16 : 222
German
Aug., Sept., Oct., Nov. : 3 cfc n., 26, 47, 49,
64, 67 n., 74, 83, 85, 116, 13 , 132 n.,
186, 212, 215, 219, 241
Gattigny Wood, Oct. 9 : 198, 199
Gauche Wood, Sept. 18 : captured. 134
Gellibrand, Maj.-Gen. J., C.B., D.S.O., G.O.C. 3rd
Aus. Div., 40, 314
General Headquarters, see also Haig
Instructions from, Aug. 17 : 65 dt n., 66
Generalship, art of, 2, 10 n., 269-70, 271
Geneve, Oct. 4 : 184
Gentelles-Ctwjhy plateau. British batteries on, 15, 28
German advance on Amiens, the final attempt to
capture, April 24 : 2 sqq.
Armies, see under Armies, German
ArtiUery, see Artillery, German
Casualties, passim
Counter-attacks, see Counter-attacks
Defeat, way opened for, 9 ; the climax, 256, 261
Defences, at
Amiens, 15-16, 73 et alibi
Hamel, 6
Hindenburg Line, 120-1 sqq., 147 sqq.
St. Souplet-Le Cateau, 202, 204
Disorganisation, by attacks of Aug. 8, Sept 29-
Oct. 8: 32, 177, 196
Forces {see also Man-power), strength of, in Sept.,
121, maximiun of, 113
Intelligence, examination by, of prisoners, 27 n.
Losses in prisoners, see also Prisoners. German,
and Appendices A, B, and C, 275-7
Aug. 8-21 : 70
Aug. 8-Sept. 28 : 145
Aug. 8-Nov. 11 : 262, Appendix C. 277
Z Z
354
INDEX
German — cont.
Maps, captured, Oct. 13: defences shown on,
204
Machine-gun posts and use of machine guns,
Aug. 8 sqq. : 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 45, 99
et alibi, passim, see also Machine Guna,
use of, German
Military position after the attack of Aug. 8 : 8 ;
increasing difficulty, 9, 196-7, 239^0 ;
after the defeat of Nov. 4 : 256 <fc n.
Minor attacks, Aug. 3, 6 : 20-7
Moral, civil and military, see Moral, German
Neglect to entrench E. of Amiens, 16 «fc n.
Offensive in May-July, failure of, 4, 7
Orders, captured, 16 n., 20 n., 69 n., 96 n., 225 n.,
256 n., 259 <fc n., and see Appendix H,
332-3
Prisoners, see Losses in prisoners above and
Prisoners, German
Reinforcement train captured, Aug. 8 : 45
Reinforcements {see also Reserves, absorption of),
45, 108, 118 n., et alibi
Reserves, absorption of, Aug. 8-Nov. 11 :
Appendix D, 278-9
Drain on, April onwards, 4
Emploved in Battle of Mont St. Quentin,
"112-13
Reduction of, 190, 237-8
Underestimated, early Aug., 17
Resistance, at Chipilly Spur, Aug. 8 : 49 ; chief
points of, Aug. 22 sqq. : 75, 77-8, 79,
80, 83-4, 87 ; stigening of, Aug. 30 :
96 dt n. ; character of, Sept. 18, Oct. 17 :
12.5-6, 225 sqq., 237 d: n., et alibi
Strategy, March-April, 3 ; errors in, 5
Steel floats for floating bridges, 246 <fc n.
Strong posts, tactics employed regarding, Aug. 8 :
36
Tribute to Australian quaUties, Oct. 3 : 182 n.
Troops, see Armj-, Corps, Divisions, Prisoners,
Regiments, etc. ; see also Moral, and
Forces, and Reserves, above
Condition of, at armistice, German letter cited
on, 261 n.
Withdrawal, progress of from Aug. 8 onwards,
8, 9, 10, 14, 69, 72, 84, 86, 89, 91, 93 <fc n.,
94, 112, 113 sqq., 191, 207, 208, 229, 238,
240 ; converted into a rout, after Nov.
4:10: tactics in withdrawal of artillery,
88 ; in full retreat, Nov. 5, 7-9 : 258 sqq.
German Great General Staff (Higher Command)
Bewilderment of, in Oct. : 10
Confidence in, of army and people shaken by
Mangin's %-ictory of July 18 : 17
Difficulties and embarrassments of, Aug. : 8
Dilemma of, Aug. 22 : 67-8
Enlightenment of, by the Battle of Amiens, 69
Initiative lost by, Aug. 8 sqq. : 8
Intentions of, anticipations on, 96 <fc n.
Indications on, 191, 202
Orders issued by, on
Holding Mont St. Quentin area at all costs, 98
Moral, etc., 69 n.
Ghent, Sept. 28 : attacked, 137
Ghissignies, Oct. 17 : 226
Gillam, Brig. -Gen. R. A., D.S.O., C.E. IX Corps,
318, 325
GiUemont Farm, Sept. 18-29 : 124, 137, 141, 157,
163, 172 ; captured, 140
GiUespie, Brig.-Gen. E. C. F., C.B., C.M.G., D.D.S.
and T. Fourth Armv, 301
Girdwood, Brig.-Gen. A. C, D.S.O., G.O.C. 96th
Inf. Brig., 311
Girdwood, Maj.-Gen. E. S., G.O.C. 74th (Yeo.) Div.,
108, 307 & n.
Glasgow, Maj.-Gen. T. W., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 1st Au3. Div., 62-3, 78-9,
313
Gloucestershire Regt.
Ist Batt., Oct. 18 : 226 ; attack on Catillon and
crossing of Sambre and Oise Canal,
Nov. 4 : 249
l/5th Batt., daj'light attack on Beaurevoir,
Oct. 5 : 188 ; at L'EvSque Wood, Oct.
23 : 234 n. ; at Landrecies, Nov. 4 :
252
9th Batt. (Pioneers), bridging by, of the Selle,
Oct. 17 : 223 ; one company of, with
Bethell's Force, Nov. 9 : 260 n.
Goddard, Brig.-Gen. H. A., D.S.O., G.O.C. 9th
Aus. Brig., 323
Godley, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. J., K.C.B., K.C.M.G..
G.O.C. XXII Corps, temp. G.O.C. Ill
Corps, 65 n., 74, 77, 90, 108, 304
Good, Cpl. H. J., V.C, 36, 280, 287
Gordon, L/Cpl. B. S., V.C, 89 n., 280, 287
Gorringe, Maj.-Gen. Sir G. F., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
D.S.O., G.O.C. 47th (London) Div. (T.).
67 n., 73, 78, 306
Gottlieb Trench, Sept. 1 : 104, 105
Gott mit uns Trench, Aug. 31 : 101
Gouraud, General, action of, July 15 : 5
Gouy, Sept. 22 sqq., Oct. 1-11 : 152, 163 n., 169,
175, 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 185, 188,
190, 196, 203
Gouzeaucourt, Sept. 27 : 145
Government Farm, Sept. 2 : occupied, 110
Graham, Lieut. -Col. M., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 2nd Cav.
Div., 303
Grammont, Nov. 11 : 261
Grand Fayt, Nov. 6 : 257
Grand Galop Farm, Nov. 4 : 243, 250
Grand Priel Woods, Sept. 11, 18 : 120, 123, 129
Grandecourt-Moyenneville front, British attack on,
Aug. 21 : 72
Grande Helpe stream, Nov. 5, 6 : 258
Grandrieu, Nov. 11 : 261
Grant, General Ulysses, and his forces, Henderson on,
270
Grant, Lieut.-Col. A. K., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 50th
Div., 327
Gratibus, Aug. 10 : Germans driven back, to, 69
Great soldiers, characters of, influence of, in war,
Henderson cited on, 270
Gressaire Wood, 14, 15 ; Aug. 8, 9 : 46, 48, 56, 57
Gricourt and Gricourt Ridge, Sept. 18-30 : 124,
142, 151, 152, 153, 158, 171 ; captured,
143 <fc n.
Griesbach, Brig.-Gen. W. A., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
1st Cdn. Inf. Brig., 309
Grirawade, Brig.-Gen. H. W., C.B., C.M.G., G.O.C.
3rd Aus. Divl. Artillery, 314
Grougis, Oct. 17-18: 225, 229
Grove, Lt.-Col. T. T., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1. 6th Div.,
319
Guillaucourt, Aug. 8 : 39, 45 ; captured, 37
Guillemont, captured, Aug. 29 : 94 ; 30th and 35th
Divs. at (1916), 162 n.
Guisancourt Farm, Sept. 22, Oct. 3-5, 8 : 153, 181,
182, 185, 187, 194; captured, 188,
189
Guise, Oct., 237
Guns, British see also Artillery, British), in attack
of Aug. 8 : 7 ; in attack of Sept. 29 :
153
Captured, March to Nov., Appendix A, 275
Guyencourt, Sept. 7 : captured, 117
Guyot Farm, Oct. 17 : 211
Gwynn-Thomas, Brig.-Gen. G., C.M.G., D.SO..,
G.O.C. 50th Inf. Brig., 316
INDEX
355
Hachette Farm, Nov. 1-5 : 244, 2o7
Haig, Brig.-Gen. N. W., C.M.G., G.O.C. 5th Cav.
Brig., 303 ; attached Aus. Corps,
323 ; attached IX Corps, 325
Haig, Field-Marshal Sir D., K.T.. G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
K.C.I.E., C.-in-C. British Armies in
France, arrangement of, with Foch,
for First French Army to take over
Canadian front, 66 <fc n.
Convergent attacks planned and executed by
Sept. 26-9 : 9, 137-8
Despatches of, ciud on
British attack on Hindenburg Line on Sept.
29: 137 R.
Reasons for extending N. the front of attack
on Aug. 21 : 71-2
Victory Despatch on the capture of the Hinden-
burg Line, Oct. 6 : 190
on the German retreat in Nov. : 10
First French Army placed directly under orders
of, July 23 : 12, till Aug. 16 : 66 n.
General report from Gen. Rawlinson called for,
Sept. 8, rendered Sept. 11 : 120-1, and
approved, Sept. 12 : 122, 123
Orders issued by
July 26, for preparations to be pressed on for
attack on Aug. 10 : 12
Aug. 17, for next big British attack, 65 <fe n.
Aug. 22, defining a ruthless offensive policy,
72 <fc «., 84
Sept. 22, for convergent attack by First, Third,
and Fourth Armies, on Hindenburg
Line, 9, 137-8
Sept. 28, to Cavalry Corps for operations with
Fourth Army, 156
Oct. 5, for continuance of offensive, 191, 192
Oct. 11, for the same, 203
Oct. 17, for general advance about Oct. 21:
226, 230
Oct. 29, for the same in a concerted attack of
Fourth, Third, and First Armies in Nov. :
240
Nov. 11, for troops to stand fast on line gained
at 11 a.m., 261
Plan of attack for Fourth Army approved by,
7, 11-12
Praise by, of
II Amer. Corps, 231
IX and XIII Corps, 256
HaU, Cpl. A. C, V.C, 105 n., 280, 287-8
Hall, Lieut. -Col. H. A. L., M.C., C.E. 6th Divl.
Engineers, 320
HaU, Lieut. -Col. P. de H., M.C., C.E. 50th Divl.
Engineers, 322
Halle, 1917 : 93 n., Aug. 31 : 100
Hallu, Aug. 9-11 : 51, 59, 61, 62
Hallu Woods, Aug. 11 : Germeui losses at, 61-2
Hallue vallev, 3
Halts in Barrage (g.v.), 269
Ham, Aug. 5, 11, 22, Sept. 6-7 : French attack on,
and capture of, 18, 61, 73, 113, 117;
strategic importance of, 73 n.
Hamel, action at, July 4 : use of tanks, and lessons
from the operations, 6, 7, 12, 21 tk n., 67
German defences at, 15
Hamelet, 156
Hamilton, Col. R. S., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.D.O.S.
Fourth Army, 301
Hancourt, Sept. 5 : 117 n.
Hangard, April 24, Aug. 8 : loss of, 4 ; bridge at,
15; attack on. 33; bridge repaired, 35;
captured, 35, 39
Hangard Wood, 17, 36
Hangest-en-Santerre-Harbonni6res-Mericourt-8ur-
Sorame line, allied objective, Aug. 8:18
Hankey, Brig.-Gen. E. B., D.S.O., G.O.C. 4th
Tank Brigade, 308, 324
Hannappes, Oct. 19 : 229
Happegarbes, Nov. 1-4 : 242, 251
Happegarbes Spur, Oct. 26, Nov. 2, 4 : 237, 240,
241 ; captured. 251-2
Happy Vallev, the, Aug. 22-4 : fighting in, 73, 75,
77, 78, 83, 84
Harbonniferes, 18 ; Aug. 8 : 39, 45 ; captured, 43
Hardecourt-aux-Bois, Aug. 26, 28 : 87 ; captured,
92
Harding-Newman, Brig.-Gen. J. C, C.M.G., D.A.
& Q.M.G. IX Corps, 318, 325
Hardress-Llovd, Brig.-Gen. J., D.S.O., G.O.C.
3rd Tank Brigade, 302, 318
Hargicourt, Sept. 11, 18, 27 : 120, 125, 153-4
Hargicourt-Bony road, Sept. 29 : 1 67
Hargival Farm, Oct. 4 : captured, 185
Harington, Brig.-Gen. J., D.S.O., G.O.C. 139th
Inf. Brig., 320
Harman, Maj.-Gen. A. E. W., G.O.C. 3rd Cav.
Div., 44, 198, 303
Harris, Sgt. T. J., V.C, M.M., 56, 280, 288
Harrison, Lieut.-Col. E. H., G.S.O. 1, 3rd Aus. Div.,
327
Harvey, Pte. J., V.C, 110 n., 280, 288
Hattencourt, 51
Haute-Allaines, Sept. 2, 14, 22-3 : 110, 114, 139;
captured, 109, 111
Haute Noyelles, Nov. 5, 6 : 257, 258
Hauteville, Oct. 17 : 225
Hautrfeve, Nov. 4 : 243
Havrincourt, 147 n.
Hayter, Brig.-Gen. R. J. F., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
10th Cdn. Brig., 311
Heane, Brig.-Gen. J., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
2nd Aus. Brig., 313
Heathcote, Brig.-Gen. C. E., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 231st Brig., 307
Heavy Artillery, see Corps Heavy Artillery,
Appendix F, 301 sqq.
Hecq, Nov. 4 : 242, 254, 255
Hedges, Lieut. F. W., V.C, 236, 280, 288
Heilly, Aug. 9 : 55
Hem, Aug. 29 : 94
Henderson, Colonel, military writings of, 1 <fc n., 2,
10 n., 270
Henderson, Lieut.-Col. W. A., D.S.O., C.E. Ist
Aus. Divl. Engineers, 313
Herbecourt, Aug. 26-31 : 86, 92, 100 ; captured, 93
Herleville, Aug. 11, 23 : 63, 78 ; captured, 79, 82
Herle%-ille-Chuignes-Square Wood line, attack on,
Aug. 23 : 78
Herleville Woods, Aug. 23 : fighting in, 80
Hermann Stellung, the, I and II, Oct. 13-14, 19, 23 :
204, 225, 234
German orders on the defence of, Oct. 12, 19 :
225 n., 256 n.
Hermies, Sept. 4: 113 n.
Herr, Col. J. K., Chief of SUff, 30th Amer. Div.,
324
Herring, Brig.-Gen. S. C. E., D.S.O., G.O.C. 13th
Aus. Inf. Brig., 315
Hervilly, Sept. 7 : secured, 118
Her\-illv-Hamelet— Bouchy area, 156
Hertzberg, Col. H. F., D.S.O., M.C, C.E. 3rd Brig.
Cdn. Engineers, 310
Hesbecourt, Sept. 9, 11, 29 : 118, 163; occupied.
120
Hestrud, Nov. 10 : 261
Hext, Brig.-Gen. L. J., C.M.G., G.O.C. 74th Divl.
Artiller}-, 307
356
INDEX
Heythorp Post, Sept. 21-2: captured, 141
Hickie, Brig.-Gen. C. J., G.O.C. 7th Inf. Brig., 321
Higginson, Maj.-Gen. H. AV., G.O.C. 12th Div.,
46, 73-4, 133, 304
Highland Light Infantry
15th Batt., Sept. 5, Nov. 4 : 115, 250 ; bayonet
charge, Oct. 3 : 178
16th Batt. (Pioneers), bridge-work, Nov. 4 : 251
Hill 105, Aug. 9, 13 : 57 ; gained, 65
Hindenburg Line, The
German defences in front of, 120, 147 sqq., 188,
189 ; weak points in, 149 ct n. ; effect of
breach made in, 9, 169, 177, 190
Outer, Gen. Rawlinson's proposal to attack
approved by C.-in-C, Sept. 11 : 121-2
Advance to, Sept. 5-28 : 114 sqq.
Attacks during Sept. 18: 123 sqq.
German retreat to, begun, March 1917 : 93 n. ;
progress of, 1918 : 9, 113
History of, and British knowledge of, 147 <fc n.
Main Line, observation over, operations to secure,
Sept. 11 sqq. : 120, 122, 142
Proper, chief features of, 121 ; German intention
to hold, 145
(A) Attack on, on Sept. 29, decided on, plan of
general offensive for, 137 tfc n., 138 n.
Obstacles before, two types of, 148-9
Orders for the attack, 137-9
Preliminaries, 153 sqq.
(B) Storming of, Sept. 29 : 147 sqq. ; the
assault, 157 sqq.
Results, 168-9
Tactical surprise of, 150-1, 264
(C) Capture of defences completed, Sept. 30-
Oct. 2 : 170 sqq. ; results of, 9, 10, 177,
189-90
Reserve or Le Catelet-Nauroy line, Sept. 11-30 :
121, 149 <b 11., 152, 164, 165, 169 ;
cleared, 171 d- n., 172
Hirondelle Stream, Nov. 4 : 254
Hoare, Brig.-Gen. R., D.S.O., G.O.C. 229th Inf.
Brig., 307
Hobbs, Maj.-Gen., see Talbot-Hobbs
Holding firm on flanks, when part of defensive line
is forced back, 3-4
HoUan Wood, Aug. 8 : 34 n. ; capture of, 35
Hollan VVood-Demuin road, Aug. 8 : 38
Holman, Maj.-Gen. H. C, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
D.A. & Q.M.G. Fourth Army, 301
Holnon, Sept. 11, 18, 19 : 120, 123, 124, 126, 127 ;
secured, 136
Holnon Wood, Sept. 10-20: fighting at, 119, 122,
123, 136, 139 n.
Home, Brig.-Gen. A. F., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.G.G.S.
Cav. Corps, 302, 317
Home's " Precis of Modern Tactics," referred to, 264 n.
Honnechy, Oct. 9 : 197, 200 ; captured, 198-9
Honnechy-Le Cateau road, Oct. 17 : 217
Honnechy Station, Oct. 9 : 200
Hore-Ruthven, Lieut.-Col. Hon. C. M., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 3rd Cdn. Div., 310
Hourges, 15; Aug. 3, 8 : 26, 33
Howitzer Brigades, see Appendix F, 301 sqq.
Hudson, Lieut.-Col. P., D.S.O., A. A. & Q.M.G.
6th Div., 319
Hughes, Col. H. T., C.M.G., C.E. 4th Cdn. Brig.
Engineers, 311
Human nature, and generalship, 1-2, 10 n., 269-70,
271
Humphreys, Brig.-Gen. G., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. R.A., IX Corps, 318, 325
Hunter, Brig.-Gen. A. J., D.S.O., M.C., G.O.C.
198th Inf. Brig., 322
Hussars, 10th (Prince of Wales's Own Royal), at
Honnechy, Oct. 9 : 198 ct n.
Hussars — cont
20th, attached to II Amer. Corps, Oct. 1 1, 17 : 204,
217, later to IX Corps. 204 n. ; Nov. 5 :
256, at Favril, 257 ; Nov. 0-10 : pur-
suit, 257, 258, 260-1
Hutier, General von. Commander German Eighteenth
Army, 7 n., 8 n., 190
Ignaucourt, Aug. 8 : 37, 44 ; captured, 39
Independence Day, 1918: American success on, 6
Independent Force, Canadian, r61e of, Aug. 8-9
33, 39, 50-3
Individual versus machine in the last war, success
of the former, 271
IndividuaUty, influence of, in war, 270-1
Infantry
British
Assembly of, for attack of Aug. 8 : 27, 29
Attack formation for, and number of men re-
quired, 265
Attacks, successful, essentials for, 64
Training of, with tanks, 7, 21 »., 247 ; results,
Nov. 4 : 254
German, at Hamel, 6
Ingledon-Webber, Brig.-Gen. A. B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 37th Inf. Brig., 305
Ingram, 2nd Lieut. C. M., V.C, M.M., 186 ?i., 280,
289
Initiative, German loss of, Aug. : 8
Initiative of subordinate commanders, N.C.O.'s, and
privates. Fourth Array, instances of, 38,
39, 53, 54, 56-7, 64 <fc n., 80, 82 n.,
89 n., 93, 103 <fc n., 104 * n., 106 n.,
109, 110 n., Ill <fc n., 128 n., 129 ».,
131, 133 n., 143 n., 160 <fc n., 161, 164
<fc n., 169, 171 n., 173, 176 n., 178, 179 nn.,
180 n., 183, 186 n., 187, 188, 211, 215,
224, 228, 234 n., 236, 241 n, 248, 251,
252, 253, 255, 270-1, 272, see also
Appendix E, 280 sqq.
Inniskilling Fusiliers, Royal, see Royal Iimiskilling
Fusiliers
Intelligence, German, records of examination by,
27 n.
Inundations effected by Germans beside the Sambre
and Oise Canal, Nov. : 242
Inventions used in the late war, purpose of, 269
Irish Regt., Royal, see Royal Irish Regt.
Irwin, Lieut.-Col. A. P. B., D.S.O., O.C. 55th Brig.,
327
Italy, British battalions from, in attack on Hinden-
burg Line, 140 n.
Izat, Lieut.-Col. W. R, D.S.O., C.E. 74th (Yeo.)
Divl. Engineers, 307
Jackson, Lieut.-Col. R. E., D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G.
3rd Aus. Div., 314
Jackson, Maj.-Gen. H. C, D.S.O., G.O.C. 50th
Div., 139, 220, 245, 321
Jeancourt, Sept. 8, 11-12: 118, 120, 122
Jerram, Lieut.-Col. C. F., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 46th
(North Midland) Div. (T.), 320
Jess, Lieut.-Col. C. H., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 3rd
Aus. Div., 314, 323 ; later G.O.C. 10th
Aus. Brig., 327
Johnson, Capt., A/Lt.-Col. D. G., V.C, D.S.O., M.C.,
248, 280, 289-90
Johnson, Sgt. W. H., V.C, 179 n., 280, 290
Jonc de Mer Farm, Oct. 11, 17, 18 : 206, 216, 227
INDEX
357
Jonc de Mer stream, Oct. 18 : 227
Joncourt, Sept. 29-Oct. 3 : 153, 161, 165, 169, 170,
171, 174, 176, 177 ; captured, 173
Jonnecourt Farm, Oct. 8-9 : 195, 197
Joynt, Lieut. W. D., V.C, 80, 280, 290
Jumping-off line, defined, 22 <fc n.
Jurbise, Nov. 11 : 261
Kavanagh, Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. T. McM., K.C.B.,
C.V.O., D.S.O., G.O.C. Cavalry Corps,
45 193 302 317
Kay, Brig.-Ge'n. Sir W.'a. I., Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 3rd Iiif. Brig., 319
" Keep Your Mouth Shut," pamphlet, 20 n.
Kelly, Brig.-Gen. G. C, D.S.O., G.O.C. 2nd Inf.
Brig., 319
Kemmel HiU, 19
Kennedy, Brig.-Gen. A. A., C.M.G., G.O.C. 230th
Inf. Brig., 307
Kennedy, Brig.-Gen. H. B. P. L., C.M.G., D.S.a,
G.O.C. UOth Inf. Brig., 306
Kent Regt.
East, see East Kent Regt.
West, see Royal West Kent Regt.
Kinoaid-Smith, Brig. Gen. K. J., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 25th Divl. Artillery, 305, 321
King, Brig.-Gen. E. L., G.O.C. 65th Araer. Inf.
Brig., 308
King, Brig.-Gen. W. B. M., C.M.G.., D.S.O., G.O.C.
4th Cdn. Divl. Artillery, 311
King's Liverpool Regt., 18th Batt., see Lancashire
Hussars
King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
1st Batt., Oct. 3, 8, 17 : 182, 183, 196 ; at the
Selle, 218, 219, 220, 221
2nd Batt., Aug. 23, Nov. 4, 8 : 80, 250, 251, 259
King's Royal Rifle Corps
2nd Batt., Sept. 24, Oct. 17 : 143, 214, 215 ;
crossing the Sambre and Oise Canal,
Nor. 4 : 247, 248
4th Batt., Oct. 3 : 182, 183 ; at the Selle, Oct. 17 :
218, 219, 220
King's Shropshire Light Infantry
10th Batt., at Cat Post, Sept. 21 : 104 n.
Kirk, 2nd Lieut. J., V.C, 251, 280, 291
Knapp, Brig.-Gen. K. K., C.M.G., G.O.C. VII
Corps, R.A., H.Q., attached II Amer.
Corps, 324
Knob, The, Sept. 30, Oct. 3 : 171, 182 ; captured, 175
Knobkerry Ridge, Sept. 29 : 165
KnoU, The, Sept. 11-29: 120, 124, 137, 138;
attacks on, 140, 141, 163 cfc n., 167-8;
captured, 168
Koros Alley, Sept. 2 : 109
Koverla Trench, 100
Kukri Valley, Oct. 3 : 181
Kurilo Alley, Sept. 2 : 109
L'Abb6 Wood, April 22, Aug. 8 : 44 ; German
Yellow Cross gas bombardment at, 3, 26
La Boiselle, Aug. 24 : crater captured, 83-4
Labour Companies, work done by, 230
La Capelle, 240
La Capelle-Avesnes-Maubeuge road, Nov. 7 : 258,
259, 260
La Chapellette, Aug. 29, Sept. 2 : 93 ; railway
bridge at, blown up, 94 ; attempted
crossing at, 109
La Cliavatte, 66
La Croisette Farm, Nov. 7 : 259
La F6re, 176 n., 241
La Flaque, Aug. 8 : 42
La Folie, Nov. 4, 7 : 243, 259
La Groise, Nov. 4 : 243 ; captured, 250
La Haie Menneresse. Oct. 9-11 : 200, 201 ; cap-
tured, 202
La Justice, Nov. 4-6 : 249, 250 ; occupied, 256
La Laurette, Oct. 17, 19 : 206, 228
La Louvi6re, Oct. 23 : 235
Lambert, Maj.-Gen. T. S., C.B., C.M.G., G.O.C.
32nd Div., 58, 78, 244, 311, 320
La Maisonnette secured (March 1917), 93 n.
Lamire Farm, Aug. 30 : 99
Lamotte-en-Santerre, Aug. 8 : captured, 43
La Motte Farm, Oct. 3, Nov. 4-6 : 181, 184, 252, 256
Lancashire Fusiliers
6th Batt., in the Battle of the Selle, Oct. 17
222, 223, 224
15th Batt., at Joncourt, Sept. 30-Oct. 1 : 170,
173 ; at Happegarbes Spur, Nov. 2, 4 :
241 <fc «., 251 ; crossing the Sambre
and Oise Canal, 2.50, 252
16th Batt., Nov. 2, 4 : 241 ; crossing the Sambre
and Oise Canal, 250, 251
Lancashire Hussars (Yeo.)
18th Batt. (King's Liverpool Regt.), at Le Cateau,
Oct. 10 : 201
Lancashire Regt.
Loyal North, see Loyal North Lancashire Regt.
South, see South Lancashire Regt.
Lancers, 12th (Prince of Wales's Royal), attached
to XIII Corps, Oct. 11: 204 ; advance
by, Nov. 5, 9 : 257-8, 260
Lundreciee, Oct. 6, 11, 14, 21, Nov. 4, 5-6: 204,
206. 231, 241, 243, 244, 245, 252, 255,
256, 257, 258 ; captured, 252-3 ; Germans
withdrawn from, 191 ; lock at, 242,
246, 253
Landrecies-Englefontaine road, Oct. 23, 24, Nov. 4 ;
230, 232, 236, 237, 253
La Neuville-les-Bray, Aug. 24 : cleared, S3
Laon, Oct. 13 : occupied, 207
Area, German retreat in, Oct. : 207, 208
SaUent, Oct. 17 : 225
La Pannerie South, Oct. 4, 5 : 184, 188 ; captured,
185
Larisch, General von. Commander, LIV German
Corps, order issued by, Oct. 19, on
holding the Hermann Stellung, 256 n.
La Rivierette, Nov. 5 : 257
Lark Spur, Sept. 29 : 167
La Roux Farm, Oct. 17-18 : 206, 216, 228 ; cap-
tured, 227
La Sabloruiifere, Oct. 5 : 185
LaTerridre, Sept. 29-30, Oct. 4 : 168, 172, 185
La Terridre-Villers Outr^aux region, Sept. 27 : 138
La Valine Mulatre, Oct. 11-18 : 206, 209, 210, 212 ;
fighting in and near, 213, 214. 215, 216,
225, 226
Lavarack, Lieut.-Col. J. D., D.S.O., G.S.O. 4th
Aus. Div., 314
Lawson, Brig.-Gen. A., C.M.G., G.O.C. 2nd Cav.
Brig., 302
Leaders, military spirit of, as aSecting their troops,
10 n., 270-1
Leane, Brig.-Gen. R. L., D.S.O., M.C., G.O.C. 12th
Aus. Brig., 315
" Leap-frogging," method of, 22 <t n.
Le Cateau, Sept., Oct., Nov.: 127 n., 184, 191, 229,
235, 246 n., 258 ; cavalry advance on, 156,
193 ; defences at, 205 ; flooded area
near, ib. ; general advance on, 193 ;
attack on, 199*?'?.. 206. 217, 218, 221.
222, 223 d- n., 224, 225, 228
358
INDEX
Le Cateau — cont.
Battle of, Aug. 1914 : 205 n.
Railway near, and junction at, Oct. 11, 17 :
attacks on, 156, 202, 218, 222 aqq., 228
Station, Oct. 11, 17 : 202
Le Cateau-Bazuel road, Oct. 17 : 220
Le Cateau-Busigny road, Oct. 23 : 234
Le Cateau-Pommereuil road, Oct. 17, 18 : 218, 221,
222, 228
Le Catcau-Solesmes line, Sept. 27 : 138
Le Cateau— Wassigny railway, Oct. 17 : 216
Le Catelet, Sept. 22-30, Oct. 1-5: 138, 149, 152,
166, 175, 177, 178, 184, 185, 188, 190,203
Le Cateletr-Nauroy, or Hindenburg Reserve Line,
Sept. 11-30: 121, 149 ofc n., 152, 164,
165, 169 ; cleared, 171 <fc n., 172
Le Champ du Pare Farm, Nov. 5 : 258
Le Donjon, Nov. 1-4 : 240, 250, 251
Lee, General, and the Confederate moral, 10 n., 270
Lee, Maj.-Gen. R. P., C.B., G.O.C. 18th (Eastern)
Div., 46, 47 n., 74, 82, 90, 107, 134, 245,
305
L'Evfique Wood, Oct. 19-31, Nov. 2 : 230, 231, 232,
233, 235, 237, 240 ; parts cleared, 234,
236
Le Forest, Aug. 29 : 94, 95 n.
Le Foyaux, Nov. 6 : 257
Legard, Brig. -Gen. D'A., D.S.O., G.O.C. 9th Cav.
Brig., 303
Legh, Lieut.-Col. F. B., M.C., O.C. 5th Field Survey
Batt., 302, 317, 325
Le Hamage Farm, Oct. 8 : 193
Lehaucourt, Sept. 22, 29: 152, 159; captured, 160
Lehaucourt ridge, Sept. 29 : secured, 161
Leicestershire Regt.
Ist Batt., moonlight attack by, Sept. 22 : 142
l/4th Batt., Oct. 17 : 211
l/6th Batt., Sept. 24, Oct. 17 : 143 n., 211
emaire Wood, Aug. 8 : 37
emon, Lieut.-Col. F. J., D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G. 66th
Div., 322
empire, Sept. 19-22 : cleared, 136 ; artillery
around, 154
Lempire Post, Sept. 18-19 : 134 <fc n. ; secxired, 136
Lena Wood, Aug. 8 : 42
Lens, Oct. : German retreat from, 191, 207, 208
Le Preseau, Nov. 4 : 253, 254
Le Quennelet Farm, Oct. 17 : 220
Le Quesnel, 15 ; Aug. 8-9 : 32 n., 38, 39, 45 ;
captured, 52, 53 <fc n.
Le Queenoy en Santerre, 1 6 ; Aug. 11: 62 ; cap-
tured, 58
Le Quesnoy-Valenciennes railway, line atj Oct.-
Nov. : 237, 240
Les Ardennes, Nov. 7 : 259
Les Etoquies, Nov. 4, 5 : 242 ; lock at, 257
Les Marliches Farm, Oct. 8 : 193
Le Sars, Aug. 25 : captured, 86
Le Sart-en-Thierache, Nov. 5 : 257
Lesdins, Sept. 22-9, Oct. 2, 4 : 149, 153, 176 n. ;
outskirts entered, 185
Lessines, Nov. 11 : 261
Lessons of the Hundred Days, 263 sqg.
Les Trois Paves, Nov. 8 : 259
Le Tronquoy, Sept. 29-30, Oct. 1-4 : 145 <fe n., 171,
176, 178, 185; captured, 160
Tunnel defences, Sept. U-30, Oct. 1-2 : 121, 152,
163, 169 ; captured, 170, 175, 177
Le Tronquoy to Le Catelet, main attack delivered
against, by Fourth Army, Sept. 29 : 138
Le Tronquoy-Sequehart-Preselles line, Sept. 30 :
169
Le Tronquoy-Sequehart ridge, Oct. 2 : 175
Leuthen, Battle of, 264 n.
Leval, Nov. 5, 6 : 257 ; occupied, 258
Levergiea, Sept. 22-Oct. 1 : 152, 161, 173 ; cap-
tured, 170
Le Verguier, Sept. 11-29: 120, 122, 123, 128, 160 j
concentration of artillery at, 154
Lewin, Brig.-Gen. H. F. E., C.M.G., G.O.C. Ist
D vl. Artillery, 319
Lewis, L/Cpl. A., V.C, 133 n., 280, 291
Lewis, Maj.-Gen. E. M., G.O.C. 30th Araer. Div., 324
Liaison Force
Australian-American, Aug. 12 : 65 <fc n.
Australian-Canadian, Aug. 8 : 41
Franco-British, Aug. 8 : 35
Lidramont, Sept. 6 : captured, 117
Lihons, 16 ; Aug. 9-12, 17, 23, 24 : 55 dk n., 59, 65,
66, 82 ; captured, 63 ; gas bombard-
ment near, 85 ; tactical value of, 62
Lihons-ChuignoUes line, Aug. 9 : 51
Lihons-Framerville-Mericourt - sur - Somme line,
Aug. 9 : 51
Lihons Hill, Aug. 9-10 : 55 <fc n. ; captured, 62 ;
tactical importance of, ib.
Lihons Wood, Aug. 1 1 : captured, 62
Lihu, Aug. 24, 26 : 85, 88
Lille area, 17, 27, 207
Limberlost Wood, Aug. 30 : 99
Lincolnshire Regt.
l/5th Batt., Oct. 17 : 211
Lindsay, Maj.-Gen. W. B., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
C.E. Cdn. Corps, 308
Lipsett, Maj.-Gen. L. J., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
3rd Cdn. Div., 33, 310
Little Priel Farm, Sept. 11, 18, 20-2 : 124, 136, 137,
140 ; captured, 141
Locquignol Farm, Nov. 4 : 243
Locquignol road-junction, Nov. 4 : 242, 244, 255
London Regt. (Royal Fusiliers) (T.)
2 /2nd Batt., Aug. 22 : 77 ; at Peiziferes, Sept. 18 :
133
2 /10th Batt., Aug. 8, 9 : 47 ; at Chipilly Spur, 66
8th Batt., Aug. 9 : 56
22nd Batt., Aug. 22 : 77
Longavesnes, Sept. 6: captured, 117
Longeau, Aug. 8 : 44
Longeau area, Canadian concentration in, Aug. 17,
27 : 66, 85
Longmore, Brig.-Gen. J. C. G., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
D.A. & Q.M.G. Cav. Corps, 302, 317
Longueval-Highwood-Pozi^res ridge, Aug. 23 :
German position on, menaced, 82
Longueval ridge, Aug. 27 : 90
Longueval Windmill, Aug. 27 : 91
Longueval Wood, Aug. 27 : 90
Long Wood, Aug. 31 : gained, 102
Long Woods, Aug. 23 : 81
Loomis, Brig.-Gen. F. O. W., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 2nd Cdn. Inf. Brig., 309
Lord, Lieut.-Col. J. E. C, D.S.O., A/O.C. 9th Aus.
Inf. Brig., 314
Lord Strathcona's Horse, advance of, Oct. 9 : 198
Lormisset Farm, Oct. 3 : 181, 182
Lorraine, German Div. from, engaged, Oct. 9 : 199
Lost Ravine, Aug. 31 : 101
Lowerson, Sgt. A. D., V.C, 106 »., 280, 291-2
Loyal North Lancashire Regt.
1st Batt., Oct. 2, 17 : 175, 211, 214, 215 ; counter-
attack repulsed by, 178 : crossing the
Sambre and Oise Canal, Not. 4 : 250
Luc Wood, Aug. 23 : 81
Luce river, 8 n., 14, 16, 17; Aug. 8: 45, 50;
crossings of, difficulty of, 15, 33, 34, 44
Luce and Oise rivers, battle front between, Aug. 8 :
68-9
Luce valley, 14, 15, 58
Ludendorff, General, change by, of strategic objec-
tive, in April : 3 n.
INDEX
359
LudendorS, General — cont.
Memoirs of, cited, 3 n., 8 n., 10 n., 68 n.
Orders issued by, Aug. 8: 17; Aug. 11 : Iddk n.,
17 n. : Sept. : captured, extracts from,
Appendix H, 332
Lys river, 4, 10, 145
Lys salient, German withdrawal from, in Aug. : 8
Lys sector, allied front, ground gained on, Aug. 22 :
72 n.
M
McBrien, Brig.-Gen. J. H., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
12th Cdn. Inf. Brig., 311
McCarthy, Lieut. L. D., V.C., 82 n., 280, 292
Macdonell, Maj.-Gen. A. C, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 1st Cdn. Div., 35, 308
MoDouall, Brig.-Gen. R., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
142nd Inf. Brig., 306
Macedonia, allied advance in, Oct. : 207
Machine Gun Corps
Battalions, allotment of, for
Aug. 8 : 25 & n.
Oct. 17 : 218
Oct. 23 : 233
2nd Life Guards, Sept. 18, Oct. 17 : 127, 212
6th, Oct. 17 : 212
18th, Aug. 26 : 87 ; Oct. 17 : 218
25th, Oct. 17 : 218
50th, Aug. 8 : 47 ; Oct. 17 : 218
66th, Oct. 17 : 218
74th, Sept. 18: 132
100th, Nov. 9 : 260 n.
Machine gun organisation and tactics. Notes on.
Appendix J, 334-5
Machine gunners, German demoralisation of, after
Aug. 8: 10
Machine guns, co-operation of, with infantry, as
affecting ideas on tactics, 263
Machine guns, use of
British (see also Machine Gun Corps), 41, 50, 62,
78, 83, 87, 110, 127, 128 n., 134, 212, 213,
218, 219, 222, 224, 235, 259
German, 5, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 dh n., 42, 43, 45, 48,
49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 65, 76-7,
78, 80, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96 n., 99,
100, 103, 104, 100, 108, 109 cfc n., 116,
123, 126, 128, 129, 130. 131, 132, 134,
136, 141, 142-3, 151, 161, 163, 164, 166,
167, 168, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 180,
181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 195, 198
<fc n., 199, 200, 201, 202, 211, 212, 214,
216, 218, 223, 224, 229, 233, 234 db n.,
235, 236, 248, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255,
259, 260
Mackenzie, Brig.-Gen. G. B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. IX Corps Heavy ArtiUery,
318 325
McNalty, Lieu't.-Col. A. G. P., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
A.A. & Q.M.G. 58th (London) Div.
(T.) 306
MoNaraara, Lieut. -Col. A. E., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.S.O. 1, 32nd Div., 311
MacNeece, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., O.C. 5th
Balloon Wing, R.A.F., 302
McNicoU, Brig.-Gen. W. R., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
10th Aus. Inf. Brig., 314
McPhail, Col. A., D.S.O., C.E. 1st Cdn. Engineers,
309
Macquiucourt Farm, Oct. 1-3 : 175, 183
Macquincourt Trench, Sept. 29 : 167 ; captured,
168
Macquincourt valley, Sept. 29 : 167, 168
MaoTier, Pte. R., V.C, 104, 280, 292-3
Magny-la-Fosse, Sept. 22-9: 149, 152, 101, 165;
captured, 160
Maisseray, Sept. 8, 11, 15: 117, 118: captured,
122-3
MalakofE Farm, Sept. 18 s?7. : 124, 130, 139, 140
Malakoff Wood, Sept. 21, 29 : 140, 172
Malard Wood, 14 ; Aug. 8 : 46, 48, 49, 55
Malassise Farm, Sept. 18, 19, Nov. 4 : 135, 136, 250
Malgarni, Oct. 23-24 : 232, 234, 235, 236
MaUncourt, Oct. 8: 196
Maltz Horn Farm knoll, Aug. 26-7 : 87 ; captured,
90
Mametz, Aug. 25 : 85, 86
Mametz Wood (July 1916), 85 : Aug. 25 : 85-6
Manancourt, Sept. 4 : 113 n., 114
Manchester Hill, Sept. 18-26 : 126 (t n., 135, 142,
143; captured, 144
Manchester Regt.
2nd Batt., attack of, with tanks, Oct. 1 : 173 ;
attack on Sambre and Oise Canal,
Nov. 4 : 250, 251
21st Batt., Nov. 4 : 252; attack of, with tanks,
Oct. 5 : 187, 188
Mangin, General, victory of, on July 18, results of,
5, 17 (fc n., 68 n., 70
Mannequin Hill, Oct. 3-8 : 177, 179, 184, 186, 187,
189, 193 ; captured, 195
Mannequin Wood, Oct. 8 : captured, 195
Man-power, British superiority in, Sept. 29 : 150
Conservation of, relative British and German,
Aug. 8-28 : 70
German, conditions as to, Sept. 4 sqq., Oct. 3 :
112, 113, 121 d: n., 130-1, 182, 196;
see also Prisoners, and Reserves, German,
and Appendices A, B, C, D, 275 sqq.
Question of, as affecting plan for Aug. 8 : 21
Maps, issue of, and number printed prior to Aug. 8 :
25 <t- n., 26
Marbaix, Nov. 5, 6 : 257, 258, 259
Marbaix-Taisnidres-en-Thierache area, Nov. 7 : 259
Marcelcave, Aug. 8, 15 : 41, 44 ; capture of, 36, 39
MarchfSlpot, Aug. 28 : 91
Marcoing, Sept. 28 : 145, 152
Marden, Maj.-Gen. T. O., C.B., C.M.G., G.O.C.
6th Div., 119, 194, 212, 319
Maretz, 127 n. ; Oct. 8, 9, 17 : 134 ji., 193, 196,
199, 218 ; captured, 198
Maricourt, Aug. 26-7 : 87, 88, 89 ; captured, 90
Mariboro Wood, Aug. 26 : 87
Marly Woods, -Aug. 23 : captured, 81
Marne river, French offensive on, July: 5, 17 n.,
68 n., 70
Maroilles, Nov. 4-5 : 245 ; captured, 257
Maroilles-Hachette Farm-Locquignol road, Nov. 4 :
244
Maroilles-Taisniferes-en-Thierache area, Nov. 5 : 257
Marri^res Wood, Aug. 30 : 95 ; captured, 102
Marri^res Wood-Priez Farm line reached, Aug. 30 :
95
Marronniers Wood, Sept. 24 : captured, 143
Marpert, Nov. 11 : 261
Marpert-East of Mons-Jurbisse-Lessines-Gram-
mont lino, held by British forces,
Nov. U : 261
MarshaU, Lieut. A/Lt.-Col. J. N., V.C, M.C., Irish
Guards, 251, 280, 293
MarshaU, Lieut.-Col. K. R., D.S.O , A.A. & Q.M.G.
4th Cdn. Div., 311
Marshes of the Ancre, Sommo, and Luce, 14-15
Marteville, Sept. 8-10: 118, 119
Martin, Brig.-Gen. E. F., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
5th Aus. Inf. Brig., 98, 313
Martinpuich, Aug. 25 : captured, 86
Martinsart Wood, Nov. 11 : 261
360
INDEX
Marwitz, General von der. Commander, German
Second Army, 7 n., 8 n., 17, 190 ; sur-
prised by attack of Aug. 8 : 17 n. ;
Order issued by on Aug. 25, on German
moral, 69 n.
Masni^res, captured, 177
Masni^res-Beaurevoir line, Sept., Oct. : 149 n., 152,
181, 182, 187, 194, 196
Masni6res-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line, Sept., Oct.:
153, 169, 176, 177, 182
Massie, Brig. -Gen. R. H., C.M.G., G.O.C. Heavy
Artillery, Cdn. Corps, 308
Mather, Lieut.-Col. L. F. S., D.S.O., C.E. 5th Aus.
Divl. Engineers, 315
Matte Woods, Aug. 23 : 80
Maubeuge, objective of Fourth Army, 137, 204, 206,
240, 243
Maucourt, Aug. 9, 10 : 53, 58
Maurepas, Aug. 25, 29 : 86 ; cleared, 94
Maurois, Oct. 9 : 197, 199, 200
Maxwell, Brig. -Gen. A., D.S.O., G.O.C. 174th Inf.
Brig., 306
Maxwell, Brig.-Gen. J. McC, C.B., D.S.O., G.O.C.
58th (London) Divl. Artillery (T.), 306
Maxwell, Lieut. J., V.C, M.C., D.C.M., 180 n., 280,
293-4
May Copse, Sept. 19 : captured, 136
Mazinghien, Oct. 14-19 : 206, 216, 226, 229 ;
captured, 227
Mazinghien-Bazuel road, Nov. 4 : 243
M6aulte, Aug. 22 : 76 ; cleared, 74-5
IKharicourt, Aug. 9 : 53, 57 ; taken, 54
Mennevret, Oct. 14, 17 : 206, 211, 212, 225
Mereaucourt Wood, Aug. 28, 30 : 98, 99 ; captured,
92
Mericourt, Oct. 8 : 193 ; rushed, 195
Mericourt-sur-Somme, 18 ; Aug. 8-10 i 43, 57 ;
encircling movement on, 60 ; occupied,
61
Messines, Battle of, June 1917 : 20
Metcalfe, Brig.-Gen. F. H., D.S.O., G.O.C. VII
Corps H.A., H.Q., attached II Amer.
Corps, 324
Meuse river, Sept. 22-7 : 137 ; attack between, and
the Suippe, 145
Meziferes, German defences near, 15 ; Aug. 8,
Sept. 26-9, Nov. 4 : captured, 39, 50, 51 ;
Franco-American attack directed on,
9, 137, 138 n.; in attack of Nov. 4:
243, 250, 252
Meziferes-Catillon road, Nov. 4 : 250, 256
Mildren, Brig.-Gen. W. F., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
141st Inf. Brig., 306
Miles, Lieut.-Col. C. G. N., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1,
2nd Aus. Div., 313
Miles, Pte. F. G., V.C, 234 n., 280, 294
MiU Ridge, Sept. 29-Oct. 1 : 161 ; captured, 174
MiUtary history, points to be kept in mind in
studying, 270
Mihtary success, based on knowledge, study and
practice, 269-70
Miner, Cpl. H. G. B., V.C, 35 n., 280, 294
Mines
Delay action, German use of, on railways, 203,
260
Road, obstacles due to, 230
Minor operations, harassing the Germans by, Aug.
11-21 : 66
Minshull-Ford, Brig.-Gen. J. R., D.S.O., M.C.,
G.O.C. 97th Inf. Brig., 312
Mint Copse, Oct. 1-3 : 176 & n. ; captured, 174
Mist on mornings of attacks, effects of
Aug. 8 : 32, 36, 37, 40, 47, 49
Sept. 18 : 132, 133
Sept. 29 : 157, 158, 162, 163
Mist on mornings of attacks, eSecte of — cont.
Oct. 17 : 214, 215, 223
Nov. 4 : 251, 253,
Mixed Artillery Brigade, see Appendix F, 301 sqq.
Mobile Artillery Brigades, see Appendix F, 301 sqq.
MoineviUe Alley, Aug. 31 : 101
Moislains, Sept. 2 sqq., Oct. 3 : 108, 184 ; captured,
110, 111
Molain, Oct. 9-17 ; 199, 202, 206, 216
Monash, Lieut.-Gen. Sir J., K.CB., G.O.C Aus.
Corps, 119, 169, 312, 327
Commander pro ton. of amalgamated American-
Australian forces for attack of Sept. 29 :
139, 151, 155
Plan of attack for
Aug. 8 : 40, 43
Aug. 23 : 78-9
Aug. 30 : 93, 98, 103
Sept. 29 : 152
Monceau, Nov. 5-6 : 257 ; captured, 258
Monckton-Arundell, Lieut.-Col. Hon. G. V. A.,
D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G. 2nd Cav. Div.,
303
Mons, pursuit towards, 203, 240, 261 ; recapture of,
10
Mons-en-Chausste, Sept. 5 : 117 n.
Montague, Lieut.-Col. P. J., D.S.O., M.C., A.A. &
Q.M.G. 2nd Cdn. Div., 309
Montauban, Aug. 26 : captured, 87
Mont-aux-Villes Wood, Oct. 9 : occupied, 198
Montay, Oct. 9-21 : 199, 202, 204, 206, 218, 222
223 n., 224, 229, 230, 231
Mont BUart, Nov. 11 : 261 <fc n.
Mont Bliart - Martinsart Wood - Grandrieu - Thure
rivei^Cousolre Une, held by Fourth
Army at moment of armistice, Nov. 1 1 :
261
Montbrehain, Oct. 3-8 : 177, 179 A n., 182, 184, 185,
190, 193, 194; captured, 186-7, 189
Montdidier, 12 ; June 9, Aug. : German attack
towards, 4 ; French offensive directed on,
18, 66, 68-9
Montdidier Sahent, 69
Mont d'Origny, 241
Mont Dourlers, Nov. 8 : 260
Montgomery, Lieut.-Col. B. L., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1,
47th (London) Div. (T.), 306
Montgomery, Maj.-Gen. A. A., C.B., M.G.G.S.,
Fourth Army, 301
Montigny Farm, Sept. 9, 29, Nov. 8 : 118, 150, 260
Mont Needle heights, Sept. 24 : 142
Mont St. Martin, Sept. 22-30, Oct. 1-3 : 152, 176 n.,
180, 182, 183
Mont St. Quentin, Aug. 31, Sept. 1 : 99, 100, 103,
105, 115 : captured, 95 n., 118 ».
Battle of, Aug. 30-Sept. 2 : 96-7, 177 ; im-
portance of the height, 97 ; the assault,
planned, 98, carried out, 99, success of,
101-2
Confusion of German units during and after,
118 n.
Events of, day by day
Aug. 30 : 98-9
Aug. 31 : 99-103
Sept. 1 : 103-8
Sept. 2: 108-11
Events following, Sept. 3-4 : 111
Exploitation of, success, Sept. 2 : 108 sqq.
Results of. 111 sqq.
Mont St. Quentin-Bouchavesnes road, Aug. 31 :
100 ; secured, 102
Mont St. Quentin heights, Aug. 29-30 : 93, 96 sqq.
Mont St. Quentin-Rancourt road, Aug. 31 : 102
Mont St. Quentin Wood, Sept. 1 : captured, 106
Monmnent Wood, 13
INDEX
361
Moonlight attacks, Aug. 24, Oct. 23 : 83, 233 aqq.,
268
" Mopping up," defined, 42 <fc n.
Moral in war, Henderson cited on, 1-2, 10 n., 270
Influence of, to be noted in studying military
history, 270
British, increase in, April-July and after, 1, 5, 9,
69, 101-2, 145-6, 208, 237, 253
Confederate, 10 n.
German, progressive deterioration in, July 18 eqq. :
5, 6, 7, 9, 10 n., 16 n., 17 <fc n., 51, 52,
69 <fc n., 72, 112-13, 121, 122, 125, 126,
137 n., 145, 154, 159, 160 <fc n., 161 n.,
172 n., 174 n., 190, 206, 237, 253, 260,
261
Ludendorff, cited on, 10 n.
Orders issued on, by
von Freideberg, Aug. 27 : 69 n.
von der Marwitz, Aug. 25 : 69 n.
Retained by Alpine Corps and other units, 112
Moral effect of tanks, 131, German witness to,
16 n., 69 n.
Morcourt, Aug. 8, Oct. 8 : 194 ; captured, 43
Moreuil, 15 ; Aug. 8:11 »., 22 ; captured, 8, 50, 51
Moreuil to the Anere, front on which decided to
attack, Aug. 8 : 21
Moreuil Wood captured, Aug. 8 : 50
Morgan, Major S. H., M.C., A/C.E. 66th Divl.
Engineers, 322
Morgemont Wood, Aug. 8 : 36
Morlancourt, July, Aug. : 11 n., 74 ; extension of
III Corps front to, 14 ; German troops
near, 16 n., 17, attack by, 27 ; attack
on, ib.
Morland, Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. L. N., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
D.S.O., G.O.C. XIII Corps, 139, 175,
184-5, 188, 196, 217, 232, 244, 245, 321,
326
Mormal Forest, Oct. 18, 23-4, Nov. 1-4 : area and
features of, 242 ; attacks on, 226, 230,
237, 243, 244, 245, 247, 252, 254, 255,
256 ; part cleared, 257
Morrison, Maj.-Gen. E. W. B., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. R.A., Cdn. Corps, 308
Morshead, Lieut.-Col. H. T., D.S.O., C.E. 46th
(North Midland) Divl. Engineers (T.),
320
Morval, Aug. 30, Sept. 1 : 96 ; attacked by Third
Army, 103, 107
Movmd, The, at Le Cateau, 205
Moyenneville, 72
Mullins, Maj.-Gen. R. L., G.O.C. 1st Cav. Div.,
44, 302
Munster Fusiliers, Royal, tee Royal Munster
Fusiliers
Mustard Gae, see Gas, Yellow Cross
N
Napoleon I., 270
Moral of his forces, 10 n.
Views of, on value of moral, 2
Waterloo strategy of, 3
Nauroy, Sept. 22-9, Oct. 1-3 : 149, 152, 160, 162,
164, 165, 174 n., 180, 184: effect of
artillery fire on, 154
Naylor, Col. W. K., Chief of Staff, 33rd (Illinois)
Amer. Div., 307
Neele, railway centre at, Aug. : 25, 58, 61, 84 <t n.,
91 n.
Neuville-Vitasse, Aug. 24 : 86
NeuviUy, Oct. 9-11 : 199, 200, 202
Neuvilly-Troisvillee road, Oct. 9 : 199
Neville's Cross, Oct. 5, 8 : 187, 194
rOCBTB ASVT
Newton mortars used for wire-cutting, Sept. 27 :
154
Night attacks, pros and co>>e of, 268
Night movements, to ensure secrecy, 19
Norfolk Regt.
7th Batt., Aug. 8, Sept. 18 : 48, 133
9th Batt., Oct. 9, at Bohain, 197
Northamptonshire Regt.
1st Batt., Sept. 24 : defence by, 143 ; attack
by, Oct. 17: 214, 215, 216; crossing
the Sambre and Oise Canal, Nov. 4
247 ; at Fesmy, etc., 249
6th Batt., Aug. 22. Sept. 18 : 76, 133 n. ; Oct.
23-4 : 233, 236 ; Nov. 4, at Preux-
aux-Bois, 254, 255
North Staffordshire Regt.
l/6th Batt., at the St. Quentin Canal, Sept. 29 :
159 ; at Mannequin Hill, Oct. 3 ; 179 n.
Northumberland Fusiliers
2nd Batt., Oct. 3 : 182 ; at the Selle, Oct. 17 :
220, 221
Northumberland Hussars, Aug. 8, Sept. 6-7
47 <fc n., 116
NoBworthy, Lieut.-Col. F. P., D.S.O., M.C., G.8.0. 1,
66th Inf. Div., 322
" Notes on Wellington," by Henderson, referred to.
1, 10 n.
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire R^., tee Sher-
wood Foresters
Noyelles, Nov. 5 : 257
Noyon, Aug. : 18, 84 ; captured, 91 ; Germans in
full retreat from, ib.
Nurlu and Nurlu heights, Aug. 30, Sept. 2-6 : 97 ;
attacks on, 108, 110, 111, 116 ; pivot of
German retreat, 113
Observing for artillery, by R.A.F. Corps Squadrons,
24, 50 ; see alto R.A.F. , work of
Oder Trench, Aug. 31 : 100, 101
Odium, Brig. Gen. V. W., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. Uth Cdn. Inf. Brig., 311
Offensives, convergent and simultaneous, decided
for Alhes, 137
Offoy, Somme crossings near, 61
OgUvie, Col. T., C.M.G., Labour Commandant,
Fourth Army, 301
Oise river, 68-9, 147, 225, 237
Oisy, Oct., Nov. : 204, 213, 229, 231, 237, 240, 241,
242, 243, 248
Oisy-Rejet de Beaulieu road, Oct. 19 : 229
O'Keefe, Maj.-Gen. Sir SI. W . K.C.M.G., C.B.,
D.M.S. Fourth Army, 301
Old British main line of resistance in 1917, and
March 1918. held by Germans, Sept.:
118 <fc n., 120
Outpost Line held by Germans, Sept. : 120,
124, 136
Reserve Une of March 1918, reoccupied, Sept.
11 : 120
" Old Contemptibles, " The, retreat of, in 1914, 10
Old Copse, Sept. 19 : 136
Omignon river, Sept. 8 : 117, 118
Ommiecourt-les-Cl^ry, Aug. 29-31, crossing the
Somme at, 93, 94, 99, 101
Ormond, Brig.-Gen. D. M., D.S.O., G.O.C. 9th Cdn.
Inf. Brig., 310
Ors, Oct. 23-4, Nov. 1-4: 230. 231, 233, 235, 236,
237. 244, 250, 251, 252 ; captured, 240
O'Ryan, Maj.-Gen. F., G.O.C. 27th Amer. Div.,
324
Osier, Col. S. H., D.S.O., C.E. 2nd Cdn. Div.,
Ammunition Column, 310
3 A
362
INDEX
OviUers-la-Boisselle, Aug. 24 : 83
Owen, Brig.-Gen. C. S., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
36th Inf. Brig., 304
Panet, Brig.-Gen. H. A., D.S. O., C.E. 2nd Cdn.
Divl. Artillery, 310
Panet, Lieut. -Col. E. de B., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1,
4th Cdn. Div., 311
Parachutes for dropping ammunition from aero-
planes, 24 ».
Paris-Amiens railway, operations to disengage,
Aug. : 1 8 sqq.
Park Wood, Aug. 31 : 99, 100
Parson, Lieut. -Col. J. L. R., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 1st
Cdn. Div., 308
Parvillers, Aug. 10 sqq. : 13 ; attack and covmter-
attack at, 58, 61, 64
Passchendaele Ridge, crossed, 9
Paterson, Brig.-Gen. E., D.S.O., G.O.C. 6th Cav.
Brig., 303
Paterson, Brig.-Gen. R. W., D.S.O., G.O.C. Cdn.
Cav. Brig., 304
Patrols, see also Contact Patrols
German instructions on, Aug. 29 : 96 n.
Peck, Lieut.-Col. J., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 5th Aus.
Div., 315
Peizi6res, Sept. 7 sqq. : attacks on, 117, 1\S d: n.,
119, 120, 124, 131, 132, 134, 139
Peninsular Campaign, the, 270
Perkins, Brig.-Gen. A. E. J., C.B., G.O.C. Ill
Corps Heavy Artillery, 304, 318
Peron river, 237
Peronne, 8 n., 14 ; Aug. 21-30, Sept. 1 sqq. : 108 sqq.,
112, 113, 121 n. ; advance and attack on,
and capture of, 71 sqq., 84, 86, 91 sqq.,
104 <fc n., 105 <fc n., 106 <fc nn., 107, 109,
110, 111; German front N. of, heavily
reinforced, 108
Cemetery N. of, Sept. 1 : captured, 105; advance
checked, 105, 106
Railway centre at, 25
Strategic importance of, 73 dk n.
Terrain near, fully known to Commander and
staff Fourth Array, 93 n. ; marshes
near, 98
P6ronne-Bouchavesnos road, Aug. 31, Sept. 1: 100, 105
Peronne-Nurlu road, Sept. 5 : 116
Peronne railway bridge, Somme crossings at, 97
Peronne Wood, Aug. 8 : 39
Petit Cambresis, Nov. 4 : bridge at, 243, captured, 250
Petit Galop Farm, Nov. 4 : 243, 250
Petite Helpe stream, Nov. 5 : crossed, 257
Petit Landrecies, Nov. 5, 6 : 257, 258
Petit Planty, Oct. 26 : 237
Petit Versaille, 243
Petrol tins as rafts, 246 dk n., 25
PhilUps, Brig.-Gen. O. F., D.S.O., G.O.C. 2nd Aus.
Divl. Artillery, 314
Photographs, aerial, see Air Photographs
Pierce, Brig.-Gen. P. D., G.O.C. 54th Amer. Inf.
Brig., 324
Pierrepont-Arvillers line, Aug. 9 : 57
Pieuret Wood, Aug. 8 : 37
Pill-boxes, concrete, German, 21
Pinon Wood, Oct. 8-9 : 196 ; occupied, 198
Pioneers, tasks of, Oct. 23 : 230
Pitman, Maj.-Gen. T. T., C.B., C.M.G., G.O.C.
2nd Cav. Div., 44, 303
Plan of attack for Aug. 8 : conditions affecting, 21
Plateau Woods, Aug. 23 : 78
Plessier-Rozain\nllers, Aug 8 : captured, 51
Plevna Trench, Sept. 1 : 105, 106
Pollard, Lieut.-Col. G. C, C.M.G., D.S.O., C.E.
32nd Divl. Engineers, 312
Pommereuil, Oct. 23 : 230, 231, 233, 234
Pommereuil-Forest road, Oct. 23 : 232
Ponchaux, Oct. 3-8 : 177, 185, 186, 188, 195, 196
Pont a Beaumetz, Nov. 4 : 252, 253
Pontruet, Sept. 18-24 : attacks on, 124, 128, 142,
143 dk n.
Poplar Trench, Sept. 18 : 135, 136
Poulainville, Aug. 20 : 67
PragneU, Lieut.-Col. T. W., D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G
3rd Cav. Div., 303
Prague Trench, Aug. 31 : 100
" Precis of Modem Tactics " by Home, referred to
264 n.
Pr^mont, Sept. 29, Oct. 8 : 156, 193, 196
Preselles, Sept. 30, Oct. 1-2 : 169, 173, 176 <fc n.
Preux-aux-Bois, Nov. 4 : 242, 247 ; convergent
attack on, 245, 254, 255
Priez Farm, Aug. 29-Sept. 1 : fighting at, 94, 95,
102 ; captured, 107 n. ; heavy German
losses near, 108
Priez Farm-Fregicourt position, Aug. 31 : 103
Priez Farm-Fregicourt-Haie Wood line, held by
Germans, Sept. 1 : 107
Preliminary bombardment, advisabilty of, on what
dependent, 264
Pre-war military text-books, value of, 269
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, at
ParviUers, Aug. 12-13 : 64
Printing and Stationery Services, Army, work of
prior to Aug. 8 : 25-6
Prisches, Nov. 4 : 257
Prisoners, warning to, on silence, 20 n.
British and Australian, discretion shown by,
20 n., 27 n.
German, taken from July 4 to No v. 1 1 , at various
dates, 5, 7 n., 17, 27, 35 dk n., 36, 37 n.,
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51 dk n.,
53 n., 54, 55, 57, 59, 64, 65, 68, 69,
70, 77 cfc n., 80, 81 n., 82 tfc n., 83, 84,
86, 87, 88 n., 89 n., 91, 92, 93, 98, 106 dk n.,
107ct,-n., 108, 110<fc»., lUn., 1 12 <fcnn.,
116, 117, 118 n., 122 <fc n., 123, 128 dk n.,
129, 130, 131, 132 dk n., 142, 143 <fc n.,
145, 159, 161 dk n., 162, 168, 170. 172
<fc n., 173, 174 dk n., 175, 178, 179 dk n.,
182, 183, 187, 188, 189, 190, 194, 195.
196 <fc n., 198. 199, 200 n., 211, 212, 217,
225, 228. 229, 234, 235-6, 237, 248, 250,
252-3, 256, 259, 262; see also Appendices
A, B, a)id C, 275-7
Sununaries for
Battles of Aug. 8 sqq., Sept. 18, 24, 29, Oct.
3-7, 8-9, 17, 23-4, and Nov. 4 : 68. 70,
112 dk nn., 145, 168, 190, 196 dk n., 225,
229, 235-6, 250. 256
Whole period from Aug. 8 to Nov. 1 1 : 262
Prospect Hill, Oct. 3-4: attack on, 177, 178, 181,
182, 183, 184, 185
Proyart, Aug. 8, 10-12: 60, 61, 65; German LI
Corps Staff surprised at, 42
Proyart Wood, Oct. 9 : 200
Pnissia, 10 n.
Prussian military discipline contrasted with British,
271
Putney, Oct. 5 : 188
Q
Quadrilateral, The, Sept. 18-19, 24-6 : attacks on,
125, 126. 135, 142 dk n., 144
Quarry, Montbrehain, Oct. 5 : 186
Quarry, near Templeux-le Gu^rard, Sept. 18 :
captured, 132 <fc n.
INDEX
363
Quarry, near Trones Wood, Aug. 27 : 90 n.
Quarry Farm, Aug. 31-Sept. 1 : 102, 106
Queen's Own, see Royal West Kent Regt.
Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, see Cameron
Highlanders
Queen's, The, see Royal West Surrey Regt.
Quennemont Farm, Sept. 11-29: attacks on, 120,
124, 129, 130, 137, UO-1, 149, 163,
164, 166, 167
Quennemont Farm-Gillemont Farm line, Sept. 1 1-29 :
120, 124; attacks on, 140-1, 144, 157,
163
Quennet Copse, Sept. 21, 29 : 140, 166, 167
Querenaing, Oct. 17 : 226
Quid Copse, Sept. 18 : 133, 134
Quj^vy, Oct. 11 : 202
B
Bafts, used at Sambre and Oise Canal crossing,
246 ifc n., 253
Raids by Australians, effect of, on German moral,
5-6
Railway centres bombed by R.A.F., 25, 189 et alibi
Junctions, see Aulnoye, and Lie Cateau
Lines available for Fourth Army, 13, 121 n. ; see
also Railway Centres, Junctions, Stations,
etc.
Damage sustained by, 203, 260
Ridge, Oct. 1 : occupied, 174^5
Rainecourt, Aug. 11, 21 : 66; captured, 63
RambourUeux Farm, Oct. 9 : 199
Ramicourt, Oct. 1-4 : 174, 176, 177, 179, 182, 185
Ramsay, Maj.-Gen. F. W., G.O.C. 58th (London)
Div. (T.), 46, 74, 306
Rancourt, Aug. 31, Sept. 1 : 102, 112; captured, 107
Rankin, Brig.-Gen. C. H., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
4th Cav. Brig., 303
RawUnson, Gen. Sir H. S., Bt., G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
K.C.JI.G., A.D.C., G.O.C. Fourth Army,
301, 316, 324
British Representative at Versailles, again be-
comes G.O.C. Fourth Army, 2 n.
Concern of, to secure Somme bridges intact, Aug.
29 : 93 <fc n.
Conference with commanders held by
July 21 : 18
Aug. 4 : 18-19
Aug. 11 : 63
Oct. 19: 229-30
Co-operation with, of the First French Army,
11 n., 12
Decision of, as to
Barrage line, for Sept. 29 : 157
Capture of Hamel, July 4 : 6
Retaking ViUers Bretonneux, April 24 : 3
Securing Quennemont and Gillemont Farms
and the Knoll, Sept. 20 : 137
Orders issued by (in order of date) for
Attack on Aug. 8 : 18 sgq.
Continuance of advance on Aug. 9-10 : 51,
57-8, 61
Combined attack by III Corps and Aus. Corps
on Aug. 23 : 77
Battle of Mont St. Quentin, Aug. 30 sgq. : 97
Pursuit by III Corps and Aus. Corps on Sept.
5 sqg. : 113, 114
Attack on Outer Defences of Hindenburg Line
on Sept. 18: 123-5
Readjustment of Fourth Army front, Sept.
21-5: 138 <* r»., 139
Attack on Hindenburg Line on Sept. 29 :
138 <tn.. 149-50 «?'/.
Bawlinson, Gen. Sir H. S. — cont.
Orders issued by (in order of date) for — eorU.
Cavalry concentration for Sept. 29 : 156-7
Operations on Sept. 30 : 169
Attack on the Msisniferes-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme
line on Oct. 3 : 177-8
Attack on Oct. 8 (advance to Le Cateau),
193-4
Besvunption of offensive on Oct. 9 : 1 97
Further objectives on Oct. 9 : 199, 200
Continuance of attack on Oct. 18 (Battle of the
Selle), 226
Advance to lino of exploitation. Orders for
attack on Oct. 17, to take effect on Oct.
19: 228
Combined attack on Oct. 23 : 230 cfc n.
Continuance of attack on Oct. 24 : 236
Attack of Xov. 4 : 243, 256
Continuance of pursuit on Nov. 7-9 : 258
Plans (in order of date), for
Attack on Aug. 8 : approved by C.-in-C, 7,
11-12; the original proposal, 11 n.
Forcing passage across the Somme, Sept. 3 :
113
Operation to gain possession of Outer Defences
of Hindenburg Line, Sept. 11 : 121-2;
approved by C.-in-C, 122
Praise given bv, to
II Amer. Corps, Oct. 19 : 231
IX and XIII Corps, Xov. 4 : 256
Report of, to C.-in-C. on the general situation on
Sept. 11 : 120-1
Read, Maj.-Gen. G. W., G.O.C. H Amer. Corps,
324 : Aus. Corps front taken over by.
Oct. 6 : 189 ; working with Gen. Monash,
Sept. 29 : 139, 151
Regiments
American
105th, Sept. 29: 165:; Oct. 17-18:216.217,227
106th, Oct. 17 : 217
107th, Oct. 17-18 : 217, 227
108th, Oct. 17 : 216, 217
117th, Sept. 29: 162; Oct. 7, 17: 194,216
118th, Oct. 11, 17 : 202, 216
119th, Oct. 10, 17, 18 : 201, 216, 227
120th, Oct. 9, 17 : 201, 216
130th, Aug. 8 : 47
131st, Aug. 9, 10, 12-20 : 55, 56, 57, 60 ;
forming part of liaison force, 65 n., 67
132nd, Aug. 20 : 67
British, see under their respective designations
German
Emperor Francis Joseph's Prussian Guards, at
Trones Wood, Aug. 27: 90
1st Guard Grenadier, count-er-attack by, foiled,
poor moral of, Sept. 30: 172 n.
Regnicourt, Oct. 17 : 210, 211, 213
Regnicourt-Andigny-les-Fermes road, Oct. 17 : 210,
211
Reinforcement train captured, Aug. 8 : 45
Rejet de Beaulieu, Oct. 19 : 229
Rennie, Brig.-Gen. R., C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 4th Cdn. Inf. Brig., 309
Renuart Farm, Oct. 24 : flank attack on, 236, 237
Reports, conflicting, secrecy secured by, early Aug.,
19
B«serve Hindenburg Line, see Hindenburg Reserve
Line
Reserves, German, absorption of, see Appendix D,
278-9
Reticence of British prisoners, German tribute to,
20 n., 27 n.
Beumont, Oct. 9, 17 : 199, 218, 223 ; secured, 200
Reverse fire, German, Sept. 29 : 164
Rheims, July 15: German attack on, 4, 5
3 A*
364
INDEX
Rheima to Albert, extent of allied offensive, 68
Rhine, the, Aug. 8 : march to, of British Army,
begun, 31
Ribeauville, Oct. 17, 18 : 210, 217, 226 ; captured,
227
Richardson, Brig.-Gen. M. E., D.S.O., G.O.C. 75th
Inf. Brig., 321
Richemont Mill, Oct. 23 : 235
Richemont river, Oct. 14-23 : 206, 218, 221, 222,
226, 228, 229, 233 ; crossed, 234
Richmond, U.S.A., 10 n.
Richmond Copse, Oct. 4 : 185
Richmond Quarry, Oct. 4 : 185
Rifle pits, German, in pairs, seen from the air,
Oct. 14 : 204
Rifle Wood, 15 ; Aug. 8 : 33 ; flank attack on,
34 <fc n., 35, 50, 264
Rifle Wood-Hangard road, Aug. 8 : cleared, 35
Riga, Gen. von Hutier's success at, 7 n.
Riquerval Wood, Oct. 6-17 : 192, 200, 201, 202,
206, 209, 210, 211
Riqueval, Sept. 29 : tunnel entrance captured, 162
Riqueval Farm, Sept. 29 : 163 n. ; bridge at, 159
Riverside Wood, Sept. 4 : 111
Road-clearing work for attack of Oct. 23 : 230
Road mines, German use of, 230
Road Wood, Aug. 30, 31, Sept. 29 : 95, 158 ; cap-
tured, 102
Robelm6tre, Nov. 4 : 243, 250
Robersart, Oct. 23-4, Nov. 4 : 230, 231, 237, 253 ;
cleared, 236
Roberts, Field-Marshal Earl, memoir by, of Col.
Henderson cited, 270
Robertson, Brig.-Gen. J. C, C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
6th Aus. Inf. Brig., 105, 313 ; orders
anticipated by, 103 <fc n.
Robertson, Maj.-Gen. P. R., C.B., C.M.G., G.O.C.
17th (Northern) Div., 316
Robert Wood, Aug. 23 : captured, 80
Robinson, Lieut.-Col. J. P. B., D.S.O., A.A. &
Q.M.G. 32nd Div., 311
Robinson, Brig.-Gen. P. M., C.M.G., G.O.C. 149th
Inf. Brig., 322
Robinson, Brig.-Gen. S. W., D.S.O., D.A. & Q.M.G.
XIII Corps, 321, 326
Roisel, Sept. 4-7, 22 : 115, 150 ; R.A.F. work over,
117 <fc n.
Roisel-Ep^hy railway, Sept. 7 : 117
Rolland, Brig.-Gen. A., D.S.O., C.E. Ill Corps,
304, 318
RoUo, Brig.-Gen. G., D.S.O., G.O.C. 150th Inf.
Brig., 322
Roman road, the, Oct. 6, 17, 23 : 193, 223, 224, 230
Ronssoy, Sept. 11, 29, Oct. 3: 120, 122, 123, 133,
134 n., 136, 167, 184
Flank attack on, and capture of, 131, 135, 264-5
Ronssoy-Basse Boulogne, Sept. 18 : 123, 125
Ronssoy-Ep6hy-Ste. EmiUe, basin in triangle formed
by, importance of, 131
Ronssoy Wood, Sept. 10, 18 : 119, 125, 133
Rosbach, Battle of, 264 n.
Rosenthal, Maj-Gen. C, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 2nd Aus. Div., 40, 93, 98, 103,
31
Rosi6res-en-Santerre, Aug. 8-9 : 45, 52, 53, 55 ;
secured, 54
Rosimbois, Nov. 4 : 242
Ross, Brig.-Gen. A., D.S.O., G.O.C. 6th Cdn. Inf.
Brig., 310
Ross, Lieut.-Col. A. M., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, Ist Aus.
Div., 313
Ross-Johnson, Brig.-Gen. C. M., C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., G.O.C. R.A., III Corps, 304, 318
Round Hill, Sept. 18-19 : 126 <fc n., 135
Roupy, Sept. 13 : 122
RouvToy-en-Santerre, Aug. 9 : 57 ; occupied, 54
Rouvroy-en-Santerre-M6haricourt road, Aug. 9 : 58
Rouy le Grand, Aug. 28 : 91
Rowley, Brig.-Gen. F. G. M., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 138th Inf. Brig., 320
Royal Air Force, see also Appendix F, 301 sqq.
Work of (see also Air Photographs, etc.), Aug.,
Sept., Oct., Nov. : 25-6, 50, 117 <t n.,
121, 122, 123, 125, 156, 157, 189, 197,
204, 245
Air reconnaissance («ee aho Contact Patrols),
24-6, 50, 123, 191, 202, 204, 206, 238,
245 et passim
Noise of tanks covered by, 24, 28, 125, 156
157
Brigades
5th, July-Oct. : 12, 24, 117 db n., 125, 191
9th, Aug. : 24
Squadrons
with Bethell's Force, Nov. 9 : 260 n.
with Cdn. Corps, 19
with Fourth Army, July, Aug. sqq. :
12 et passim
Bombing Corps and Scout, allotment of,
Aug. 8: 13, 24, 25
3rd Aus., Aug. 8 : 24
5th, Aug. 8 : 24
6th, Aug. 8 : 24
8th, Aug. 8 : 24
9th, Aug. 8 : 24 <fc n.
35th, Aug. 8 : 24
84th, work of, Sept. 5 : 111 n. ; see also Appendix
E
Wings
15th (Corps), Aug. 8 : 13, 24
22nd (Army), Aug. 8 : 13, 24
Royal Berkshire Regt.
5th Batt., Aug. 9 : 56 ; work of, Sept. 18 : 135
8th Batt., Oct. 23 : 234, 235 ; Nov. 4 : 255 ; at
La Boisselle, Aug. 24 : 84 ; at Malard
Wood, Aug. 8 : 48 ; at Trones Wood,
Aug. 27 : 90
Royal Canadian Dragoons, Aug. 8 : at Beaucourt
Wood, 44
Royal Dragoons, 1st, Oct. 9 : at Honnechy, 198
Royal Dublin Fusiliers
2nd Batt., Oct. 17 : 219, 220, 221 ; Oct. 18:228<fcn.
6th Batt., Oct. 17 : 223, 224
Scratch tank crew of, Nov. 4 : 253 n.
Royal Engineers, work of, during the Hundred
Days, 25 et passim, see also Appendix F,
301 ; bridging of the Selle, Oct. 17 : 219
Royal Field Artillery, Brigades of, see Appendix F,
301 sqq.
Royal Fusiliers
3rd Batt., Oct. 17 : 219, 220
9th Batt., Sept. 18 : 133
nth Batt., Aug. 22: 76; Sept. 22: 141-2;
eleven guns captured by, Oct. 23 : 235 ;
at Preux-aux-Bois, Nov. 4 : 254, 255
Royal Highlanders, 42nd (The Black Watch)
1st Batt., Sept. 29 : 158 ; Oct. 17 : 214 ; at
Wassigny, Oct. 18 : 226 ; at the Sambre
and Oise Canal, Nov. 4 : 248
13th Batt. (Scottish Horse), Oct. 17 : 219, 220,
221
Royal Horse Artillery Brigades, see Appendix F,
301 sqq.
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
5th Batt., Oct. 17 : 223, 224
6th Batt., Oct. 17 : 219, 220, 221; at Dourlere,
Nov. 7 : 259
Royal Irish Regt.
5th Batt. (Pioneers), bridging the Selle, Oct. 17:
219
INDEX
365
Royal Munster Fusiliers
2nd Batt., Oct. 17 : 220, 221 ; at Preux-aux-Bois,
Nov. 4: 254, 255
Royal Scots
5/6th Batt., at Sequehart, Oct. 1-3 : 173, 175,
178 ; at the Sambre and Oise Canal,
Nov. 4 : 250, 251
Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons), attached IX
Corps, Oct. U: 204; Oct. 18: 227;
Nov. 8 : 260
Royal Sussex Regt.
2nd Batt., Oct. 17 : 214 ; counter-attack re-
pulsed by, Sept. 24 : 143 ; crossing
the Sambre and Oise Canal, Nov. 4 :
247, 248
Royal Warwickshire Regt.
l/8th Batt., Oct. 5 : 187,188; Oct. 23: 234; at
Landrecies, Nov. 4 : 252, 253
Royal West Kent Regt. (The Queen's Own)
6th Batt., at Morlancourt, Aug. 9 : 56—7
7th Batt., at the Brickyard, Aug. 8 : 48 ; at
Trones Wood, Aug. 27 : 90 ; at Fr^gi-
court, Sept. 1 : 107 ; at Ronssoy, Sept.
18: 133; at Garde Mill, Oct. 23 : 234;
at Hecq, Nov. 4 : 254-5
Roye, Aug. 8-11, 20, 26, 27 : 8 n., 18, 23, 58, 66,
112 ; captured, 89
Railway centre at, 25
Roye-Chaulnes line, Aug. 5 : objective, 18
Roye-Chaulnes-Bray-sur-Somnie-Demancourt line,
objective for Aug. 9-10 : 51, 57, 58
Roye-Hattencourt^Hallu line, Aug. 9 : 51
Roye road, Aug. 7-8 : 29, 44
Roxby, Lieut.-Col. F. F. M., O.C. 5th Balloon Wing,
R.A.F., 316, 324
Ruby Wood, Sept. 11, 21 : 120; captured, 140
Rue Verte, Nov. 4 : 251
Ruesnes, 226
Rxiisseau Wood, Aug. 8 : 37
Rumour, use of, to confuse, July : 1 9
Rupprecht, Prince of Bavaria, reserves of, Aug. 16 :
68 <fc n.
Ryan, Pte. J., V.C, 171 n., 280, 294-5
S
Sadlier-Jackson, Brig. -Gen. L. W. de V., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., G.O.C. 54th Inf. Brig., 305
Saillisel, Sept. 1 : captured, 107
Sailly Laurette, 14 ; Aug. 8 : 46, 47, 48
Sailly-Saillisel, Sept. 1 : 107
Sailly-Saillisel-Combles valley, Sept. 1 : 107
Sains-du-Nord, Nov. 8 : 260
St. Aubert, Oct. 11: 202
St. Aubin, Nov. 7 : 259
St. Aubyn, Brig.-Gen. E. G., D.S.O., G.O.C. 3rd
Inf. Brig., 319
St. Benin, Oct. 6-17 : 192, 199, 200, 202, 205, 218,
219 ; captured, 201
St. Christ, Aug. 10, 25, Sept. 3-5 : 61, 96 ; surprise
attack on, 113, 115; cleared, 116;
R.A.F. success at, 117 ; Somme crossing
shelled, 86
St. Christ to Cl^ry-sur-Somme reached, Aug. 29 : 96
St. Crepin, Oct. 14, 17 : 205, 219
St. Denis, Aug. 31, Sept. 1, 2 : 99, 104, 105, 106, 109
St. Denis-Aizecourt-le-Haut road, defensive flank
N. of, Sept. 2 : 110
St. Denis-Mont St. Quentin road, Sept. 2 : 109
St. Denis Wood, Aug. 23, Sept. 2 : 109 ; captured,
79-80
St. Hilaire-les-Cambrais, Oct. 11 : 202
St. Hilaire-Bur-Helpe, Nov. 7 : 259
St. Martin Rivere, Oct. 14-17 : 206, 216, 217
St. Maurice Ravine, Oct. 19 : 229
St. Mihiel Salient, Sept. 12 : American success at,
137
St. Pierre Vaast Wood, Aug. 28, Sept. 1, 2 : 91, 107 ;
captured, 110, 111
St. Pol, 13
St. Quentin, Sept. 29, Oct. 2, 9-11: 147 n., 153,
176 n., 197, 203 ; occupied, 177
St. Quentin-Bohain-Busigny-Cambrai railway, Oct.
6, 11, Nov. 8: 191, 203, 260
St. Quentin-Cambrai, strategic objective, Aug. 21 :
71
St. Quentin-Cambrai front, Sept. 27-9 : attack on,
137-8
St. Quentin-Cambrai road, Sept. 29 : 158
St. Quentin Canal, Sept. 7, 11, 29 sqq., Oct. 2, 5, 8 :
117, 121, 177, 188, 190, 194; German
defences along, 148-9 ; preparations
for crossing, 150; storming of, 158-9;
crossed, 188, 190, ,
St. Quentin- Vendhuile front, Sept. : 150
St. Quentin Wood, Aug. 8 : 39
St. Rad^gonde Wood, Aug. 31, Sept. 1 : 101 ;
captured, 104
St. Remy Chaussee, Nov. 4 : 243
St. Roch ChapeUe, Nov. 5 : 257
St. Simon, Sept. 7 : 117
St. Souplet, Oct. 9-17, Nov. 4 : 199, 200, 201, 204,
206, 215, 225, 250 : Selle crossing at,
216, 217, 218, 219, 221
St. Souplet^Arbre Guemon road, crossing place for
tanks over Selle, 221
St. Souplet^Reumont hne, Oct. 9 : 199
St. Souplet^St. Benin line, Oct. 9 : 200
Ste. Emilie, Sept. 7-29, Oct. 3 : 117, 131, 163, 184 ;
occupied, 120
Ste. H616ne, sunken road N. from, 130 ; Sept. 11,
18, 24 : 120, 127, 128 ; cleared, 142, 143
Salient occupied by Germans, Aug. 21 : 71
Salonika, Divisions from, 140 nn.
Sambom, Colonel J. B., O.C. 13lBt Amer. Regt.,
56
Sambre and Oise Canal, Oct. 11-Nov. 4 : objective,
203 sqq., 206, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231,
233 ; crossings shelled, 204 ; the crossing,
239 sqq. ; preliminaries and plan,
bridge-work, etc., 240 sqq., 246-7 ;
the passage forced, 247 sqq. ; results of
the operation, 255-6 ; subsequent pur-
suit, 256 sqq.
Defence of, German Anny Order on (Oct. 29),
238 n.
Locks on, 242
Terrain of attack on, Nov. 4 : 241-3
Sambre river, Battle and Victory of, 10, 239 «gg.
Line of, Nov. 4 : 256 cfc n.
Terrain S. of, 244
Marshes, Nov. 5 : 257
Tributaries of, 242
Sambre vaUey, 216, 241, 242
Sankey, Lieut.-Col. C. E. P., D.S.O., C.E. 1st Dirl.
Engineers, 319
Saplgnles, Aug. 25 : captured, 86
Sart Farm, Sept. 18, 20, 29 : 124, 136, 167
Seissegnies, Nov. 4 : 245
Saulcourt, Sept. 7: captured, 117
Saule Bryante, Nov. 4 : 253
Sausage Valley, Aug. 24 : 84
Sautain, Nov. 11 : 261 n.
Savage, Lieut.-Col. A. J., C.E. 58th (London) Divl.
Engineers (T.), 307
Save Trench. Sept. 1 : 105
Save Trench-Galatz Alley-Agram Alley line, Aug.
31 : 99
Savy, Sept. 13 : 122
366
INDEX
Savy Wood, Sept. 17 : captured, 123
Scarpa river, Aug. 21-2 sqq. : extension of front of
attack to, 9, 71-2 tfc n., 73
Scheldt river (I'Escaut), 226 ; line of, turned, 240
Scheldt valley, 242
" Science, The, of War," by Henderson, referred to,
1, 10 n. ; foresight shown in, 270
Scots, Royal, see Royal Soots
Scottish Horse, see Royal Highlanders, 13th Batt.
(Scottish Horse)
Seagram, Lieut. -Col. T. O., A/O.C. 18th (Eastern)
Divl. Artillery, 305
Seboncourt Oct. 11 : 202
Secrecy (see also Surprise), difficulty of, in combmed
attacks, 11 n., 29 ». ; basis of the plan
of attack, Aug. 8 : how secured, 13, 18
sqq., and how maintained, 20 n., 26,
27 (Ss n. : maintained in concentration
for attacks of Sept. 18 and 29 : 123,
150 sqq. ; importance of, in attack of
Nov. 4 : 245
Sedan, Oct. 14 : 207
Selency, Sept. 18-29 : 121, 123, 125, 126, 127, 138,
139, 142, 151, 153 ; secured, 144
Self-confidence based on knowledge, value of, in
war, 270
Seligman, Brig.-G«n. H. S., D.S.O., G.O.C. R.A.,
Cav. Corps, 302, 317
Selle river, crossing of, operations directed on, Oct.
8 sqq. : 192, 199, 200 sqq., 216, 217, 218,
219, 223 n., 224-5 ; enemy driven across,
201-2, 229 ; fighting along, 201-2 ;
German intention to make a stand be-
hind, 202
Battle of, Oct. 17-18 : 10, 207, 209 sqq. ; conclusion
and results, 229
Tanks crossing, 218, 221
German defence at, and defences of, 208, 211, 212,
214, 215, 223, 229
Orders on, of Oct. 12 : 225 n.
Terrain E. of, 231
SeUe valley, Oct. 17 : 216, 219, 223
Semeries, Nov. 8 : 260
Semousies, Nov. 8 : 260
Sensde river, Aug. 26, Sept. 27 : extension of battle
to, 137, 145
Sequehart, Sept. 30, Oct. 1, 3, 8 : struggle for, 169,
171, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 195
Serain, Sept. 29, Oct. 8 : 156, 193 ; captured,
195
Serain Farms, Oct. 8 : 195
Serbia, German Alpine Corps sent to, Oct.: 207
Serre river crossed, 237
Services, Army, Printing and Stationery, work of,
prior to Aug. 8 : 25-6
Seven Years' War, 10 n.
SeweU, Brig.-Gen. H. S., D.S.O., G.O.C. 1st Cav.
Brig., 302
Serton, Sgt. G., V.C, 129 n., 280, 295
Shakespear, Lieut.-Col. A. T., D.S.O., M.C., C.E.
12th Divl. Engineers, 305
Shamrock Hill, Aug. 22 : 73, 74, 76
Sherer, Brig.-Gen. J. D., D.S.O., G.O.C. XIII
Corps Heavy Artillery, 321, 326
Sherwood Foresters (Notts and Derby Regt.)
l/5th Batt., Oct. 17 : 211 ; at Montbrehain, Oct.
3: 179 n.
l/6th Batt., Oct. 17: 211
l/8th Batt., Oct. 17 : 211
11th Batt., Oct. 5, 8 : 187, 188 ; Nov. 4- 253
Shropshire Light Infantry
1st Batt., Oct. 17 : 213
Siegfried Line, or Main Hindenburg Line (?.«.),
120 <fc n.
Signal Compemies, see Appendix F, 301 sqq.
Silence, as essential to success, pamphlet to impress
on troops, 20 ti.
of Assembly of Canadian forces, Aug. 8 : 34
Silesian wars, 10 n.
Simonds, Col. G. S., Chief of StaS, II Amer. Div.,
324
Simultaneous attacks, pros and cons of, 265
Sinclair-Maclagan, Maj.-Gen. E. G., C.B., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. 4th Aus. Div., 41, 314
Sivry, Nov. 8, 10 : 260, 261
Smoke of barrage, Sept. 18 : effects on Aus. Corps*
advance, 128
Smoke bombs for masking anti-tank guns, used
by R.A.F., Sept. 18 sqq. : 125
Smoke screen, use of, Aug. 8, 22-3, Sept. 1, Nov. 4 :
24, 75, 79, 107, 243-4
Smoke shell used by IBritish, Aug. 8 : 40 ; Oct. 16 :
222
Soissons, general allied advance from, to the Scarpe,
Aug. 22 sqq. : 73
Soissons-Neuville-Vitasse front, attack on ordered
for Aug. 23 : 72 n.
Soldiers, see Australian, British, Canadian, and
South African Soldiers, see also American
Soldiers
Solesmes, Oct. 8 : 192
Solre-le-Chateau, Nov. 8 : 260
Solrinnes, Nov. 8 : 260
Somme area, conditions in, 243
Battle of, 1916: 20
Deterioration since, of German infantry, 69
" Going " during, 269
Machine gun fire during, 334
Results, 147
Somme battlefields, the old, area covered by advance
from Aug. 22 to Sept. 4 : 112, 132
Germans forced bsick to, by Aug. 11 : 68
Long range fire on, during German withdrawal of
guns, etc., Aug. 25 : 86
State of, in Aug.: 62, 83, 86
Somme campaigns of 1916-17, main centres of
German resistance during, 73 n.
Strategical value in, to the Germans, of P^ronne,
Bapaume, and Ham, 73 n.
Somme river
Banks, reached, S. of P6ronne, Aug. 29 : 93 sqq. ;
scene on, during halt, Aug. 31 : 101
Bends of, high ground near, tactical importance of,
14
as Boundary, defects of, Aug. 9 : 57
Bridges, Aug. 29 : 93, 94
Fourth Army front on, July-Aug. : 5 ; operations
along, Aug. 8 sqq. : 5, 8 n., 14, 22, 32,
40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 57, 60, 65. 66, 67, 71 sqq.,
83 sqq., 86, 87 sqq., 93, 94-5 cfc «., 96 sqq.,
104
Crossings, Aug. 10, 23-5, 30, Sept. 1-3 : forced
by, 61, 79, S3, 86. 97, 98, 99, 108, 113,
115, 116
German coimter-attacks N. of (Sept.), 112
Evacuation N. of (begun Aug. 24), 84, 86
43rd Reserve division a-stride of, early Aug. : 17
Intention to make stand W. of, Aug. 1 1 : 63
Retirement S. of, rapidity of, Aug. 24 sqq. :
112
Thin screen on, Sept. 4 : 113
Line of, on which Germans intended to stand,
96 <fc n. ; turned, 8, 113
Terrain near, 14-15, 16
Somme-Scarpe area, British front of attack extended
N. to, Aug. 21 : 71-2
Somme valley, 3, 6, 28, 89 ; nature of, 14, 49
Soult valley, Oct. 1 : 175
Sound-ranging sections, work of, prior to Aug. 8
and on Aug. 26 : 31 <fc n., 88 n.
INDEX
367
South African Field Ambulance, Nov. 9 : 260 n.
Forces, see under Brigades, etc.
Soldier, qualities of, shown at Le Cateau, 1918,
and DelviUe Wood, 1916: 223-4
South Guillemont Trench, Sept. 29 : 166, 167
South Lancashire Regt.
11th Batt. (Pioneers), at the Sambre and Oise
Canal, Nov. 4 : 252
South Staffordshire Regt.
l/5th Batt., Sept. 29 : 159
l/6th Batt., Sept. 29 : 158
South Wales Borderers
1st Batt., Oct. 18 : 226 ; at Catillon, Nov. 4 :
249
Soyecourt, Aug. 28, Sept. 7 : 117 ; occupied, 91
Spall, Sgt. R., V.C, 64. 280, 296
Spender-aay, Lieut.-Col. H. H., C.M.G., M.C.,
A.A. & Q.M.G. 1st Div., 319
Square Wood, Aug. 23 : captured, 81
Staffordshire Regt.
North, see North Staffordshire Regt.
South, see South Staffordshire Regt.
Starting line, defined, 22 <fc n.
Statton, Sgt. P. C, V.C, M.M., 65, 280, 296
Stewart, Brig.-Gen. I., D.S.O., B.G.G.S. XIII
Corps, 321, 326
Stewart, Brig.-Gen. J. C, D.S.O., G.O.C. 14th
Aus. Inf. Brig., 315 ; detailed for cap-
ture of Peronne, Aug. 29-Sept. 1 : 98,
103
Stewart, Brig.-Gen. J. S., D.S.O., G.O.C. 3rd Cdn.
Divl. Artillery, 310
StirUng, Brig.-Gen. W., D.S.O., G.O.C. 50th Divl.
Artillery. 307
" Stonewall Jackson," by Henderson, referred to,
10 n.
Stourton, Lieut.-Col. Hon. E. P. J., D.S.O., A.A.
& Q.M.G. 25th Div., 321
Strat Kompignie
56th, Sept. 8 : 118
Strategical Surprise, see under Surprise
Strategy, German, 3, errors in, 5
of Napoleon at Waterloo, 3
Strathoona's Horse, see Lord Strathcona's Horse
Strickland, Maj.-Gen. E. P., G.O.C. 1st Div.,
119, 213, 215, 243-4, 319
Subordinate Commanders, N.C.O.'s and Privates,
Initiative of, instances of, 38, 39, 53, 54,
50-7, 64 <fc 71., 80, 82 n., 89 ?i., 93, 103
<fc «., 104 ofc «., 106 «., 109, 110 n.. Ill
dk n., 128 n., 129 n., 131, 133 n., 143 n.,
160 <t- n., 161, 164 db n., 169, 171 n., 173,
176 ?i., 178, 179 nn., 180 n., 183, 186 n.
187, 188, 211, 215, 224, 228, 234 n., 236,
241 n., 248, 251, 252, 253. 255, 270-1.
272
Success in war, on what dependent, 1-2, 131, 255,
209-71
Sugar Factory, Nauroy, Sept. 29 : 165
Peronne, Sept. 1, 2 : 104, 106, 109
Sugden. Brig.-Gen. R. E., D.S.O., G.O.C. 151st Inf.
Brig., 322
Suippe river, Sept. 26-7 : 145
Supplies, difficulties of bringing up, Oct. 11 sqq. :
203
Supply, question of, in relation to pursuit of
Germans, Nov. 8-9 : 200
Support Copse, Aug. 26 : 87
Surprise, value of, hi
Attack, see Surprise Attacks
Counter-attack, 268
Value of tanks as rendering possible, 264
Strategical, importance of, 263-4
Instance of, Aug. 8: 21, 150, 263-i
When impossible, 150
Surprise — cont.
Tactical, importance of. 263-4
Instances of
Aug. 8 : 263-4
Failure of. results of. 264
Sept. 29 : 150-1. 264
Advantages of. ib.
When possible, 150
Surprise Attacks
July 4 : 6-7
Aug. 8 : 7, 21, 42. 49, 124. 150, 263-4
Aug. 31 : 100
Sept. 5: 115-16
Sept. 18: 124, 129, 132
Oct. 17 : 222
Nov. 4 : 245-6
Surrey Regt., East, see East Surrey Regt.
Sussex Regt., Royal, see Royal Sussex Regt.
Suzanne, 14 j Aug. 22, 26 : 74 ; captured, 87
Swiss Cottage. Oct. 1-3 : 173, 176, 177
Switzerland, 147
Sword Wood, Aug. 30 : 99
Sycamore Wood, Sept. 29 : secured, 158
Symons, Lieut.-Col. C. B. O., D.S.O., C.E. 18th
(Eastern) Divl. Engineers, 305
Tactical point, capture of, in preliminary or general
attack, 241 n.
Surprise, see under Surprise
Tallies Wood, terrain near, 14, and German defences,
15 ; Aug.8 : 46, 56, 57. 60. 61
Taisni6res-en-Thierache, Nov. 5, 6 : 257, 258
Tait, Lieut. J. E., V.C. M.C. 39, 280, 296
Talana Hill, Sept. 30 : captured, 170
Talbot-Hobbs, Maj.-Gen. Sir J. J. T., K.C.B., V.D.,
G.O.C. 5th Aus. Div., 41. 98, 167, 315
Tandy, Lieut.-Col. E. N., C.M.G.. D.S.O., G.S.O. I,
1st Inf. Div.. 319
Tank Battalions
American
301st (Mark V). allotment and work of
Sept. 29 : 155 <fc n.
Oct. 6-23 : 193. 195, 197, 204, 207, 217, 230
British
let (Mark V Star), allotment and work of
Aug. 8 : 38, 39
Sept. 29 : 155 <fc n.
Oct. 8-17 : 193, 196, 197, 203-4, 207, 218, 221
2nd (Mark V). allotment and work of
Aug. 8 sqq. : 40, 41, 55, 79
Sept. IS, 21 : 12.5, 140-1
3rd (Whippets), allotment and work of
Sept. 29 : 155
Oct. 3, 8 : 180, 193
Withdrawn to re6t, 203
4th (Mark V), allotment and work of
Aug. 8 : 35
Sept. 27 sqq. : 144, 155 <fc n.
Oct. 5 sqq. : 187, 193, 197
Withdrawn to refit, 203
5th (Mark V). allotment and work of
Aug. 8 : 34
Oct. 9 sqq. : 197, 203-4
6th (Whippets), allotment and work of
Aug. 8 : adventures of one. Appendix K,
336
Oct. 8 sqq. : 193, 195, 196, 204. 207 214
8th (Mark V). allotment and work of
Aug. 8 sqq. : 41, 54. 79
Sept. 17 sqq.: 155, 174
Oct. 1-3 : 174, 180
368
INDEX
Tank Battalions — cont.
British — cont.
9th (Mark V), allotment and work of
Sept. 27-9 : 155
Oct. 1 : 173
Nov. 4 : 247, 253 <fc n.
10th (Mark V), allotment and work of
Aug. 8-9 : 46, 47, 56
Oct. 17-23 : 204, 230, 233, 235
Nov. 2-4 : 241, 247, 249
13th (Mark V), allotment and work of
Aug. 8, 23 : 40, 41, 79
Sept. 23-8 : 142, 155
Oct. 3 : 180
14th (Mark V), allotment and work of
Aug. 8 : 36
Nov. 4 : 247, 254
15th (Mark V Star), allotment and work of,
Aug. 8 : 41
16th (Mark V), allotment and work of
Sept. 22-9 : 155
Oct. 3-5 : 180, 186
Oct. 17 : 204, 207, 210, 212, 214
Brigades
with Cdn. Corps, 19
2nd (Mark V or Mark V Star), Tank Battalions
directed by, Oct. 23 : 230 ; allotment of,
Nov. 4 : 247
3rd, Aug. 8: 13 ; allotment for Sept. 27 : 155;
withdrawn, Oct. U : 203
4th, Aug. 8 : 13 ; allotment for Sept. 27 : 155
5th, allotment of, Aug. 8 : 12, 13 ; Sept. 22-8 :
155
Companies
of 2nd Batt., allotment of, for Sept. 18 : 125
of 10th Batt., allotment of, for Aug. 8 : 47
of Whippets, allotment of, Oct. 8 : 197
Corps, 18
Battalions employed in attack of Aug. 8 :
nature of, and allotment of, 23 dh n., 33 ;
assembly of, 28 <fc n.
R.A.F. working with, Aug. 8 : 24 ; Sept. 18 : 125
Success of, at Cambrai, Nov. 1917 : subsequent
expansion of, 21
View of, on principles for using tank units, 155
Tanks
Advance of, before " zero," Aug. 8 : 31
Alhed superiority in, Sept. 29 : 150
Attack with, hour of, problem of, 29 n., 268
Ideae on attack formation, etc., modified by,
263, 265
British use of, at Cambrai, 1917 : 21 ; at Hamel,
July 4, 1918 : 6, 7, 12, 21 ; during the
Hundred Days, 13, passim, and see
Battalions, etc.
Oasses of
Mark V, heavy, 13, 23 n.
Mark V Star, heavy, 13, 23 n.
Whippet (?.«.), 13, 23
Dummy, Sept. 18, Oct. 17 : 125 dk n., 210
German attempts to belittle effect of, 69 n.
German use of, at ViUers Bretonneux, 2-3
Improved, 1917-18 : surprise rendered possible by,
264
Mark V and Mark V Star {see also Classes above),
numbers available, Aug. 8 : 23 d: n.
Noise of, aeroplanes covering, 24, 28, 125, 156, 157
Not used by II Amer. Corps Oct. 18 : con-
sequences, 227
Nvunber available (Aug. 8), fighting, and
whippet tanks, 23
Supply, various uses of, 23 n., 28 n., 33, 34 n.,
40 n., 79
Surprise effected by, Aug. 8 : Ludendorfi oikd on,
8n.
Tanks — cont.
Terrain favourable for, 6, 11, 21
Unsuited to, 14, 57, 58, 207
Training with, of Infantry, 7, 21 n., 247, 254
Value of, proved at Hamel, 7
Whippet
Adventures of one, on Aug. 8 : Appendix K, 336
Allotment of, on various dates, 13, 23, 24, 29,
41, 44, 74, 75, 155, 156, 165, 193, 195,
196, 197, 204, 207
Numbers available, Aug. 8 : 23
Work and casualties of
Aug.: 4, 36, 37-9, 41, 42, 43, 44, 49, 52, 57,
63, 64
Sept.: 124-5 & n., 126, 128, 131, 133, 150, 154,
155 cfc n.. 156, 157, 159-60, 163, 164.
165, 166, 167
Oct.: 173, 174, 178, 179 n., 180, 181, 186, 187,
193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 203-4, 207, 210,
211, 217, 218, 221, 230, 233, 237
Nov.: 241, 247, 249, 251, 253-5, 258
Tanner, Brig.-Gen. W. E. C, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. South African Inf. Brig., 322
Tape-laying for starting line, 29 cfc n.
Tara Hill, Aug. 23, 24 : 82, 84 ; captured, 83
Tara Hill-Usna Hill ridge, Aug. 23 : captured, 82, 83
Tatam, Col. W. J., C.M.G., D.D.V.S., Fourth Army,
301
Temperley, Lieut.-Col. A. C, D.S.O., G.S.O. 1,
74th (Yeo.) Div., 307
Templeux - la - Fosse-Nurlu defences penetrated,
Sept. 6: 116
Templeux-le-Gu6rard, Sept. 18 : 124, 154 ; cap-
tured, 132
Tertry area, 139 <fc n.
Tetard Wood, Sept. 18 : secured, 136
Thacker, Brig.-Gen. H. C, C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
3rd Cdn. Divl. Artillery, 309
Thackeray, Brig.-Gen. F. C, D.S.O., M.C., G.O.C.
229th Inf. Brig., 307
Thennes, bridge at, 34
Thiepval, the Ulster Div. at (1916), 162 n.
Thomas, Brig.-Gen. H. M., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
12th (Eastern) Divl. Artillery, 305
Thorigny, Sept. 18-30: 124, 152, 153, 168; cap-
tured, 170
Thorigny - St. H616ne - Buisson - Gaulaine Farm-
Ruby Wood-Quennemont Farm-GiUe-
mont Farm-The KnoU, German third
Une of defence (Sept.), 120
Thunder, Lieut.-Col. S. H. J., D.S.O., M.C., A.A-
& Q.M.G. 47th (London) Div. (T.), 306
Thure stream, Nov. 8, 1 1 : 260, 261
Tilleuls Farm, Oct. 23 : 232, 234
Tilleuls Farm- Vert Baudet road, Oct. 23 : 232, 233
Tincourt, Sept. 22-3 : 139
Tivey, Brig.-Gen. E., C.B., D.S.O., V.D., G.O.C.
8th Aus. Inf. Brig., 315
Tombois Farm, Sept. 18 sgq. : 124, 137, 140, 141,
142, 152, 167
Torrens Canal, Oct. 3, 6 : 181, 184, 194
Tortille river, Sept. 1-2 : 106 <fc n., 110
Tortille Trench. Sept. 1 : 106
Tortille valley, Sept. 1-2 : 110
Touffu Wood, Aug. 28 : 8-inch howitzer captured
in, and train secured near, 92 n.
Toumai salient, Nov. 2 : 240
Towner, Lieut. E. T., V.C, M.C., 106 «., 280, 296-7
Track, special, made for cavalry, Aug. 7 : 29
Trains, special, for concentration of troops, before
Aug. 8 : 13
Trench-digging, German dislike for, Ludendorfi on,
16 cfc n.
Trench Mortar Batteries, see alto Appendix F, 301
sgq.
INDEX
369
Trench Mortar Batteries — cont.
142nd, Sept. 1 : 107 n.
Trench mortars, with Canadian Independent Force,
Aug. 8 : 33
Trench warfare, reversion to, Aug. 10 : 59
Triangular Wood, Aug. 28 : cleared, 92
Trigger Wood, Aug. 25 : 85
Troisvilles, Oct. 9 : captured, 199, 200
Trones Wood, flank attack on, Aug. 26-7 : 90-1,
172 n., 264
Troops, tendency of, to be drawn in direction
whence fire comes, 181 n., 183
Trout Copse, Sept. 17 : secured, 123
Tugny, Sept. 7 : 117
Tunnel defences of Hindenburg Line, Sept. 29 : 154,
159, 162, 163 dh n., 164, 169, 172
Tunnelling Companies, see also Appendix F, 301 sqq.
182nd, at the Lock gates, Landrecies, Nov. 4 :
253
Tupigny, Oct. 19 : 229
Turkey, armistice signed by, Oct. 31 : 239 <fc n.
Tuxford, Brig.-Gen. G. S., C.B., C.M.G., G.O.C.
3rd Cdn. Inf. Brig., 309
Tyler, Brig.-Gen. J. A., C.M.G., G.O.C. 32nd Divl.
Artillery, 312
Tyler, Brig.-Gen. J. A., C.M.G., G.O.C. 54th Inf.
Brig., 305
U
U-boat unrestricted campaign, failure of, demon-
strated, 70
Ulster Div. at Thiepval, July 1, 1916 : 162 n.
Usna Hill, Aug. 23 : 82, 83
Vache Wood, Aug. 27 : 89
Vadencourt, Sept. 18, Nov. 4 : 124, 241
Vaire Wood, attack on, July 4 : 6
Valenciennes, 156, 193, 201, 237, 240, 241
Vann, Capt. (A/Lieut. -Col.) B. W., V.C, M.C., 160
tfcn., 281, 297
Vauban Valley, Oct. 1 : 175
Vauvillers, Aug. 8-9 : 45 ; captured, 54
Vaux, 89, 117
Vaux Andigny, Oct. 8-22 : 192, 200, 201, 204, 205,
206, 210, 212, 214, 215; captured, 202
Vauxhall Quarry, Oct. 5 : 188
Vaux-le-Pr6tre, Chateau of, Oct. 8 : 193
Vaux Spur, Aug. 27 : captured, value of as observa-
tion point, 89
Vaux Wood, Aug. 27, Sept. 3 : 111 ; captured, 89
Vaux Wood-Maricourt ridge, Aug. 26 : 87
V.C. Stories, Appendix E, 280-300
Vendegies Wood, Oct. 23 : 235
Vendelles, Sept. 7, 18 ; 118, 128
Vendhuile, Sept. 29-30, Oct. 2, 5 : 145 cfc n., 151,
152, 167, 168, 109, 177, 188; captured,
172
Bridge, 153
Verdun, American forces near, 67
Vermand, Sept. 8-29 : 119, 120, 157, 158 ; entered,
118; railhead, 260
Vermandovillers, Aug. 27 : captured, 89
Vermandovillers-Foucaucourt-Fontaine-les-Cappy-
Vache Wood lino, Aug. 27 : 89
Vert Baudet, Oct. 23 : 232, 233
Vesle river, 17 n.
Victory Despatch of Sir D. Haig cited on the
German retreat in Nov., 10
Shattering of the last German defences, 190
Vi6ville, Nov. 4 : captured, 249. 250
Viesly, Oct. 10 : 200
Vignette Wood, Aug. 8 : 34 n.
Villages, defended, in front of Hindenburg Line,
Sept. 29 : 150
VillechoUes, Sept. 7, 18: 118; occupied, 122
Villeret, Sept. 18: 124; captured, 129
Villers-aux-Erables, Aug. 8 : captured, 50, 51
Villers Bretonneux, March, April, Aug. : 2, 13, 17,
63 ; tactical importance of, loss of, and
recapture by counter-attack, 3—4, 268
Villers Bretonneux road, Aug. 8 : 28-9, 44
Villers Bretonneux-Chaulnes railway, Aug. 8 : 21,
22, 44
Villers Carbonnel, Aug. 25, 29 : 86 ; captured, 93
Villers Cotteret Forest, July 18 : Mangin's attack
from, 5
ViUers Farm, Oct. 8 : 196
Villers Faucon, Sept. 7 : 118 : captured, 117
Villers Guislain, Sept. 21 : 140
Villers Outreaux, Oct. 8 : 193, 194 ; captured, 196
Vill6v^cque, Sept. 7 : occupied, 117
Vincent, Brig.-Gen. B., C.M.G., G.O.C. 35th Inf.
Brig., 304
Viney, Lieut.-Col. H. G., C.M.G., D.S.O., A. A.
& Q.M.G. 1st Aus. Div., 313
Visibility, in relation to selection of " zero," 29,
268-9
Vivier Mill, Aug. 22 : 76
Vivier Mill-Albert road, Aug. 22 : 76
Voyennes, Aug. 22 : 84
Vraignea, Oct. 3 : 180
Vr61y, Aug. 8-9 : 45, 52 ; captured, 53, 54
W
Waldersee, General Count von. Commander Ist
German Reserve Div., captured Orders
of (Sept. 16), ciud, 333
Wales Borderers, South, see South Wales Borderers
Walker, Brig.-Gen. H. A., C.M.G., D.S.O.. G.O.C.
16th Inf. Brig., 319
War, fundamental principles of, and their appli-
cation, 269-70
Maxims of, 10 n.
Success in, on what dependent, 269-70
War, the late, nature of, in essential, 271
Warfusee-Abancourt, Aug. 8 : captured, 40, 43
Wark, Maj. B. A., V.C, D.S.O., 164 dk n., 281, 298
Warvillers, Aug. 8-9 : 45, 53 ; captured, 54
Warwickshire Regt., Royal, see Royal Warwickshire
Regt.
Wassigny, Oct. 11-19, Nov. 5-6: 203, 206, 209,
213, 226, 228, 256 ; finally cleared, 229
Wassigny Cemetery-Ribeau\-iIle road, Oct. 18 : 226
Wassigny-Le Cateau line, Oct. 1 1 : 203
Wassigny-Oisy road, Oct. 17 : 213
Wassigny-St. Souplet railway, Oct. 17 : 215
Waterloo, Battle of, 270
Waterloo Campaign, a comparison with, 3
Waters, Temp. Capt. (A/Major) A. H. S., V.C,
D.S.O., M.C, 251, 281, 298-9
Wateon, Maj. -Gen. Sir D., K.C.B., CM.G., G.O.C.
4th Cdn. Div., 37, 38, 311
Weathers, L/Ci^l. L. C, V.C, 106 n., 281, 299
Webber. Brig.-Gen. N. W.. C.M.G., D.S.O., B.G.G.S.
Cdn. Corps, 308
Weldon, Lieut.-Col. H. C, D.S.O., O.C 54th Brig.,
327
Wellesley, Brig.-Gen. R. A. C, C.B., C.M.O., G.O.C.
R.A., XIII Corps, 321
Wellingborough School, 160 n.
Wellington, the Duke of, Henderson on, 270
Views of, on surprise attacks, Henderson on, 10 n.
370
INDEX
Welsh Regt.
l/6th Batt. (Pioneers), Nov. 4 : 249
2nd Batt., Oct. 18, Nov. 4 : 226, 247-8, 250
Weet, Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) F. M. F., V.C, M.C.,
50 n., 281, 299
Western Front, April-July : events on parts other
than that held by Fourth Army, 4 sqq.
Weet Yorkshire Regt.
1st Batt., Oct. 8-17 : 198, 212, 213
Wheatley, Brig.-Gten. L. L., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
Ist Inf. Brig., 319
Wheatley, Brig.-Gen. P., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
17th Divl. ArtiUery (T.), 316
White Springs, Oct. 23 : captured, 235
Whitley, Brig.-G«n. E. N., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.
47th Divl. ArtiUery, 306
Wianoourt, Sept. 29, Oct. 3, 5 : 153, 177, 179,
181, 186
Wiancourt-La Motte Farm line, Oct. 3 : 181
Wiencourt I'Equip^e, Aug. 8 : 32, 39 ; captured, 39
Wilhelm, German Crown Prince, Order issued by,
to XVIII German Army on the defence
of the Sambre and Oise Canal, circa
Oct. 29 : 238 n.
WiUiams, Brig.-Gon. G. C, D.S.O., G.O.C. 199th
Inf. Brig., 322
Wilson, Lieut.-Col. A. E. J., D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G.
17th (Northern) Div., 316
Wiltshire Regt.
7th Batt., Oct. 17 : 220
Wire, belts of, in German defences, 15-16, 21, 150,
153, 154, 173 n., 202, 203, 223, 234, 242
et alibi ; bombardment of, Oct. 15 sqq. :
207
Deciding factor as to preUminary bombardment,
1915-17: 264
Wisdom, Brig.-Gen. E. A., G.O.C. 7th Aus. Inf.
Brig., 313 ; haison force under, Aug. 12 :
65 n.
Withdrawal, German, see German withdrawal
Withdrawing, 3
Wolf, Brig -Gen. P. A., G.O.C. 66th Amer. Inf.
Brig., 308
Wood, Brig.-Gen. E. A., D.S.O., G.O.C. 55th Inf.
Brig., 305
Woods, Pte. J. P., V.C, 128 n., 281, 299-300
Worcestershire Regt.
l/8th Batt., Oct. 4, 24, Nov. 4 : 188, 236, 252 j
Sambre and Oise Canal crossed by, 253
X, Y, and Z Copses, Sept. 18-20 : 134 cfc n., 136
Yak Post, Sept. 18-19 : 134 ; secured, 136
YardJey, Col. J. W., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.D. Remounts,
Fourth Army, 301
Yellow Cross Gas, see Gas, Yellow Cross
York and Lancaster Regt.
2nd Batt., Oct. 17 : 213
9th Batt., Nov. 4 : 253
Yorkshire Light Infantry, see King's Own Yorkshire
Light Infantry
Yorkshire Regt.
9th Batt., Oct. 5 : 188
Yorkshire Regt., West, see West Yorkshire Regt.
Ypres, 19
Battle of, July 1917 : 20
Ypres Salient, intended German attack in, July, 68
" Z " day, definition of, 19 n.
Zebra Post, Sept. 18-19 : 134 ; secured, 136
Zengel, Sgt. R. L., V.C, M.M., 54 n., 281, 300
" Zero," definition of, 19 <fc n.
Best hour for, 29 n., 268, 269
Positions at, Aug. 8 : 28, 29, 31
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